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


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
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HISTORY

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

BY H. A. TROTT

EDITED BY J. H. M. J. VAN DER LINDEN

TRANSLATED

WITH NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS

BY J. H. M. J. VAN DER LINDEN

MOST AUTHENTIC SOURCE,

FREDERICK SCHUBERT

COMPILED IN FOUR VOLUMES

WITH ENGRAVINGS.

VOL. I.

NEW-Y

O. APPLETON

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THE

UNIV. OF
CALIFORNIA

HISTORY

OF

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

BY M. A. THIERS,

LATE PRIME MINISTER OF FRANCE.

TRANSLATED,

WITH NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS

FROM THE

MOST AUTHENTIC SOURCES,

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HISTORY

OF THE

FRENCH REVOLUTION.

THE DIRECTORY.

INTERNAL STATE OF FRANCE—FALL OF THE MANDATS—ATTACK ON THE CAMP OF GRENELLE BY THE JACOBINS—RENEWAL OF THE FAMILY COMPACT WITH SPAIN, AND PROJECT OF A QUADRUPLÉ ALLIANCE—NEGOTIATIONS IN ITALY—CONTINUATION OF HOSTILITIES; ARRIVAL OF WURMSER ON THE ADIGE; BATTLES OF LONATO AND CASTIGLIONE—OPERATIONS ON THE DANUBE; BATTLE OF NERESHEIM; MARCH OF THE ARCHDUKE CHARLES AGAINST JOURDAN—MARCH OF BONAPARTE FOR THE BRENTA; BATTLES OF ROVEREDO, BASSANO, AND ST. GEORGE; RETREAT OF WURMSER TO MANTUA—RETURN OF JOURDAN TO THE MAYN; BATTLE OF WURZBURG; RETREAT OF MOREAU.

FRANCE had never appeared greater abroad than during this summer of 1796; but her internal situation was far from corresponding with her external glory. Paris exhibited a singular spectacle; the patriots, furious ever since the apprehension of Babœuf, Drouet, and their other chiefs, execrated the government, and wished the republic no more victories, since they proved beneficial to the Directory. The declared enemies of the Revolution stoutly denied them; the men who were tired of it affected not to believe them. Some recently-enriched upstarts, who owed their wealth to jobbing or contracts, displayed unbounded luxury,* and manifested the most ungrateful indifference for that revolution which had made their fortune. This moral state was the inevitable result of a general weariness in the nation, of inveterate passions in the parties, and of cupidity excited by a financial crisis. But there were still republican and enthusiastic Frenchmen, who retained their old sentiments, whose hearts rejoiced at

* "In the midst of the wreck of ancient opulence, modern wealth began to display its luxury; and the riches of the bankers and those who had made fortunes in the Revolution, began to shine with unprecedented lustre. Splendid hotels sumptuously furnished in the Grecian taste were embellished by magnificent fêtes."—*Lacretelle*. E.

our victories, who, so far from denying them, on the contrary hailed the tidings of them with transport, and pronounced with affection and admiration the names of Hoche, Jourdan, Moreau, and Bonaparte. These were desirous that fresh efforts should be made, that the evil-disposed and the indifferent should be obliged to contribute, with all their means, to the glory and the greatness of the republic.

To dim the lustre of our triumphs, the parties fell to work to decry the generals. They were particularly bitter against the youngest and the most brilliant of them, against Bonaparte, whose name had in two months become so glorious. He had, on the 13th of Vendémiaire, struck great terror into the royalists, and they did not spare him in the newspapers. It was known that he had manifested a very imperious disposition in Italy; people were struck by the manner in which he treated the states of that country, granting or refusing at pleasure armistices which decided peace or war; they knew that, without making the treasury the vehicle, he had transmitted funds to the army of the Rhine. They, therefore, took delight in maliciously reporting that he was intractable, and that he was about to be removed. A great general would thus have been lost to the republic, and a vexatious glory cut short in its outset. Accordingly, the malcontents assiduously circulated the most absurd reports. They went so far as to say that Hoche, who was then in Paris, was going off to arrest Bonaparte in the midst of his army. The government wrote a letter to Bonaparte contradicting these rumours, and repeating the assurance of its entire confidence. It caused this letter to be published in all the papers. The brave Hoche, incapable of any mean jealousy of a rival who had raised himself in two months above the greatest generals of the republic, wrote to disavow that part that was ascribed to him. It may not be amiss to quote this letter, so honourable to the two young heroes. It was addressed to the minister of the police and published:

“Citizen Minister—Men who, concealed or unknown during the first years of the foundation of the republic, now think only of seeking the means of destroying it, and speak of it merely to slander its firmest supporters, have, for some days past, been spreading reports most injurious to the armies, and to one of the general officers who commanded them. Can they then no longer attain their object by corresponding openly with the horde of conspirators, resident at Hamburg? Must they, in order to gain the patronage of the masters whom they are desirous of giving to France, vilify the leaders of the armies? Do they imagine that these, as weak as in times past, will suffer themselves to be calumniated without daring to reply, and to be accused without defending themselves? Why is Bonaparte then the object of the wrath of these gentry? is it because he beat their friends and themselves in Vendémiaire? is it because he is dissolving the armies of kings, and furnishing the republic with the means of bringing this honourable war to a glorious conclusion? Ah! brave young man, where is the republican soldier whose heart does not burn with the desire to imitate thee! Courage, Bonaparte! lead our victorious armies to Naples, to Vienna; reply to thy personal enemies by humbling kings, by shedding fresh lustre over our armies, and leave to us the task of upholding thy glory.

“I have smiled with pity on hearing a man, in other respects of very shrewd understanding, express an alarm which he does not feel, respecting the powers conferred on the French generals. You are acquainted with almost all of them, citizen minister. Which of them is it, supposing him even to possess sufficient authority over his army to induce it to march against the government—which of them is it, I ask, who would ever at

tempt to do so, without being immediately crushed by his comrades? The generals are scarcely acquainted, scarcely correspond, with one another. Their number ought to make people easy respecting the designs which are gratuitously ascribed to one of them. Who is ignorant how powerfully envy, ambition, and hatred, influence men—and I believe I may add, love of country and honour? Cheer up, then, ye modern republicans!

"Some journalists have carried their absurdity so far as to state that I am going to Italy to arrest a man whom I esteem, and with whom the government has the greatest reason to be satisfied. It may be asserted that, in the times in which we live, few general officers would undertake the duty of gendarmes, though many may be disposed to combat the factions and the factious.

"During my stay in Paris, I have seen men of all opinions. I have been enabled to appreciate some of them at their just value. Some there are who think that the government cannot proceed without them. They raise an outcry, that they may obtain places. Others, though nobody cares about them, imagine that their destruction has been sworn. They cry out, to render themselves interesting. I have seen emigrants, more Frenchmen than royalists, weep with joy at the recital of our victories; I have seen Parisians throw doubts upon them. It has appeared to me that one party, daring, but without means, was desirous of overthrowing the present government, in order to introduce anarchy in its stead; that a second, more dangerous, more adroit, and which numbers friends everywhere, was aiming at the destruction of the republic, in order to give back to France the rickety constitution of 1791 and a thirty years' civil war; that, lastly, a third, if it is capable of despising the other two, and assuming over them that empire which is conferred on it by the laws, will conquer them, because it is composed of genuine, laborious, and upright republicans, whose means are talents and virtues, because it numbers among its partisans every good citizen and the armies, who assuredly have not been conquering for these five years merely to suffer the country to be enslaved."

This letter put an end to all the reports, and imposed silence on the malicious circulators of them.

Amidst its glory, the government excited pity by its poverty. The new paper-money had kept its ground for a very short time, and its fall deprived the Directory of an important resource. It will be recollected, that on the 26th of Ventose two thousand four hundred millions of mandats had been created, and a corresponding value in national domains had been pledged for them. One part of these mandats had been appropriated to the withdrawing of the twenty-four thousand millions remaining in circulation, and the remainder to the supply of current wants. It was, in some sort, as we have observed, a new edition of the old paper, with a new title and a new figure. For the twenty-four thousand millions in assignats were given eight hundred millions in mandats, and, instead of creating forty-eight thousand millions more in assignats, one thousand six hundred millions in mandats were created. The difference was, therefore, in the title and the figure, and also in the pledge; for the assignats, owing to the effect of the sales by auction, did not represent a determinate value in domains; the mandats, on the contrary, as they were capable of procuring domains on the mere offer of the price in 1790, exactly represented the sum of two thousand four hundred millions. All this did not prevent their fall. It was owing to various causes. France would not have any more paper and was determined to place no more confidence in it. Now, let the

guarantees be ever so good, if people will no longer regard them, they are as though they did not exist. Then, the figure of the paper, though reduced, was not sufficiently reduced. Twenty-four thousand millions in assignats were converted into eight hundred millions in mandats; the old paper, therefore, was reduced to one-thirtieth, and it ought, by right, to have been reduced to the two hundred and twentieth, for twenty-four thousand millions were worth at most one hundred and twenty millions. To throw them back into circulation for eight hundred millions, by converting them into mandats, was an error. It is true that there was appropriated to them a like value in domains: but an estate which, in 1790, was worth one hundred thousand francs, would not, at this time, sell for more than thirty thousand or twenty-five thousand. Consequently the paper, bearing this new title and this new figure, even while exactly representing domains, must like them, be worth no more than one-third of the money. Now, to attempt to make it circulate at par, as had been done, was again to support a fallacy. Thus, if there had even been a possibility of restoring confidence to the paper, the exaggerated supposition of its value must still have made it fall; therefore, though its circulation was forced everywhere, people would not countenance it for a moment. The violent measures which it was possible to impose in 1793 were, at this time, powerless. Nobody bargained but for a money price. That specie, which was supposed to be hoarded or carried abroad, found its way into circulation. That which had been hidden came forth; that which had quitted France returned. The southern provinces were full of piasters, which came from Spain, and were introduced among us from necessity. Gold and silver come, like all commodities, whithersoever the demand calls them; only their price is higher, and keeps up till the quantity is sufficient and the want is supplied. Some rogueries were also committed by means of payments in mandats, because the laws, giving the forced currency of money to paper, allowed it to be employed in acquitting written engagements; but people scarcely durst avail themselves of that faculty, and as for all stipulations, they were made in specie. In all the markets nothing was to be seen but gold and silver, and the wages of the lower classes were paid in no other medium. One would have imagined that there was no paper in France. The mandats were in the hands of speculators only, who received them from the government and sold them to the purchasers of national domains.

In this manner, the financial crisis, though existing for the state, had almost ceased to affect individuals.* Commerce and industry, availing themselves of the first moment of quiet, and of some communications reopened with the continent in consequence of our victories, began to resume some activity.

It is not requisite, as governments have had the vanity to assert, to encourage production in order that it may prosper; all that it needs is, not to be thwarted. It takes advantage of the first moment to develop itself with wonderful activity. But, if the circumstances of private individuals were improved, the government, that is to say, its chiefs, its agents of all kinds, military men, administrators or magistrates, and its creditors, were reduced to extreme distress. The mandats which were given to them were power

* "Government and all the persons who received payment from it, including the public creditors, the army, and the civil servants, were still suffering the most severe privations; but the crisis had passed with the great bulk of individuals in the state. The fall in the value of the assignats had been so excessive, that no one would take either them or their successors in change." — *Alison*. E.

less in their hands; they could make but one use of them, namely, pass them to speculators in paper, who took one hundred francs for five or six, and afterwards sold these mandates to the purchasers of national domains. Thus the annuitants were perishing of hunger; the functionaries were giving up their places, and, contrary to the usual custom, instead of soliciting appointments people were resigning them. The armies of Germany and Italy, living at the enemy's cost, were protected from the general want; but the armies of the interior were in extreme distress. Hoche had nothing with which to subsist his soldiers but the articles of consumption levied in the provinces of the West, and he was obliged to maintain the military system in those provinces in order to have a right to levy in kind the supplies which he needed. As for the officers and himself, they had not wherewithal even to procure clothing and other necessaries. The supply of the stations established in France for the troops marching through the country had frequently failed, because the contractors would no longer make advances. The detachments sent from the coasts of the Ocean to reinforce the army of Italy had been stopped by the way. Hospitals had even been shut up, and the unfortunate soldiers who filled them turned out of the asylum which the republic owed to their infirmities, because they could no longer be supplied either with medicines or with food. The gendarmerie was entirely disorganized. Being neither clothed nor equipped, it had almost ceased to do any duty. In order to spare their horses which were not replaced, the gendarmes no longer protected the roads; they were infested by robbers, who abound after civil wars. They broke into country-houses, and frequently penetrated into the towns, plundering and murdering with unheard-of audacity.

Such then was the internal state of France. The particular character of this new crisis was the poverty of the government amidst the improved circumstances of private individuals. The Directory subsisted entirely on the wrecks of the paper, and a few millions which its armies sent to it from abroad. General Bonaparte had already remitted thirty millions, and sent it one hundred fine carriage-horses to contribute a little to its pomp.

It now became necessary to destroy the whole system of paper-money. To this end it was requisite that its circulation should no longer be forced, and that the taxes should be received in real value. It was, therefore, declared on the 28th of Messidor (July 16), that every one might bargain in whatever money he pleased; that the mandates were in future to be taken only at their real currency, and that this currency should be daily ascertained and published by the treasury. At length, the government ventured to declare that the taxes should be paid in specie or in mandates at the current value. The only exception made was for the land-tax. Ever since the creation of the mandates, it had been required to be paid in paper and no longer in kind. It was now felt that it would have been better to continue to levy it in kind, because, amidst the fluctuations of the paper, articles of consumption would, at least, have been obtained. It was, therefore, decided, after long discussions and several plans successively rejected by the Ancients, that, in the frontier departments of those contiguous to the armies, the taxes might still be demanded in kind; that in the others they should be paid in mandates, at the current price of corn. Thus corn was valued in 1790 at ten francs the quintal; it was valued at the present time at eighty francs in mandates. Every ten francs assessed, representing a quintal of corn, was now to be paid at eighty francs in mandates. It would have been much more simple to require payment in specie, or in mandates at

the current value; but this the government durst not yet venture upon; it began therefore to return, but with hesitating steps, to reality.

The forced loan was not yet entirely raised. The supreme authority had no longer that arbitrary energy requisite to insure the prompt execution of such a measure. There remained nearly three hundred millions to be collected. It was decided that, in payment of the loan and taxes, mandats should be received at par, and assignats at the rate of one hundred for one, but for a fortnight only; and that, after the expiration of this term, paper should be taken only at the current value. This was one way of encouraging those who were backward in paying up.

The fall of the mandats being declared, it was no longer possible to take them in integral payment for the national domains which were appropriated to them. The bankruptcy predicted to them, as to the assignats, became inevitable. Notice was actually given that, as the mandats issued for two thousand four hundred millions had fallen far below that value, and were not worth more than two hundred or three hundred millions, the state would no longer give the promised value in domains, namely, two thousand four hundred millions. The contrary had been maintained, in the hope that the mandats would keep up to a certain value; but, one hundred francs falling to five or six, the state could no longer give land, worth one hundred francs in 1790, and thirty or forty francs at that time, for five or six francs. It was the same kind of bankruptcy that the assignats had experienced, and the nature of which we have already explained. The state then did what is done at the present day by a sinking fund which redeems at the currency of the Exchange, and which, in case of an extraordinary fall, would redeem perhaps at fifty what might have been placed at eighty or ninety. In consequence, it was decided on the 8th of Thermidor, that the last fourth of the national domains appropriated by the law of the 26th of Ventose (that which created the mandats) should be paid for in mandats at the current value, and by six equal instalments. It had appropriated to the amount of eight hundred millions. This fourth was, of course, two hundred millions.

Paper-money was, therefore, drawing near to its end. It may be asked why the government had made this second trial of assignats, which had had so short a duration and so little success. In general, we are too apt to judge of all measures independently of the circumstances which have commanded them. Fear of the want of specie had no doubt contributed to the creation of the mandats, and, had there been no other reason, the government would have been egregiously mistaken, for there cannot be any want of specie; but it had been particularly impelled by the imperative necessity of living upon the produce of the domains, and of anticipating upon their sale. It was necessary to put their price in circulation before receiving it, and for this purpose to issue it in the form of paper. The resource had indeed not been great, because the mandats had fallen so speedily, but at any rate the government had lived upon it for four or five months. And was that nothing? The mandats must be considered as a new discount of the value of the national domains, as a makeshift till these domains could be sold. We shall see what moments of distress the government had still to go through, before it could realize their sale in specie.*

* "The mandats completed the revolutionary cycle of assignats of which they formed the second period. They procured the Directory a momentary supply, but they also in turn lost their credit, and insensibly led the way to bankruptcy, which was the transition from paper to cash payments."—*Mignet*. E.

The treasury was not deficient in resources demandable by it ; but these resources were in the same predicament as the national domains ; they had to be realized. It had yet to receive three hundred millions of the forced loan ; three hundred millions of the land-tax for the year, that is to say, the whole amount of that tax ; twenty-five millions of the tax on moveable property ; the whole rent of the national domains, and the arrears of that rent, amounting together to sixty millions ; various military contributions ; the price of the moveable property of the emigrants ; divers arrears ; lastly, eighty millions in paper on foreigners. All these resources, added to the two hundred millions of the last fourth of the price of the domains, amounted to one thousand one hundred millions, an enormous sum, but difficult to realize. To complete its year, that is, to go on till the 1st of Vendémiaire, it wanted only four hundred millions. It would be saved if out of the one thousand one hundred it could realize four hundred. For the following year, it had the ordinary contributions which it hoped to raise all in specie, and which, amounting to some five hundred millions, covered what were called the ordinary expenses. For the war expenses, if a new campaign were necessary, it had the remainder of the one thousand one hundred millions just mentioned, and of which it was to absorb this year about four hundred ; lastly, it had the new appropriations of the national domains. But the difficulty still was how to get in those sums. Ready money never consists of anything but the proceeds of the year ; now it was difficult to raise them at once by the forced loan, by the tax on land and moveables, and by the sale of the domains. The government fell to work afresh to collect the contributions, and the Directory was invested with the extraordinary faculty of pledging Belgian domains for one hundred millions in specie. The rescriptions, of the nature of royal *bons*, having for their object to discount the proceeds of the year, had shared the fate of all the paper. Being unable to avail himself of this resource, the minister settled with the contractors by orders, which were to be paid out of the first receipts.

Such were the distresses of this government, which was so glorious abroad. At home, parties were still at work. The submission of La Vendée had greatly abated the hopes of the royalist faction ; but the Paris agents felt only the more convinced of the merit of their old plan, which consisted in not having recourse to civil war, but in corrupting opinions, and in gaining an influence by degrees over the Councils and the authorities. At this they laboured in their journals. As for the patriots, they had arrived at the highest point of indignation. They had favoured the flight of Drouet, who had found means to escape from prison, and they meditated new plots, notwithstanding the discovery of Babœuf's. Many old Conventionalists and Thermidorians, heretofore connected with the government, which they had themselves formed, began immediately after the 13th of Vendémiaire to be discontented. A law enjoined, as we have seen, the ex-Conventionalists not re-elected and all dismissed functionaries to quit Paris. The police, by mistake, sent orders for apprehending four Conventionalists, members of the legislative body. These orders were denounced with acrimony in the Five Hundred. Tallien, who, at the time of the discovery of Babœuf's plot, had loudly declared his adhesion to the system of the government, inveighed bitterly against the police of the Directory, and against the distrust of which the patriots were the object. Thibaudeau, his habitual opponent, answered him, and, after a very warm

discussion and some recriminations, each fell back into sullen silence. Cochon, the minister, his agents, his spies, were particular objects of the hatred of the patriots, who had been the first that were galled by his vigilance. For the rest, the course to be pursued by the government was clearly marked out; and, if it was decidedly hostile to the royalists, it was equally unconnected with the patriots, that is, with that portion of the revolutionary party which was desirous to return to a more democratic republic, and deemed the present system too mild for the aristocrats. But, setting aside the state of the finances, this situation of the Directory, detached from all parties, curbing them with a strong hand, and supported by admirable armies, was very cheering and very brilliant.

The patriots had already made two attempts, and been twice foiled, since the installation of the Directory. They had endeavoured to recommence the club of the Jacobins at the Pantheon, and had seen it shut up by the government. They had then hatched a mysterious plot under the direction of Babœuf; they had been discovered by the police and deprived of their new chiefs. Still they were restless, and thought of making a last attempt. The opposition, in once more attacking the law of the 3d of Brumaire, excited in them redoubled rage, and impelled them to a final struggle. They had already striven to corrupt the police legion. That legion had been dissolved, and changed into a regiment, which was the 21st dragoons. They conceived the design of trying the fidelity of that regiment, and hoped, in gaining it, to gain the whole army of the interior, encamped in the plain of Grenelle. They purposed at the same time to excite a commotion by firing muskets in Paris, by scattering white cockades in the streets, by shouting *Vive le Roi!* and, by thus inducing a belief that the royalists were taking up arms, to destroy the republic. They meant then to avail themselves of this pretext to run to arms, to seize the reins of government, and to make the camp of Grenelle declare in their favour.

On the 12th of Fructidor (August 29) they executed part of their plan, fired petards, and threw white cockades about in the streets. But the police, being forewarned, had taken such precautions that they found it impossible to excite any commotion. They were not, however, disheartened, and some days afterwards, on the 23d of Fructidor (September 9), they resolved to carry their plan into effect. Thirty of the principal assembled at the Gros Caillou, and resolved that very night to collect a mob in the quarter of Vaugirard. That quarter, near the camp of Grenelle, was full of gardens, and intersected by walls; it afforded lines behind which they could assemble and make resistance, in case they should be attacked. Accordingly, in the evening, they collected, to the number of seven or eight hundred, armed with muskets, pistols, swords, and sword-sticks. This assemblage comprehended all the most determined men of the party. There were among them some dismissed officers, who headed the mob, in their uniforms and with their epaulettes. There were also some ex-Conventionals, in the costume of representatives, and also, it was said, Drouet, who had been concealed in Paris ever since his escape. An officer of the guard of the Directory, at the head of ten horse, was patrolling in Paris, when he was informed of the concourse collected at Vaugirard. He hastened thither with his little detachment, but, on coming up, was received with a discharge of musketry, and attacked by two hundred armed men, who obliged him to retreat at full gallop. He went immediately to order the guard of the Directory to be put under arms, and sent an officer to the camp of Grenelle to give the alarm. The patriots lost no time, and, the

alarm being given, repaired in all haste to the plain of Grenelle, to the number of some hundreds.* They proceeded towards the quarters of the 21st dragoons, lately the police legion, and endeavoured to gain it over by saying that they had come to fraternize with it. Malo, *chef d'escadron*, who commanded that regiment, immediately left his tent, mounted his horse half-dressed, rallied around him some officers and the first dragoons whom he met with, and charged with drawn sword those who proposed to him to fraternize. This example decided the soldiers; they ran to their horses, dashed upon the mob, and soon dispersed it. They killed and wounded a great number of persons, and apprehended one hundred and thirty-two. The noise of this combat roused the whole camp, which was instantly under arms, and filled Paris with consternation; but it soon subsided, when the folly and the result of the attempt became known. The Directory immediately ordered the prisoners to be shut up, and applied to the two Councils for authority to make domiciliary visits, for the purpose of securing in certain quarters many of the rioters whose wounds had prevented them from leaving Paris. Having formed part of an armed assemblage, they were amenable to the military tribunals, and were delivered up to a commission, which began by ordering a certain number of them to be shot. The organization of the high national court was not yet completed, and its installation was urged anew, that the trial of Babœuf might commence.

This rash enterprise was estimated at its real value, that is to say, it was considered as one of those indiscretions which characterize an expiring party. The enemies of the Revolution alone affected to attach great importance to it, that they might have a new occasion to raise an outcry against terror, and to excite alarm. People in general were not much frightened; and this vain attack proved more clearly than all the other successes of the Directory that its establishment was definitive, and that the parties must relinquish all hopes of destroying it.

Such were the events that were occurring in the interior. While fresh battles were about to be fought abroad, important negotiations were preparing in Europe. The French republic was at peace with several powers, but in alliance with none. The detractors, who have asserted that it would never be recognized, now said it would never have any allies. By way of replying to these malicious insinuations, the Directory thought of renewing the family compact with Spain, and projected a quadruple alliance between France, Spain, Venice, and the Porte. By these means, the quadruple alliance, composed of all the powers of the South, against those of the North, would control the Mediterranean and the East, give uneasiness to Russia, threaten the rear of Austria, and raise up a new maritime enemy against England. It would moreover procure great advantages for the army of Italy, by insuring to it the support of the Venetian squadron and of thirty thousand Sclavonians.

* "The camp at Grenelle had retired to rest when the conspirators arrived. When the sentinels demanded, 'Who goes there?' they replied, 'Long live the republic! Long live the constitution of Ninety-three!' The sentinels immediately gave the alarm. The conspirators, relying upon the assistance of a battalion of the guard which had been reduced, marched towards the tent of Malo, the commander, who ordered his men to sound to horse, and his dragoons, who were half-naked, to mount. Surprised at this reception, the insurgents made but a feeble resistance. They were put to flight, leaving a number of dead, and many prisoners on the field of battle. This unfortunate expedition was almost the last of the party; at each successive defeat it lost its energy and its leaders, and at length acquired the secret conviction that its reign was at an end."—*Mignet*. E.

Spain was the easiest of the three powers to decide. She had grievances against England that dated from the commencement of the war. The principal were the conduct of the English at Toulon, and the secrecy observed towards the Spanish admiral, at the time of the expedition against Corsica. The English had insulted her ships, detained supplies destined for her, violated her territory, taken posts threatening for her in America, infringing the custom-house regulations in her colonies, and openly excited them to revolt. These causes for discontent, added to the splendid offers of the Directory, which held out to her hopes of possessions in Italy, and the victories which authorized her to believe in the accomplishment of these offers, at length decided Spain to sign, on the 2d of Fructidor (August 19th), a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with France, on the bases of the family compact. By this treaty, those two powers mutually guaranteed to each other all their possessions in Europe and in the Indies; they reciprocally promised one another succours to the extent of eighteen thousand infantry, and six thousand cavalry, fifteen first rates, fifteen seventy-fours, six frigates, and four cutters. These succours were to be furnished on the first requisition of either of the two powers that should be at war.

Instructions were sent to our ambassadors to represent to the Porte and to Venice the advantages which they would derive from concurring in such an alliance.

The French republic, therefore, was no longer solitary, and she had raised up a new foe against England. Everything indicated that a declaration of war by Spain against England would soon follow the treaty of alliance with France. The Directory was preparing for Pitt perplexities of a different nature.

Hoche was at the head of one hundred thousand men spread along the coast of the Atlantic. La Vendée and Bretagne were quelled; he was impatient to employ these forces in a manner more worthy of himself, and to add new exploits to those of Weissenburg and Landau. He suggested to the government a plan which he had long meditated, that of an expedition to Ireland. Now, said he, that we have driven civil war from the coasts of France, we must carry that scourge to the shores of England, and, by exciting an insurrection of the Catholics in Ireland, repay the mischief which she did us in raising the Poitevins and the Bretons. The moment was favourable. The Irish were more incensed than ever against the oppression of the English government; the people of the three kingdoms were suffering severely from the war; and an invasion, added to the other evils which they were already enduring, was likely to goad them to the last degree of exasperation. Pitt's finances were tottering; and the enterprise directed by Hoche might be productive of the most important consequences. The plan was at once approved. Truguet, minister of the marine, seconded it by all means in his power. He collected a squadron in the harbour of Brest, and made every effort which the state of the finances permitted to equip it in a suitable manner. Hoche selected all the best troops from his army, and marched to Brest to embark. Care was taken to spread various reports; sometimes they were intended for an expedition to St. Domingo, at others for an expedition to Lisbon, in order to drive the English out of Portugal, aided by Spain.

England, suspecting the object of these preparations, was seriously alarmed. The treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between Spain and France foreboded new dangers to her; the defeats of Austria caused

ner to apprehend the loss of this powerful and last ally; her finances were in a state of great embarrassment; the Bank had contracted its discounts; capital began to fail; and the loan opened for the emperor had been stopped to prevent further funds from leaving the country. The ports of Italy were closed against English ships; so were those of the Ocean as far as the Texel; and those of Spain were to be closed also. Thus the commerce of Great Britain was singularly threatened.

To all these difficulties were added those of a general election; for the parliament, approaching its seventh year, had to be wholly re-elected. The elections took place amidst shouts of malediction against Pitt and the war.

The Empire had almost entirely abandoned the cause of the coalition. The states of Baden and Wirtemberg had just signed a definitive peace, allowing the belligerent armies a passage through their territories. Austria was alarmed on seeing two French armies on the Danube, and a third on the Adige, which seemed to close Italy against her. She had sent Wurmser, with thirty thousand men, to collect several reserves in the Tyrol, to rally and reorganize the wrecks of Beaulieu's army, and to descend into Lombardy with sixty thousand men. In this quarter she thought herself least in danger, but she was in great apprehension with respect to the Danube, and turned all her attention in that direction. To prevent alarming reports, the Aulic Council* had forbidden public events to be talked of at Vienna. It had organized a levy of volunteers, and laboured with extraordinary activity to equip and arm fresh troops. Catherine, who always promised and never performed, had rendered one service; she had guaranteed Galicia to Austria, and this arrangement had enabled the latter to withdraw her troops from that country, and to march them towards the Alps and the Danube.

Thus France everywhere affrighted her enemies, and people awaited with impatience to see what the fortune of arms would decide along the Danube and the Adige. On the immense line extending from Bohemia to the Adriatic, three armies were about to encounter three others, and to decide the fate of Europe.

During the suspension of hostilities, negotiations had been going on in Italy. Peace had been made with Piedmont, and the armistice had been succeeded, two months afterwards, by a treaty. It stipulated the definitive cession of the duchy of Savoy and of the county of Nice to France; the destruction of the forts of Susa and Brunetta, situated at the outlet of the Alps; the occupation during the war of the fortresses of Coni, Tortona, and Alexandria; a free passage for the French troops through the states of Piedmont; and the supply of necessaries for these troops during their march. The Directory, at the instigation of Bonaparte, proposed moreover an offensive and defensive alliance with the King of Sardinia, that it might have ten or fifteen thousand men of his excellent army. But this prince wished for Lombardy, which France could not yet give away, and which she still meant to employ as an equivalent for the Netherlands. This concession being refused, the king would not consent to an alliance. The Directory had not yet settled anything with Genoa; discussions were still going on relative to the recall of the exiled families, to the expulsion

* The Aulic Council at Vienna (that pernicious tribunal which, in the Seven Years' War, called Laudohn to account for taking Schweidnitz without orders) has destroyed the schemes of many an Austrian general, for, though plans of offensive operations may be concerted at home, it is impossible to frame orders for every possible contingency."—*Gentz*. E.

of the feudatory families of Austria and Naples, and to the indemnity for the *Modeste* frigate. The relations were friendly with Tuscany; but the means employed towards the Leghorn merchants, to obtain a declaration of the merchandise belonging to the enemies of France, had sown the seeds of dissatisfaction. Naples and Rome had sent agents to Paris in conformity with the armistice; but the negotiation for peace was attended with considerable delay. It was evident that the powers were waiting to see what turn the war would take before they concluded it. The people of Bologna and Ferrara were still as enthusiastic for liberty, which they had received provisionally. The regency of Modena and the Duke of Parma were immoveable. Lombardy awaited with anxiety the result of the campaign. Urgent solicitations had been addressed to the senate of Venice, with the double view of inducing it to concur in the plan of a quadruple alliance and of securing a useful auxiliary to the army of Italy. Besides direct overtures, our ambassadors at Constantinople and Madrid had made indirect proposals, and had earnestly pressed the matter upon the legations of Venice, for the purpose of demonstrating to them the advantages of the plan; but all these efforts had proved fruitless. Venice, since she had the French in her territory, and had witnessed the rapid extension of her political ideas, had conceived a hatred for them. She no longer stopped at an unarmed neutrality. On the contrary, she armed with activity. She had given orders to the commandants of the islands to despatch the disposable ships and troops into the lagoons; and she had sent for the Slavonian regiments from Illyria.* The *providitore* of Bergamo was secretly arming the superstitious but brave peasants of the Bergamasco. Funds were collected by the twofold way of taxes and voluntary donations.

Bonaparte thought that, for the moment, his course was to dissemble with all, to protract the negotiations, to suffer affairs to remain *in statu quo*, and to appear ignorant of all hostile proceedings, till fresh battles should have decided in Italy either our establishment or our expulsion. He deemed it prudent to desist from agitating the questions which were under discussion with Genoa, and to persuade her that the French were content with the satisfaction obtained, in order that they might find in her a friend in case of retreat. He conceived also that it was wrong to displease the Duke of Tuscany by the conduct that was pursued at Leghorn. He was no doubt of opinion that a brother of the emperor's ought not to be left in that duchy, but he wished to avoid alarming him yet. Garreau and Salicetti, the commissioners of the Directory, having issued an order for the departure of all the French emigrants from the environs of Leghorn, Bonaparte wrote a letter to them, in which, without any regard to their quality, he severely reprimanded them for having overstepped their powers, and affronted the Duke of Tuscany by usurping the sovereign authority in his dominions. With respect to Venice also, he was desirous of maintaining the *status quo*; though he complained loudly of some murders committed on the high-roads, and of the preparations which he saw making around him. His object in keeping the quarrel open was to continue to compel the republic to supply his wants, and to reserve a motive for fleecing it of a few millions, if he should conquer the Austrians. "If I am victorious," he wrote, "a mere express will be sufficient to put an end to all the difficulties that are raised up against me."

* "Venice had still fifty thousand men at her command, and those of a fierce and courageous description, chiefly consisting of Slavonians; the mistress of the Adriatic therefore was an enemy not to be lightly provoked."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E.

The citadel of Milan had fallen into his hands. The garrison had surrendered; all the artillery had been sent off and added to the considerable train before Mantua. He would fain have brought the siege of that fortress to a conclusion before the new Austrian army should come to its relief, but this he had little hope of accomplishing. He employed in the blockade only just the number of troops that was indispensably necessary, on account of the fevers that raged in the environs. He had, nevertheless, pressed the place very closely, and was preparing to attempt one of those surprises which, according to his own expression, *depend on a goose or a dog*; but the waters of the lake were too low to admit of the passage of the boats that were to carry his disguised troops. He then renounced, for the moment, the intention of making himself master of Mantua. Besides, Wurmser was coming, and it was requisite to attend to that which was most urgent.

The army, which had entered Italy with some thirty thousand men, had received but small reinforcements to repair its losses. Nine thousand men had been sent to it from the Alps. The divisions drafted from Hoche's army had not yet been able to traverse France. Owing to this reinforcement of nine thousand men, and to the sick who had left the depots of Provence and the Var, the army had retrieved its losses and even gained an accession of strength. It numbered nearly forty-five thousand men, distributed upon the Adige and around Mantua, at the moment when Bonaparte returned from his march into the Peninsula. The diseases which attacked the soldiers before Mantua reduced it to about forty or forty-two thousand men. This was its number in the middle of Thermidor (the end of July). Bonaparte had left merely depots at Milan, Tortona, and Leghorn. He had already driven out of the field two armies, one of Piedmontese and the other of Austrians, and now he had to fight a third, more formidable than the preceding.

Wurmser arrived at the head of sixty thousand men. Thirty thousand were drawn from the Rhine, and were composed of excellent troops. The remainder was formed of Beaulieu's wrecks, and of battalions from the interior of Austria. Upwards of ten thousand men were shut up in Mantua, exclusively of the sick. Thus the whole army comprehended more than seventy thousand men. Bonaparte had nearly ten thousand around Mantua and had, therefore, no more than about thirty thousand to oppose to the sixty who were about to debouch from the Tyrol. With such an inequality of force, it required extraordinary bravery in the soldiers, and a most fertile genius in the general, to restore the balance.

The line of the Adige, to which Bonaparte attached such value, was about to become the theatre of the struggle. We have already stated the reasons for which Bonaparte preferred it to every other. The Adige was not so long as the Po, or as those rivers which, falling into the latter, blend their line with that of the Po; after a course of small extent, it ran directly to the sea; it was not fordable, neither could it be turned by the Tyrol, like the Brenta, the Piave, and the rivers higher up towards the extremity of Upper Italy. It has been the theatre of such magnificent events that we must describe its course with some care.

The rivers of the Tyrol form two lines, those of the Mincio and the Adige, nearly parallel, and supporting themselves upon one another. Part of these waters forms in the mountains an extensive and elongated lake, called the Lake of Garda; issuing from it, they traverse the plain of the Mantuan to Peschiera, become the Mincio, form another lake around

Mantua, and, pursuing their course, at length fall into the Lower Po. The Adige, formed by the streams from the upper valleys of the Tyrol, runs beyond the preceding line. It descends through the mountains in a direction parallel to the Lake of Garda, debouches into the plain in the environs of Verona, then runs parallel to the Mincio, scoops out for itself a wide and deep bed as far as Legnago, and a few leagues beyond that town ceases to be cramped between banks, and can spread itself out into impassable inundations, which intercept the whole space comprised between that point and the Adriatic. Three routes presented themselves to the enemy. One, crossing the Adige as high as Roveredo, before the commencement of the Lake of Garda, turned round that lake, and led behind it to Salo, Gavardo, and Brescia. Two other routes, running from Roveredo, followed the two banks of the Adige, in its course along the Lake of Garda. The one on the right bank ran between the river and the lake, passed through the mountains, and entered the plain between the Mincio and the Adige. The other following the left bank, and running outside the Adige, debouched into the plain towards Verona, and thus led to the front of the defensive line. The first of the three, crossing the Adige before the origin of the Lake of Garda, afforded the advantage of turning at once the two lines of the Mincio and of the Adige, and leading to the rear of the army that was guarding them. But it was not very practicable; it was accessible to mountain artillery only, and therefore it might serve for a diversion, but not for a principal operation. The second, which descended from the mountains between the lake and the Adige, crossed the river at Rivalta or Dolce, a point where it was scarcely at all defended; but it ran into the mountains, through positions easily defended, those of La Corona and Rivoli. The third, running beyond the river to the middle of the plain, debouched outside, and led to the best defended part of its course, that from Verona to Legnago. Thus all three routes presented very great difficulties. The first could be occupied by a detachment only; the second, passing between the lake and the river, came upon the positions of La Corona and Rivoli; the third abutted upon the Adige, which has a wide, deep bed from Verona to Legnago, and is defended by two fortresses, eight leagues distant from one another.

Bonaparte had placed General Sauret, with three thousand men, at Salo, to guard the road which debouches on the rear of the Lake of Garda. Massena, with twelve thousand, intercepted the road which runs between the Lake of Garda and the Adige, and occupied the positions of La Corona and Rivoli. Despinos, with five thousand, was in the environs of Verona; Augereau, with eight thousand, at Legnago; Kilmaine, with two thousand horse and light artillery, as a reserve, in a central position at Castel Novo. There Bonaparte had fixed his head-quarters, to be at an equal distance from Salo, Rivoli, and Verona. As he attached great importance to Verona, which had three bridges over the Adige, and distrusted the intentions of Venice, he resolved to make the Sclavonian regiments quit that place. He pretended that they were in hostility with the French troops; and, upon pretext of preventing quarrels, he insisted on their leaving the city. The provveditore complied and the French garrison alone was left in Verona.

Wurmser had carried his head-quarters to Trent and Roveredo. He detached twenty thousand men, under Quasdanovich, to take the road that turns the Lake of Garda and debouches upon Salo. He took forty thousand with him, and distributed them upon the two roads that run along the

Adige. Some were to attack La Corona and Rivoli, others to debouch upon Verona. He thought in this manner to envelop the French army, which, being attacked on the Adige and on the rear of the Lake of Garda, would be in danger of being forced on its front, and of being cut off from its line of retreat. Rumour had anticipated the arrival of Wurmser. Throughout all Italy his coming was expected, and the party hostile to Italian freedom was full of joy and boldness. The Venetians manifested a satisfaction which they could no longer repress. The Sclavonian soldiers ran about the public places, holding out their hands to the passengers, and demanding the price of the French blood which they were going to spill. In Rome, the agents of France were insulted; the Pope, imboldened by the hope of speedy deliverance, ordered the carriages laden with the first instalment of the contribution imposed upon him to turn back; he even despatched his legate to Ferrara and Bologna. Lastly, the court of Naples, still as senseless as ever, trampling upon the conditions of the armistice, sent off troops to the frontiers of the Roman States. The most painful anxiety prevailed, on the contrary, in all the towns devoted to France and to independence. Tidings from the Adige were awaited with impatience. The Italian imagination, which magnifies everything, had exaggerated the disproportion of the forces. It was said that Wurmser was coming with two armies, one of sixty, the other of eighty thousand men. People asked one another how that handful of French could possibly withstand such a mass of foes;* and they repeated the famous proverb, that *Italy was the grave of the French*.

On the 11th of Thermidor (July 29) the Austrians found themselves in presence of our posts, and surprised them all. The corps which had turned the Lake of Garda debouched upon Salò, whence it repulsed General Sauret. General Goyeux was left alone there with a few hundred men, and shut himself up in an old building, which he refused to quit, though he had neither bread nor water, and scarcely any ammunition. Along the two roads which border the Adige the Austrians advanced with similar advantage; they forced the important position of La Corona, between the Adige and the Lake of Garda; they proceeded with equal facility by the third road, and debouched before Verona. Bonaparte, in his head-quarters at Castel Novo, received all these tidings. Couriers succeeded one another without intermission, and on the following day, the 12th of Thermidor (July 30), he was apprized that the Austrians were marching from Salò upon Brescia, and that thus his retreat upon Milan was intercepted; that the position of Rivoli was forced, as well as that of La Corona; and that the Austrians were about to cross the Adige at all points. In this alarming situation, having lost his defensive line and his line of retreat, he could scarcely escape being taken. It was his first taste of misfortune. Whether struck by the enormity of the danger, or, ready to adopt a daring determination, he was desirous of sharing the responsibility with his generals; he assembled a council of war, and for the first time asked their opinion. All recommended retreat. Without any point of support before them, having lost one of the two roads to France, there was not one who deemed it prudent to maintain their ground,

* "Nothing but the greatest ability on the part of the French general could have compensated for his inferiority in numbers, but the genius of Napoleon proved adequate to the task. His success was mainly owing to the vicious plan of attack adopted by the Austrians, which, like all the others framed by the Aulic Council, was exposed to defeat from the division of their forces."—*Jomini*. E.

excepting Augereau. He alone, to whom these days were the most glorious of his life, strongly insisted on trying the fortune of arms. He was young and ardent; he had learned in the faubourgs to speak with fluency the language of camps, and he declared that he had good grenadiers who would not retire without fighting. Without capacity for judging of the resources which the situation of the armies and the nature of the ground yet presented, he listened only to his courage,* and warmed by his military ardour the genius of Bonaparte. The latter dismissed his generals, without expressing his own opinion, but his plan was formed. Though the line of the Adige was forced, and that of the Mincio and the Lake of Garda turned, the ground was so favourable that it still offered resources to a resolute man of genius.

The Austrians, divided into two corps, were descending along the two shores of the Lake of Garda; their junction was to be effected at the point of the lake, and, on their arrival there, they would have sixty thousand men to overwhelm thirty thousand. But, by concentrating himself at the point of the lake, Bonaparte might prevent their junction. If, then, he were to form with sufficient rapidity a principal mass, he might overwhelm the twenty thousand who had turned the lake, and then return to the forty thousand who had filed between the lake and the Adige. But, in order to occupy the point of the lake, he must call away all the troops from the Lower Adige and the Lower Mincio towards the Lake of Garda; he must withdraw Augereau from Legnago, and Serrurier from Mantua, for it was impossible to guard so extended a line. It was a great sacrifice, for he had been besieging Mantua for two months, he had brought thither a great train, the place was about to surrender, and, by allowing it to revictual itself, he should lose the fruit of long toil and an almost certain prey. Bonaparte did not hesitate. He had the sagacity to seize the most important of two objects, and to sacrifice the other—a simple resolution, which indicates not the great captain, but the great man. It is not only in war, but also in politics and in all situations, that men meet with two objects; they wish to attain one as well as the other, and miss both. Bonaparte possessed that force, so great and so rare, which is requisite for making the choice and the sacrifice. Had he attempted to keep the whole course of the Mincio, from the point of the Lake of Garda to Mantua, he would have been broken; and if he had concentrated himself upon Mantua to cover it, he would have had to fight seventy thousand men at once, sixty thousand in front and ten thousand in rear. He sacrificed Mantua, and concentrated himself at the point of the Lake of Garda. Orders were immediately sent to Augereau to quit Legnago, and to Serrurier to leave Mantua, and to concentrate themselves towards Valleggio and Peschiera, on the Upper Mincio. During the night of the 13th of Thermidor (July 31), Serrurier burned his gun-carriages, spiked his cannon, buried his projectiles, and threw his powder into the water, before he started to join the active army.†

Bonaparte, without losing a single moment, resolved to march first upon

* "Augereau was a man very decided in action, and not very capable of reasoning—two qualities which rendered him an excellent instrument of despotism, provided the despotism assumed the name of revolution."—*Madame de Staël*. E.

† "Napoleon despatched Louis in the greatest haste to Paris, with an account of what had taken place. Louis left his brother with regret on the eve of the battle, to become the bearer of bad news. 'It must be so,' said Napoleon, 'but, before you return, you will have to present to the Directory the colours which we shall take to-morrow.'"—*Louis Bonaparte*. E.

that corps of the enemy which was most forward, and the most dangerous from the position which it had taken. This was the corps of Quasdanovich, who, with twenty thousand men, had debouched by Salo, Gavardo, and Brescia, on the rear of the Lake of Garda, and threatened the communication with Milan. On the same day that Serrurier left Mantua, the 13th (July 31), Bonaparte made a retrograde movement for the purpose of falling upon Quasdanovich, and recrossed the Mincio at Peschiera, with the greater part of his army. Augereau crossed at Borghetto, over the same bridge which had witnessed a glorious action at the time of the first conquest. Rear-guards were left to watch the march of the enemy who had passed the Adige. Bonaparte ordered General Sauret to go and release General Guyeux, who had shut himself up in an old building with seventeen hundred men, without either bread or water, and who had been fighting most heroically for two days. He himself resolved to march upon Lonato, whither Quasdanovich had just pushed forward a division; and he ordered Augereau to march upon Brescia to reopen the communication with Milan. Sauret succeeded in extricating General Guyeux, and drove back the Austrians into the mountains, taking some hundred of them prisoners. Bonaparte, with the German brigade, was not in time to attack the Austrians at Lonato: he was anticipated. After a very brisk action, he repulsed the Austrians, entered Lonato, and took six hundred prisoners. Augereau was, meanwhile, marching upon Brescia. He entered it on the 14th (August 1), without striking a blow, released some prisoners who had been taken from us, and forced the Austrians to fall back into the mountains. Quasdanovich, who calculated on coming upon the rear of the French army and surprising it, was astonished to find imposing masses everywhere, making head with such vigour. He had lost only a few men either at Salo or at Lonato; but he thought it right to halt, and not to advance farther, till he knew what had become of Wurmser, with the principal Austrian mass. He therefore halted.

Bonaparte likewise halted. Time was precious. He was aware that there is a point beyond which an advantage ought not to be pushed. It was enough to have awed Quasdanovich. He now resolved to turn back to make head against Wurmser. He retrograded with Massena's and Augereau's divisions. On the 15th (August 2), he placed Massena's division at Pon San Marco, and Augereau's division at Monte Chiaro. The rear-guards which he had left on the Mincio became his advanced guards. He had not arrived a moment too soon, for Wurmser's forty thousand men had crossed not only the Adige but the Mincio also. The division of Bayalitsch had masked Peschiera by a detachment, and passed the Mincio; and it was advancing upon the road to Lonato. Liptai's division had crossed the Mincio at Borghetto, and driven General Valette from Castiglione. Wurmser had proceeded with two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry to raise the blockade of Mantua. On seeing our gun-carriages in ashes, our cannon spiked, and all the signs of extreme precipitation, he discovered in these objects not the calculation of genius but the effect of fear: overjoyed, he entered the place in triumph which he came to relieve. He entered it on the 15th (August 2).

Bonaparte, on returning to Pon San Marco and Monte Chiaro, did not stop for a moment. His troops had marched without ceasing; he had himself been constantly on horseback; he resolved to make them fight the very next morning. He had before him Bayalitsch at Lonato, and Liptai at Castiglione, presenting between them a front of twenty-five thousand

men. It was requisite that he should attack them before Wurmser returned from Mantua. Sauret had, for the second time, abandoned Salo; Bonaparte sent Gueux to recover the position, and to keep back Quasdanovich. After these precautions on his left and on his rear, he resolved to march forward to Lonato with Massena, and to throw Augereau upon the heights of Castiglione, which had been abandoned on the preceding day by General Valette. He broke that general at the head of his army, to impress upon all his lieutenants the necessity for firmness. On the following day, the 16th (August 3), the whole army was in motion; Gueux re-entered Salo, which rendered any communication between Quasdanovich and the Austrian army still more impossible. Bonaparte advanced upon Lonato; but his advanced guard was beaten back, some pieces of cannon were taken, and General Pigeon was made prisoner. Bayalitsch, proud of this success, advanced with confidence, and extended his wings around the French division. He had two objects in this manoeuvre—in the first place to envelop Bonaparte, and, in the second, to extend himself on his right for the purpose of entering into communication with Quasdanovich, whose cannon he heard at Salo. Bonaparte, undismayed as regarded his rear, suffered himself to be enveloped with imperturbable coolness. Throwing some tirailleurs on his threatened wings, he took the 18th and 32d demi-brigades of infantry, ranged them in close column, gave them a regiment of dragoons to support them, and rushed headlong upon the enemy's centre, which had weakened, in order to extend itself. With this brave body of infantry he overturned all before him, and thus broke the line of the Austrians. The latter, divided into two corps, immediately lost their courage; one part of the division of Bayalitsch fell back in all haste towards the Mincio; but the other, which had extended itself, in order to communicate with Quasdanovich, was driven towards Salo, where Gueux was at the moment. Bonaparte caused it to be pursued without intermission, that he might place it between two fires. He sent Junot* in pursuit of it, with a regiment of cavalry. Junot dashed

* "Andoche Junot was born of humble parents in the year 1771. At a very early period he enlisted in the army; but of his military exploits nothing is known until the siege of Toulon, when he was a simple grenadier. Here he was fortunate enough to attract the notice of the young commandant of the artillery. During a heavy cannonade, Bonaparte, having occasion to dictate a despatch, inquired if any one near him could write. Junot stepped out of the ranks, and, while penning the despatch, a shot struck the ground close by his side, and covered both with dust. 'This is fortunate, sir,' observed the grenadier, laughing, 'I was in want of sand.'—'You are a brave fellow,' said Napoleon; 'how can I serve you?'—'Give me promotion; I will not disgrace it.' He was immediately made a sergeant; not long afterwards he obtained a commission; and, in 1796, was nominated aide-de-camp to his benefactor. In the campaign of Italy, Junot exhibited daring courage, and it is said, great rapacity. In Egypt he served with distinction as general of brigade, and soon after his return was placed over a division. Into the Legion of Honour he entered as a matter of course; but to the particular favour of Napoleon he owed the governorship of Paris, and the embassy to Lisbon, which was a most lucrative mission. He entered Portugal at the head of a powerful army in 1807, levied oppressive contributions, punished all who ventured to speak against his measures, and allayed partial revolts by bloody executions. About this time he was created Duke d'Abrantes, but being soon after defeated by Sir Arthur Wellesley at the battle of Vimeira, he was compelled to evacuate Portugal, and remained until 1812 in complete disgrace. In the Russian campaign he headed a division, but could not obtain the marshal's truncheon. On his return a protracted fever seized him, which ended in settled derangement. He died at his father's house in 1813. In his person, Junot was eminently handsome; in his manners, coarse; in his character, rapacious and cruel. He had, however, a considerable share of moral as well as physical energy."—*Court and Camp of Bonaparte*. E.

off at a gallop, killed six horsemen with his own hand, and fell, having received several sabre-wounds. The fugitive division, pressed between the corps at Salo, and that which was pursuing it from Lonato, was broken, routed, and lost at every step thousands of prisoners. During this successful pursuit, Bonaparte proceeded to Castiglione, on his right, where Augereau had been fighting ever since the morning with admirable bravery.* It was requisite to take the heights on which Liptai's division had placed itself. After an obstinate combat, several times renewed, he had, at length, accomplished his object, and Bonaparte, on his arrival, found the enemy retreating on all sides. Such was the combat called the battle of Lonato, fought on the 16th (August 3d).

Its results were considerable. The French had taken twenty pieces of cannon and three thousand prisoners from the division cut off and driven back upon Salo, and they were still pursuing the scattered remnant of it in the mountains. They had made a thousand or fifteen hundred prisoners at Castiglione, and killed or wounded three thousand men.† They had struck terror into Quasdanovich, who, finding the French army before him at Salo, and hearing it in the distance at Lonato, believed that it was everywhere. They had thus nearly disorganized the divisions of Bayalitsch and Liptai, which fell back upon Wurmser. That general actually arrived with fifteen thousand men to rally the two beaten divisions, and began to extend himself in the plains of Castiglione. Bonaparte saw him on the morning of the following day, the 17th (August 4th), put himself in line to receive battle. He resolved to attack him again, and to have another and a final engagement with him. This was to decide the fate of Italy; but for this purpose it was requisite that he should collect all his disposable troops at Castiglione. He therefore deferred this decisive battle till the 18th (August 5th). He started at full gallop for Lonato, to accelerate in

The following is the portrait given of Junot by his wife, the Duchess d'Abrantes. "Junot had a superior mind; he was a stranger to falsehood, and was endowed with a generosity which his enemies have endeavoured to represent as a vice. He possessed in an eminent degree the qualities of a good son, a warm friend, and an excellent father. I recollect Mr. Fox telling me one day how he was struck, the preceding evening, when leaving the Opera, on seeing Junot paying as much attention and respect to his mother, as he would have done to the first peeress in England. Having begun life with the Revolution, Junot was absolutely one of its children. He was scarcely twenty when the first roll of the drum was heard. A war-cry rang throughout the kingdom; the most sober panted for combat; all were tired of repose. Had not Junot been my husband, I should tell how, all at once, he became a young Achilles. During the whole of the campaigns in Italy, he accompanied Bonaparte in those fields of glory, and was not sparing of his blood. To a brilliant and creative imagination, Junot joined an acute understanding. He learned everything with inconceivable rapidity. He was ready at composing verses, was an excellent actor, and wrote wonderfully well. His temper was warm, sometimes passionate; but never was he coarse or brutal." E

"Of the considerable fortunes which the Emperor had bestowed, that of Junot, he said, was one of the most extravagant. The sums he had given him almost exceeded belief, and yet he was always in debt; he had squandered treasures without credit to himself, without discernment or taste, and too frequently, the Emperor added, in gross debauchery. The frequent incoherences which had been observed in Junot's behaviour, towards the close of his life, arose from the excesses in which he had indulged, and broke out at last into complete insanity. They were obliged to convey him to his father's house, where he died miserably, having mutilated his person with his own hands."—*Las Cases*. E.

* "That day was the most brilliant of Augereau's life; nor did Napoleon ever forget it."—*Monkton*. E.

† Bonaparte, in his despatch to the Directory, states the loss of the Austrians at from two to three thousand killed, and four thousand prisoners. Jomini says, "three thousand killed, wounded, or prisoners." E.

person the movement of his troops. In a few days he had killed five horses with fatigue. He would not intrust any one with the execution of his orders; he was determined to see everything, to verify everything, to animate all by his presence. It is thus that a superior mind communicates itself to a vast mass, and fills it with his own ardour. He arrived about mid-day at Lonato. His orders were already put in execution; part of the troops were marching upon Castiglione; the rest were proceeding towards Salo and Gavardo. There remained, at most, a thousand men at Lonato. Scarcely had Bonaparte entered the place, when an Austrian flag of truce presented itself; and the bearer summoned him to surrender. The general, surprised, could not comprehend at first how it was possible that he should be in presence of the Austrians. He was soon enabled to account for the circumstance. The division, separated on the preceding day in the battle of Lonato, and driven back upon Salo, had been partly taken; but a corps of nearly four thousand men had been wandering all night in the mountains, and seeing Lonato almost abandoned, wanted to enter the place, in order to open for itself an outlet to the Mincio. Bonaparte had but a thousand men to oppose to it, and besides, he had no time to fight a battle. He immediately made all the officers about him mount their horses. He ordered the bearer of the flag of truce to be brought before him, and his eyes to be uncovered. "Wretched man!" said Bonaparte to him, "you know not then that you are in the presence of the general-in-chief, and that he is here with his whole army. Go tell those who have sent you, that I give them five minutes to surrender, or I will put them to the sword to punish the insult which they have dared to offer me." He immediately ordered his artillery to be drawn up, and threatened to fire upon the advancing columns. The messengers went and carried back his answer; and the four thousand men laid down their arms before one thousand.* Bonaparte, saved by his presence of mind on this occasion, gave his orders for the conflict that was about to ensue. He added fresh troops to those which had already been despatched upon Salo. The division of Despiniois was united with that of Sauret, and both, taking advantage of the ascendancy of victory, were to attack Quasdanovich, and throw him back definitively into the mountains. He led all the rest to Castiglione. In the night he arrived there, and, without taking a moment's rest, mounted a fresh horse, and hastened to the field of battle, to make his dispositions. The coming day was to decide the fate of Italy.

It was in the plain of Castiglione that this battle was to be fought. A series of heights, formed by the last range of hills belonging to the Alps, extends from Chiesa to the Mincio, by Lonato, Castiglione, and Solferino. At the foot of these heights lies the plain that was to serve for the field of battle. The two armies were there in presence of each other, perpendicularly to the line of the heights on which both supported one wing; Bonaparte his left, Wurmser his right. Bonaparte had, at most, twenty-two thousand men; Wurmser thirty thousand. The latter had another advantage: his wing, which was in the plain, was covered by a redoubt placed on the knoll of Medolano. Thus it was supported on both sides. To counterbalance these advantages of number and position, Bonaparte reckoned upon the ascendancy of victory, and upon his manœuvres. Wurmser would naturally

* This fact has been questioned by one historian, M. Botta, but it is confirmed by all the accounts; and I have received an attestation of its authenticity from M. Aubernon quarter-master-general of the active army, who reviewed the four thousand prisoners.

strive to extend himself on his right, which was supported upon the line of the heights, in order to open a communication towards Lonato and Salò. This was what Bayalitsch had done two days before, and this was what would scarcely fail to be done by Wurmser, all whose wishes must tend to a junction with his great detachment. Bonaparte resolved to favour this movement, from which he hoped to derive important advantage. He had now at hand Serrurier's division, which, pursued by Wurmser ever since it had left Mantua, had not yet been able to enter into line. It was coming by way of Guirdizzolo. Bonaparte ordered it to debouch towards Cauriana, on Wurmser's rear. He waited for his fire to begin the combat.

By daybreak the two armies were in action. Wurmser, impatient to attack, moved his right along the heights; Bonaparte, to favour this movement, drew back his left, formed by Massena's division: he kept his centre immovable in the plain. He soon heard Serrurier's fire. Then, while he continued to draw back his left, and Wurmser to prolong his right, he ordered the redoubt of Medolano to be attacked. At first he directed twenty pieces of light artillery upon that redoubt, and, after briskly cannonading it, he detached General Verdier, with three battalions of grenadiers, to storm it. That brave general advanced, supported by a regiment of cavalry, and took the redoubt. The left flank of the Austrians was thus uncovered, at the very moment when Serrurier, arriving at Cauriana, excited alarm upon their rear. Wurmser immediately moved part of his second line upon his right, deprived of support, and placed it *en potence* to make head against the French who were debouching from Medolano. The rest of his second line he moved back to cover Cauriana, and thus continued to make head against the enemy. But Bonaparte, seizing the moment with his wonted promptness, immediately ceased to refuse his left and his centre; he gave Massena and Augereau the signal which they were impatiently awaiting. Massena, with the left, Augereau with the centre, rushed upon the weakened line of the Austrians, and charged it with impetuosity. Attacked so briskly on its whole front, and threatened on its left and its rear, it began to give way. The ardour of the French redoubled. Wurmser, seeing his army compromised, gave the signal for retreat. He was pursued, and some prisoners were taken. To put him completely to the rout, it would have been necessary to make double haste, and to push him in disorder upon the Mincio. But, for six days,* the troops had been marching and fighting without intermission; they were unable to advance farther, and slept on the field of battle. Wurmser had on that day lost only two thousand men, but he had nevertheless lost Italy.

On the following day, Augereau proceeded to the bridge of Borghetto, and Massena before Peschiera. Augereau commenced a cannonade, which was followed by the retreat of the Austrians; and Massena fought a rear-guard action with the division which had masked Peschiera. The Mincio was abandoned by Wurmser; he again took the road to Rivoli between the Adige and the Lake of Garda, to regain the Tyrol. Massena followed him to Rivoli and to La Corona, and resumed his old positions. Augereau appeared before Verona. The Venetian provveditore, in order to give the Austrians time to evacuate the city and to save their baggage, demanded a respite of two hours before opening the gates; Bonaparte ordered them to be broken open with cannon-balls. The Veronese, who were devoted

* "It has been said that, during these extraordinary six days, Bonaparte never once took off his boots, nor lay down upon a bed."—*Bourrienne*. E.

to the cause of Austria, and who had openly manifested their sentiments at the moment of the retreat of the French, dreaded the wrath of the conqueror, but they experienced at his hands the utmost lenity.

Towards Salò and La Chiesa, Quasdanovich was effecting an arduous retreat behind the Lake of Garda. He halted and attempted to defend a defile called La Rocca d'Anfo; but he was beaten and lost twelve hundred men. The French had soon recovered all their old positions.

This campaign had lasted six days; and in that short space of time some thirty thousand men had put sixty thousand *hors de combat*.* Wurmser had lost twenty thousand men, seven or eight thousand of whom were killed, and twelve or thirteen thousand prisoners. He was driven into the mountains, and it was utterly impossible for him to keep the field. Thus had this redoubtable expedition vanished before a handful of brave men. These extraordinary results, unexampled in history, were owing to the promptness and vigour of resolution of the young commander. While two formidable armies covered both shores of the Lake of Garda, and the courage of all was shaken, he had known how to reduce the whole campaign to a single question—the junction of the two armies at the extremity of the Lake of Garda. He had known how to make a great sacrifice, that of the blockade of Mantua, in order to concentrate his forces at the decisive point; and, dealing tremendous blows to each of the enemy's masses in turn, at Salò, at Lonato, and at Castiglione, he had successively disorganized them, and driven them back into the mountains from which they had issued.

The Austrians were struck with consternation; the French transported with admiration of their young chief. Their confidence in and devotion to him were at their height. One battalion could put three to flight. The old soldiers, who had made him corporal at Lodi, promoted him to sergeant at Castiglione. In Italy the sensation was profound. Milan, Bologna, Ferrara, the towns in the duchy of Modena, and all the friends of liberty, were transported with joy. Grief pervaded the convents and all the old aristocracies. Venice, Rome, and Naples, the governments which had committed imprudences, were terror-stricken.

Bonaparte, judging soundly of his position, did not consider the struggle as at an end, though he had deprived Wurmser of twenty thousand men. The old marshal was retiring into the Alps with forty thousand. He was going to rest, to rally, to recruit them, and it was to be presumed that he would pounce once more upon Italy. Bonaparte had lost a few thousand men, in prisoners, killed, and wounded; he had a great number in the hospitals: he thought it best to continue to temporize, to keep his eyes constantly upon the Tyrol, and his feet upon the Adige, and to content himself with overawing the Italian powers until he should have time to chastise them. He therefore merely took care to apprise the Venetians that he was informed of their armaments, and continued to make them furnish him with supplies at their own cost, still postponing the negotiations for an alliance. He had learned the arrival at Ferrara of a papal legate, who had come to resume possession of the legations. He summoned him to his head-quarters. This legate, who was Cardinal Mattei,† fell at his feet, saying, *Peccavi*. Bonaparte put him

* "In the different engagements between the twenty-ninth of July and the twelfth of August, the French army took 15,000 prisoners, 70 pieces of cannon, and nine stand of colours; and killed or wounded 25,000 men. The loss of the French army was 7,000 men."—*Montholon*. E

† "Cardinal Mattei was born at Rome in 1744. Compelled, in the year 1810, to repair to France with his colleagues, he was banished by Napoleon to Rhetel, for refusing

under arrest in a seminary. He wrote to M. d'Azara, who was his go-between with the courts of Rome and Naples, complained to him of the imbecility and of the insincerity of the papal government, and declared his determination to turn back very soon upon it, if he were obliged to do so. With regard to the court of Naples, he assumed the most threatening language. "The English," said he to M. d'Azara, "have persuaded the King of Naples that he was something; I will soon prove to him that he is nothing. If he persists, in despite of the armistice, in arraying himself against us, I solemnly engage, before the face of Europe, to march against his pretended seventy thousand men with six thousand grenadiers, four thousand horse, and forty pieces of cannon."

He wrote a polite but firm letter to the Duke of Tuscany, who had suffered the English to occupy Porto Ferrajo, and told him that France had certainly had it in her power to punish him for this negligence by occupying his dominions, but that she forbore to do so for old friendship's sake. He changed the garrison of Leghorn, in order to awe Tuscany by a movement of troops. To Genoa he was silent. He wrote a strong letter to the King of Sardinia, who tolerated the Barbets in his territories, and despatched a column of twelve hundred men, with a roving military commission to seize and shoot all Barbets found on the roads. The people of Milan had shown the most amicable dispositions towards the French. He addressed to them a delicate and noble letter, expressing his thanks.* His recent victories gave him the strongest hopes of retaining Italy. He thought that he might proceed further with the Lombards; he granted them arms, and permitted them to raise a legion in their own pay, in which a great number of Italians and the Poles wandering over Europe since the last partition, enrolled themselves. Bonaparte testified his satisfaction to the people of Bologna and Ferrara. Those of Modena desired to be emancipated from the regency established by the duke; Bonaparte had already some motives for breaking the armistice, for the regency had transmitted supplies to the garrison of Mantua. He resolved, however, to wait awhile. He solicited reinforcements of the Directory to repair his losses, and remained at the entrance of the gorges of the Tyrol, ready to rush upon Wurmser and to destroy the remains of his army, as soon as he should learn that Moreau had crossed the Danube.

During these important events in Italy, others were in progress on the Danube. Moreau had pushed the archduke foot by foot, and had arrived in the middle of Thermidor (the first days of August) on the Danube. Jourdan was on the Naab, which falls into that river. The chain of the Alb, which separates the Neckar from the Danube, is composed of mountains of middling height, terminating in a plateau, crossed by defiles, narrow as fissures in rocks. It was by these defiles that Moreau had debouched upon the Danube, in an unequal country, intersected by ravines, and covered with wood. The archduke, who entertained the design of concentrating himself on the Danube, and recovering strength on that powerful line, suddenly formed a resolution which had well nigh compromised his judicious plans. He received intelligence that Wartensleben, instead of falling back

to be present at his marriage with Maria Louisa. The Cardinal died in 1820."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E.

* "After the victory of Castiglione, Bonaparte returned his thanks to the Milanese in the name of the republic. 'Your people,' he said, 'render themselves daily more worthy of liberty, and they will, no doubt, one day appear with glory on the stage of the world.'"—*Moniteur*. E.

upon him as near as possible to Donauwerth, was falling back towards Bohemia, under the foolish idea of covering it. He was apprehensive lest, profiting by this false movement, which uncovered the Danube, the army of the Sambre and Meuse should attempt to cross it. He resolved, therefore, to cross it himself, in order to file rapidly along the other shore, and to go and make head against Jourdan. But the river was encumbered by his magazines, and it would take him some time to clear them out. He had, besides, no intention to execute the passage before the face of Moreau, and within reach of his blows, and he conceived the idea of removing him, by giving him battle with the Danube at his back—a bad idea, for which he has since severely censured himself, since it rendered him liable to be thrown into the river, or at least not to reach it entire, an indispensable condition for the success of his ulterior designs.

On the 24th of Thermidor (August 11), he halted before Moreau's positions, to make a general attack upon him. Moreau was at Neresheim, occupying the positions of Dunstelingen and Dischingen by his right and his centre, and that of Nordlingen by his left. The archduke, wishing in the first place to remove him farther from the Danube, in the next to cut him off, if possible, from the mountains by which he had debouched, and lastly, to prevent him from communicating with Jourdan, attacked him in order to attain all his ends on all the points at once. He succeeded in turning the right of Moreau and in dispersing all his flankers; he advanced to Heidenheim almost close to his rear, and excited such alarm that all his artillery fell back. At the centre he attempted a vigorous attack, but it was not sufficiently decisive. On the left, towards Nordlingen, he made threatening demonstrations. Moreau was not intimidated either by the demonstrations made upon his left, or by the excursion behind his right; and, judging very correctly that the essential point was at the centre, did the reverse of what is done by ordinary generals, who are always alarmed when their wings are threatened: he weakened his wings to strengthen the centre. His precaution was judicious, for the archduke, redoubling his efforts at the centre towards Dunstelingen, was repulsed with loss. Both armies passed the night on the field of battle.

Next day Moreau found himself greatly embarrassed by the retrograde movement of his parks, which left him without ammunition. He nevertheless conceived that he ought to make amends by daring, and to affect an intention to attack. But the archduke, in a hurry to recross the Danube, had no mind to renew the combat; he retreated with great firmness to the Danube, repassed it unmolested by Moreau, and broke down the bridges as far as Donauwerth. There he learned what had passed between the two armies which had operated by the Mayn. Wartensleben had not thrown himself into Bohemia, as he feared, but had remained on the Naab, in presence of Jourdan. The young Austrian prince then formed an admirable resolution, which was the consequence of his long retreat, and which was calculated to decide the campaign. His aim, in falling back upon the Danube, had been to concentrate himself there, that he might have it in his power to act upon one or other of the two French armies with a superior mass of forces. The battle of Neresheim might have thwarted this plan, if, instead of being uncertain, it had been positively disastrous. But, having retreated unhurt to the Danube, he could now take advantage of the separation of the French armies, and fall upon one of the two. He consequently resolved to leave General Latour, with thirty-six thousand men, to occupy Moreau, and to proceed himself with twenty-five thousand towards War

tensleben, in order to overwhelm Jourdan by this junction of forces. Jourdan's army was the weaker of the two. At so great a distance from his base, he numbered little more than forty-five thousand men. It was evident that he could not resist, and that he was even likely to be exposed to great disasters. Jourdan being beaten and driven back to the Rhine, Moreau, on his part, could not remain in Bavaria, and the archduke might even proceed to the Neckar, and anticipate him on his line of retreat. This conception has been considered the most judicious of any that the Austrian generals have to boast during these long wars. Like those which at the same moment shed lustre on the genius of Bonaparte in Italy, it belonged to a young man.

The archduke set out from Ingoldstadt on the 29th of Thermidor, (August 16), five days after the battle of Neresheim. Jourdan, placed on the Naab, between Naaburg and Schwandorf, was not aware of the storm that was gathering over his head. He had detached General Bernadotte* to Neumarkt, on his right, with a view to put himself in communication with Moreau—an object which it was impossible to accomplish, and for which a detached corps was uselessly compromised. With this detachment, the archduke, coming from the Danube, must necessarily fall in. General Bernadotte, attacked by superior forces, made an honourable resistance, but was obliged rapidly to recross the mountains by which the army had debouched from the valley of the Mayn into that of the Danube. He retired to Nuremberg. The archduke, having despatched a corps in pursuit

* "Jean Baptiste Jules Bernadotte was born in 1764. His father was a lawyer. In 1780 the son entered the military profession, and was still a sergeant in 1789. When the Revolution broke out, he embraced its principles with enthusiasm, and obtained quick promotion in the army. In 1794 he was general of division at the battle of Fleurus: and in 1796 he served in Jourdan's army. He afterwards led reinforcements to the army of Italy; and shortly before the 18th of Fructidor, Bonaparte chose him to carry to the Directory the banners taken at the battle of Rivoli. After the treaty of Campo Formio, Bernadotte was appointed ambassador of the French republic to the court of Vienna. He was next placed in the ministry of war, but, being speedily removed from office, retired into private life till the 18th of Brumaire, when Napoleon called him to the council of state. Here he opposed the establishment of the order of the Legion of Honour, which gave great umbrage to the First Consul. In 1804, on the establishment of the Empire, Bernadotte was created a marshal, and soon afterwards received the grand decoration of the Legion of Honour. He greatly distinguished himself at the battle of Austerlitz, and, in the same year, the Emperor created him Prince of Ponte-Corvo. From the close of 1807 to 1809 he commanded the French army which remained in the north of Germany. At the battle of Wagram he led the Saxon allies who fought with great skill and bravery. In consequence, however, of an altercation with the Emperor, he quitted the service, and went to Paris. In 1810 he was appointed successor to the Swedish throne, by the name of Charles John. In 1813 he issued a formal declaration of war against Napoleon, placed himself at the head of the Swedish army in Germany, and contributed greatly to the victory of the allies at Leipzig. In the following year he obtained the cession of Norway to Sweden. In 1818 he succeeded to the throne by the title of Charles XIV.; and since his accession has done everything in his power to promote the welfare and happiness of his subjects, with whom he is deservedly popular. His son, Oscar, the crown prince, who was born in 1799, is said to be a young man every way worthy of his father. It is remarkable that Bernadotte is the only sovereign who has retained a throne acquired during the late wars in Europe."—*Encyclopedia Americana*. E.

"Bernadotte," said Napoleon, "was ungrateful to me, as I was the author of his greatness; but I cannot say that he betrayed me; he in a manner became a Swede, and never promised that which he did not intend to perform. I can accuse him of ingratitude, but not of treachery. Neither Murat nor he would have declared against me, had they thought it would have lost me my throne. Their wish was, to diminish my power, but not to destroy me altogether. Bernadotte is a Gascon, a little inclined to boasting."—*A Voice from St. Helena*. E.

of him, proceeded with the rest of his forces against Jourdan. The latter having received intelligence that a reinforcement was coming, and being apprized of the danger which Bernadotte had incurred, and of the retreat which he was obliged to make upon Nuremberg, resolved to recross the mountains himself. At the moment when he was commencing his march, he was attacked, at once, by the archduke and Wartensleben; he had a difficult combat to sustain at Amberg, and lost his direct route to Nuremberg. Thrown, with his artillery, his infantry, and his cavalry, into cross-roads, he incurred the greatest dangers, and was eight days in making a most difficult but a most honourable retreat, both for the troops and for himself. He found himself once more on the Mayn, at Schweinfurt, on the 12th of Fructidor (August 29), purposing to proceed to Wurtzburg, to halt there, to rally his corps, and to try the fortune of arms.

While the archduke was executing this admirable movement upon the army of the Sambre and Meuse, he afforded Moreau occasion to execute a similar one, equally masterly and equally decisive. An enemy never attempts any daring stroke without uncovering himself and opening favourable chances to his adversary. Moreau, having no more than thirty-eight thousand men opposed to him, might easily have overwhelmed them by acting with a little vigour. He might have done still more (in the opinion of Bonaparte and the Archduke Charles), he might have made a movement, the results of which would have been immense. He should himself have followed the march of the enemy, have fallen upon the archduke, as that prince was himself falling upon Jourdan, and have got unawares upon his rear. The archduke, caught between Jourdan and Moreau, would have incurred incalculable dangers. But for this purpose he must have executed a very extensive movement, suddenly changed his line of operation, and thrown himself from the Neckar upon the Mayn; he must, moreover, have disobeyed the instructions of the Directory, which ordered him to support himself upon the Tyrol, with a view to turn the enemy's flanks and to communicate with the army of Italy. The young conqueror of Castiglione would not have hesitated to take this bold step and to have committed such a disobedience, which would have decided the campaign in a victorious manner; but Moreau was incapable of such a determination. He remained several days on the banks of the Danube, ignorant of the departure of the archduke, and leisurely exploring a position that was then but little known. Being, at length, apprized of the movement which had taken place, he was alarmed for Jourdan; but, not daring to take any vigorous determination, he resolved to cross the Danube and to advance into Bavaria, to try to draw the archduke back upon him, while adhering to the plan prescribed by the Directory. It was, however, easy to judge that the archduke would not quit Jourdan till he had put him *hors de combat*, and that he would not suffer himself to be diverted from the execution of a vast plan by an incursion into Bavaria. Moreau, nevertheless, crossed the Danube after Latour and approached the Lech. Latour showed an intention to dispute the passage of the Lech; but, too much extended to support himself there, he was obliged to abandon it, after being worsted in an action at Friedberg. Moreau then approached Munich: on the 15th of Fructidor (September 1) he was at Dachau, Pfaffenhofen, and Geisenfeld.

Thus Fortune began to be less favourable to us in Germany, owing to a vicious plan, which, separating our armies, rendered them liable to be beaten singly. Other results were preparing in Italy also. We have seen that Bonaparte, after he had driven back the Austrians into the Tyrol, and

resumed his old positions on the Adige, meditated fresh designs against Wurmser. Not content with having destroyed twenty thousand of his men, he wished to ruin his army entirely. This operation was indispensable for the execution of all his plans in Italy. Wurmser destroyed, he could make a push as far as Trieste, ruin that port, so important for Austria, then return to the Adige, give law to Venice, Rome, and Naples, whose ill-will was still as manifest as ever, and at length throw out the signal of liberty in Italy, by constituting Lombardy, the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, and perhaps even the duchy of Modena, an independent republic. In order to accomplish these plans, he resolved to ascend into the Tyrol, certain of being now seconded by the presence of Moreau, on the other slope of the Alps.

While the French troops were taking about three weeks' rest, Wurmser had reorganized and reinforced his. New detachments from Austria, and the Tyrolese militia, enabled him to increase his army to nearly fifty thousand men. The Aulic Council sent him a new chief of the staff, General Lauer, of the engineers, with fresh instructions respecting the plan to be pursued for taking the line of the Adige. Wurmser was to leave eighteen or twenty thousand men under Davidovich, to guard the Tyrol, and to descend with the rest, by the valley of the Brenta, into the plains of the Vincentine and the Paduan. The Brenta rises not far from Trent, recedes from the Adige in the form of an arch, again becomes parallel to that river in the plain, and discharges itself into the Adriatic. A causeway, commencing at Trent, leads into the valley of the Brenta, and, running through Bassano, terminates in the plains of the Vincentine and the Paduan. Wurmser would have to pass through this valley, in order to debouch in the plain and to attempt the passage of the Adige between Verona and Legnago. This plan was not better conceived than the preceding, for it was still attended with the inconvenience of dividing him into two corps and placing Bonaparte between them.

Wurmser entered into action at the same moment as Bonaparte. The latter, ignorant of Wurmser's designs, but foreseeing, with rare sagacity, that, during his excursion to the extremity of the Tyrol, the enemy might possibly try the line of the Adige, from Verona to Legnago, left General Kilmaine at Verona, with a reserve of nearly three thousand men, and with all the means of resisting for two days at least. General Sahuguet remained, with a division of eight thousand men, before Mantua. Bonaparte set out with twenty-eight thousand, and ascended by all the three roads of the Tyrol, that which runs behind the Lake of Garda and the two which border the Adige. On the 17th of Fructidor (September 3), Sauret's division, now become Vaubois', after passing behind the Lake of Garda, and fighting several actions, arrived at Torbole, near the upper extremity of the lake. On the same day, Massena's and Augereau's divisions, which, at first, proceeded along both banks of the Adige, and afterwards formed a junction on one bank by means of the bridge of Golo, arrived before Seravalle. They fought an advanced-guard action, and took some prisoners from the enemy.

The French had now to ascend a narrow and deep valley. On their left they had the Adige, on their right lofty mountains. In places, the river, running close to the foot of the mountains, left only the breadth of the causeway, and thus formed frightful defiles to pass. In penetrating into the Tyrol, there was more than one of this kind to encounter. But the

French, daring and active, were as fit for this kind of warfare as for that which they had just been carrying on in the extensive plains of the Mantuan.

Davidovich had placed two divisions, one in the camp of Mori, on the right bank of the Adige, to make head against Vaubois' division, which was advancing along the causeway from Salo to Roveredo, behind the Lake of Garda; the other at San Marco, on the left bank, to guard the defile against Massena and Augereau. On the 18th of Fructidor (September 4th), the French and Austrians found themselves in presence of each other. It was Wukassowich's division that defended the defile of San Marco. Bonaparte, instantly adopting the kind of tactics suited to the situation, formed two corps of light infantry, and distributed them on the right and left on the surrounding heights. Then, after he had fatigued the Austrians for some time, he formed the 18th demi-brigade into close column by battalions, and ordered General Victor* to force the defile with it. A violent combat ensued; the Austrians, at first, kept their ground, but Bonaparte decided the action by directing General Dubois to charge at the head of the hussars. That brave general rushed upon the Austrian infantry, broke it, and fell pierced with three balls. He was borne away expiring. "Before I die," said he to Bonaparte, "let me know if we are conquerors." The Austrians fled on all sides and retired to Roveredo, a league distant from Marco. They were pursued at a run. Roveredo is at some distance from the Adige; Bonaparte directed Rampon, with the 32d, towards the space between the river and the town; and Victor, with the 18th, upon the town itself. The latter entered the main street of Roveredo at the charge step, swept the Austrians before him, and reached the other extremity of the town at the very moment when Rampon was completing the exterior circuit of it. While the principal army was thus carrying San Marco and Roveredo, Vaubois' division arrived by the other bank of the Adige. The Austrian division of Reuss had disputed with it the camp of

* "Perrin Victor was born in 1766. In his fifteenth year he entered the army as a private soldier, and by his good conduct at Toulon obtained the rank of general of brigade. From the breaking out of the Revolution to the battle of Friedland he was almost constantly in the field, and his gallantry in that great action procured him his marshal's baton. On the peace of Tilsit, Victor was appointed governor of Berlin, but he had been only fifteen months there when he was sent to Spain, where he remained from 1808 to 1812, while his troops on more than one occasion disgraced themselves by shameful excesses. At the battle of Talavera, Victor was defeated by Sir Arthur Wellesley with the loss of about ten thousand men. After an unsuccessful, though tedious siege of Cadiz, the marshal, whom the Emperor had now created Duke of Belluno, was summoned to the Russian campaign. At the Beresina, Dresden, Leipzig, and Hanau, Victor fought nobly, and equally so on the invasion of France by the allies in 1814. After incredible efforts at Nangis and Villeneuve, and seeing his son-in-law killed before his face, he took a few hours' rest at Salins. This greatly enraged Napoleon, who had commanded him to pursue the allies to Montereau without intermission, and he told him that his command was given to another, and that he might go about his business. The tears streamed down the marshal's cheeks as he replied, 'No, sire, I will not leave the service. Victor was once a grenadier, and has not forgotten how to use the musket. I will take my place in the ranks with the soldiers of the guard.' The Emperor, affected by this proof of fidelity, stretched out his hand to the marshal, and said, 'I cannot return you your command, since another has it, but you may head two brigades of my guard.' The veteran did so, and throughout the remainder of the campaign, fought with the most determined bravery. On the return of Napoleon from Elba, Victor followed Louis to Ghent, and on the second restoration was made a French peer, and minister of war in 1821. At a subsequent period, he was sent as ambassador to Vienna."—*Court and Camp of Bonaparte*. E.

Mori, but Vaubois had just carried it, and all the divisions were now united about noon, on both banks of the river, near Roveredo. But the most difficult task was yet to be performed.

Davidovich had rallied his two divisions upon his reserve, in the defile of Calliano—a formidable defile, and dangerous in a very different way from that of Marco. At this point, the Adige, running close to the mountains, left but the width of the causeway between its bed and their foot. The entrance of the defile was closed by the castle of La Pietra, which connected the mountain with the river and was crowned with artillery.

Bonaparte, persisting in his tactics, distributed his light infantry on the right upon the declivities of the mountain, and on the left upon the banks of the river. His soldiers, born on the banks of the Rhone, the Seine, or the Loire, equalled the hunters of the Alps in boldness and agility. Some, climbing from rock to rock, attained the summit of the mountain, and poured down a perpendicular fire upon the enemy; others, not less intrepid, glided along the river, venturing wherever they could find a footing, and turned the castle of La Pietra. General Dommartin placed a battery of light artillery in a situation where it produced the best effect; the castle was taken. The army then passed through it, and advanced in close column upon the Austrian army, crowded together in the defile. Artillery, cavalry, infantry, were intermingled, and fled in frightful disorder. Young Lemarois, aide-de-camp of the general in chief, with a view to prevent the flight of the Austrians, dashed away at full gallop at the head of fifty hussars, passed through the whole length of the Austrian mass, then suddenly facing about, attempted to stop the van. He was struck from his horse, but he spread terror in the Austrian ranks, and gave the cavalry which hastened after him, time to pick up several thousand prisoners. Thus ended that series of actions which made the French army master of the defiles of the Tyrol, the town of Roveredo, the whole of the Austrian artillery, and four thousand prisoners, exclusively of killed and wounded. Bonaparte called this affair the battle of Roveredo.

On the following day, the 16th of Fructidor (September 5th), the French entered Trent, the capital of the Italian Tyrol. The bishop had fled. Bonaparte, in order to appease the Tyrolese, who were strongly attached to the house of Austria, addressed to them a proclamation, in which he exhorted them to lay down their arms and not to commit hostilities against his army, promising that, on this condition, their property and public establishments should be respected. Wurmser was no longer at Trent. Bonaparte had surprised him at the moment when he was marching to execute his plan. On seeing the French enter the Tyrol, for the purpose of communicating perhaps with Germany, Wurmser was only the more disposed to descend by the Brenta, in order to possess himself of the Adige during their absence. He even hoped, by means of this rapid circuit, which would bring him to Verona, to enclose the French in the upper valley of the Adige, and at once to envelop them and to cut them off from Mantua. He had set out two days before, and must already have reached Bassano. Bonaparte immediately formed one of the boldest of resolutions. He determined to leave Vaubois to guard the Tyrol, and to hasten himself through the gorges of the Brenta, after Wurmser. He could not take with him more than twenty thousand men, and Wurmser had thirty; he might be cooped up in those frightful gorges, if Wurmser should make head against him; he might also come too late to fall upon the rear of Wurmser, and the latter might have time to force the Adige. All this was possible

but his twenty thousand men were as good as thirty; if Wurmser attempted to oppose him and to shut him up in the gorges, he would cut his way through his army; if he had twenty leagues to go, he would perform that distance in two days and reach the plain as soon as Wurmser. He would then drive him back either upon Trieste or upon the Adige. If he drove him upon Trieste, he would pursue him and burn that port before his face; if he drove him upon the Adige, he would hem him in between his army and the river, and thus envelop the enemy who thought to catch him in the gorges of the Tyrol.

This young man, whose conceptions and resolutions were prompt as lightning, ordered Vaubois, on the very day of his arrival at Trent, to proceed to the Lavis, and to take that position from the rear-guard of Davidovich. He made Vaubois execute this order before his face, pointed out to him the position which he was to occupy with his ten thousand men, and then set out with twenty thousand to dash through the gorges of the Brenta.

He started on the morning of the 20th (September 6th), and passed the night at Levico. Next morning, the 21st (September 7th), he resumed his march, and arrived before another defile, called the defile of Primolano, where Wurmser had placed a division. Bonaparte employed the same manœuvres as before, threw tirailleurs upon the heights and upon the bank of the Brenta, and then ordered a column to charge upon the road. The defile was taken. There was a small fort beyond it; this was surrounded and carried. A few intrepid soldiers, running forward along the road, outstripped the fugitives, stopped them, and gave the army time to come up and secure them. Three thousand prisoners were taken. Bonaparte arrived in the evening at Cismona, after marching twenty leagues in two days. He would have advanced farther, but the soldiers were unable to proceed; he was himself exhausted with fatigue. He had distanced his head-quarters, and had neither attendants nor victuals. He partook of the ammunition bread of one of the soldiers,* and lay down to wait with impatience for the morrow.

This daring and unexpected march filled Wurmser with astonishment. He could not conceive how his foe could have ventured into those gorges, at the risk of being shut up there. He was at Bassano, which closed the outlet, and he resolved to bar the passage with his whole army. If he succeeded in the attempt, Bonaparte would be taken in the bend of the Brenta. He had already sent the division of Mezaros to try Verona; but he recalled it that he might combat here with all his forces; it was not probable, however, that the order would arrive in time. The town of Bassano is seated on the left bank of the Brenta. It communicates with the right bank by a bridge. Wurmser placed the two divisions of Schlotterndorf and Quasdanovich on the two banks of the Brenta, in advance of the town, and six battalions as an advanced guard in the defiles which precede Bassano and close the valley.

On the morning of the 22d (September 8th), Bonaparte left Cismona and advanced towards Bassano. Massena marched on the right bank, Augereau on the left. The defiles were carried, and the French debouched in presence of the enemy's army, drawn up on both banks of the

* "Napoleon, in his eagerness to pursue the enemy, outrode all his suite, and passed the night alone, wrapped in his cloak, on the ground, in the midst of a regiment of infantry who bivouacked round the town. A private soldier shared with him his rations, and reminded him of it, after he became emperor, in the camp at Boulogne"—*Alton*. E.

Brenta. Wurmser's soldiers, disconcerted by their audacity, did not resist with the courage which they had shown on so many other occasions. They gave way, were broken, and entered Bassano.* Augereau appeared at the entrance of the town. Massena, on the opposite bank, resolved to penetrate by the bridge. He carried it in close column, like that of Lodi, and entered the place at the same time as Augereau. Wurmser, whose headquarters were still there, had only to escape, leaving us four thousand prisoners and an immense *matériel*. Bonaparte's plan was thus realized. He had reached the plain as soon as Wurmser, and it was now his business to envelop him by driving him backward upon the Adige.

Wurmser, in the disorder of so hurried an action, found himself separated from the remains of Quasdanovich's division. This division retired towards the Friule; and he, pressed by Massena's and Augereau's divisions, which cut him off from the road to the Friule, and drove him towards the Adige, formed the resolution of forcing a passage across that river and throwing himself into Mantua. He had been rejoined by the division of Mezaros, which had made vain efforts to take Verona. He now numbered no more than fourteen thousand men, eight of which were infantry, and six excellent cavalry. He proceeded along the Adige, seeking a passage everywhere. Luckily for him, the post which guarded Legnago had been removed to Verona, and a detachment which was to come and occupy the place had not yet arrived. Wurmser, profiting by this accident, took possession of Legnago. Certain of being now able to regain Mantua, he gave some rest to his troops, who were overwhelmed with fatigue.

Bonaparte followed him without intermission. He was deeply mortified on hearing of the negligence which had saved Wurmser; he did not, however, despair of still preventing him from reaching Mantua. He transferred Massena's division to the other bank of the Adige by means of the ferry of Ronco, and directed it upon Sanguinetto, to bar the road to Mantua. He directed Augereau towards Legnago itself. Massena's advanced guard, outstripping his division, entered Cerea on the 25th (September 11), at the moment when Wurmser was arriving there from Legnago with his whole *corps d'armée*. This advanced guard of cavalry and light infantry, commanded by Generals Murat and Pigeon, made a most heroic resistance, but was overthrown; Wurmser forced his way through it and continued his march. Bonaparte arrived alone at a gallop, at the moment of this action; he narrowly escaped being taken, and rode off in the utmost haste.†

* "Napoleon, the same night, visited the field of battle at Bassano, and he told this anecdote of it at St. Helena: 'In the deep silence of a beautiful moonlight night,' observed the Emperor, 'a dog, leaping suddenly from beneath the clothes of his dead master, rushed upon us, and then immediately returned to his hiding-place, howling piteously. He alternately licked his master's face, and again flew at us; thus at once soliciting aid, and threatening revenge. Whether owing to my own particular mood of mind at the moment, the time, the place, or the action itself, I know not, but certainly no incident on any field of battle ever produced so deep an impression on me. I involuntarily stopped to contemplate the scene. This man, thought I, must have had among his comrades friends; and yet here he lies, forsaken by all, except his dog! What a strange being is man, and how mysterious are his impressions! I had without emotion ordered battles which were to decide the fate of armies; I had beheld with tearless eyes the execution of those operations in the course of which numbers of my countrymen were sacrificed; and here my feelings were roused by the mournful howling of a dog! Certainly at that moment I should have been easily moved by a suppliant enemy, and I could very well imagine Achilles surrendering up the body of Hector at the sight of Priam's tears.'—*Las Cases*. E.

† "The Austrians fought with the courage of despair, and their cavalry, which was unbroken, and whose spirit had not suffered by disaster, proved irresistible to their

Wurmser passed through Sanguinetto; then, being informed that all the bridges over the Molenilla were broken down excepting that of Villimpenta, he descended to that bridge, crossed the Molenilla, and marched for Mantua. General Charton attempted to oppose him with three hundred men formed into a square. Those brave fellows were all killed or taken. Thus Wurmser arrived at Mantua on the 27th (September 13). These slight advantages served to soothe the old and brave marshal under his disasters. He spread himself over the environs of Mantua, and, for a moment, kept the field, owing to his numerous and excellent cavalry.

Bonaparte arrived breathless and enraged against the negligent officers, who had caused him to lose so important a prize. Augereau had re-entered Legnago, and had made the Austrian garrison prisoners. It consisted of sixteen hundred men. Bonaparte ordered Augereau to proceed to Governolo on the Lower Mincio. He then commenced a series of petty actions with Wurmser, to draw him out of the place, and in the night between the 28th and 29th (September 14 and 15) he took a backward position to induce Wurmser to show himself in the plain. The old general, enticed by his slight successes, actually deployed outside Mantua, between the citadel and the suburb of St. George. Bonaparte attacked him on the 3d, complementary day (September 19). Augereau, coming from Governolo, formed the left; Massena, starting from Due Castelli, formed the centre; and Sahuguet, with the blockading corps, formed the right. Wurmser still had twenty-one thousand men in line. He was forced back everywhere, and driven into the place with the loss of two thousand men. Some days afterwards he was entirely shut up in Mantua. The numerous cavalry which he had brought back with him was useless, and served only to increase the number of unprofitable mouths; he, therefore, ordered the horses to be killed and salted. He had some twenty thousand men in garrison, several thousand of whom were in the hospitals.

Thus, though Bonaparte had partly lost the fruit of his most daring march to the Brenta, and had not forced the marshal to lay down his arms, he had entirely ruined and dispersed his army. Some thousand men were driven back into the Tyrol under Davidovich; and some thousand were fleeing into the Friule under Quasdanovich. Wurmser, with twelve or fourteen thousand, had shut himself up in Mantua. Thirteen or fourteen thousand were prisoners, six or seven thousand slain or wounded. Thus this army had lost about twenty thousand men, besides a considerable *matériel*, in ten days. Bonaparte had lost seven or eight thousand, fifteen hundred of whom were prisoners, and the rest killed, wounded, or sick. Thus to the armies of Colli and Beaulieu, destroyed on entering Italy, was to be added that of Wurmser, destroyed twice over, in the plains of Castiglione and on the banks of the Brenta. To the trophies of Montenotte, Lodi, Borghetto, Lonato, and Castiglione, were to be added those of Roveredo, Bassano, and St. George. At what period of history had such great results been seen, so many enemies slain, so many prisoners, colours, and cannon, taken! These tidings diffused fresh joy in Lombardy, and terror in the

enemies. Napoleon himself, who had come up during the engagement, had great difficulty in saving himself by flight; and Wurmser, who arrived a few minutes after, deemed himself so secure of his antagonist that he recommended to his dragoons to take him alive. Having missed so brilliant a stroke, the old marshal continued his march, passed the Molenilla, cut to pieces a body of eight hundred infantry which endeavoured to interrupt his progress, and entered Mantua in a species of triumph which threw a ray of glory over his long series of disasters."—*Alison* E.

farthest extremities of the Peninsula. France was transported with admiration for the commander of the army of Italy.

Moreau had advanced upon the Lech, as we have seen, in the hope that his progress in Bavaria would bring back the archduke and extricate Jourdan. This hope was not well founded, and the archduke would have ill appreciated the importance of his movement had he relinquished its execution to return towards Moreau. The whole campaign depended on what was about to take place on the Mayn. If Jourdan were beaten and driven back upon the Rhine, the progress of Moreau would serve only to compromise him still more, and to expose him to the risk of losing his line of retreat. The archduke, therefore, contented himself with despatching General Nauendorf, with ten regiments of cavalry and some battalions, to reinforce Latour, and continued his pursuit of the army of the Sambre and Meuse.

That brave army retired with the deepest regret, retaining the entire consciousness of its strength. It was this army that had performed the greatest and the most brilliant exploits during the first years of the Revolution. It was this army that had conquered at Watignies, at Fleurus, on the banks of the Ourthe and of the Roer. It had a warm esteem for its general and a strong confidence in itself. This retreat had not disheartened it, and it was persuaded that it yielded solely to superior combinations and to the mass of the hostile forces. It ardently desired an occasion for measuring its strength with the Austrians, and re-establishing the honour of its flag. Jourdan desired it too. The Directory wrote to him that he must at all hazards maintain his ground in Franconia on the Upper Mayn, in order to take up his winter-quarters in Germany, and more particularly not to uncover Moreau, who had advanced to the very gates of Munich. Moreau, on his part, had acquainted Jourdan, by a despatch dated the 8th of Fructidor (August 25), with his march beyond the Lech, the advantages which he had gained there, and his intention of advancing still farther with a view to bring back the archduke. All these reasons induced Jourdan to try the fortune of arms, though he had before him a very superior force. He would have deemed it derogatory to his honour had he quitted Franconia without fighting, and left his colleague by himself in Bavaria. Misled, moreover, by the movement of General Nauendorf, Jourdan conceived that the archduke had set out again for the banks of the Danube. He halted, therefore, at Wurtzburg, a place which he judged it important to preserve, but of which the French retained the citadel alone. He there gave some rest to his troops, made some changes in the distribution and the command of his divisions, and declared his intention to fight. The army displayed the greatest ardour in carrying all the positions which Jourdan deemed it advisable to occupy before he gave battle. He had his right supported upon Wurtzburg, and the rest of his line upon a series of positions extending along the Mayn to Schweinfurth. The Mayn separated him from the enemy. Part of the Austrian army only had crossed that river, which confirmed him in the idea that the archduke had gone back to the Danube. He left at the extremity of his line Lefebvre's division at Schweinfurth, to secure his retreat upon the Saale and the Fulda, in case the result of the battle should cut him off from the road to Frankfurt. He thus deprived himself of a second line and of a corps of reserve; but he conceived that he owed this sacrifice to the duty of securing his retreat. He determined to attack on the morning of the 17th of Fructidor (September 3).

During the night between the 16th and 17th, the archduke, apprized of

the plan of his adversary, caused the rest of his army quickly to cross the Mayn and deployed a very superior force before Jourdan's face. The battle commenced, at first with advantage to us; but our cavalry being attacked in the plains extending along the Mayn by the powerful cavalry of the Austrians, was broken, rallied, was again broken, and sought shelter behind the lines and the steady fire of our infantry. Jourdan, if his reserve had not been at too great a distance from him, might have won the victory; he sent to Levebvre officers, who could not penetrate through the numerous squadrons of the enemy. He hoped, nevertheless, that Lefebvre, seeing that Schweinfurth was not threatened, would march to the place of danger; but he waited in vain, and made his army fall back in order to withdraw it from the formidable cavalry by which it was assailed. The retreat was made in good order upon Arnstein. Jourdan, the victim of the vicious plan of the Directory, and of his attachment to his colleague, was now under the necessity of retiring to the Lahn. He continued his march with out intermission, ordered Marceau to retire from before Mayence, and arrived behind the Lahn on the 24th of Fructidor (September 10). His army, in its arduous march to the very frontiers of Bohemia, had not lost more than five or six thousand men. It sustained a sensible loss in the death of young Marceau, who was struck by the ball of a Tyrolese rifleman, and who could not be removed from the field of battle. The Archduke Charles caused every attention to be paid to him, but he soon expired. The young hero, regretted by the two armies, was buried under a discharge of the artillery of both.*

During these occurrences on the Mayn, Moreau, still beyond the Danube and the Lech, was waiting with impatience for tidings from Jourdan. None of the officers sent to bring him intelligence had arrived. He hesitated, without venturing to take any resolution. Meanwhile, his left, under the command of Desaix, had to sustain a most violent attack from the cavalry of Latour, which, united with Nauendorf's, debouched unawares by Langenbrück. Desaix made such judicious and such prompt dispositions, that he repulsed the numerous squadrons of the enemy, and dispersed them in the plain, after inflicting upon them a considerable loss. Moreau, still left in uncertainty, at length decided, after a delay of about three weeks, to attempt a movement for the purpose of gaining intelligence. He resolved to approach the Danube, in order to extend his left wing to Nuremberg, and to obtain tidings of Jourdan, or to afford him succour. On the 24th of fructidor, he directed his left and his centre to recross the Danube, and left his right alone on the other side of the river, near Zell. The left, under Desaix, advanced as far as Aichstett. In this singular situation, he extended his left towards Jourdan, who at the moment was sixty leagues distant from him: he had his centre on the Danube, and his right beyond it, exposing one of those three corps to the risk of being destroyed, if Latour had been capable of taking advantage of their separation. All military men have censured Moreau for this movement, as one of those half means

* "During the night of the 16th, after an obstinate engagement, the republicans sounded a retreat under cover of a thick fog, which long concealed their movements from the Austrians; and when it cleared away on the following morning, they found all their positions abandoned. The pursuit was continued with vigour, and on the 19th a serious engagement took place with the rear-guard at Altenkirchen, where General Marceau was severely wounded, and fell into the hands of the imperialists. The archduke, who admired his great military qualities paid him the most unremitting attention, but, in spite of all his care, he died a few days after, and was buried with military honours, amidst the tears of his generous enemies."—*Jomini*. E.

which have all the danger of grand measures without any of their advantages. Moreau having, in fact, missed the opportunity of briskly falling upon the archduke when the latter was falling upon Jourdan, could only expose himself to danger by thus placing himself *à cheval* upon the Danube.

At length, after waiting four days in this singular situation, he became aware of the danger, moved back beyond the Danube, and thought of ascending it in order to approach his base of operation. He then received intelligence of the forced retreat of Jourdan on the Lahn, and he had no doubt that the archduke, after forcing back the army of the Sambre and Meuse, would fly to the Neckar to cut off the retreat of the army of the Rhine. He was likewise informed of an attempt made by the garrison of Mannheim upon Kehl, with a view to destroy the bridge by which the French army had entered Germany. In this state of things, he hesitated no longer to march for the purpose of regaining France. His position was perilous. In the heart of Bavaria, having to recross the Black Mountains to return to the Rhine, having in front Latour with forty thousand men, and likely to find the Archduke Charles with thirty thousand on his rear, he could not help foreseeing incalculable dangers. But, if he had not that vast and ardent genius which his rival displayed in Italy, he was endowed with a resolute mind, inaccessible to those alarms with which impetuous dispositions are sometimes seized. He had a superb army, some six y thousand strong, whose courage had not been shaken by any defeat, and which placed extreme confidence in its leader. Duly appreciating such a resource, he was not frightened at his position, and resolved quietly to regain his route. Thinking that the archduke, after forcing Jourdan to fall back, would probably return to the Neckar, he was apprehensive lest he should find that river already occupied; he therefore ascended the valley of the Danube, to proceed direct to that of the Rhine by way of the forest towns. These passes, being the most distant from the point where the archduke then was, appeared to him to be the safest.

He remained, therefore, beyond the Danube, and ascended it quietly, supporting one of his wings upon the river. His artillery and his baggage marched before him, without confusion; and every day his rear-guard bravely repulsed the enemy's advanced guards. Latour, instead of crossing the Danube, and striving to prevent Moreau from entering the defiles, was content to follow him step by step, without daring to attack him. On reaching the Lake of Federsee, Moreau thought fit to halt. Latour had divided his forces into three corps; he had given one to Nauendorf, and sent him to Tübingen on the Upper Neckar, through which Moreau did not mean to pass; he was himself with the second at Biberach; and the third was at a great distance, at Schussenried. Moreau, who was approaching the Höllenthal, by which he intended to retreat, who wished not to be too closely pressed in the passage of that defile, who saw Latour by himself before him, and who was aware that a victory must impart firmness to his troops during the rest of the retreat, halted on the 11th of Vendémiaire (October 2) in the environs of the Lake of Federsee, not far from Biberach. The country was hilly, wooded, and intersected by valleys. Latour was ranged on several heights, which it was possible to cut off from one another and to turn, and which, moreover, were backed by a deep ravine, that of the Riss. Moreau attacked him at all points, and cleverly contriving to penetrate through his positions, attacking some in front and turning others, he drove him back to the Riss, threw him into it,

and took from him four thousand prisoners. This important victory, called after the town of Biberach, drove back Latour to a great distance, and remarkably increased the courage of the French army. Moreau resumed his march and approached the defiles. He was already past the roads which run through the valley of the Neckar and lead into that of the Rhine. The road which passes through Tuttlingen and Rothweil was yet left to him, towards the very sources of the Neckar, follows the valley of the Kintzig, and terminates at Kehl, but this Nauendorf had already occupied. The detachments which had come from Mannheim had already joined the latter, and the archduke was approaching him. Moreau preferred to ascend a little higher, and to pass through the Höllenthal, which, running through the Black Forest, formed a longer elbow, but led to Breisach, much farther from the archduke. Accordingly, he placed Desaix and Ferino, with the left and the right, towards Tuttlingen and Rothweil, to cover himself on the side next to the outlets where the principal Austrian forces were; and he sent the centre, under St. Cyr,* to force the Höllenthal. At the same time, he made his heavy artillery file off for Huningen by way of the forest towns. The Austrians had surrounded him with a multitude of petty corps, as if they had hoped to envelop him, and had not left themselves strong enough anywhere to resist him. St. Cyr found scarcely a detachment in the Höllenthal, proceeded without difficulty to Neustadt, and arrived at Freiburg. The two wings immediately followed, and debouched through that frightful defile into the valley of the Rhine, rather with the attitude of a victorious army than with that of an army in retreat.

Moreau reached the valley of the Rhine on the 21st of Vendémiaire (October 12). Instead of recrossing the Rhine at the bridge of Breisach, and ascending along the French bank to Strasburg, he resolved to ascend the right bank to Kehl in the face of the whole hostile army. Whether he thought to give more *éclat* to his return, or hoped to maintain himself on the right bank to cover Kehl by proceeding directly thither, these reasons have been deemed insufficient for risking a battle. Had he recrossed the Rhine at Breisach, he might have ascended unmolested to Strasburg, and then debouched again by Kehl. That *tête de pont* was capable of maintaining a resistance long enough to give him time to arrive. To determine, on the contrary, to march in face of the hostile army, the whole of which

* "Gouvion St. Cyr was born in the year 1764. In his youth he was designed for a painter, and he even travelled through Italy to perfect himself in his art. But his predilection for the profession of arms was irresistible; so that when the Revolution broke out he entered into a company of volunteers, and was soon sent to join the French armies on the Rhine. In 1795 he commanded a division, and fought under Pichegru, Moreau, and Massena, by all of whom he was esteemed, not only for his extensive knowledge of tactics, but for his virtues. With Bonaparte, however, he was never a favourite. There was, in fact, a downright simplicity about him, and as for flattery, he knew not what it meant. The Legion of Honour was open to him, and he was appointed colonel-general of the cuirassiers, but, though one of the ablest officers in the army, he was not for many years made a marshal. He expected that dignity as a reward for reducing some fortresses in Spain, but he was soon afterwards superseded by Augereau, and punished with two years' exile from the imperial presence. At the close of the Russian campaign, St. Cyr, at length marshal, commanded the corps of Oudinot, who had been severely wounded. He fought at the battle of Dresden, and was left in that city when Napoleon fell back on Leipsic. On the restoration, Louis received him favourably, and raised him to the chamber of peers. During the Hundred Days he retired into the country, and on the King's return, was rewarded with the portfolio of war. In 1819 he quitted office, and went into retirement."—*Court and Camp of Bonaparte*. E.

was again assembled under the archduke, and thus to expose himself to a general engagement, with the Rhine at his back, was an inexcusable imprudence, now that he had no longer the motive either of taking the offensive or of protecting a retreat. On the 28th of Vendémiaire (October 19), both armies were in presence, on the banks of the Elz, from Waldkirch to Emmendingen. After a sanguinary and varied conflict, Moreau perceived the impossibility of proceeding to Kehl along the right bank, and resolved to cross over the bridge of Breisach. Conceiving, however, that he could not pass his whole army over this bridge without the risk of encumbering it, and being anxious to send a force as speedily as possible to Kehl, he ordered Desaix with the left wing to cross again at Breisach, and returned towards Huningen with the centre and the right. This determination has been deemed not less imprudent than that of fighting at Emmendingen; for Moreau, weakened by the separation of one-third of his army, was liable to be compromised. He reckoned, it is true, upon a position, that of Schliengen, which covers the débouché of Huningen, and upon which he could halt and fight, in order to render his passage quieter and safer. Accordingly, he fell back to it, halted there on the 3d of Brumaire (October 24), and fought an obstinate and drawn battle. Having, by means of this engagement, afforded time for his baggage to cross, he evacuated the position during the night, passed over to the left bank, and proceeded towards Strasburg.

Thus ended that celebrated campaign and that still more celebrated retreat. The result sufficiently indicates the faultiness of the plan. If, as Napoleon, the Archduke Charles, and General Jomini have demonstrated, the Directory, instead of forming two armies, advancing in separate columns, under different generals, in the petty view of attacking the enemy's flanks, had formed a single army of one hundred and sixty thousand men, a detachment of which, fifty thousand strong, should have besieged Mayence, while the other one hundred and ten thousand, united into a single corps, should have invaded Germany by the valley of the Rhine, the Höllenthal, and Upper Bavaria, the imperial armies would have been forced to keep retreating, without being able to concentrate themselves with advantage against a too superior mass. The admirable plan of the young archduke would have been rendered impossible, and the republican flag would have been carried to Vienna itself. With the plan prescribed, Jourdan was a compulsory victim. Thus his campaign, always disastrous, was entirely one of obedience, as well when he first crossed the Rhine to draw the forces of the archduke upon him, as when he advanced into Bohemia and fought at Wurtzburg. Moreau alone, with his fine army, had it in his power to repair in part the vices of the plan, either by hastening to crush all that was before him at the moment when he débouched by Kehl, or by falling upon the archduke when the latter was following Jourdan. He either dared not, or had not the capacity, to do anything of the kind; but if he displayed not a spark of genius, if he preferred a retreat to a decisive and victorious manœuvre, at least he displayed in that retreat a great character and extraordinary firmness.* It was certainly not so difficult as it has been represented, but still it was conducted in the most imposing manner.

"Moreau, however consummate a commander, had not the fire or energy by which his younger rival, Bonaparte, was actuated; he trusted for success rather to skilful combinations or methodical arrangements, than to those master-strokes which are attended with peril, but frequently domineer over fortune by the intensity of the passions which they awaken among mankind."—*Alison*. E.

The young archduke was indebted to the vice of the French plan for a fine conception, which he executed with prudence; but, like Moreau, he lacked that ardour, that daring, which might have rendered the fault of the French government fatal to its armies. Only conceive what might have happened, had there been on either side that impetuous genius which had just destroyed three armies beyond the Alps! Had Moreau's sixty thousand men, at the moment when they debouched from Kehl, had the Imperialists, at the moment when they quitted the Danube to fall upon Jourdan, been led with the impetuosity displayed in Italy, most assuredly the war would have been terminated immediately in a disastrous manner for one of the two powers.

This campaign earned the young archduke a high reputation in Europe. In France, infinite obligation was felt to Moreau, for having brought back safe and sound the army compromised in Bavaria. Extreme anxiety had been felt on account of that army, especially after the moment when, Jourdan having fallen back, the bridge of Kehl being threatened, and a multitude of petty corps having intercepted the communications through Swabia, people knew not what had become or what was likely to become of it. But when, after these painful apprehensions, it was seen debouching into the valley of the Rhine with so firm an attitude, they were enchanted with the general who had so happily brought it back. His retreat was extolled as a prodigy of the art, and immediately compared with that of the Ten Thousand. People durst not, it is true, place anything beside those brilliant triumphs of the army of Italy; but as there are always numbers of men, whom superior genius and extraordinary fortune offend, and who are better pleased with less brilliant merit, all these ranged themselves on Moreau's side, expatiated on his prudence, his consummate ability, and ranked it above the ardent genius of the young Bonaparte. From that day Moreau had in his favour all who prefer second-rate faculties to superior faculties; and it must be confessed that, in a republic, we would almost forgive those enemies of genius when we observe what crimes genius is capable of committing against that liberty which has brought it forth, nourished, and raised it to the pinnacle of glory.

THE DIRECTORY

STATE OF FRANCE AFTER THE RETURN OF THE ARMIES FROM GERMANY—COMBINATIONS OF PITT—OPENING OF A NEGOTIATION WITH THE DIRECTORY—ARRIVAL OF LORD MALMESBURY IN PARIS—PEACE WITH NAPLES AND GENOA—FRUITLESS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE POPE—DEPOSITION OF THE DUKE OF MODENA—FOUNDATION OF THE CISPADANE REPUBLIC—MISSION OF CLARKE TO VIENNA—FRESH EFFORTS OF AUSTRIA IN ITALY—ARRIVAL OF ALVINZY—EXTREME DANGER OF THE FRENCH ARMY—BATTLE OF ARCOLE.

THE turn which the campaign in Germany had taken was prejudicial to the republic. Her enemies, who persisted in denying her victories, or in predicting severe reverses of fortune, saw their prognostics realized, and openly triumphed in consequence. Those rapid conquests in Germany had then no solidity. The Danube and the genius of a young prince had soon put an end to them. No doubt the rash army of Italy, which seemed so firmly established on the Adige, would be hurled from it in its turn and flung back upon the Alps, as the armies of Germany had been upon the Rhine. The conquests of General Bonaparte, it is true, seemed to rest upon a somewhat more solid foundation. He had not merely driven Colli and Beaulieu before him; he had destroyed them: he had not merely repulsed the new army of Wurmser; he had first disorganized it at Castiglione, and afterwards annihilated it on the Brenta. There was somewhat more hope, therefore, of remaining in Italy than of remaining in Germany; but people took delight in circulating alarming rumours. Numerous forces were coming, it was said, from Poland and Turkey, to proceed towards the Alps; the imperial armies of the Rhine would now be able to send away fresh detachments, and General Bonaparte, having continually new enemies to fight, would, with all his genius, find an end to his successes, were it only from the exhaustion of his army. It was natural that, in the existing state of things, people should form such conjectures; for the imagination, after exaggerating successes, is sure to exaggerate reverses also.

The armies of Germany had retired without great losses, and occupied the line of the Rhine. In this there was nothing particularly disastrous; but the army of Italy was without support, and that was a serious disadvantage. Moreover, our two principal armies, having returned to the French territory, would now be at the charge of our finances, which were still in a deplorable state: and this was the greatest calamity. The mandates having ceased to have the forced currency of money, had fallen to nothing, besides, they were expended, and there were scarcely any remaining at the disposal of the government. They were in Paris, in the hands of a few speculators, who sold them to the purchasers of national domains. The

amount due was still considerable, but it did not come in; the arrears of taxes and the forced loan were slowly collected; the national domains sold were partly paid for; the instalments still due were not demandable according to law; the sales that were still taking place were considerable enough to replenish the exchequer. For the rest, the government subsisted upon the produce of these sales, as well as upon the articles of consumption proceeding from the land-tax, and upon the promises of payment made by the ministers. The budget for the year V had just been made up. It was divided into ordinary and extraordinary expenses. The ordinary expenses amounted to four hundred and fifty millions, the others to five hundred and fifty. The land-tax, the customs, the stamp-duties, and all the annual proceeds, were expected to cover the ordinary expenditure. The five hundred and fifty millions of the extraordinary would be amply covered by the arrears of the taxes of the year IV and of the forced loan, and by the instalments yet to be paid for the domains sold. There was another resource still in the domains which the republic yet possessed; but all this required to be realized first, and therein lay the same difficulty as ever. The contractors, remaining unpaid, refused to continue their advances, and all the public services were aground at once. The public functionaries and the annuitants were not paid, and were perishing of hunger.

Thus the insulated state of the army of Italy and our finances were likely to give great hopes to our enemies. From the project of a quadruple alliance between France, Spain, the Porte, and Venice, formed by the Directory, nothing had resulted but the alliance with Spain. The latter, induced by our offers and our brilliant fortune in the middle of the summer, had decided, as we have seen, to renew the family compact with the republic, and she had just published her declaration of war against Great Britain. Venice, in spite of the solicitations of Spain and the invitations of the Porte, and in spite of Bonaparte's victories in Italy, had refused to ally herself with the republic. To no purpose it had been represented to her that Russia coveted her colonies in Greece, and Austria her Illyrian provinces; that her union with France and the Porte would secure her against these two ambitious enemies by associating her with powers who could not covet any of her possessions; that the reiterated victories of the French on the Adige must insure her against a return of the Austrian armies, and against the vengeance of the emperor; that the concurrence of her forces and of her navy would render that return still more impossible; that neutrality, on the contrary, would not gain her any friend, but leave her without protector, and perhaps even expose her to the danger of serving as a medium of accommodation between the belligerent powers. Venice, filled with hatred of the French, equipping armaments evidently destined against her, since she consulted the Austrian ministry on the choice of a general, refused a second time the alliance proposed to her. She clearly perceived the danger from the Austrian ambition; but the danger of French principles was greater, more urgent, in her estimation, and she replied that she should persist in the unarmed neutrality, which was false, for she was arming on all sides. The Porte, shaken by the refusal of Venice, by the suggestions of Vienna and of England, had not yet acceded to the project of alliance. There was left, therefore, only France and Spain, whose union could contribute to wrest the Mediterranean from the English, but might also compromise the Spanish colonies. Pitt had, in fact, conceived the idea of exciting them to insurrection against the mother country, and he already had intrigues on foot in Mexico. The negotiations with Genoa were not

concluded; for they involved at once the payment of a sum of money, the expulsion of certain families, and the recall of certain others. With Naples they were not finished, because the Directory demanded a contribution, and the queen, who negotiated with despair, refused to comply. Peace with Rome was not made, on account of a condition required by the Directory: it insisted that the Holy See should revoke all the briefs issued against France since the commencement of the Revolution, which severely hurt the pride of the aged pontiff. He summoned a council of cardinals, which decided that the revocation could not take place.* The negotiations were broken off. They were renewed at Florence; a congress was opened. The envoys of the Pope having repeated that the briefs issued could not be revoked, and the French commissioners having replied on their part, that the condition was a *sine qua non*, they separated in a few minutes. The hopes of succour from the King of Naples and from England supported the Pope in his refusals. He had just sent Cardinal Albani to Vienna, to implore the aid of Austria and to concert with her as to his resistance.

Such were the relations of France with Europe. Her enemies, on their part, were much exhausted. Austria was cheered, it is true, by the retreat of the armies which had advanced to the Danube; but she was very uneasy respecting Italy, and was making fresh preparations to recover it. England was reduced to an extremely deplorable situation: her footing in Corsica was precarious, and she saw herself likely soon to lose that island. The French wished to close all the ports of Italy against her, and one fresh victory gained by General Bonaparte would be sufficient to decide her entire expulsion from that country. War with Spain was about to close the Mediterranean against her and to threaten Portugal. The whole coast, as far as the Texel, was interdicted to her. The expedition which Hoche was preparing alarmed her for Ireland; her finances were in peril, the Bank was shaken, the people wished for peace; the Opposition had been strengthened by the recent elections. These were very urgent reasons for thinking of peace, and for taking advantage of the late reverses of France to induce her to accept it. But the royal family and the aristocracy had a strong dislike to treat with France, because, in their estimation, it was treating with the Revolution. Pitt, much less attached to aristocratic principles, and intent solely on the interests of the English power, would certainly have been glad of peace, but on one condition, indispensable with him, and inadmissible for the republic—the restitution of the Netherlands to Austria. Pitt, as we have already remarked, was wholly English in pride, ambition, and prejudices. The greatest crime of the Revolution was, according to his notions, not so much the giving birth to a colossal republic as the incorporation of the Netherlands with France.

The Netherlands were, in fact, an important acquisition for France. That acquisition gave her, in the first place, the possession of the most fertile and wealthy provinces of the continent, and, above all, of manufacturing provinces; it gave her the mouths of the rivers most important to the commerce of the North, the Scheldt, the Meuse, and the Rhine; it gave her a considerable increase of coast, and consequently of shipping;

* "The college of Cardinals having rejected the proposals of France, as containing articles contrary to conscience, the Pope declared his determination to abide by the utmost extremity, rather than accede to conditions destructive, degrading, and, in his opinion, impious. The Directory instantly determined on the total ruin of the Pope and of his power, both spiritual and temporal."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E.

it gave her seaports of high importance, especially Antwerp; it gave her lastly, a prolongation of our maritime frontier in a quarter the most dangerous to the English frontier, opposite to the defenceless coasts of Essex, Suffolk, Norfolk, and Yorkshire. Besides this positive acquisition, the Netherlands conferred on us another advantage: Holland must fall under the immediate influence of France when no longer separated from her by Austrian provinces. In this case, the French line would extend not only to Antwerp but to the Texel, and the English shores would be encompassed by a girdle of hostile shores. Add to this a family compact with Spain, then powerful and well organized, and we shall easily conceive that Pitt must have felt some uneasiness respecting the maritime power of England. It is, in fact, a principle with every Englishman thoroughly imbued with his national ideas, that England ought to have control at Naples, Lisbon, and Amsterdam, in order to have a footing on the continent and to break the long line of coast which might be opposed to her. This principle was as deep-rooted in 1796 as that which caused any injury done to France to be considered as a benefit done to England. In consequence, Pitt, in order to procure a moment of respite for his finances, would gladly have consented to a temporary peace, but upon condition that the Netherlands should be restored to Austria. He thought, therefore, of opening a negotiation on this basis. He could not hope that France would admit such a condition, for the Netherlands were the principal acquisition of the Revolution, and the constitution did not even allow the Directory to treat for their alienation. But Pitt knew little about the continent. He sincerely believed that France was ruined, and he was in good earnest when he came to proclaim every year the exhaustion and the fall of the republic. He thought that if France had ever been disposed to peace, it was at that moment, as well on account of the fall of the mandates, as on account of the retreat of the armies from Germany. At any rate, whether he considered the condition admissible or not, he had a stronger reason for opening a negotiation. This was the necessity of complying with the public opinion, which loudly demanded peace. In fact, in order to obtain the levy of sixty thousand militia and fifteen thousand seamen, it behoved him to prove, by a signal step, that he had done his utmost to treat. He had another motive not less important. In taking the initiative, and opening a solemn negotiation in Paris, he had the advantage of concentrating there the discussion of all the European interests and preventing the commencement of any separate negotiation with Austria. This latter power was, in fact, much less intent on recovering the Netherlands than England was on restoring them to her. To Austria the Netherlands were a distant province, which was detached from the centre of her empire, exposed to continual invasions from France, and deeply imbued with revolutionary ideas; a province which she had several times thought of exchanging for other possessions in Germany or Italy, and which she had kept solely because Prussia had always opposed her aggrandizement in Germany, and because combinations admitting of her aggrandizement in Italy had not presented themselves. Pitt thought that a solemn negotiation opened in Paris, on behalf of all the allies, would prevent individual combinations and any private arrangement relative to the Netherlands. *Lastly, he wished to have an agent in France who could judge of her from actual observation, and to obtain authentic information respecting the expedition preparing at Brest. Such were the reasons which, even without any hope of obtaining peace, decided Pitt to make an overture to the Directory. He did not

confine himself, as in the preceding year, to an insignificant communication from Wickham to Barthelemy. He demanded passports for an envoy invested with the powers of Great Britain. In this emphatic procedure of the most implacable foe of our republic there was something glorious for her. The English aristocracy was thus forced to ask peace of the regicide republic. The passports were immediately granted. Pitt selected Lord Malmesbury, son of the author of "Hermes." This nobleman had not the character of being a friend to republics: he had contributed to the oppression of Holland in 1787. He arrived in Paris, with a numerous retinue, on the 2d of Brumaire (October 23, 1796).

The Directory appointed Delacroix, the minister, to represent it. The two negotiators met at the hotel of Foreign Affairs, on the 3d of Brumaire (October 24). The minister of France exhibited his powers. Lord Malmesbury declared himself to be sent by Great Britain and her allies, in order to treat for a general peace. He then exhibited his powers, which were signed by England alone. The French minister then asked if he was commissioned by the allies of Great Britain to treat in their name. Lord Malmesbury replied that, as soon as the negotiation was opened, and the principle on which it could be based was admitted, the King of Great Britain was sure of obtaining the concurrence and the powers of his allies. His lordship then delivered to Delacroix a note from his court, stating the principle upon which the negotiation was to be based. This principle was that of compensations for conquests between the powers. England, it was stated in this note, had made conquests in the colonies; France had made conquests on the continent from the allies of England; there was, therefore, restitution to be made on both sides. But it would be necessary to agree upon the principle of these compensations, before entering into explanations concerning the objects that were to be compensated. We see that the English cabinet forebore to speak out positively concerning the restitution of the Netherlands, and submitted a general principle, lest it should cause the negotiation to be broken off as soon as it was opened. Delacroix replied that he would refer the matter to the Directory.

The Directory could not give up the Netherlands. This was not in its power, and it ought not, if it had been able. France had engagements of honour towards those provinces, and could not expose them to the vengeance of Austria by restoring them to her. Besides, she had a right to indemnities for the unjust war that had been made upon her; she had a right to compensation for the aggrandizements which Austria, Prussia, and Russia, had gained in Poland by the perpetration of a political outrage; it was her duty to tend invariably to give herself her natural limit; and, for all these reasons, it behoved her never to part with the Netherlands and to uphold the dispositions of the constitution. The Directory, firmly resolved to perform its duty on this point, had it in its power to break off immediately a negotiation, the evident aim of which was to propose to us the cession of the Netherlands and to prevent an arrangement with Austria; but it would thus have given occasion to say that it was averse to peace; it would have fulfilled one of the principal intentions of Pitt, and furnished him with excellent reasons for demanding fresh sacrifices of the English nation. It replied on the very next day. France, it stated, had already treated with most of the powers of the coalition, without their having invoked the concurrence of all the allies; to render the negotiation general was to render it interminable; it was giving room to believe that the present negotiation was not more sincere than the overture made in the

preceding year through the medium of Mr. Wickham. Besides, the English minister had not the powers of the allies, in whose name he spoke. Lastly, the principle of compensations was mentioned in a manner too general and too vague for it to be possible either to admit or to reject it. The application of this principle always depended on the nature of the conquests, and on the strength left to the belligerent powers for retaining them. "Thus," added the Directory, "the French government might spare itself the trouble of replying; but, to prove its desire of peace, it declares that it will be ready to listen to all the propositions as soon as Lord Malmesbury shall be furnished with the powers of all the other potentates in whose name he pretends to treat."

The Directory, which, in this negotiation, had nothing to conceal, and could therefore act with the greatest frankness, resolved to make the negotiation public, and to insert in the newspapers the notes of the English minister and the replies of the French minister. Accordingly, it published immediately the memorial of Lord Malmesbury, and the answer which it had returned. This mode of proceeding was of such a nature as somewhat to disconcert the crooked policy of the English cabinet, but, though deviating from ordinary practice, it was not at all derogatory to decorum. Lord Malmesbury replied that he would refer to his government. A singular plenipotentiary this, who had only such insufficient powers, and who, at every difficulty, was obliged to refer to his court! The Directory might have considered this as shuffling, and as indicating an intention to gain time by assuming the air of negotiating. It might even have taken umbrage at the presence of a foreigner, whose intrigues might be dangerous, and who came to discover the secret of our armaments: it, nevertheless, manifested no dissatisfaction; it permitted Lord Malmesbury to wait for the answers of his court, and, while thus waiting, to see Paris, the parties, their strength, and that of the government. The Directory, indeed, could only gain by so doing.

Meanwhile our situation was becoming perilous in Italy, notwithstanding the recent triumphs of Roveredo, Bassano, and St. George. Austria redoubled her efforts to recover Lombardy. In consequence of the guarantees given by Catharine to the emperor, for the security of Galicia, the troops which were in Poland had been marched towards the Alps. Owing also to the hope of maintaining peace with the Porte, the frontiers of Turkey had been stripped, and all the reserves of the Austrian monarchy directed towards Italy. A numerous and devoted population, furnished, moreover, powerful means of recruiting the armies. The Austrian administration displayed extraordinary zeal and activity in enlisting fresh men, incorporating them with the old troops, and in arming and equipping them. A fine army was thus preparing in the Friule, with the wrecks of Wurmser, the troops from Poland and Turkey, the detachments from the Rhine, and the recruits. Marshal Alvinzy* was appointed to the command of it. It was hoped that this third army would be more fortunate than the two preceding, and that it would succeed in wresting Italy from the young conqueror.

During this interval, Bonaparte was perpetually demanding reinforcements, and recommending negotiations with the Italian powers who were

* "Marshal Alvinzi, an officer of high reputation, which was then thought merited, was at this time seventy years of age. The marshal died in the year 1810." *Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E.

in his rear. He urged the Directory to treat with Naples, to renew the negotiations with Rome, to conclude with Genoa, and to negotiate an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the King of Sardinia, in order to procure succour in Italy if none could be sent to him from France. He desired to be permitted to proclaim the independence of Lombardy, and that of the states of the Duke of Modena, that he might gain himself partisans and auxiliaries strongly attached to his cause. His views were correct, and the distress of his army justified his urgent entreaties. The rupture of the negotiations with the Pope had stopped a second time the contribution imposed by the armistice of Bologna. Only one instalment of it had been paid. The contributions levied upon Parma, Modena, and Milan were exhausted, either by the expenses of the army or by the remittances made to the government. Venice supplied abundance of provisions, but the pay was in arrear. The amounts to be taken from foreign commerce at Leghorn were still in dispute. Amidst the richest countries in the world, the army began to suffer privations. But the greatest misfortune was the vacancy in its ranks, thinned by the Austrian cannon. It was not without great losses that it had destroyed so many enemies. It had been reinforced by nine or ten thousand men since the opening of the campaign, which made the number of the French who had entered Italy about fifty thousand; but, at this moment, it had at most thirty and some odd thousand; fighting and disease had reduced it to this small number. A dozen battalions from La Vendée had just joined, but they were singularly diminished by desertions; the other detachments which had been promised had not arrived. General Willot, who commanded in the South, and who was ordered to send several regiments to the Alps, detained them to quell the disturbances which his mismanagement and his bad spirit excited in the provinces under his command. Kellermann could not strip his line of troops, for he was still obliged to hold himself in readiness to curb Lyons and its environs, where the companies of Jesus were committing murders. Bonaparte asked for the 83d and the 40th, forming nearly six thousand good troops, and undertook to answer for the result if they should arrive in time.

He complained that he had not been commissioned to negotiate with Rome, because he should have expected the payment of the contribution before signifying the ultimatum. "So long," said he, "as your general shall not be the centre of everything in Italy, all will go wrong. It would be easy to accuse me of ambition, but I have only too much honour. I am ill; I can scarcely sit my horse; nothing is left me but courage, and that is insufficient for the post which I occupy. They can count us," added he; "the charm of our strength is dissolving. Troops, or Italy is lost!"

The Directory, feeling the necessity of depriving Rome of the support of Naples and of securing Bonaparte's rear, at length concluded a treaty with the court of the Two Sicilies. It desisted from any particular demand, and that court, which our recent victories on the Brenta had intimidated, which saw Spain making common cause with France, and was afraid of seeing the English driven from the Mediterranean, acceded, on its side, to the treaty. Peace was signed on the 19th of Vendémiaire (October 10). It was agreed that the King of Naples should withhold every kind of succour from the enemies of France, and that he should shut his ports against the armed vessels of the belligerent powers. The Directory then concluded its treaty with Genoa. One circumstance led to its conclusion. Nelson had taken a French ship within sight of the Genoese batteries. This violation of the neutrality deeply compromised the republic of Genoa; the

French party there became bolder, the party of the coalition more timid, and it was resolved to enter into an alliance with France. The ports of Genoa were closed against the English. Two millions were paid to us as an indemnity for the *Modeste* frigate, and two more were furnished by way of loan. The feudatory families were not exiled, but all the partisans of France, expelled from the territory and from the senate, were recalled and reinstated. Piedmont was anew solicited to conclude an alliance, offensive and defensive. The king was just dead; his young successor, Charles Emanuel, manifested very favourable dispositions towards France, but he was not content with the advantages offered to him as the price of his alliance. The Directory offered to guarantee his dominions, which nothing in that general convulsion, and amidst all the republics that were ready to start up, no other power could guarantee to him. But the new king, like his predecessor, insisted on having Lombardy given to him. This the Directory could not promise, being obliged to reserve equivalents in order to treat with Austria. The Directory then permitted Bonaparte to renew the negotiations with Rome, and gave him full powers for that purpose.

Rome had sent Cardinal Albani to Vienna. She had reckoned upon Naples, and in her eagerness she had offended the Spanish legation. Naples failing her, and Spain manifesting her dissatisfaction, she was alarmed, and the moment was favourable for treating with her. Bonaparte, in the first place, wanted his money: in the next, though he was not afraid of her temporal power, he dreaded her moral influence over the people. The two Italian parties, engendered by the French Revolution, and developed by the presence of our armies, became daily more and more exasperated against one another. If Milan, Modena, Reggio, Bologna, Ferrara, were the seat of the patriotic party, Rome was the seat of the monastic and aristocratic party. She had it in her power to excite fanatic fury, and to do us great mischief, especially at a moment when the question with the Austrian armies was not yet resolved. Bonaparte deemed it right to temporize a little longer. As a man of a free and independent mind, he despised all the fanaticism that restrains the human understanding; but, as a man of action, he dreaded those powers which are not to be controlled by force, and he chose rather to elude than to combat with them. Besides, though educated in France, he was born amidst Italian superstition. He did not share that dislike of the Catholic religion, so strong and so common among us, ever since the eighteenth century; and he had not the same repugnance to treat with the Holy See, as was felt in Paris. He purposed, therefore, to gain time, to spare himself a retrograde march through the Peninsula, to spare himself fanatical denunciations, and, if possible, to regain the sixteen millions carried back to Rome. He directed Cacault,* the minister, to disavow the demands made by the Directory in regard to matters of faith, and to insist on the purely material conditions alone. He selected Cardinal Mattei, whom he had confined in a convent, for the purpose of sending him to Rome: he set him at liberty, and commissioned him to go and speak to the Pope. "The court of Rome," he wrote to him, "desires war; it shall have war; but first I owe it to my nation and to humanity to make a final effort to bring back the Pope to reason. You are acquainted with the strength of the army which I command. To destroy the temporal power of the Pope, I need but to will it. Go to Rome, see his holiness, enlighten him

* "The French envoy, Cacault, was born at Nantes in the year 1742. During the consulate, he was chosen a member of the senate. He published a translation of *Lesving's* Historical Sketch of the Drama. He died in the year 1805." E.

on the subject of his true interests; rescue him from the intriguers by whom he is surrounded, who wish for his ruin and for that of the court of Rome. The French government permits me still to listen to words of peace. Everything may be arranged. War, so cruel for nations, has terrible results for the vanquished. Save the Pope from great calamities. You know how anxious I am to finish by peace a struggle which war would terminate for me without glory as without danger."

While he was employing these means to *cheat the old fox*, as he said, and to screen himself from the fury of fanaticism, he thought of kindling the spirit of liberty in Upper Italy, in order to oppose patriotism to superstition. All Upper Italy was in a state of great excitement. The Milanese, wrested from Austria; the provinces of Modena and Reggio, impatient of the yoke with which their old absent duke oppressed them, the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, withdrawn from the Pope; loudly demanded their independence and their organization into republics. Bonaparte could not proclaim the independence of Lombardy, for victory had not yet positively decided its fate; but he continued to give it hopes and encouragement. As for the provinces of Modena and Reggio, they were immediately contiguous to the rear of his army, and bordered on Mantua. He had a complaint to make against the regency, which had sent provisions to the garrison; he had recommended to the Directory not to give peace to the Duke of Modena, but to confine itself to the armistice, that it might be able to punish him if occasion required. As circumstances were daily becoming more difficult, he decided upon a vigorous stroke, without giving previous notice of it to the Directory. It was ascertained that the regency had again been in fault, and that it had violated the armistice by supplying Wurmser with provisions. He immediately declared the armistice broken, and, by virtue of the right of conquest, he expelled the regency, declared the Duke of Modena deposed, and the provinces of Reggio and Modena free. The enthusiasm of the Reggians and the Modenese was extraordinary. Bonaparte organized a municipal government to administer the country temporarily till it should be constituted. Bologna and Ferrara had already constituted themselves republics, and began to raise troops. Bonaparte resolved to unite those two legations with the states of the Duke of Modena, and to form with them a single republic, which, situated entirely on this side of the Po, should be called the *Cispadane Republic*. He thought that, if it were necessary at the peace to restore Lombardy to Austria, it might not be so to restore the Modenese and the legations to the Duke of Modena and the Pope; that there might thus be erected a republic, the daughter and friend of the French republic, which would be beyond the Alps the focus of French principles, and the asylum of the compromised patriots, whence liberty might some day spread over all Italy. He conceived that the enfranchisement of Italy was not to be accomplished at a single stroke; he considered the French government as too much exhausted to effect it at that moment, and he thought that it was requisite to sow, at least, the seeds of liberty in this first campaign. To this end, it was advisable to unite Bologna and Ferrara with Modena and Reggio. Local interests were adverse to this plan; but he hoped to conquer that opposition by his all-powerful influence. He repaired to those cities, was received with enthusiasm, and decided them to send to Modena one hundred deputies from all parts of their territory, to form a national assembly, which should be charged to constitute the *Cispadane Republic*. This assembly met on the 25th of Vendémiaire (October 16th), at Modena. It was composed of lawyers, landed proprietors, and

mercantile men. Restrained by the presence of Bonaparte, and directed by his counsels,* it showed the greatest discretion. It voted the incorporation of the two legations and of the duchy of Modena into a single republic; it abolished the feudal system, and decreed civil equality; it appointed a commissioner to organize a legion of four thousand men, and ordained the formation of a second assembly, which was to meet on the 5th of Nivose (December 25th), to deliberate upon a constitution. The Reggians displayed the greatest zeal. An Austrian detachment having quitted Mantua, they ran to arms, surrounded it, made it prisoner, and conducted it to Bonaparte. Two Reggians were killed in the action. They were the first martyrs of Italian independence.

Lombardy was jealous and alarmed at the favours conferred on the Cispadane Republic, and regarded them as a sinister omen for herself. She conceived that, as the French were constituting the legations and the duchy without constituting her, they intended to restore her to Austria. Bonaparte cheered the Lombards anew, represented to them the difficulties of his situation, and repeated that they must gain independence by seconding him in this arduous struggle. They resolved to increase to twelve thousand men the two Italian and Polish legions, the organization of which they had already commenced.

Bonaparte had thus surrounded himself with friendly governments, which were about to exert their utmost efforts to support him. Their troops, to be sure, were of no great account; but they were capable of undertaking the police of the conquered country, and in this manner they rendered disposable the detachments which he employed there. Supported by a few hundred French, they would be able to resist a first attempt of the Pope, if he were mad enough to make one. Bonaparte strove at the same time to cheer the Duke of Parma, whose states bordered on the new republic, whose friendship might be useful, and whose relationship with Spain commanded attention. He held out to him the possibility of gaining a few towns amidst the dismemberment of territories. He thus availed himself of all the resources of politics to make amends for the forces with which his government could not furnish him; and in this he did his duty to France and to Italy, and did it with all the skill of a veteran diplomatist.

Through his exertions, Corsica had just been emancipated. He had collected the principal refugees at Leghorn, given them arms and officers, and daringly thrown them upon the island to second the rebellion of the inhabitants against the English.† The expedition had been successful; his native country was delivered from the English yoke, and the Mediterranean was soon likely to be. There was ground to hope that the Spanish fleet, united with that of France, would in future close the Straits of Gibraltar against the English squadrons, and command the whole of the Mediterranean.

* "Never forget," said Bonaparte, in reply to the address of the Assembly, announcing its new form of government, "that laws are mere nullities without the force necessary to support them. Attend to your military organization, which you have the means of placing on a respectable footing; you will then be more fortunate than the people of France, for you will arrive at liberty, without passing through the ordeal of revolution." *Moniteur*. E.

† "Gentili and all the refugees landed in October, 1796, in spite of the English cruisers. The republicans took possession of Bastia and all the fortresses. The English hastily embarked. The King of England wore the Corsican crown only two years. This whim cost the British treasury five millions sterling. John Bull's riches could not have been worse employed."—*Napoleon's Memoirs*. E.

He had therefore employed the time which had elapsed since the occurrences on the Brenta in improving his position in Italy; but if he had rather less to fear from the princes of that country, the danger from Austria was only augmented, and his strength was still inadequate to ward it off. The 83d and the 40th demi-brigade were still detained in the South. He had twelve thousand men in the Tyrol under Vaubois, drawn up in front of Trent, on the bank of the Lavis; about sixteen or seventeen thousand, under Massena and Augereau, on the Brenta and Adige; lastly, eight or nine thousand before Mantua; which made his army amount to about thirty-six or thirty-eight thousand. Davidovich, who had remained in the Tyrol after Wurmser's disaster, with a few thousand men, had now eighteen thousand. Alvinzy was advancing from the Friule upon the Piave, with about forty thousand. Bonaparte was, therefore, in a critical situation, for, to oppose sixty thousand men, he had only thirty-six thousand, worn out by a campaign which comprehended three; and daily thinned by the fevers which they contracted in the rice-grounds of Lombardy. He wrote with grief to the Directory, and told them that he was on the point of losing Italy.*

The Directory, observing Bonaparte's danger, and unable to come soon enough to his assistance, thought of suspending hostilities immediately by means of a negotiation. Malmesbury was in Paris, as we have seen. He was waiting for the answer of his government to the communications of the Directory, which insisted that he should have the powers of all the governments, and that he should express himself more clearly on the principle of compensation for conquests. The English ministry, after a lapse of nineteen days, at length answered, on the 24th of Brumaire (November 14th), that the pretensions of France were unusual; that it was common for an ally to apply to treat in the name of her allies, before she had their formal authority; that England was sure of obtaining it, but it was first requisite that France should speak out distinctly respecting the principle of the compensations, the only basis upon which the negotiation could be opened. The English cabinet added that the reply of the Directory was full of very indecorous insinuations respecting the intentions of his Britannic majesty, that it was beneath him to answer them, and he should take no notice of them, that he might not impede the negotiation. On the same day, the Directory, wishing to be prompt and categorical, replied to Lord Malmesbury that it admitted the principle of compensations, but that it expected him to state immediately the objects to which that principle was to be applied.

The Directory could give this answer, without proceeding too far, since, while refusing to cede Belgium and Luxemburg, it could cede Lombardy

* Napoleon's letter to the Directory was in these terms: "Mantua cannot be reduced before the middle of February; you will perceive from that, how critical our situation is, and our political system is, if possible, still worse. The emperor has thrice reformed his army since the commencement of the campaign. Everything is going wrong in Italy. The *prestige* of our forces is dissipated. The enemy now count our ranks. It is indispensable that you take into your instant consideration the critical situation of the army in Italy. The influence of Rome is incalculable. You did wrong in breaking with that power; I would have temporized with it, as we have done with Venice and Genoa. Whenever the general in Italy is not the centre of negotiation as well as military operations, the greatest risks will be incurred. You may ascribe this language to ambition; but I am satiated with honours, and my health is so broken, that I must implore you to give me a successor. I can no longer sit on horseback. My courage alone is unshaken." E

and some other small territories. But for the rest this negotiation was evidently illusory; the Directory could not promise itself any benefit from it, and it resolved to frustrate the tricks of England by sending direct to Vienna a negotiator commissioned to effect a separate arrangement with the emperor. The first proposal which the negotiator was to make was, that of an armistice in Germany and Italy which was to last for at least six months. The Rhine and the Adige were to separate the armies of the two powers. The sieges of Kehl and Mantua were to be suspended. The provisions requisite for the daily consumption were to be sent every day into Mantua, so that, at the conclusion of the armistice, the two parties might be replaced in the situation in which they then were. France would thus gain the retention of Kehl, and Austria that of Mantua. A negotiation was to be opened immediately to treat for peace. The conditions offered by France were the following: Austria was to cede Belgium and Luxemburg to France; France was to restore Lombardy to Austria, and the Palatinate to the Empire; she would thus renounce, on the latter point, the line of the Rhine; she would consent, moreover, to indemnify Austria for the loss of the Netherlands by the secularization of several bishoprics of the empire. The emperor was not to interfere in any way in the affairs of France with the Pope, and she was to employ her influence in Germany to procure indemnities for the stadtholder. This was an indispensable condition, to insure the quiet of Holland, and to satisfy the King of Prussia, whose sister was the wife of the stadtholder. These conditions were extremely moderate, and proved the desire of the Directory to put an end to the horrors of war, and for the alarm which it had felt for the army of Italy.

For the bearer of these proposals the Directory chose General Clarke,* who was employed in the war office under Carnot. His instructions were signed on the 26th of Brumaire (November 16th). But it took time before

* "The father of Henri-Jacques-Guillaume Clarke, who was born in 1765, was an Irish adventurer, and colonel in the French army. Young Clarke received his education at the military school of Paris. In 1793 he was made general of brigade, but was soon afterwards imprisoned as a noble. On his release he introduced himself to Carnot, advocated extreme revolutionary doctrines, and was placed over the board of Topography. On the establishment of the Directory, he was sent on a secret mission to Vienna, and ultimately to Italy, to act as a spy on Bonaparte, who, however, found means to attach him to his interests. After the 18th of Brumaire, Clarke became the tool of the Consuls, and was employed on several important missions. In 1805 he was governor of Vienna, and afterwards of Erfurth and Berlin. In the latter city his conduct is said to have been distinguished by rapacity. After the peace of Tilsit he was appointed minister of war, obtained the grand cordon of the Legion of Honour, and the ducal title of Feltre. On the restoration he attached himself to the Bourbons, and in return was ranked among the new peers, and received the portfolio of war, from which, however, he was dismissed in 1817. He died in 1818, leaving behind him a large fortune."—*Court and Camp of Bonaparte*. E.

"Clarke," said the Emperor, "is not a man of talent, but he is laborious and useful in the bureau. He is moreover incorruptible, and saving of the public money. He is not a soldier, nor do I believe that he ever saw a shot fired in his life. He is infatuated with his nobility. He pretends that he is descended from the ancient kings of Scotland or Ireland. I sent him to Florence as ambassador, where he employed himself in nothing but turning over the old musty records of the place, in search of proofs of the nobility of my family, for you must know that they come from Florence. He plagued me with letters on this subject, which caused me to tell him to attend to his business, and not trouble his head or mine with his nonsense about nobility; that I was the first of my family. When I returned from Elba he offered me his services, but I sent him word that I would not employ traitors, and ordered him to his estates."—*Voices from St Helena*. E.

he could set out, arrive, be received, and heard; and during this interval events succeeded one another in Italy with extraordinary rapidity.

On the 11th of Brumaire (November 1st), Marshal Alvinzy had thrown bridges over the Piave, and advanced upon the Brenta. The plan of the Austrians, this time, was to attack at once by the mountains of the Tyrol and by the plain. Davidovich was to drive Vaubois from his positions, and to descend along both banks of the Adige to Verona. Alvinzy, on his part, was to cross the Piave and the Brenta, to advance upon the Adige, to enter Verona with the main body of the army, and there form a junction with Davidovich. The two Austrian armies were to start from this point, and to march in concert, to raise the blockade of Mantua and to deliver Wurmser.

Alvinzy, after crossing the Piave, advanced upon the Brenta, where Massena was posted with his division. The latter, having reconnoitred the enemy's force, fell back. Bonaparte marched to his support with Augereau's division. At the same time he directed Vaubois to make head against Davidovich in the valley of the Upper Adige, and to take from him, if possible, his position of the Lavis. He marched himself against Alvinzy, resolving, in spite of the disproportion of strength, to attack him impetuously, and to break him at the very outset of this new campaign. On the morning of the 16th of Brumaire (November 6th), he came in sight of the enemy. The Austrians had taken position in advance of the Brenta, from Carmignano to Bassano; their reserves had remained behind on the other side of the Brenta. Bonaparte directed his whole force against them. Massena attacked Liptai and Provera before Carmignano; Augereau attacked Quasdanovich before Bassano. The action was hot and bloody; the troops displayed great bravery; Liptai and Provera were driven beyond the Brenta by Massena; Quasdanovich was repulsed upon Bassano by Augereau. Bonaparte intended to enter Bassano the same day, but was prevented by the arrival of the Austrian reserves. He was obliged to defer the attack till the following day. Unfortunately, he received intelligence in the night that Vaubois had just experienced a reverse on the Upper Adige. That general had gallantly attacked the positions of Davidovich, and had, at first, obtained some advantages, but a panic had seized his troops, notwithstanding their tried bravery, and they had fled in disorder. He had rallied them in the famous defile of Calliano, where the army had deployed so daringly in the invasion of the Tyrol: he hoped to maintain his ground there, when Davidovich, sending a corps to the other bank of the Adige, had fallen upon Calliano and turned the position. Vaubois added that he was retiring, in order to avoid being cut in two, and he expressed his fear that Davidovich would get before him to the important positions of La Corona and Rivoli, which cover the road to Tyrol, between the Adige and the Lake of Garda.

Bonaparte was aware of the danger of proceeding farther against Alvinzy, while Vaubois, who was with his left in the Tyrol, was liable to lose La Corona, Rivoli, and even Verona, and to be driven back into the plain. Bonaparte would then have been cut off from his principal wing, and placed with fifteen or sixteen thousand men between Davidovich and Alvinzy. He consequently resolved to fall back immediately. He ordered a trusty officer to fly to Verona, to collect there all the troops he could find, to hasten with them to Rivoli and La Corona, in order to anticipate Davidovich, and to give Vaubois time to retire thither.

On the next day, the 17th of Brumaire (November 7), he marched back

and passed through the city of Vicenza, which was astonished to see the French army retiring, after the success of the preceding day. He proceeded to Verona, where he left his whole army. He repaired alone to Rivoli and La Corona, where, very fortunately, he found Vaubois' troops rallied, and able to make head against a new attack of Davidovich. He resolved to give a lesson to the 39th and 85th demi-brigades, which had given way to a panic terror. He ordered the whole division to be assembled, and, addressing those two demi-brigades, he reproached them for their want of discipline and their flight. He then said to the chief of the staff, "Let it be inscribed on the colours that the 39th and the 85th no longer form part of the army of Italy." These expressions produced the keenest mortification in the soldiers of those two demi-brigades. They surrounded Bonaparte, told him that they had been fighting one against three, and asked to be sent to his advanced guard, to show whether they had ceased to belong to the army of Italy. Bonaparte compensated them for his severity by a few soothing words, which transported them, and left them in a disposition to avenge their honour by desperate bravery.*

Vaubois had only eight thousand men left out of the twelve thousand that he commanded before this rash enterprise. Bonaparte distributed them in the best manner that he could, in the positions of La Corona and Rivoli, and after he had made sure that Vaubois could maintain his ground for a few days, and cover our left and our rear, he returned to Verona to operate against Alvinzy. The causeway leading from Brenta to Verona, skirting the foot of the mountains, passes through Vicenza, Monte-Bello, Villa Nova, and Caldiero. Alvinzy, surprised to see Bonaparte fall back the day after he had gained an advantage, had followed him at a distance, doubting whether the progress of Davidovich could alone have induced him to retire. He hoped that his plan of a junction at Verona was about to be realized. He halted about three leagues from Verona, on the heights of Caldiero, which command the road to that city. These heights presented an excellent position for making head against an army leaving Verona. Alvinzy established himself there, placed batteries, and omitted nothing to render them impregnable. Bonaparte reconnoitred and resolved to attack them immediately; for the situation of Vaubois at Rivoli was very precarious, and left him not much time to act against Alvinzy. He marched against him on the evening of the 21st (November 11), repulsed his advanced guard, and bivouacked with Massena's and Augereau's divisions at the foot of Caldiero. At daybreak, he perceived that Alvinzy, deeply intrenched, meant to accept battle. The position was assailable on one side, that which abutted upon the mountains, and which had not been

* "The two brigades appeared before him with dejected countenances, and Napoleon upbraided them with their indifferent behaviour. 'You have displeased me,' he said; 'you have shown neither discipline, nor constancy, nor bravery. You have suffered yourselves to be driven from positions where a handful of brave men might have arrested the progress of a large army. You are no longer French soldiers. Let it be written on their colours—*They are not of the army of Italy!*' Tears and groans of sorrow and shame answered this harangue. The rules of discipline could not stifle their sense of mortifications; and several of the grenadiers, who had deserved and wore marks of distinction, called out from the ranks, 'General, we have been misrepresented; place us in the advance, and you may then judge whether we do not belong to the army of Italy.' Bonaparte, having produced the intended effect, spoke to them in a more conciliatory tone; and the regiments which had undergone so severe a rebuke, redeemed their character in the subsequent part of the campaign."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E.

defended with sufficient care by Alvinzy. Bonaparte sent Massena thither, and directed Augereau to attack the rest of the line. The action was brisk. But the rain fell in torrents, which gave a great advantage to the enemy, whose artillery was placed beforehand in good positions, while ours, obliged to move along roads rendered impassable, could not be brought to suitable points, and was wholly ineffective. Massena, nevertheless, succeeded in climbing the height neglected by Alvinzy. But the rain suddenly changed to a cold sleet, which a violent wind blew in the faces of our soldiers. At the same instant, Alvinzy ordered his reserve to march to the position which Massena had taken from him, and recovered all his advantages. In vain did Bonaparte persist in renewing his efforts. They were attended with no better success. The two armies passed the night in presence of each other. The rain never ceased falling, and our soldiers were in a miserable plight.* On the next day, the 23d of Brumaire (November 15), Bonaparte returned to Verona.

The situation of the army now became desperate. After having uselessly driven the enemy beyond the Brenta, and lost without benefit a great number of brave men, after having lost on the left the Tyrol and four thousand men, after having fought an unsuccessful battle at Caldiero to drive off Alvinzy from Verona, and again weakened him to no purpose, every resource seemed to fail. The left, now consisting of no more than eight thousand men, was liable every moment to be hurled from La Corona and Rivoli, and then Bonaparte would be enveloped at Verona. The two divisions of Massena and Augereau, which formed the active army opposed to Alvinzy, were reduced by two battles to fourteen or fifteen thousand men. What were fourteen or fifteen thousand men against nearly forty thousand? The artillery, which had always served to counterbalance the superiority of the enemy, could no longer move along through the mud. There was, therefore, no hope of fighting with any chance of success. The army was in consternation. Those brave soldiers, tried by so many hardships and dangers, began to murmur. Like all intelligent soldiers, they were subject to fits of ill-humour, because they were capable of judging "After destroying," said they, "two armies which were opposed to us, we are expected, forsooth, to destroy those too which are opposed to the troops of the Rhine. After Beaulieu came Wurmser, after Wurmser comes Alvinzy. The struggle is renewed every day. We cannot do the work of all. We have no business to fight Alvinzy, any more than we had to fight Wurmser. If every one had done his duty as well as we have, the war would be over. Well and good," they added, "if they had but sent us succours proportioned to our dangers! but here we are abandoned in the farthest corner of Italy, here we are left by ourselves to tackle two innumerable armies. And when, after spilling our blood in thousands of fights, we are led back to the Alps, we shall return without honour and without glory, like runaways who have not done their duty." Such was the talk of the soldiers in their bivouacs. Bonaparte, who shared their spleen and their mortification, wrote on the same day, the 24th of Brumaire (November 14), to the Directory. "All our superior officers, all our best generals, are *hors de combat*. The army of Italy, reduced to a handful of men, is exhausted. The heroes of Millesimo, of Lodi, of Castiglione, of Bas-

* "The rain fell in torrents; the ground was so completely soaked, that the French artillery could make no movement, while that of the Austrians, being in position, and advantageously placed, produced its full effect."—*Moniteur*. E.

sano, have died for their country, or are in the hospital. Nothing is left to the corps but their reputation and their pride. Joubert, Lannes, Lamare, Victor, Murat, Charlot, Dupuis, Rampon, Pigeon, Ménard, Chabrand, are wounded. We are abandoned at the extremity of Italy. The brave men who are left me have no prospect but inevitable death, amidst chances so continual and with forces so inferior. Perhaps the hour of the brave Augereau, of the intrepid Massena, is near at hand. Then, what will become of these brave fellows! This idea makes me reserved. I dare no longer confront death, which would be a subject of discouragement to any one exposed to my anxieties. If I had received the 83d, numbering three thousand five hundred men known to the army, I would have answered for the result. Perhaps in a few days forty thousand may not be enough!—"To-day," added Bonaparte, "rest for the troops; to-morrow, according to the movements of the enemy, we shall act."

While he was addressing these bitter complaints to the government, he affected the greatest security in the presence of his soldiers. He desired his officers to repeat to them that another effort must be made, and that that effort would be the last; that if Alvinzy were destroyed, the means of Austria would be exhausted forever, Italy conquered, peace secured, and the glory of the army immortal.* His presence, his words, roused the courage of the men. The sick, consumed by fever, on hearing that the army was in danger, left the hospitals in a throng, and hastened to take their places in the ranks. The keenest and the deepest emotion was in every heart. The Austrians had that very day approached Verona, and were showing the ladders which they had prepared to scale the walls. The Veronese manifested their joy at the idea of seeing, in a few hours, Alvinzy joined in their city with Davidovich, and the French destroyed. Some, who were compromised on account of their attachment to our cause, sauntered sorrowfully about, counting the small number of our brave fellows.

The army awaited with anxiety the orders of the general, and hoped every moment that he would order a movement. The day of the 24th had, nevertheless, passed off, and the order of the day had, contrary to custom, not intimated anything. But Bonaparte had not lost time; and, after meditating on the field of battle, he had taken one of those resolutions with which despair inspires genius.† Towards night, orders were issued for the whole army to get under arms; the strictest silence was recommended; the command to march was given, but, instead of moving forward, the army fell back, recrossed the Adige by the bridges of Verona, and left the city by the gate leading to Milan. The troops conceived that they were retreating, and that all idea of keeping Italy was relinquished. Sorrow pervaded the ranks. However, at some distance from Verona, it turned to the left; instead of continuing to recede from the Adige, it

* "We have but one more effort to make, (said Bonaparte to his soldiers,) and Italy is our own. The enemy is, no doubt, more numerous than we are, but half his troops are recruits; when he is beaten, Mantua must fall, and we shall remain masters of all. From the smiling, flowery bivouacs of Italy you cannot return to the Alpine snows. Succours are on the road. Only beat Alvinzi, and I will answer for your future welfare."—*Montholon*. E.

† "Napoleon's movements and tactics on this critical occasion were those of a consummate master of the art of war; and, among all those ordered by the most renowned captains, both of ancient and modern times, I can find none more worthy of praise and admiration. They were conceived and executed with the rapidity of lightning, nor had the Austrians any notion of what he was doing, until Bonaparte had chosen his own ground, and entirely changed the state of the campaign."—*Carlo Botta*. E

began to descend close to the river, and followed its course for four leagues. At length, after a march of some hours, it arrived at Ronco, where a bridge of boats had been thrown across by direction of the general. The troops recrossed the river, and at daybreak found themselves beyond the Adige, which they imagined that they had quitted for ever. The plan of the general was extraordinary. He was about to astonish both armies. The Adige, on issuing from Verona, ceases for a short distance to run perpendicularly from the mountains to the sea, and turns obliquely towards the east. In this oblique movement it approaches the road from Verona to the Brenta, on which Alvinzy was encamped. Bonaparte, on reaching Ronco, consequently found himself on the flanks, and nearly on the rear, of the Austrians. By means of this point, he was placed amidst extensive marshes. These marshes were traversed by two causeways, one of which, on the left, running along the Adige, through Porcil and Gombione, was continued to Verona; the other, on the right, passing over a small stream, called the Alpon, at the village of Arcole, rejoined the Verona road near Villa Nova, in the rear of Caldiero.

Bonaparte was, therefore, master at Ronco of two causeways, both of which ran to the high-road occupied by the Austrians, the one between Caldiero and Verona, the other between Caldiero and Villa Nova. His calculation was as follows: Amidst these marshes the advantage of number was absolutely annulled; it was impossible to deploy unless upon the causeways, and on the causeways the courage of the heads of columns must decide everything. By the causeway on the left, he could fall upon the Austrians if they attempted to scale Verona. By that on the right, which crossed the Alpon, at the bridge of Arcole, and terminated at Villa Nova, he might debouch upon the rear of Alvinzy, take his artillery and baggage, and intercept his retreat. He was, therefore, unassailable at Ronco, and he clasped his two arms about the enemy. He had ordered the gates of Verona to be closed, and had left Kilmaine* there, with fifteen hundred men, to withstand a first assault. This combination, so daring and so profound, struck the army, which immediately guessed the intention of it, and was filled with hope.

Bonaparte placed Massena on the left-hand dike, with directions to proceed to Gombione and Porcil, and take the enemy in the rear, if he should march upon Verona. He sent Augereau to the right, to debouch upon Villa Nova. It was just daybreak. Massena placed himself in observation on the left-hand dike. Augereau, in advancing along that on the right, had to cross the Alpon by the bridge of Arcole. Some battalions of Croats had been detached thither to watch the country. They bordered the river, and had their cannon pointed at the bridge. They received Augereau's advanced guard with a brisk fire of musketry, and forced it to fall back. Augereau hastened up, and led his troops forward again; but the fire from the bridge and the opposite bank again stopped them. He was obliged to yield to this obstacle, and to order a halt.

Meanwhile Alvinzy, who had his eyes fixed upon Verona, and who conceived that the French army was still there, had been surprised on hearing a very brisk fire amidst the marshes. He did not suppose that General

* Kilmaine was born at Dublin in the year 1754. He distinguished himself at Jemappes and in La Vendée, and was selected to command the army of England, but died in Paris in 1799. E.

Bonaparte could choose such a field, and imagined that it was a detached corps of light troops. But his cavalry soon returned, to inform him that the action was serious, and that reports of musketry proceeded from all quarters. Still his eyes were not opened. He despatched two divisions: one, under Provera, followed the left-hand dike, the other, under Mitrowski, took that on the right, and advanced upon Arcole. Massena, seeing the Austrians approaching, suffered them to advance upon a narrow dike, and when he judged them to be far enough, he dashed upon them at a run, drove them back, threw them into the marsh, and killed and drowned a great number. Mitrowski's division arrived at Arcole, debouched by the bridge, and followed the dike, as Provera's had done. Augereau rushed upon it, broke it, and threw part of it into the marsh. He pursued, and attempted to cross the bridge at its heels, but the bridge was still more strongly guarded than in the morning. A numerous artillery defended the approach to it, and all the rest of the Austrian line was deployed on the bank of the Alpon, firing on the dike, and taking it crosswise. Augereau seized a pair of colours, and carried them upon the bridge. His men followed, but a tremendous fire drove them back. Generals Lannes, Verne, Bon, and Verdier, were severely wounded. The column fell back, and the men descended to the side of the dike, to shelter themselves from the fire.

Bonaparte saw from Ronco the whole hostile army set itself in motion. Apprized, at length, of its danger, it hastened to quit Caldiero, that it might not be taken in the rear at Villa Nova. He saw, with vexation, great results slipping from his grasp. He had, indeed, sent Gueux with a brigade to attempt to cross the Alpon below Arcole; but the execution of that attempt would take several hours; and it was of the utmost importance to cross the Arcole immediately, in order to arrive in time on the rear of Alvinzy, and to obtain a complete triumph. The fate of Italy depended upon it. He hesitated no longer. Starting off at a gallop, he rode to the bridge, sprang from his horse, went to the soldiers who were lying on the borders of the dike, asked them if they were still the conquerors of Lodi, revived their courage by his words, and, seizing a pair of colours, cried, "Follow your general!" At this command, a number of soldiers went up to the causeway and followed him. Unfortunately, the movement could not be communicated to the whole column, the rest of which remained behind the dike. Bonaparte advanced, carrying the colours, amidst a shower of balls and grape-shot. All his generals surrounded him. Lannes, who had already received two wounds from musket-shots during the battle, was struck by a third. Young Muiro, the general's aide-de-camp, striving to cover him with his body, fell dead at his feet.* The column was, nevertheless, on the point of clearing the bridge, when a last discharge stopped it and threw it back. The rear abandoned the head. The soldiers who still remained with the general then laid hold of him, carried him away amidst the fire and smoke, and insisted on his remounting his horse. An Austrian column debouching upon them, threw them in disorder into the marsh. Bonaparte fell in, and sunk up to the waist. As soon as the soldiers perceived his danger, "Forward," cried they, "to save the general."

* "This was the day of military devotedness. Lannes, who had been wounded at Governolo, had hastened from Milan; he was still suffering; he threw himself between the enemy and Napoleon, and received three wounds. Muiro, Bonaparte's aide-de-camp, was killed in covering the general with his own body. Heroic and affecting death!"—*Napoleon's Memoirs*. E

They ran after Belliard and Vignolles to extricate him. He was pulled out of the mud, set upon his horse, and returned to Ronco.*

At this moment, Gueux had succeeded in crossing below Arcole, and in taking the village by the other bank. But he was too late. Alvinzi had already made his artillery and his baggage file away; he had deployed in the plain, and was enabled to frustrate the intentions of Bonaparte. All his heroism and genius were thus rendered useless. Bonaparte might, indeed, have avoided the obstacle of Arcole by throwing his bridge over the Adige, a little below Ronco, that is, at Albanedo, the point where the Alpon falls into the Adige. But then he would have debouched in the

* We subjoin Napoleon's own account of the battle at the bridge of Arcole, as dictated by him to Las Cases at St. Helena.

"It was five o'clock in the morning, and the enemy knew nothing of our proceedings. The first shots were fired on the bridge of Arcole, where two battalions of Croats, with two pieces of cannon, were in bivouac as a corps of observation, to guard the rear of the army, where were all the parks, and to watch the parties which the garrison of Legnago might detach into the plain. That place was only three leagues off; the enemy had been so negligent as not to advance any posts to the Adige; they looked on this space as impracticable marshes. The interval between Arcole and the Adige was not guarded; the enemy had contented themselves with sending some patrols of hussars, who thrice a day rode over the dikes, and reconnoitred the Adige. The road from Ronco to Arcole meets the Alpon two miles from Ronco, and then reascends the right bank of that little stream for a mile, up to the bridge, which turns perpendicularly to the right, and enters the village of Arcole. Some Croats were bivouacked, with their right supported on the village, and their left towards the mouth of the rivulet. This bivouac had in front the dike, from which it was separated only by the rivulet; by firing in front they took the column, the head of which was advancing on Arcole, in flank. It was necessary to fall back hastily to that point of the road, the side of which was no longer exposed to the left bank. Alvinzi was informed that some firing had taken place at the bridge of Arcole, but he paid little attention to the circumstance. However, at daybreak, the movement of the French could be distinguished from Caldiero and the neighbouring steeples. Already the reconnoitring parties of hussars, which every morning rode along the banks of the Adige, to ascertain the events of the night, were received with a fire of musketry on all the dikes, and pursued by the French cavalry. Alvinzi then received from all quarters certain intelligence that the French had passed the Adige, and were in force on all the dikes. It seemed to him folly to suppose that a whole army could thus have been thrown into impracticable morasses. He rather thought it must be a detachment placed there to harass him, whilst he should be attacked in force from the side of Verona. But his reconnoitring parties on the Verona side having brought him intelligence that all was quiet there, Alvinzi thought it necessary to repulse these French troops beyond the Adige, for the security of his rear. He ordered one division to advance by the dike of Arcole, and another towards the dike which runs parallel with the Adige, with orders to fall furiously on all they should meet, and drive them all into the river. Accordingly, towards nine o'clock, these two divisions made a brisk attack. Massena, who was intrusted with the left dike, having allowed the enemy to advance, charged them furiously, broke them, caused them considerable loss, and took a great number of prisoners. The same thing was done on the dike of Arcole; they waited until the Austrians had turned the elbow of the bridge; they then charged and routed them, and took many prisoners. It became of the utmost importance to gain possession of Arcole, because that was the point from whence to debouch on the rear of the enemy, before they could be formed. But this bridge of Arcole, by its situation, resisted all our attacks. Napoleon, in his person, tried a last effort; he seized a standard, rushed towards the bridge, and fixed it there. The column he led had half cleared the bridge, when the flank fire caused their attack to fail. The grenadiers of the head of the column, abandoned by the rear, hesitated; they were disposed to retire, but they would not forsake their general; they seized him by his arms, his hair, and his clothes, and dragged him along with them, in their flight, amidst the dead, the dying, the fire, and the smoke. The general-in-chief was thrown into a marsh, where he sunk up to the middle; he was in the midst of the enemy; but the French perceived that their general was not amongst them. A cry was heard of 'Soldiers! forward, to rescue the general!' These brave men instantly turned, and rushed upon the enemy; they drove them beyond the bridge, and Napoleon was saved." E.

plain, which it behoved him to avoid doing; and he would not have had it in his power to fly by the left-hand dike to the relief of Verona.* He was, therefore, right in doing what he had done; and, though the success was not complete, important results had been obtained. Alvinzy had quitted the formidable position of Caldiero; he had descended again into the plain; he no longer threatened Verona; he had lost a great number of men in the marshes. The two dikes had become the only field of battle between the two armies, which insured the advantage to bravery and took it away from number. Lastly, the French soldiers, animated by the conflict, had recovered all their confidence.

Bonaparte, who had to think of all dangers at once, had to attend to his left, which was at La Corona and Rivoli. As it was liable every moment to be overthrown, he wished to have it in his power to fly to its assistance. He thought it best, therefore, to fall back from Gombione and Arcole, to recross the Adige to Ronco, and to bivouac on this side of the river, in order to be at hand to succour Vaubois, in case he should hear in the night of his defeat. Such was this first battle, on the 25th of Brumaire (November 15).

The night passed without any bad news. It was known that Vaubois still maintained his ground at Rivoli. The exploits of Castiglione covered Bonaparte on that side. Davidovich, who commanded a corps at the battle of Castiglione, had retained such an impression of that event, that he durst not advance to gain certain intelligence of Alvinzy. Thus the spell of Bonaparte's genius was where he was not himself. The fight of the 26th (November 16) commenced. The combatants met on the two dikes. The French charged with the bayonet, broke the Austrians, threw a great number of them into the marsh, and made many prisoners. They took colours and cannon. Bonaparte ordered a fire of musketry to be kept up on the bank of the Alpon, but he made no decisive effort to cross it. When night came on, he again drew back his columns, took them above the dikes, and rallied them on the other bank of the Adige, satisfied with having harassed the enemy the whole day, while awaiting more certain intelligence of Vaubois. The second night was passed like the preceding. The tidings from Vaubois were cheering. A third day might now be devoted to a definitive conflict with Alvinzy. At length, the sun rose for the third time on this frightful theatre of carnage. It was the 27th (November 17). Bonaparte calculated that the enemy must have lost, at least, one third of his army, in killed, wounded, drowned, and prisoners. He judged him to be harassed and disheartened; and he saw his own soldiers full of enthusiasm. He then resolved to quit those dikes, and to transfer the field of battle to the plain beyond the Alpon. As on the preceding days, the French, debouching from Ronco, met the Austrians on the dikes. Massena still occupied the left dike. On that upon the right, General Robert was directed to attack, while Augereau proceeded to cross the Alpon near its influx into the Adige. Massena at first encountered an obstinate resistance, but, putting his hat on the point of his sword, he marched in that manner at the head of his soldiers. As on the former days, many of the enemy were killed, drowned, or taken. On the right-hand dike, General Robert advanced at first with success; but he was killed, and his column repulsed nearly to the bridge of Ronco.

* I here repeat a remark often made to Bonaparte on this celebrated battle, and the answer which he has himself given to it in his "Memoirs."

Bonaparte, who saw the danger, placed the 32d in a wood of willows which borders the dike. While the enemy's column, victorious over Robert, was advancing, the 32d suddenly sallied from its ambuscade, took it in flank, and threw it into frightful disorder. It consisted of three thousand Croats. The greater part of them were slain or made prisoners. The dikes thus swept, Bonaparte determined to cross the Alpon. Augereau had passed it on the extreme right. Bonaparte brought back Massena from he left to the right-hand dike, despatched him upon Arcole, which was evacuated, and thus brought his whole army into the plain before that of Alvinzy. Before he ordered the charge, he resorted to a stratagem to frighten the enemy. A marsh, overgrown with reeds, covered the left wing of the Austrians: he ordered Hercule, *chef de bataillon*, to take with him twenty-five of his guides, to file away through the reeds, and to charge unawares with a great blast of trumpets. These twenty-five brave fellows started to execute the order. Bonaparte then gave the signal to Massena and to Augereau. These latter made a vigorous charge upon the Austrian line, which resisted; but all at once a loud sound of trumpets was heard. The Austrians, conceiving that they were charged by a whole division of cavalry, gave way. At that moment, the garrison of Legnago, which Bonaparte had ordered to move upon their rear, appeared at a distance, and increased their alarm. They then retreated, and, after a tremendous conflict of seventy-two hours, disheartened and worn out with fatigue, they yielded the victory to the heroism of a few thousand brave men and to the genius of a great commander.*

The two armies, exhausted by their efforts, passed the night in the plain. Next morning, Bonaparte renewed the pursuit upon Vicenza. On arriving at the causeway leading from the Brenta to Verona, through Villa Nova, he left his cavalry alone to pursue the enemy, and resolved to return to Verona, by way of Villa Nova and Caldiero, in order to relieve Vaubois. Bonaparte received intelligence on the road that Vaubois had been obliged to abandon La Corona and Rivoli, and to fall back to Castel Novo. He redoubled his speed, and arrived the same evening at Verona, passing over the field of battle which had been occupied by Alvinzy. He entered the city at the gate opposite to that by which he had left it. When the Veronese saw this handful of men, who had gone forth as fugitives by the Milan gate, re-entering as conquerors by the Venice gate, they were filled with astonishment.† Neither friends nor foes could repress their admiration of the general and the soldiers who had so gloriously changed the fortune of the war. It was no longer feared or hoped by any one that the French might be driven out of Italy. Bonaparte immediately ordered Massena to march to Castel Novo, and Augereau upon Dolce, along the right bank of the Adige. Davidovich, attacked on all sides, was quickly driven back into the Tyrol, with the loss of a great number of prisoners. Bonaparte con-

* "It was so apparent to all the Austrian army, that this last retreat was the result of a secret understanding with the French general, and with a view to the negotiation which was now pending, that they loudly expressed their indignation. One colonel broke his sword in pieces, and declared he would no longer serve under a commander whose conduct brought disgrace on his troops. Certain it is that Alvinzi during this dreadful strife at Arcole, had neither evinced the capacity nor the spirit of a general worthy to combat with Napoleon."—*Alison*. E.

† "The French army re-entered Verona in triumph by the Venice gate, three days after having quitted that city almost clandestinely by the Milan gate. It would be difficult to conceive the astonishment and enthusiasm of the inhabitants."—*Monstolon*. E.

tented himself with re-occupying the positions of La Corona and Rivoli, without attempting to ascend again to Trent and to recover possession of the Tyrol. The French army was exceedingly reduced by this last conflict. The Austrian army had lost five thousand prisoners, and eight or ten thousand in killed and wounded, but it was still upwards of forty thousand strong, including the corps of Davidovich. It retired into the Tyrol and upon the Brenta, to rest itself: it was far from having suffered so severely as the armies of Wurmser and Beaulieu. The French, exhausted, had been able only to repulse, not to destroy it. Their general was, therefore, obliged to relinquish all idea of pursuing it, until the promised reinforcements should arrive; and merely occupied the Adige from Dolce to the sea.

This new victory produced extreme joy both in Italy and in France. People everywhere admired that persevering genius, which, with fourteen or fifteen thousand men against forty thousand, had never thought of retreating; that inventive and profound genius, which had the sagacity to discover in the dikes of Ronco a new field of battle, that rendered numbers of no avail and exposed the flanks of the enemy. They extolled, in particular, the heroism displayed at the bridge of Arcole, and the young general was everywhere represented with the colours in his hand, amidst fire and smoke.* The two councils, when declaring, according to custom, that the army of Italy had deserved well of the country, resolved, moreover, that the colours which the two generals, Bonaparte and Augereau, had borne upon the bridge of Arcole should be given to them to be kept as heir-looms—an appropriate and a noble reward, worthy of an heroic age, and much more glorious than the diadem subsequently decreed by weakness to all-powerful genius.

* "By the battle of Arcole, where the loss on both sides was immense, the French gained every advantage proposed by their wonderful leader, who remained for two months the undisturbed possessor of Lombardy; while he had struck the Austrians with an idea of his invincibility from which they did not recover for years. This was the hardest fought battle in all the war, and the one in which Bonaparte showed most personal courage. Lodi was nothing to Arcole!"—*Bourrienne*. E.

THE DIRECTORY

CLARKE AT HEAD-QUARTERS—RUPTURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ENGLISH CABINET; DEPARTURE OF MALMESBURY—EXPEDITION TO IRELAND—RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURE OF THE YEAR V—CAPITULATION OF KEHL—LAST EFFORT OF AUSTRIA IN ITALY—VICTORY OF RIVOLI AND LA FAVORITA; REDUCTION OF MANTUA—CONCLUSION OF THE MEMORABLE CAMPAIGN OF 1796

GENERAL CLARKE arrived at the head-quarters of the army of Italy, whence he was to proceed to Vienna. His mission had lost its essential object since the battle of Arcole had rendered an armistice useless. Bonaparte, whom General Clarke was ordered to consult, totally disapproved the armistice and its conditions. The reasons which he assigned were excellent. The armistice could now have but one object, that of saving the fortress of Kehl, on the Rhine, which the archduke was besieging with great vigour; and for this very subordinate object, it sacrificed Mantua. Kehl was merely a *tête de pont*, which was not indispensable for debouching in Germany. The taking of Mantua would lead to the definitive conquest of Italy, and justify the demand in return of Mayence and the whole line of the Rhine. The armistice evidently compromised this conquest; for Mantua, full of sick, and reduced to half rations, could not defer opening its gates longer than a month. The provisions that would be introduced would restore health and strength to the garrison. Their quantity could not be accurately fixed. Wurmser might, by means of savings, lay up a store for renewing his resistance, in case of the resumption of hostilities. The effects of the battles fought to cover the blockade of Mantua would thus be done away with, and it would be necessary to begin again at a fresh cost. Nor was this all. The Pope could not fail to be included in the armistice by Austria, and then the French would be deprived of the means of punishing him, and wringing from him twenty or thirty millions, which the army much needed, and which would serve to carry on a new campaign. Lastly, Bonaparte, penetrating into futurity, advised that, instead of suspending hostilities, they should be continued with vigour, but that the war should be transferred to its true theatre, and that a reinforcement of thirty thousand men should be sent to Italy. He promised, on this condition, to march upon Vienna and to have in two months peace, the line of the Rhine, and a republic in Italy. This combination, indeed, would place in his hands all the military and political operations of the war; but, whether it was interested or not, it was just and profound, and the result proved its wisdom.

Nevertheless, in obedience to the Directory, letters were addressed to the Austrian generals on the Rhine and the Adige, to propose an armistice and to obtain passports for Clarke. The Archduke Charles answered Moreau that he could not listen to any proposal for an armistice, that his

powers did not permit him to do so, and that he must refer the matter to the Aulic Council. Alvinzy returned the same answer, and sent off a courier to Vienna. The Austrian minister, secretly devoted to England, was not disposed to comply with the proposals of France. The cabinet of London had communicated to him the mission of Lord Malmesbury, and had taken pains to persuade him that the emperor would gain many more advantages by joining in the negotiation opened in Paris than by making separate conditions, since the English conquests in the two Indies would be sacrificed to procure for him the restitution of the Netherlands. Besides the insinuations of England, the cabinet of Vienna had other reasons for rejecting the proposals of the Directory. It flattered itself with the expectation of taking the fortress of Kehl in a very short time; the French, hemmed in along the Rhine, would then no longer be able to cross that river; it might then, without danger, withdraw new detachments and send them to the Adige. These detachments, joined to the new levies that were being raised throughout all Austria with wonderful activity, would admit of one more attempt being made upon Italy. Perhaps that terrible army, which had annihilated so many Austrian battalions, might itself succumb at last under reiterated efforts.

In this case, then, German perseverance was true to itself, and, in spite of so many reverses, it did not yet renounce the possession of fair Italy. It was, in consequence, resolved not to allow Clarke to come to Vienna. Besides, the Austrian cabinet was shy of admitting an observer into the capital, and it wished not for any direct negotiation. As for the armistice, it would have consented to it on the Adige, but not on the Rhine. Clarke was answered that, if he would repair to Vicenza, he would there find the Baron de Vincent, with whom he might confer. A meeting accordingly took place at Vicenza. The Austrian minister alleged that the emperor could not receive an envoy of the republic, because that would be equivalent to acknowledging it; and, as for the armistice, he declared that it was admissible in regard to Italy alone. This proposal was ridiculous, and it is inconceivable how the Austrian minister could make it, for it would save Mantua without saving Kehl, and the French could scarcely have been supposed stupid enough to accept it. Nevertheless, the Austrian ministry, desirous of reserving to itself the means of a separate negotiation in case of emergency, directed its envoy to declare that, if the French commissioner had proposals to make relative to peace, he had only to proceed to Turin, and to communicate them to the Austrian ambassador at the court of Sardinia. Thus, owing to the suggestions of England and to the silly hopes of the cabinet of Vienna, the dangerous project of an armistice, was foiled. Clarke went to Turin, in order to avail himself, in case of need, of the channel of communication offered to him at the court of Sardinia. But he had another mission—that was, to watch General Bonaparte. The genius of that young man had appeared so extraordinary,* his charac-

* The following was the opinion entertained of Bonaparte's extraordinary genius by one of his most inveterate adversaries—M. Bertrand de Moleville, a staunch royalist, and formerly minister of the marine under Louis XVI. The observations were addressed to the Count Las Cases:—

“Your Bonaparte, your Napoleon, was a very extraordinary man, it must be confessed. How little did we know of him on the other side the water! We could not, it is true, but yield to the conviction of his victories and his invasions; but Genseric, Attila, and Alaric were as victorious as he. Thus he produced on me an impression of terror rather than of admiration. But since I have been here, I have taken the trouble to look over the debates on the civil code, and I have ever since been imbued with pro-

ter so absolute and so energetic, that, without any precise motive, he was supposed to have ambition. He had insisted on conducting the war as he pleased, and had tendered his resignation when a plan that was not his own had been marked out for him; he had acted like a sovereign in Italy, granting to princes peace or war under the name of armistices; he had loudly complained because the negotiations with the Pope were not conducted by him alone, and had required that they should be left to his management; he had treated Garen and Salicetti, the commissioners, very harshly, when they ventured upon measures of which he disapproved, and had obliged them to leave the head-quarters; he had taken the liberty to transmit funds to the different armies, without any authority from the government, and without having recourse to the indispensable channel of the treasury. All these circumstances indicated a man who liked to do himself all that he thought himself alone capable of doing properly. It was as yet only the impatience of genius, which cannot bear to be thwarted in its operations; but it is in this impatience that a despotic will begins to manifest itself. On seeing him excite Upper Italy against its old masters, and create or destroy states, people would have supposed that he meant to make himself Duke of Milan. They had a foreboding of his ambition, and he had himself a presentiment of the reproach. He complained of being accused, and then justified himself, though not a single word of the Directory furnished him occasion to do so.

Clarke, then, was sent, not only to negotiate, but also to watch him. Bonaparte was aware of his errand, and, acting in this instance with his habitual haughtiness and address, he suffered him to perceive that he was acquainted with the object of his mission, subdued him in a short time by his ascendancy and his fascinating manner, not less overpowering, it is said, than his genius, and converted him into a devoted adherent. Clarke possessed ability, but he had too much vanity to be a clever and supple spy. He remained in Italy, sometimes at Turin, sometimes at head-quarters, and soon belonged more to Bonaparte than the Directory.

The negotiation opened in Paris had been protracted by the English cabinet as much as possible, but the French cabinet, by returning prompt and explicit answers, had, at last, obliged Lord Malmesbury to speak out. That minister had, as we have seen, insisted, at the outset, on the principle of a general negotiation, and that of a compensation for conquests; the Directory, on its part, had demanded the powers of all the allies, and a clearer explanation of the principle of compensations. The English minister had taken nineteen days to reply; he had at length answered that application was made for the powers; but before they were produced it was requisite that the French government should positively admit the principle of compensations. The Directory had then required an immediate declaration of the objects to which the compensations related. At this point the negotiation had arrived. Lord Malmesbury again wrote to London, and after a lapse of twelve days, replied, on the 6th of Frimaire (November 26th) that his court had nothing to add to what it had already said, and that it could not enter into any further explanation, so long as the French government did not formally admit the proposed principle. This was a quibble; for in demanding a statement of the objects which were to be compensated for, France had evidently admitted the principle of com

found veneration for him. But where in the world did he collect all his knowledge? I discover something new every day. Ah, sir, what a man you had at the head of your government! Really, he was nothing short of a prodigy." E.

pensation. To write to London and to take up twelve days more for this quibble was trifling with the Directory. It replied, as it always did, on the following day, and in a note of four lines it stated that its former note necessarily implied the admission of the principle of compensation, but, at any rate, it formally admitted that principle, and demanded immediately a statement of the objects to which it was to be applied. The Directory, also, asked if, upon every question, Lord Malmesbury would be obliged to write to London. Lord Malmesbury vaguely replied, that he should be obliged to write whenever the question required fresh instructions. He again wrote, and twenty days elapsed before he replied. It was evident, this time, that he must lay aside the vagueness in which he had enveloped himself, and, at length, grapple with the formidable question of the Netherlands. To come to an explanation on that point, was to break off the negotiation, and it is obvious that the English cabinet put off the rupture as long as possible. At last, on the 28th of Frimaire (December 18th), Lord Malmesbury had an interview with Delacroix, the minister, and delivered to him a note, in which the pretensions of the English cabinet were stated. It insisted that France should restore to the powers of the continent all that she had taken from them; that she should give up to Austria, Belgium and Luxemburg, and to the empire, the German states on the right bank of the Rhine; that she should evacuate all Italy and replace it in the *status quo ante bellum*; that she should restore to Holland certain portions of territory, such as maritime Flanders, for example, in order to render her independent; and lastly, that changes should be made in her existing constitution. The English cabinet promised to restore the Dutch colonies, but only on condition of the reinstatement of the stadtholder; and even in this case, it proposed not to give up all; some it meant to keep, as an indemnity for the war, among others, the Cape. For all these sacrifices it offered to return to us two or three islands which we had lost during the war in the West Indies, Martinique, St. Lucia, and Tobago, and again, upon condition that we should not retain the whole of St. Domingo. Thus, France, after an iniquitous war, in which she had all the justice on her side, in which she had expended enormous sums, and from which she had come off victorious—France was not to gain a single province, while the northern powers had just divided a kingdom among them, and England had recently made immense acquisitions in India! France, who still occupied the line of the Rhine, and who was mistress of Italy, was to evacuate the Rhine and Italy, at the bare summons of England! Such conditions were absurd and inadmissible. The very proposal of them was an insult, and they could not be listened to. Delacroix, nevertheless, did listen to them with a politeness which struck the English minister, and which even led him to hope that the negotiation might be continued.

Delacroix adduced a reason, which was a bad one, namely, that the Netherlands were declared national territory by the constitution; and the English minister replied, by a reason which was no better, that the treaty of Utrecht gave them to Austria. The constitution might be obligatory for the French nation, but it neither concerned nor was obligatory for foreign nations. The treaty of Utrecht was, like all other treaties in the world, an arrangement of force, which force was liable to change. The only reason which the French minister ought to have given was, that the incorporation of the Netherlands with France was just, that it was founded on all the natural and political expedencies, and that it was justified by victory. After a long discussion on all the subordinate points of the negotiation,

the two ministers parted. Delacroix went to refer the matter to the Directory, which, justly incensed, resolved to reply to the English minister as he deserved. The note of the English minister was not signed; it was merely enclosed in a signed letter. The Directory required, the very same day, that it should be clothed with the necessary forms, and demanded his *ultimatum* within twenty-four hours. Lord Malmesbury, embarrassed, replied that the note was sufficiently authentic, since it was enclosed in a signed letter, and, as to an *ultimatum*, it was contrary to all custom to demand one at so short a notice. Next day, the 29th of Frimaire (December 19), the Directory caused it to be intimated that it never would listen to any proposal contrary to the laws and treaties which bound the republic, adding that, as Lord Malmesbury had to refer every moment to his government, and performed a purely passive part in the negotiation, his presence in Paris was useless; that, in consequence, he was ordered to depart, himself and his suite, within forty-eight hours; and that couriers would be sufficient for negotiating, if the English government adopted the basis laid down by the French republic.

Thus ended this negotiation, in which the French Directory, so far from violating forms, as it has been alleged, set a real example of frankness in its relations with hostile powers. In this case, there was no violation of established usage. The communications of powers are stamped, like all the relations between individuals, with the character of the time, of the situation, of the persons who govern. A strong and victorious government talks differently from a weak and vanquished government; and it befitted a republic, supported by justice and victory, to express itself in language prompt, terse, and public.

During this interval, Hoche's grand attempt upon Ireland was carried into effect. This was what England dreaded, and what was liable, in fact, to place her in great jeopardy. Notwithstanding the reports adroitly circulated of an expedition against Portugal or America, England had rightly guessed the object of the preparations making at Brest. Pitt had caused the militia to be called out, and the coasts to be armed, and had given orders to evacuate everything in the interior, if the French should effect a landing.

Ireland, whither the expedition was bound, was in such a state as to cause serious apprehension. The partisans of parliamentary reform and the Catholics formed in that island a mass sufficient to produce an insurrection. They would gladly have adopted a republican government under the guarantee of France, and they had sent secret agents to Paris to concert plans with the Directory.* Thus everything led to the inference that an

* "The Catholics of Ireland are 3,150,000, all trained from their infancy in an hereditary hatred and abhorrence of the English name. For these five years they have fixed their eyes most earnestly on France, whom they look upon with great justice as fighting their battles, as well as those of all mankind who are oppressed. Of this class I will stake my head there are five hundred thousand men who would fly to the standard of the republic, if they saw it once displayed in the cause of liberty and their country. The republic may also rely with confidence on the support of the Dissenters, actuated by reason and reflection, as well as the Catholics, impelled by misery and inflamed by detestation of the English name. It would be just as easy in a month's time to have an army in Ireland of 200,000 men as 10,000. The peasantry would flock to the republican standard in such numbers as to embarrass the general-in-chief. A proclamation should instantly be issued, containing an invitation to the people to join the republican standard, organize themselves, and form a National Convention, for the purpose of framing a government, and administering the affairs of Ireland, till it was put into activity. The first act of the Convention thus constituted should be to declare themselves

expedition would throw England into cruel embarrassment, and force her to accept a very different sort of peace from that which she had just offered. Hoche, who had wasted the two best years of his life in La Vendée, and who saw the great theatres of war occupied by Bonaparte, Moreau, and Jourdan, burned with impatience to open one for himself in Ireland. England was as noble an adversary as Austria, and there was not less honour in fighting and conquering her. A new republic had sprung up in Italy, and was about to become the focus of liberty there. Hoche deemed it possible and desirable to erect such another in Ireland, by the side of the English aristocracy. He was very intimate with Admiral Truguet, minister of the marine, and a man of comprehensive views. Both promised themselves to give high importance to the navy, and to achieve great things; for at that time all heads were at work, all meditating prodigies for the glory and happiness of their country. The offensive and defensive alliance concluded with Spain, at St. Ildefonso, offered great resources, and admitted of vast projects. By uniting the Toulon squadron with the Spanish fleet, and concentrating them in the Channel with that which France had in the Atlantic Ocean, a very formidable force might be collected, and attempt to deliver the seas by a decisive engagement. It might, at least, set Ireland in flames, and then proceed to interrupt the successes of England in India. Admiral Truguet, sensible of the importance of sending speedy succours to India, proposed that the Brest squadron, without waiting for the junction of the French and Spanish fleets in the Channel, should start immediately, land Hoche's army in Ireland, keep a few thousand men on board, then sail for the Isle of France, take on board the battalions of negroes which were being organized there, and proceed to India with these succours for Tippoo Saib. This grand expedition had one inconvenience, that of carrying to Ireland only part of the army destined for that island, and leaving it exposed to great risks, till the very precarious junction of Admiral Villeneuve's* squadron, which was to sail from Toulon, of the Spanish squadron, which was dispersed in the parts of Spain, and of Richery's squadron, which was returning from America. This expedition was not carried into effect. Admiral Richery's arrival from America was waited for, and, notwithstanding the state of the finances, extraordinary efforts were made to complete the equipment of the Brest squadron. In Frimaire (December), it was in a condition to sail. It

the representatives of the Irish people, free and independent. The Convention should next publish a proclamation, notifying their independence and their alliance with the French republic, and forbidding all adherence to the British government, under the penalty of high treason."—*Wolfe Tone's Memorial to the French Directory*. E.

* Villeneuve was a brave but unfortunate French admiral, who, in consequence of his total defeat by Nelson at Trafalgar, is supposed to have committed suicide. Napoleon in the *Voice from St. Helena* gives the following details of the catastrophe: "Villeneuve, when taken prisoner and brought to England, was so much grieved at his defeat, that he studied anatomy on purpose to destroy himself. With this view he bought some anatomical plates of the heart, and compared them with his own body, in order to ascertain the exact situation of that organ. On his arrival in France, I ordered that he should remain at Rennes, and not proceed to Paris. Villeneuve, afraid of being tried by a court martial for a disobedience of orders, and consequently losing the fleet—for I had ordered him not to sail, or engage the English—determined to destroy himself, and accordingly took his plates of the heart, and compared them with his breast. Exactly in the centre of the plate, he made a mark with a large pin, then fixed the pin, as nearly as he could judge, in the same spot in his own breast, shoved it in to the head, penetrated his heart, and expired. When the room was opened he was found dead, the pin in his breast, and a mark in the plate corresponding with the wound. He need not have done it, as he was a brave man, though possessed of no talent." E

consisted of fifteen sail of the line, twenty frigates, six luggers, and fifty transports. Hoche could not agree with Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse. Morad de Galles was appointed to supersede the latter. The expedition was to land in Bantry Bay. Each of the captains of the ships of the line was furnished with sealed orders, specifying the direction which he was to follow, and the port for which he was to steer in case of accident.

The expedition sailed on the 26th of Frimaire (December 16). Hoche and Morad de Galles were on board a frigate. Owing to a thick fog, the French squadron escaped the English cruisers, and crossed the sea unperceived. But in the night between the 26th and 27th it was dispersed by a violent storm. One ship foundered. Rear-admiral Bouvet, however, manœuvred for the purpose of rallying the squadron, and succeeded in two days in collecting the whole of it, excepting one ship of the line and three frigates. Unfortunately, the frigate which had Hoche and Morad de Galles on board was one of the latter. The squadron doubled Cape Clear, and manœuvred there several days, waiting for the two commanders. At length, on the 4th of Nivose (December 24), it entered Bantry Bay. A council of war decided on landing, but this was rendered impossible by the bad weather. The squadron was again blown from the coasts of Ireland. Rear-admiral Bouvet, daunted by so many obstacles, apprehensive lest he should run short of provisions, and separated from the two commanders-in-chief, deemed it advisable to regain the coast of France. Hoche and Morad de Galles at length arrived in Bantry Bay, and were informed of the return of the French squadron. They followed it, amidst unparalleled dangers. Tossed by the sea, pursued by the English, they reached the French shores only by a sort of miracle. The *Droits de l'Homme*, Captain La Crosse, was separated from the squadron, and performed prodigies. Attacked by two English vessels, she destroyed one, and escaped the other; but, being much damaged, and having lost masts and sails, she could not withstand the violence of the sea. One part of the crew went to the bottom with her, another part was saved.

Thus ended that expedition, which excited great alarm in England and revealed her vulnerable point.* The Directory did not relinquish the idea of reviving this plan, but, for the moment, turned its whole attention towards the continent, with a view to force Austria to lay down her arms as speedily as possible. The troops of the expedition had suffered little; they were disembarked; a sufficient force was left on the coast to perform the police duty of the country, and the greater part of the army which had been called the Army of the Ocean, was marched towards the Rhine. The two Vendées and Bretagne were, for the rest, perfectly quiet, through the vigilance and the continual presence of Hoche. An important command was provided for that general, to reward him for his arduous and ungrateful toils. The resignation of Jourdan, whom the unsuccessful issue of the campaign had disgusted, and who had been temporarily succeeded by Beurnonville, af-

* "It is a curious subject for speculation what might have been the result, had Hoche succeeded in landing with sixteen thousand of his best troops on the Irish shores. To those who consider indeed the patriotic spirit, indomitable valour, and persevering character of the English people, and the complete command they had of the sea, the final issue of such a conquest cannot appear doubtful; but it is equally evident that the addition of such a force and so able a commander to the numerous bodies of Irish malcontents would have engendered a dreadful domestic war, and that the whole energies of the empire might for a very long period have been employed in saving itself from dismemberment."—*Alison*. E.

fording an opportunity for offering Hoche a compensation which had long been due to his patriotism and to his talents.

The winter, already far advanced (it was now Nivose), had not interrupted this memorable campaign. On the Rhine, the Archduke Charles was besieging Kehl and the *tête-de-pont* of Huningen: on the Adige, Alvinzy was preparing for a new and last effort against Bonaparte. The interior of the republic was tolerably quiet. The parties had their eyes fixed on the different theatres of the war. The credit and the strength of the government increased or diminished according to the chances of the campaign. The late victory of Arcole had shed a great lustre, and counteracted the bad effect produced by the retreat of the armies of the Rhine. Still this effort of desperate bravery had not made people's minds quite easy respecting the possession of Italy. It was well known that Alvinzy was reinforcing himself, and that the Pope was equipping troops. The evil-disposed asserted that the army of Italy was exhausted; that its general, worn out by the toils of an unexampled campaign and consumed by an extraordinary disease, was unable to sit on horseback. Mantua was not yet taken, and great apprehensions were to be entertained for the month of Nivose (January).

The journals of the two parties, taking unbounded advantage of the liberty of the press, continued to launch out. Those of the counter-revolution, seeing spring, the period for the elections, approaching, strove to agitate opinion and to influence it in their favour. Ever since the disasters of the royalists in La Vendée, it was evident that their last expedient was to make use of liberty to destroy itself, and to obtain the control of the republic by carrying the elections. The Directory, witnessing their animosity, was seized with those movements of impatience, which even the most enlightened government cannot always repress. Though accustomed to liberty, it was alarmed at the language assumed in some of the journals; it did not yet thoroughly comprehend, that it is right to allow perfect freedom of discussion; that falsehood is never to be feared whatever publicity it may gain; that it expends itself by its violence; and that a government perishes by truth alone, and especially by truth repressed. It applied to the two councils for laws respecting the abuses of the press. An outcry was raised. It was alleged that, as the elections were at hand, the Directory wished to cramp the freedom of them. The laws which it solicited were refused: two propositions only were adopted: one relative to the repression of private slander, the other to the hawkers of newspapers in the streets, who instead of crying them by their titles, announced them by detached and frequently very indecorous sentences. The hawkers of a particular pamphlet, for instance, cried about the streets, "Give us back our myriagrammes, and d—n the camp if you cannot make the people happy." It was decided that, to obviate this scandal, the journals and other publications should be cried in future by their title only. The Directory recommended the establishment of an official journal of the government. The Five Hundred assented to this suggestion. The Ancients opposed it. The law of the 3d of Brumaire, brought a second time under discussion in Vendémiaire, and made the pretext for the ridiculous attack of the patriots on the camp of Grenelle, had been maintained after a solemn debate. It was, as it were, the post around which the two parties were incessantly running against one another. It was that clause, in particular, which excluded the relatives of emigrants from public offices, that the right side wished to rescind, and it was that which the republicans were anxious to retain. After a third

attack, it was decided that this clause should be maintained. Only one modification was made in this law. It excluded from the general amnesty, granted for revolutionary misdemeanors, offences connected with the 13th of Vendémiaire; that event was of too old a date not to extend the amnesty to those who might have taken part in it, and who, besides, had in fact all gone unpunished: the amnesty was therefore applied to the offences of Vendémiaire as to all the other purely revolutionary acts.

Thus the Directory, and all those who were in favour of the directorial republic, retained a majority in the Councils, in spite of the outcries of certain hotheaded patriots and of some intriguers sold to the counter-revolution.

The state of the finances produced the usual effect of poverty in families—it disturbed the domestic union of the Directory with the legislative body. The Directory complained that its measures were not always favourably received by the Councils; it addressed to them an alarming message, and published it, as if to throw the blame of the public misfortunes upon them, if they did not cheerfully adopt these suggestions. This message, of the 25th of Frimaire, was couched in these terms: "All departments of the service are distressed. The pay of the troops is in arrear; the defenders of the country are exposed to the horrors of nakedness; their courage is enervated by the painful feeling of their wants; the disgust, which is the consequence of it, leads to desertion. The hospitals are destitute of furniture, of fire, of drugs. The charitable institutions, a prey to the same penury, repel the poor and the infirm, whose sole resource they were. The creditors of the state, the contractors, who every day contribute to supply the wants of the armies, with difficulty obtain but small portions of the sums that are due to them; distress keeps aloof men who could perform the same services with more punctuality or for a less profit. The roads are cut up, the communications interrupted. The public functionaries are without salary: from one end of the republic to the other judges and administrators may be seen reduced to the horrible alternative either of dragging on with their families a miserable existence, or of being dishonoured by selling themselves to intrigue. The evil-disposed are everywhere busy; in many places murder is being organized, and the police, without activity, without energy, because it is without pecuniary means, cannot put a stop to these disorders."

The Councils were irritated at the publication of this message, which seemed to throw the blame of the disastrous condition of the state upon them, and warmly censured the indiscretion of the Directory. They, nevertheless, immediately set about examining its propositions. Specie abounded everywhere, excepting in the coffers of the state. The taxes, which might now be collected in specie or in paper at the current value, came in but slowly. The national domains disposed of were partly paid for; the remaining instalments were not yet due. The government lived by expedients. The contractors received orders of the ministers, called *bordereaux de liquidation*, a sort of promissory notes, which were taken only for a very inferior value, and which caused a considerable rise in the price of the markets. It was, therefore, precisely the same situation that we have already so frequently described.

Great improvements were introduced into the finances for the year V. The budget was divided, as we have already seen, into two parts; the ordinary expenses of four hundred and fifty millions, and the extraordinary expenses of five hundred and fifty. The land-tax, estimated at two hundred

and fifty millions, the sumptuary and personal contribution at fifty, the customs, the stamp and registration duties, at one hundred and fifty, were expected to furnish the four hundred and fifty millions for the ordinary expenditure. The extraordinary expenditure was to be covered by the arrears of the taxes and by the produce of the national domains. The taxes were now to be levied entirely in specie. There were still left some mandates and some assignats, which were immediately annulled, and taken at the current value for the payment of arrears. In this manner a final stop was put to the disorders of the paper-money.* The forced loan was definitively closed. It had produced scarcely four hundred millions, effective value. The arrears of taxes were to be paid up before the 15th of Frimaire (December 5) of the current year. The expedient of putting persons in possession was adopted to accelerate the collection. Lists were ordered to be made out, for the purpose of levying immediately one-fourth of the taxes for the year V. It yet remained to be decided how the value of the national domains was to be made available, as there was no longer any paper-money for putting it beforehand into circulation. The last sixth of the national domains disposed of was still to be received. It was decided that, in order to anticipate this last payment, there should be required of the purchasers obligations payable in specie, falling due at the same time that the law obliged them to acquit themselves, and entailing, in case of protest, the forfeiture of the domains sold. This measure was likely to bring in some eighty millions in obligations, which the contractors declared their willingness to discount. People had no longer any confidence in the state, but they had in private individuals; and the eighty millions of this personal paper had a value which a paper issued and guaranteed by the republic would never have had. It was resolved that the domains sold in future should be paid for as follows: One-tenth down in cash, five-tenths down in orders of ministers, or in *bordereaux de liquidation* delivered to contractors, and the other four-tenths in bills payable one per year.

Thus, having no longer any public credit, the government availed itself of private credit; being no longer able to issue paper-money upon mortgage of the domains, it required of the purchasers of those domains a kind of paper, which, bearing their signature, had an individual value; and lastly, it allowed the contractors to pay themselves for their services out of the domains.

These arrangements induced a hope of a little order and some returns. To supply the urgent wants of the ministry of war, there was assigned to it immediately, for the months of Nivose, Pluviose, Ventose, and Germinal, months devoted to preparations for the new campaign, the sum of one hundred and twenty millions, thirty-three of which were to be taken from the ordinary and eighty-seven from the extraordinary. The registration, the posts, the customs, the patents, the land-tax, were to furnish these thirty-three millions: the eighty-seven of the extraordinary were to be composed of the produce of the woods, the arrears of the military contributions, and the obligations of the purchasers of national domains. These amounts were sure, and they would be paid up forthwith. All the public functionaries

* "Such was the end of the system of paper credit, six years after it had been originally commenced, and after it had effected a greater change in the fortunes of individuals than had perhaps ever been accomplished in the same time by any measure of government. It did more to overthrow the existing wealth, and to transfer moveable fortunes from one hand to another than even the confiscation of the emigrant and church estates."—*Alison*. E

were paid in cash. It was decided that the annuitants should be paid in the same manner; but as there was not yet money to give them, the government gave them notes to bearer, receivable in payment for national domains, like the orders of ministers and the *bordereaux de liquidation* delivered to the contractors.

Such were the administrative operations of the Directory during the winter of the year V (1796–1797), and the means which it prepared, in order to provide for the ensuing campaign. The campaign of 1796 was not yet over, and everything indicated that, notwithstanding ten months' hard fighting, notwithstanding ice and snow, there would still be fresh battles. The Archduke Charles was bent on taking the *têtes de pont* of Kehl and Huningen, as if, in possessing himself of them, he should for ever prevent the return of the French to the right bank. The Directory had an excellent reason for occupying him there, namely, to prevent him from proceeding to Italy. He spent nearly three months before the fortress of Kehl. The troops on both sides signalized themselves by heroic courage, and the generals of division displayed an extraordinary ability. Desaix, in particular, immortalized himself by his intrepidity, his coolness, and his skilful dispositions around that miserably intrenched fort. The conduct of the two commanders-in-chief was far from being so highly approved of as that of their lieutenants. Moreau was censured for not knowing how to profit by the strength of his army, and for not having debouched on the right bank to fall upon the besieging army. The archduke was blamed for having expended such efforts on a *tête de pont*. Moreau surrendered Kehl on the 20th of Nivose, year V (January 9th, 1797); it was a slight loss. Our long resistance proved the solidity of the line of the Rhine. The troops had suffered little; Moreau had employed the time in improving their organization; his army presented a superb aspect. That of the Sambre and Meuse, the command of which had devolved on Beurnonville, had not been usefully employed during these latter months; but it had rested and was reinforced with fresh detachments from La Vendée; it had received an illustrious leader, Hoche, who was, at length, called to conduct a war worthy of his talents. Thus the Directory, though not yet in possession of Mayence, and though it had lost Kehl, might still consider itself as powerful upon the Rhine. The Austrians, for their part, were proud of having taken Kehl, and now directed all their efforts against the *tête de pont* of Huningen. But the chief attention of the emperor and of his ministers was turned to Italy. The exertions of the administration for reinforcing Alvinzy's army, and in preparing for a final struggle, had been extraordinary. The troops had been sent off by post. The whole garrison of Vienna had been despatched towards the Tyrol. The inhabitants of the capital, devotedly attached to the imperial house, had furnished four thousand volunteers, who were formed into regiments and called Vienna volunteers. The empress had presented them with colours, embroidered with her own hands. A new levy had been made in Hungary, and some thousand of the best troops of the Empire had been drawn from the Rhine. Owing to this activity, worthy of the highest praise, Alvinzy's army had been reinforced by about twenty thousand men, so that it now amounted to upwards of sixty thousand. It had rested and reorganized itself, and, though it contained some recruits, it was chiefly composed of troops inured to war. The battalion of Vienna volunteers was formed of young men, strangers, it is true, to war, but filled with elevated sentiments,

thoroughly devoted to the imperial house, and ready to display the greatest bravery.*

The Austrian ministers had made arrangements with the Pope, and prevailed upon him to resist the threats of Bonaparte. They had sent him Colli and some other officers to command his army, and had recommended to him to push it forward as near as possible to Bologna and Mantua. They had given Wurmser notice of speedy succours; they had instructed him not to surrender, but, if he should be reduced to extremity, to leave Mantua with all the troops, and especially all the officers, to throw himself across the Bolognese and the Ferrarese into the Roman states, to join the papal army, and to organize and carry it upon the rear of Bonaparte. This well-conceived plan had a chance of succeeding, with so brave a general as Wurmser. This old marshal still held out in Mantua, with great firmness, though his garrison had nothing to eat but salted horseflesh and polenta.

Bonaparte anticipated this last struggle which was to decide for ever the fate of Italy, and he prepared for it. It was reported in Paris by the malicious, who wished for the humiliation of our armies, that he was afflicted with psora, which had been improperly treated, and which he had caught at Toulon, in charging a cannon with his own hands. This disease, mis-conceived, together with the excessive fatigues of this campaign, had weakened him extremely. He could scarcely sit on horseback; his cheeks were hollow and livid. His whole appearance was deplorable. His eyes alone, still bright and piercing as ever, indicated that the fire of his soul was not extinguished.† His physical proportions formed a singular contrast with his genius and his renown—a contrast amusing to soldiers at once jovial and enthusiastic. Notwithstanding the decline of his strength, his extraordinary energy supported him, and imparted an activity which was applied to all objects at once. He had begun what he called *the war against robbers*. Intriguers of all kinds had thronged to Italy, for the purpose of introducing themselves into the administration of the armies, and profiting by the wealth of that fine country. While simplicity and indigence prevailed in the armies of the Rhine, luxury pervaded that of Italy—

* "The citizens of Austria, though living under a despotic government, are little sensible of its severities, and are sincerely attached to their emperor. The nobility were as ready, as in former times, to bring out their vassals; and Hungary possessed still the high-spirited race of barons and cavaliers, who, in their great convocation in 1740, rose at once, and drawing their sabres, joined in the celebrated exclamation, 'Moriatur pro rege nostro, Maria Teresa!'"—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E.

† We subjoin a characteristic letter addressed by Napoleon to Josephine at this period, as it conveys a vivid idea of his impassioned and energetic temperament, which fatigue and indisposition had no power to subdue.

"At length, my adored Josephine, I live again. Death is no longer before me, and glory and honour are still in my breast. The enemy is beaten at Arcole. To-morrow we will repair the blunders of Vaubois, who abandoned Rivoli. In a week Mantua will be ours, and then thy husband will fold thee in his arms, and give thee a thousand proofs of his ardent affection. I shall proceed to Milan as soon as I can. I am a little fatigued. I have received letters from Eugene and Hortense. I am delighted with the children. I will send you their letters as soon as I am joined by my household, which is now somewhat dispersed. We have made five thousand prisoners, and killed at least six thousand of the enemy. Adieu, my adorable Josephine! Think of me often. When you cease to love your Achilles—when your heart grows cold towards him—you will be very cruel, very unjust. But I am sure you will always continue my faithful mistress, as I shall ever remain your fond lover. Death alone can break the union which sentiment, love, and sympathy have formed. Let me have news of your health. A thousand and a thousand kisses."—*Josephine's Correspondence*. E.

luxury as great as its glory. The soldiers, well clothed and well fed, were everywhere cordially received, and lived in pleasures and abundance. The officers, the generals, participated in the general opulence, and laid the foundation of their fortunes. As for the contractors, they displayed a scandalous profusion, and purchased with the produce of their extortions the favours of the most beautiful actresses of Italy. Bonaparte, who had within him all the passions, but who, at that moment, was wholly engrossed by one passion, that of glory, lived in a simple and austere manner, seeking relaxation only in the society of his wife, to whom he was tenderly attached, and who had come, at his desire, to his head-quarters. Indignant at the disorders of the administration, he strictly scrutinized the minutest details, verified by personal inspection the accounts of the companies, denounced the dishonest administrators without mercy, and caused them to be prosecuted. He reproached them, in particular, with want of courage, and with leaving the army in days of danger. He recommended to the Directory to select men of tried energy; he proposed the institution of a syndicate, which, trying like a jury, should have power, on its mere conviction, to punish offences of which material proofs were never to be obtained. He willingly forgave his soldiers and his generals enjoyments which were not to prove for them the delights of Capua; but he bore an implacable hatred to all those who enriched themselves at the expense of the army, without serving it by their exploits or by their attention to its wants.

In his relations with the Italian powers he displayed the same attention and the same activity. Continuing to dissemble with Venice, whose armaments he saw preparing in the lagoons and in the mountains of the Bergamasco, he deferred all explanation till after the surrender of Mantua. He sent troops to occupy temporarily the citadel of Bergamo, which had a Venetian garrison, and assigned as a reason that he did not think it sufficiently guarded to resist a *coup-de-main* of the Austrians. He thus secured himself against treachery, and overawed the numerous enemies whom he had in Bergamo. In Lombardy and the Cispadane, he continued to favour the spirit of liberty, repressing the Austrian and papal party, and moderating the democratic party, which needs restraining in every country. He kept himself in amity with the King of Sardinia and the Duke of Parma. He went in person to Bologna, to terminate a negotiation with the Duke of Tuscany, and to awe the court of Rome. The Duke of Tuscany was annoyed at the presence of the French in Leghorn. Warm discussions had arisen with the merchants of Leghorn, respecting the commodities belonging to traders, enemies of France. These disputes produced violent animosity; besides, the commodities rescued with such difficulty, were sold to great disadvantage, and by a company which had robbed the army of five or six millions. Bonaparte preferred an arrangement with the grand-duke. It was agreed that he should be paid the sum of two millions and evacuate Leghorn. This arrangement afforded the additional advantage of rendering the garrison which he had placed in that city disposable. His intention was to take the two legions formed by the Cispadane, to unite them with the garrison of Leghorn, to add to them three thousand of his troops, and to despatch this little army towards the Romagna and the March of Ancona. He meant to take possession of two more provinces of the Roman state, to seize the property of the Pope there and the produce of the taxes, to pay himself by these means for the contribution which had not been discharged, to take hostages selected from the party inimical to France, and thus to establish a barrier between the states of the Church

and Mantua. He would thereby render the plan of a junction between Wurmser and the papal army impracticable; he would overawe the Pope, and oblige him, at last, to submit to the conditions of the republic. In his spleen against the Holy See, he even thought of not pardoning it, and contemplated an entirely new division of Italy. His plan was to restore Lombardy to Austria, to form a powerful republic, by adding the Romagna, the March of Ancona, and the duchy of Parma to the Modenese, the Bolognese, and the Ferrarese, and to assign Rome to the Duke of Parma, which would have given great pleasure to Spain, and have compromised the most Catholic of all the powers. He had already set about executing his project. He had proceeded to Bologna with three thousand men, and thence threatened the Holy See, which had already formed the nucleus of an army. But the Pope, now certain of a new Austrian expedition, hoping to communicate by the Lower Po with Wurmser, defied the threats of the French general, and even manifested a wish to see him advance still farther into his dominions. His Holiness, it was said at the Vatican, will quit Rome, if he is obliged to do so, and take refuge at the extremity of his territories. The farther Bonaparte advances, the farther he removes from the Adige, the more dangerous will be his situation, and the more favourable will be the chances for the holy cause. Bonaparte, who was quite as sharp-sighted as the Vatican, had no intention of marching to Rome; he meant only to threaten, and he kept his eye constantly upon the Adige, expecting every moment a new attack. On the 19th of Nivose (January 8th, 1797) he actually received intelligence that an action had taken place on all his advanced posts; he immediately recrossed the Po with two thousand men, and hastened in person to Verona.

Since the affair of Arcole, his army had received the reinforcements which it ought to have received before that battle. With the winter, his sick had left the hospitals; he had about forty-five thousand men present under arms.* Their distribution was still the same. Nearly ten thousand men were blockading Mantua, under Serrurier; thirty thousand were in observation on the Adige. Augereau occupied Legnago; Massena, Verona; Joubert, who had succeeded Vaubois, guarded Rivoli and La Corona. Rey, with a division of reserve, was at Desenzano, on the border of the Lake of Garda. The other four or five thousand men were either in the citadels of Bergamo and Milan, or in the Cispadane. The Austrians were advancing with sixty and some odd thousand men, and had twenty thousand in Mantua, at least twelve thousand of whom were under arms. Thus, in this struggle, as in those which had preceded, the proportion of the enemy was as two to one. The Austrians had this time a new plan. They had tried all the routes for attacking the double line of the Mincio and of the Adige. At the time of the battle of Castiglione they had descended along both shores of the Lake of Garda, by the two valleys of the Chiese and of the Adige. Subsequently, they had debouched by the valley of the Adige and by that of the Brenta, attacking by Rivoli and Verona. They had now modified their plan agreeably to their arrangements with the Pope. The principal attack was to be made by the Upper Adige, with forty-five thousand men under the command of Alvinzy. An accessory attack, and independent of the former, was to be made with nearly twenty thousand

* "After the battle of Arcole, the active French army amounted to thirty-six thousand three hundred and eighty; while ten thousand two hundred and thirty formed the blockade of Mantua."—*Jomini*. E.

men, under the command of Provera, by the Lower Adige, with a view to communicate with Mantua, La Romagna, and the army of the Pope.

Alvinzy's attack was to be the principal one; it would be strong enough to induce a hope of success on this point, and it was to be pushed without any consideration of what might happen to Provera. We have described the three routes which issue from the mountains of the Tyrol. That which turned behind the Lake of Garda had been neglected ever since the affair at Castiglione. The two others were now followed. The one, running between the Adige and the Lake of Garda, passed through the mountains which separate the lake from the river, and there came upon the position of Rivoli; the other, bordering the river exteriorly, debouched in the plain of Verona outside the French line. It was the one which passed between the river and the lake, and which penetrated into the French line, that Alvinzy chose. It was at Rivoli, therefore, that the blow would be aimed. The situation of that ever-celebrated position is this. The chain of Monte Baldo separates the Lake of Garda and the Adige. The high-road runs between the Adige and the foot of the mountains, for some leagues. At Incanale the river washes the very foot of the mountains, and leaves no space whatever for proceeding along its bank. The road then leaves the banks of the river, rises by a kind of spiral stairs in the sides of the mountain, and debouches in an extensive plateau, which is that of Rivoli. It looks down upon the Adige on one side, and is encompassed on the other by the amphitheatre of Monte Baldo. An army in position on this plateau threatens the winding road which ascends to it, and sweeps by its fire both banks of the Adige to a great distance. This plateau is difficult of attack in front, since the narrow spiral ascent must be climbed in order to reach it. Accordingly, an enemy would not strive to attack it by that single way. Before arriving at Incanale, other roads lead to Monte Baldo, and ascending its steep acclivities terminate at the plateau of Rivoli. They are not practicable either for cavalry or for artillery, but they afford easy access to foot soldiers, and may be employed for directing a considerable force in infantry upon the flanks and rear of the corps defending the plateau. Alvinzy's plan was to attack the position by all the avenues at once.

On the 23d of Nivose (January 12) he attacked Joubert, who held all the advanced positions, and forced him back upon Rivoli. The same day, Provera pushed two advanced guards, the one upon Verona, the other upon Legnago, by Caldiero and Bevilacqua. Massena, who was at Verona, went out to meet the advanced guard coming in that direction, overthrew it, and took nine hundred prisoners. At that very moment, Bonaparte arrived upon the spot from Bologna. He directed the whole division to return to Verona, to keep it in readiness for marching. In the night, he received intelligence that Joubert was attacked and forced at Rivoli, and that Augereau, before Legnago, had observed considerable forces. He could not yet judge upon what point the enemy was directing his principal mass. He still kept Massena's division ready to march, and ordered Rey's division, which was at Desenzano, and which had not seen any enemy debouching behind the Lake of Garda, to proceed to Castel Novo, the most central point between the Upper and the Lower Adige. Next day, the 24th (January 13), couriers rapidly succeeded one another. Bonaparte was informed that Joubert, attacked by immense forces, was likely to be surrounded, and that it was owing only to the obstinacy and the success of his resistance that he still retained the plateau of Rivoli.

Augereau sent him word from the Lower Adige that a fire of musketry was kept up along both banks, but that nothing of importance had occurred. Bonaparte had not more than about two thousand Austrians before him at Verona. From that moment he guessed the plan of the enemy, and saw clearly that the principal attack was directed against Rivoli. He conceived that Augereau would be sufficient to defend the Lower Adige; he reinforced him with a corps of cavalry, detached from Massena's division. He ordered Serrurier, who was blockading Mantua, to send his reserve to Villa Franca, that it might be placed intermediately with regard to all the points. He left a regiment of infantry and one of cavalry at Verona, and set out in the night between the 24th and 25th (January 13 and 14), with the 18th, 32d, and 75th demi-brigades of Massena's division, and two squadrons of cavalry. He sent word to Rey not to stop at Castel Novo, but to proceed immediately to Rivoli. He himself, pushing on before his divisions, arrived at Rivoli at two in the morning.* The weather, which had been rainy for some days, had now cleared up. The sky was serene, the moon shone brightly, and the cold was intense. On his arrival, Bonaparte beheld the whole horizon in a blaze with the enemy's fires. He reckoned him to have forty-five thousand men; Joubert had ten thousand at most: it was high time that succours should arrive. The enemy had divided his force into three corps. The principal, composed of a strong column of grenadiers, the whole of the cavalry, the whole of the artillery, and the baggage, under Quasdanovich, followed the high-road between the river and Monte Baldo, and was to debouch by the spiral ascent of Incanale. Three other corps, under the command of Ocskay, Koblos, and Liptai, composed of infantry only, had climbed the sides of the mountains, and were to descend to the field of battle by the steps of the amphitheatre formed by Monte Baldo about the plateau of Rivoli. A fourth corps, under the command of Lusignan, ascending the side of the plateau, was to place itself on the rear of the French army, to cut it off from the road to Verona. Lastly, Alvinzy had detached a sixth corps, which, from its position, was totally excluded from the operation. It marched on the other side of the Adige, and followed the road which runs along the river exteriorly through Roveredo, Dolce, and Verona. This corps, commanded by Vukassovich, could at most send a few balls upon the field of battle by firing from one bank upon the other.

Bonaparte instantly perceived that it behoved him to keep the plateau at any rate. He had in front the Austrian infantry descending the amphitheatre, without a single piece of cannon. On his right he had the grenadiers, the artillery, the cavalry, advancing along the road by the river, and ready to debouch by the spiral ascent of Incanale on his right flank. On his left, Lusignan was turning Rivoli. The balls of Vukassovich, fired on the other side of the river, reached his head. Placed on the plateau, he prevented the junction of the different arms. He played with his artillery upon the infantry deprived of its cannon, and drove back

* "Napoleon was especially desirous to secure the elevated and commanding position of Rivoli, before the enemy had time to receive his cavalry and cannon, as he hoped to bring on an engagement ere he was united with those important parts of his army. Accordingly, by forced marches he arrived at Rivoli at two o'clock in the morning, and from that elevated situation, by the assistance of a clear moonlight, he was able to discover that the bivouac of the enemy was divided into five distinct and separate bodies, from which he inferred that their attack the next day would be made in the same number of columns."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E.

the cavalry and artillery, crowded together in a narrow, winding road. The attempt which was making by Lusignan to turn him, and the balls which Vukassovich was throwing at him, gave him then but little concern.

His plan being formed with his accustomed promptness, he commenced the operation before daylight. Joubert had been obliged to keep his troops close together, that he might occupy only a space proportionate to his strength; and it was to be feared that the infantry, descending the declivity of Monte Baldo, would form a junction with the head of the column climbing up by Incanale. Bonaparte, long before daylight, ordered Joubert's troops, which, after forty-eight hours' fighting, were taking a little rest, to be roused. He directed them to attack the advanced posts of the Austrian infantry, drove them back, and extended himself more widely upon the plateau.

The action became extremely brisk. The Austrian infantry, without cannon, gave way before that of the French, armed with its formidable artillery, and fell back in semicircle upon the amphitheatre of Monte Baldo. But, at this moment, an unfortunate event happened on our left. Liptai's corps, which formed the extremity of the enemy's semicircle, fell upon Joubert's left, composed of the 89th and 25th demi-brigades, surprised them, broke them, and obliged them to retire in disorder. The 14th, coming immediately after these two demi-brigades, formed *en crochet* to cover the rest of the line, and resisted with admirable courage. The Austrians united their efforts against it, and were ready to overwhelm it. They strove particularly to take its cannon, the horses attached to which had been killed. They had already reached the pieces, when an officer exclaimed, "Grenadiers of the 14th, will you let your guns be taken?" Fifty men immediately rushed forward after the brave officer, repulsed the Austrians, harnessed themselves to the pieces, and drew them off.

Bonaparte, perceiving the danger, left Berthier on the threatened point, and set out at a gallop for Rivoli to fetch succours. Massena's first troops had only just arrived there, after marching all night. Bonaparte took the 32d, which had become celebrated for its exploits during the campaign, and directed it upon the left, in order to rally the two demi-brigades which had given way. The intrepid Massena* advanced at the head of the 32d, rallied behind him the broken troops, and overthrew all before him. He repulsed the Austrians, and placed himself by the side of the 14th, which had not ceased to perform prodigies of valour. The combat was thus re-established on this point, and the army occupied the semicircle of the plateau. But the momentary check of the left wing had obliged Joubert to fall back with the right. He gave up ground, and already the Austrian infantry was a second time approaching the point which Bonaparte had been so anxious to compel it to relinquish to him, and had nearly reached the outlet of the winding road of Incanale, leading upon the plateau. At this moment, the column composed of artillery and cavalry, and preceded by several battalions of grenadiers, ascended the winding road, and, with incredible efforts of bravery, repulsed the 39th. Vukassovich poured a shower of balls from the other bank of the Adige, to protect this kind of escalade. The grenadiers had already climbed the summit of that defile, and the cavalry was debouching after them upon the plateau. Nor was

* "It was after the battle of Rivoli that Massena received from Bonaparte and the army the title of 'Enfant chéri de la victoire.'"—*Thibaudeau*. E.

this all. Lusignan's column, whose fires had been seen at a distance, and who had been perceived on the left, turning the position of the French, had moved upon their rear, in order to intercept the Verona road, and to stop the advance of Rey, who was coming from Castel Novo with the division of reserve. Lusignan's soldiers, finding themselves on the rear of the French army, already clapped their hands, and considered it as taken. Thus, on this plateau, closely pressed in front by a semicircle of infantry, turned on the left by a strong column, scaled on the right by the main body of the Austrian army, and harassed by the fire from the opposite bank of the Adige—on this plateau Bonaparte was pent up with Joubert's and Massena's divisions alone, amidst a host of enemies.* He, with sixteen thousand men, was surrounded by at least forty thousand.

In this extremely trying moment Bonaparte was not shaken. He retained all the fire and all the promptness of inspiration. On seeing Lusignan's Austrians, he said, *Those are ours!* and he allowed them to advance without giving himself any concern about their movement. The soldiers, guessing the meaning of their general, shared his confidence, and also repeated to one another, *They are ours!*

Bonaparte, at this instant, was attending only to what was passing before him. His left was covered by the heroism of the 14th and the 32d. His right was threatened at once by the infantry which had resumed the offensive, and by the column that was scaling the plateau. He immediately arranged decisive movements. A battery of light artillery and two squadrons, under two brave officers, Leclerc† and Lasalle, were directed upon the outlet by which the enemy were debouching. Joubert, who, with the extreme right, had this outlet at his back, suddenly faced about with a corps of light infantry. All charged at once. The artillery first poured a discharge upon all that had debouched; the cavalry and the light infantry then charged with vigour. Joubert's horse was killed under him. He sprang up more terrible than ever, and rushed upon the enemy with a musket in his hand. All that had debouched, grenadiers, cavalry, artillery, were hurled headlong down the winding road of Incanale, in the utmost disorder. Some pieces of cannon, firing down into the defile, augmented the terror and the confusion. At every step, the French killed and made prisoners. Having cleared the plateau of the assailants who had scaled it, Bonaparte again directed his blows at the infantry which was ranged in a semicircle before him, and threw upon it Joubert with the light infantry, and Lasalle with two hundred hussars. On this new attack, consternation seized that infantry, now deprived of all hope of junction. It fled in disorder. Our whole semicircular line then moved from right to left, drove back the Austrians against the amphitheatre of Monte Baldo,

* "This day the general-in-chief was several times surrounded by the enemy; he had several horses killed under him."—*Montholon*. E.

† "Charles Emanuel Leclerc, a French general, entered the army while yet very young, and soon proved successful. Intrepid in the field and judicious in the council, he was employed in 1793 as adjutant-general in the army which besieged Toulon. In the armies of the North and the Rhine he increased his reputation; and in the campaign of Italy, in 1796, he reaped fresh laurels. He next accompanied the expedition to Egypt, returned to France in 1799, and greatly contributed to the revolution of the 18th Brumaire. Leclerc was afterwards commissioned to reunite St. Domingo to the French government, but in 1802 he fell a victim to the plague, which had carried off many of his men. Napoleon held his character in such esteem that he gave him his own sister in marriage."—*Biographie Moderne*. E.

and closely pursued them into the mountains. Bonaparte then turned back, and proceeded to realize his prediction respecting Lusignan's corps. That corps, on witnessing the disasters of the Austrian army, soon perceived what would be its own fate. Bonaparte, after playing upon it with his artillery, ordered the 18th and the 75th demi-brigades to charge it. These brave demi-brigades moved off singing the song of departure, and pushed Lusignan along the Verona road, by which Rey was coming with the division of reserve. The Austrian corps at first resisted, then retired, and encountered the head of Rey's division. Terrified at this sight, it invoked the clemency of the conqueror, and laid down its arms, to the number of four thousand men. Two thousand had been taken in the defile of the Adige.

It was now five o'clock, and it may be said that the Austrian army was annihilated. Lusignan was taken; the infantry that had advanced from the mountains was fleeing across tremendous rocks; the principal column was pent up on the bank of the river; while the accessory corps of Vukassovich was a useless spectator of the disaster, separated by the Adige from the field of battle.

This admirable victory did not stun the mind of Bonaparte. He thought of the Lower Adige, which he had left menaced; he judged that Joubert, with his brave division, and Rey, with the division of reserve, would be sufficient to give the last stroke to the enemy, and to take from him thousands of prisoners. He rallied Massena's division, which had fought the preceding day at Verona, which had then marched all night, and again fought the whole of the 26th (14th), and set out with it, to march the whole of the following night and to hasten to new combats. These brave soldiers, with joyful faces, and reckoning upon fresh victories, seemed not to feel fatigue. They flew, rather than marched, to cover Mantua.* They were fourteen leagues from that city.

Bonaparte received intelligence by the way, of what was passing on the Lower Adige. Provera, slipping away from Augereau, had thrown a bridge at Anghiari, a little above Legnago; he had left Hohenzollern beyond the Adige, and marched upon Mantua with nine or ten thousand men. Augereau, apprized too late, had nevertheless followed him, taken him in rear, and made two thousand prisoners. But Provera himself, with seven or eight thousand men, was continuing his march towards Mantua, in order to join the garrison. Bonaparte learned these particulars at Castel Novo. He was apprehensive lest the garrison, apprized of the circumstance, might sally forth to give the hand to the corps which was coming, and that the blockading corps might thus be placed between two fires. He had marched the whole night between the 25th and 26th (14th

* "Were I to name all those who have been distinguished by acts of personal bravery, I must send the muster-roll of all the grenadiers and carabiniers of the advanced guard. They jest with danger and laugh at death; and if anything can equal their intrepidity, it is the gaiety with which, singing alternately songs of love and patriotism, they accomplish the most severe forced marches. When they arrive at their bivouac, it is not to take their repose, as might be expected, but to tell each his story of the battle of the day, and produce his plan for that of to-morrow; and many of them think with great correctness on military subjects. The other day I was inspecting a demi-brigade, and, as it filed past me, a common chasseur approached my horse, and said, 'General, you ought to do so and so.'—'Hold your peace, you rogue!' I replied. He disappeared immediately, nor have I since been able to find him out. But the manoeuvre which he recommended, was the very same which I had privately resolved to carry into execution."—*Napoleon's Letter to the Directory.—Moniteur.* E

and 15th) with Massena's division, and he made it march again the whole of the 26th (15th), that it might arrive in the evening before Mantua. He likewise directed thither the reserves, which he had left in the intermediate distance to Villa Franca, and flew thither himself to arrange his dispositions.

On the very same day, the 26th, Provera, who had arrived before Mantua, presented himself before the suburbs of St. George, in which Miollis with at most fifteen hundred men was placed. Provera summoned him to surrender. The brave Miollis replied by a discharge of his artillery. Provera, repulsed, moved to the side nearest to the citadel, hoping for a sortie by Wurmser; but he found Serrurier before him. He halted at the palace of La Favorita, between St. George and the citadel, and sent a boat across the lake to desire Wurmser to debouch from the place on the following morning. Bonaparte arrived in the evening, placed Augereau on the rear of Provera, and Victor and Massena on his flanks, so as to separate him entirely from the citadel, by which Wurmser must attempt to debouch. He opposed Serrurier to Wurmser. Next morning, the 27th (January 16th), at daybreak, the battle commenced. Wurmser debouched from the place and attacked Serrurier with fury. The latter resisted with equal bravery, and kept him back along the lines of circumvallation. Victor, at the head of the 57th, which, on that day, received the name of *the Terrible*, rushed upon Provera, and overthrew all before him. After an obstinate conflict Wurmser was driven back into Mantua. Provera, hunted like a deer, inclosed by Victor, Massena, and Augereau, annoyed by a sortie of Miollis, laid down his arms, with six thousand men. The young Vienna volunteers formed part of them. After an honourable defence, they surrendered their arms, and the colours embroidered by the empress herself.

Such was the last act of that splendid operation, which is considered by military men as one of the most extraordinary recorded in history. News arrived that Joubert, pursuing Alvinzy, had taken from him seven thousand more prisoners; and six had been taken on the day of the battle of Rivoli, which made thirteen. Augereau had taken two thousand; Provera had surrendered six thousand; one thousand had been picked up before Verona, and several hundred in other places;* which made the total number in three days amount to twenty-two or twenty-three thousand men. Massena's division had marched and fought without intermission for four days, marching all night and fighting all day. Thus Bonaparte wrote with pride that his soldiers had surpassed the so much vaunted rapidity of Cæsar's

* "The following is a striking instance of the utter consternation and dispersion of the Austrians after this dreadful defeat. René, a young officer, was in possession of the village of Garda, and, while visiting his advanced posts, he perceived some Austrians approaching whom he caused his escort to surround and take prisoners. Advancing to the front to reconnoitre, he found himself close to the head of an imperial column of eighteen hundred men, which a turning in the road had concealed, till he was within twenty yards of them. 'Down with your arms!' said the Austrian commander, to which René answered with ready boldness, 'Do you lay down your arms! I have destroyed your advanced guard, as witness these prisoners—so ground your arms, or no quarter!' and the French soldiers, catching the hint of their leader, joined in the cry of 'Ground your arms.' The Austrian officer hesitated, and proposed to enter into capitulation; but the French would admit of no terms but instant surrender. The dispirited Imperialist yielded up his sword, and commanded his soldiers to imitate his example. But the Austrian soldiers began to suspect the truth; they became refractory, and refused to obey their leader, whom René addressed with the utmost apparent composure. 'You are an officer, sir, and a man of honour—you know

legions.* It is obvious why, at a later period, he attached the title of Rivoli to the name of Massena. The action of the 27th (January 14th) was called the battle of Rivoli, that of the 25th (16th), before Mantua, the battle of La Favorita.

Thus, in three days again, Bonaparte had taken or destroyed half of the enemy's army, and, as it were, stricken it with a thunderbolt. Austria had made her last effort, and now Italy was ours. Wurmser, driven back into Mantua, was without hope. He had eaten all his horses; disease and famine were destroying the garrison. A longer resistance would have been useless, and contrary to humanity. The old marshal had given proof of a noble courage and a rare perseverance; he was justified in thinking of surrender. He sent one of his officers to Serrurier to parley. It was Klenau Serrurier referred to the general-in-chief, who repaired to the conference. Bonaparte, wrapped in his cloak, without making himself known, listened to the conversation between Klenau and Serrurier. The Austrian officer expatiated at length on the resources which his general still had left, and declared that he had yet provisions for three months. Bonaparte, muffled up as before, approached the table, near which the conference was held, took the paper containing Wurmser's propositions, and, without saying a word, began writing on the margin, to the great astonishment of Klenau, who could not conceive what he was about. Then rising and throwing off his cloak, Bonaparte stepped up to Klenau. "There," said he, "are the conditions which I grant to your marshal. If he had but a fortnight's provisions and could talk of surrender, he would not deserve an honourable capitulation. As he sends you, he must be reduced to extremity. I respect his age, his valour, and his misfortunes. Carry to him the conditions which I grant. Whether he leaves the place to-morrow, in a month, or in six months, he shall have neither better nor worse conditions. He can stay as long as it befits his honour."

By this language and this tone, Klenau recognised the illustrious commander, and hastened back to Wurmser with the conditions which he offered. The old marshal was full of gratitude on seeing the generosity with which he was treated by his young adversary. He gave him permission to march freely out of the place with all his staff; he even granted him two hundred horse, five hundred men, chosen by himself, and six pieces of cannon, to render his departure the less humiliating. The garrison was to be conducted to Trieste and there exchanged for French prisoners. Wurmser hastened to accept these conditions; and, to show his gratitude to the French general, he informed him of a plan laid in the papal dominions for poisoning him. He was to leave Mantua on the 14th of Pluviose (February 2, 1797). His consolation was that, on leaving Mantua, he should deliver up his sword to the conqueror himself; but he found only the brave Serrurier, before whom he was obliged to file off with his

the rules of war—you have surrendered—you are therefore my prisoner—but I rely on your parole; here, I return your sword; compel your men to submission, otherwise I direct against you the division of six thousand men who are under my command.' The Austrian was utterly confounded. He assured René he might rely on his punctilious compliances with the parole he had given him; and, speaking in German to his soldiers, he persuaded them to lay down their arms—a submission which he had soon afterwards the satisfaction to see had been made to one-twelfth part of their number."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E.

* "The Roman legions are reported to have marched twenty-four miles a day; but the French brigades, though fighting at intervals, marched thirty. —*Bonaparte's Letter to the Directory*. E.

whole staff. Bonaparte had already set out for the Romagna, to chastise the Pope and to punish the Vatican. His vanity, as profound as his genius, had calculated differently from the vanity of vulgar minds. He chose rather to be absent, than present at the place of triumph.*

Mantua having surrendered, Italy was definitively conquered, and this campaign at an end.

When we take a general view of it, the imagination is struck by the multitude of the battles, the fecundity of the conceptions, of the consequence and the immensity of the results. Bonaparte, entering Italy with some thirty thousand men, first separates the Piedmontese from the Austrians at Montenotte and Millesimo, completes the destruction of the former at Mondovi, then hastens after the latter, crosses before their face the Po at Placentia, the Adda at Lodi, possesses himself of Lombardy, stops there for a moment, again marches, finds the Austrians reinforced on the Mincio, and finishes their destruction at the battle of Borghetto. There, he seizes at a glance the plan of his future operations. It is on the Adige that he must establish himself to make head against the Austrians. As for the princes on his rear, he would content himself by curbing them with negotiations and threats. A second army is sent against him under Wurmser; he cannot beat it unless by rapidly concentrating himself, and alternately striking each of his separate masses. Like a resolute man, he sacrifices the blockade of Mantua, crushes Wurmser at Lonato and Castiglione, and drives him into the Tyrol. Wurmser is again reinforced, as Beaulieu had been. Bonaparte anticipates him in the Tyrol; ascends the Adige, overturns all before him at Roveredo, throws himself across the valley of the Brenta; cuts off Wurmser, who hoped to cut him off, beats him at Bassano, and shuts him up in Mantua. This is the second Austrian army destroyed after being reinforced.

Bonaparte, still negotiating and threatening the banks of the Adige, awaits the third army. It is formidable. It arrives before he has received reinforcements; he is obliged to give way before it; he is reduced to despair; he is ready to succumb; when, amidst an impassable morass, he discovers two dikes debouching upon the enemy's flanks, and throws himself upon them with incredible audacity. He is again conqueror at Arcole. But the enemy is only checked—not destroyed. He returns, for the last time, stronger than ever. On the one hand, he descends from the mountains; on the other, he advances along the Lower Adige. Bonaparte discovers the only point where the Austrian columns, traversing a mountainous country, can form a junction, pounces upon the celebrated plateau of Rivoli, and from that plateau crushes the main army of Alvinzy; then resuming his flight towards the Lower Adige, surrounds the whole column that had crossed it. His last operation is the most brilliant, for here success is united with genius.

Thus, in ten months, besides the Piedmontese army, three formidable armies, thrice enforced, had been destroyed by one, which, only thirty and a few odd thousand strong on taking the field, had received only about twenty thousand to repair its losses. Thus fifty-five thousand French had beaten more than two hundred thousand Austrians, taken more than eighty

* "Napoleon had too much grandeur of mind to insult the vanquished veteran by his own presence on this occasion; his delicacy was observed by all Europe, and, like the statues of Brutus and Cassius at the funeral of Junia, was the more present to the mind because he was withdrawn from the sight."—*Alison*. E.

thousand,* killed and wounded more than twenty thousand. They had fought twelve pitched battles and more than sixty actions, and crossed several rivers, in defiance of the waves and the enemy's fire. When war is a purely mechanical routine, consisting only in driving and slaughtering the enemy whom you have before you, it is scarcely worthy of history; but when you meet with one of those conflicts in which you see a mass of men moved by a single vast conception, which develops itself amid the din of battle with as much precision as that of a Newton or a Descartes in the silence of the closet, then the sight is worthy of the philosopher, as well as of the statesman and the soldier: and if this identification of the multitude with a single individual, who produces force at its highest degree, serves to protect, to defend, a noble cause, that of liberty, in this case the scene becomes as moral as it is grand.

Bonaparte now hastened to new plans. He hurried to Rome, to put an end to the shuffling at that court of priests, and to march, not for the Adige again, but for Vienna. He had by his successes brought back the war to its proper theatre, that of Italy, whence he could dash upon the emperor's hereditary dominions. The government, enlightened by his exploits, sent him reinforcements, to enable him to proceed to Vienna and to dictate a glorious peace in the name of the French republic. The conclusion of the campaign had realized all the hopes which its commencement had excited.

The triumph of Rivoli had raised the joy of the patriots to the highest pitch. Everybody talked of those twenty-two thousand prisoners, and quoted the testimony of the authorities of Milan, who had reviewed them and certified their number, in order to silence all the doubts of malevolence. The surrender of Mantua soon followed to crown the general satisfaction. From that moment the conquest of Italy was regarded as definitive. The courier who brought these tidings arrived in the evening in Paris. The garrison was immediately assembled, and the intelligence published by torchlight, to the sound of trumpets, amid shouts of joy from all the French attached to their country. O days ever celebrated and ever to be regretted by us! At what period was our country ever greater and more glorious! The storms of the Revolution seemed to have subsided. The murmurs of parties sounded like the last moans of the expiring tempest. These remains of agitation were considered as the very life of a free state. Commerce and the finances were emerging from a tremendous crisis: the entire soil, restored to industrious hands, was about to be rendered productive. A government composed of citizens, our equals, ruled the republic with moderation. The best were selected to succeed them. All votes were free. France, at the height of power, was mistress of the whole extent of country from the Rhine to the Pyrenees, and from the sea to the Alps. Holland and Spain were about to unite their fleets with hers, and to attack maritime despotism in concert. She was resplendent with immortal glory. Admirable armies waved her tricoloured banners in the face of kings, who had leagued to annihilate her. Twenty heroes, differing in character and talent, alike only in age and courage, led her soldiers to victory.† Hoche,

* "The trophies acquired in the course of January were 25,000 prisoners, twenty-four colours and standards, and sixty pieces of cannon. On the whole, the enemy's loss was at least 35,000 men. Bessières carried the colours to Paris. The prisoners were so numerous that they created some difficulty."—*Moniteur*. E.

† "Bonaparte's lieutenants, in particular, were themselves qualified to command and had sufficient confidence in their own talents to take upon themselves the respon

Kleber, Desaix, Moreau, Joubert, Massena, Bonaparte, and a great number of others advanced together. People weighed their different merits, but no eye, how piercing soever it might be, could distinguish in this generation of heroes the unfortunate or the guilty. No eye could distinguish him who should so soon expire in the flower of his age from the attack of an unknown disease, the man who should fall by the dagger of the Mussulman, or the fire of the enemy, who should crush liberty, or who should betray his country. All appeared great, pure, happy, destined to future glory. This was for a moment only; but there are only moments in the life of nations, as in the life of individuals. We were about to recover wealth with repose; liberty and glory we already possessed! "The country," said one of the Ancients, "ought to be not only prosperous, but sufficiently glorious." This wish was accomplished. Frenchmen, let us, who have since seen our liberty strangled, our country invaded, our heroes shot or unfaithful to their glory—let us never forget those resplendent days of liberty, greatness, and hope!

ability of a movement or a battle; and his army was composed of citizens, even of noble and cultivated minds, who were ambitious of performing memorable deeds, and passionately attached to the Revolution. With men like these a man of genius might do anything. The remembrance of his earlier days, when he called liberty and intelligence around him, was calculated to make Bonaparte regret, at a later period of his life that he had substituted mechanical armies in their place, and generals who knew nothing but how to obey."—*Mignet*. E.

THE DIRECTORY.

SITUATION OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE WINTER OF THE YEAR V (1797)—CHARACTERS AND DIVISIONS OF THE FIVE DIRECTORS—STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION—INTRIGUES OF THE ROYALIST FACTION—PLOT OF BROTTIER, LAVILLE-HEURNOIS, AND DUVERNE DE PRESLE, DISCOVERED—ELECTIONS OF THE YEAR V.

THE recent victories of Rivoli and La Favorita, and the taking of Mantua, had restored to France all her superiority. The Directory, as grossly abused as ever, struck the greatest terror into the foreign powers. "Half Europe," wrote Mallet Dupan,* "is at the knees of this divan, vying for the honour of becoming its tributary." These fifteen months' firm and brilliant reign had consolidated the power of the five directors, but had also developed their passions and their characters. Men cannot live long together without soon taking a liking or a dislike to one another, and without grouping themselves into parties according to their inclinations. Carnot, Barras, Rewbel, Lareveillère-Lepeaux, Letourneur, already formed different groups. Carnot was systematic, obstinate, and proud. He was totally destitute of that quality which imparts enlarged views and precision to the mind and suppleness to the character. He was shrewd, and could readily fathom any subject which he was examining; but, when once involved in an error, he could never extricate himself from it. He was upright,† persevering, very attentive to business, but never forgave either a wrong or an affront offered to his self-love; he was witty and original, which is frequently the case with men who are wrapped up in themselves. He had formerly quarrelled with the members of the committee of public welfare, for it was impossible that his pride should sympathize with that of Robespierre and St. Just, and that his great courage should flinch before their despotism. Now, he could not fail to be in the same predicament in regard to the Directory. Besides the occasions which he had to jostle against his colleagues, while engaged with them in a task so difficult as that of government, and which so naturally provokes a diversity of opinions, he cherished old resentments, particularly against Barras. All his dispositions, as a strict, upright, laborious man, kept him aloof from this prodigal, debauched, and indolent colleague; but he especially detested in him the chief of those Thermidorians, friends and avengers of Danton, and persecutors of the old Mountain. Carnot, who was one of the prin-

* Secret Correspondence with the government of Venice.

† "Faction, in the most violent paroxysms of its fury, had the prudence not to attack Carnot's private life; its impure breath never attempted to taint his virtues as a son, a husband, or a father. His disinterestedness, especially, was always acknowledged by friends and enemies.—Carnot was the great citizen, who by his genius preserved France from foreign domination. His life was an eventful, a varied, and a stormy one."—*Arago. E.*

cipal authors of Danton's death, and who had well nigh fallen a victim to the persecutions directed against the Mountain, could not forgive the Thermidorians : he therefore entertained a profound hatred against Barras.

Barras had formerly served in India, and had there displayed the courage of a soldier. He was a fit man to mount his horse on occasion of disturbances ; and it was in this manner, as we have seen, that he had earned his place in the Directory. Hence, on all difficult occasions, he would still talk of mounting his horse and putting to the sword the enemies of the republic. In person he was tall and handsome ; but in his countenance there was something dark and sinister, that harmonized little with his disposition, which was rather passionate than wicked. Though he belonged, by birth, to the higher ranks, his manners indicated no superiority of breeding. They were blunt, bold, and vulgar. He was endowed with a soundness and a penetration of mind, which, with study and application, might have become highly distinguished faculties ; but, indolent and ignorant, he knew at most only what is learned in a stormy life ; and, in those matters upon which he was daily called to give his opinion, he manifested good sense enough to induce regret that he should not have had a more careful education. In other respects, dissolute and rough, violent and false, like the Southerners, who are apt to conceal duplicity under the guise of bluntness, republican by sentiment and by position, but a man without faith, admitting to his house the most violent revolutionists of the fauxbourgs and all the emigrants who had returned to France, pleasing the one by his trivial vehemence, and the other by his spirit of intrigue, he was in reality a warm patriot, and in secret he held out hopes to all parties. In himself alone he was the entire Danton party, excepting the genius of its chief, which had not devolved on his successors.*

Rewbel, formerly an advocate at Colmar, had acquired at the bar, and in our different assemblies, great experience in the management of affairs. With the most extraordinary penetration and discernment he combined extensive information, a prodigious memory, and persevering application to business. These qualities made him a most useful man at the head of the state. He discussed matters ably, though somewhat disposed to cavil, owing to a relic of the habits of the bar. To a handsome person he joined the manners of good society ; but he was rough and affronting by the warmth and keenness of his language. Notwithstanding the calumnies of counter-revolutionists and rogues, he was a man of strict integrity. Unluckily, he was not wholly free from avarice. He was fond of employing his private fortune in a profitable manner, which caused him to have intercourse with men of business, and this furnished calumny with plausible pretexts. He paid particular attention to the department of foreign affairs, and so strong was his attachment to the interest of France, that he would not have cared to be unjust towards foreign nations. A warm, sincere, and stanch republican, he belonged originally to the moderate part of the Convention, and equally disliked Carnot and Barras, the one as a Mountaineer, the other as a Dantonist. Thus Carnot, Barras, and Rewbel, all three sprung from adverse parties, all three hated one another ; thus these animosities, kindled during a long and terrible struggle, were not extinguished under the con-

* "Barras was pliant, insinuating, and without attachment to any particular sect ; and while his birth brought him in contact with the aristocracy, his conduct had obtained him revolutionary connexions. He took upon himself the character of representative of the Directory, and established at the Luxembourg a sort of republican regency."—*Mignet*. E

stitutional system; thus hearts had mingled, like rivers which unite without blending their waters. These three men, however, though detesting one another, curbed their resentments and laboured together at the general work.

There remained Lareveillère-Lepeaux and Letourneur, who hated nobody. Letourneur, a good-natured man, having vanity, but an easy and not importunate vanity, who was satisfied with the domestic marks of power and the homage of sentinels, felt a respectful submission for Carnot. He was prompt in giving his opinion, but equally prompt in retracting it as soon as any one proved to him that he was wrong, or as soon as Carnot had spoken. He voted on all occasions with Carnot.

Lareveillère, the most honest and the best of men, united with a great variety of knowledge a just and observant mind. He possessed application; he was capable of giving sound advice on all subjects, and he did give it on important occasions. But he was frequently led away by illusions, or stopped by the scruples of an upright mind. He would sometimes fain have willed what was impossible, and he dared not will what was necessary; for it requires a great mind to calculate how much is due to circumstances without detriment to principles. Speaking well, and possessing extraordinary firmness, he was of great service when support was needed for good opinions, and he was very useful to the Directory from his personal consideration.

The part which he acted among colleagues who detested each other was extremely useful. Among the four directors, he entertained a decided preference in favour of the most honest and the most capable, namely, Rewbel. Yet, from independence and prudence, he had avoided any close connexion, which he would have preferred, but which would have estranged him from his other colleagues. He was not without a leaning towards Barras, and would have cultivated his acquaintance, if he had found him more sincere and less depraved. He acquired a certain ascendancy over his colleague, from his high character, his penetration, and his firmness. The dissolute take pleasure in scoffing at virtue, but they dread it when, with the penetration which fathoms them, it combines the courage that is above being afraid of them. Lareveillère used his influence over Rewbel and Barras to keep them in harmony with one another and with Carnot. Owing to this mediator, and owing also to their zeal for the interests of the republic, these directors lived on tolerable terms together, and prosecuted their task, divided with respect to the questions which they had to decide much more by their real opinions than by their animosities.

With the exception of Barras, the directors resided with their families, each occupying apartments in the Luxembourg. They did not live in an expensive style. Lareveillère, indeed, who was fond of company, and of the arts and sciences, and who deemed it his duty to spend his salary in a manner useful to the state; admitted to his house scientific and literary men, but he treated them with simplicity and cordiality. He had unfortunately exposed himself to some ridicule, but without having in any way contributed to it. He adhered in every respect to the philosophy of the eighteenth century, as expressed in the profession of faith of the Savoyard vicar. He wished for the fall of the Catholic religion, and he flattered himself that a speedy end would be put to it, if governments had the prudence to employ against it no other weapons than indifference and disregard. He wished for no superstitious ceremonies, no material images of the Deity; but he conceived that public meetings were requisite for men, at which they might edify themselves with discourses on moral subjects and on the won-

ders of the creation. These subjects, in fact, ought to be discussed in assemblies, because men there are more easily wrought upon, and more accessible to elevated and generous sentiments. These ideas he had developed in a publication, and he had said that it would be well some day to supersede the ceremonies of the Catholic worship by meetings like those of the Protestants, but more simple and more free from formality. This idea, caught up by some benevolent minds, was immediately carried into execution. A brother of Haüy, the celebrated geologist, formed a society which he called the Society of the Theophilanthropists, whose meetings embraced moral exhortations, philosophical lectures, and pious hymns. More than one society of this kind was formed. They assembled in halls hired at their own expense, and under the superintendence of the police. Though Lareveillère approved of this institution, and deemed it capable of drawing from the Catholic churches many of those tender consciences which feel a need of pouring forth their religious sentiments in common, he took care that neither himself nor his family should ever appear there, lest he should acquire the character of the leader of a sect, and provoke a comparison with the pontificate of Robespierre. In spite of Lareveillère's reserve, malignity seized this pretext to throw some ridicule on a magistrate universally honoured, and who afforded no handle for calumny. For the rest, if Theophilanthropism was the subject of some poor jokes in Barras's parties, or in the royalist journals, it attracted at the time but little notice, and did not in the least diminish the respect which Lareveillère-Lepeaux enjoyed.*

If any one of the directors really detracted from the consideration of the government, it was Barras. He did not live in the same simple and modest manner as his colleagues. He displayed a luxury and a prodigality for which his participation in the profits of men of business could alone account. The finances were directed with strict probity by the directorial majority and by the excellent minister, Ramel; but they could not prevent Barras from receiving from the contractors, or the bankers whom he supported with his influence, a very considerable share of their profits. He had a thousand other ways of supplying his extravagance. France had become the arbitress of so many states, great and small, that many princes were glad to seek her favour, and to pay large sums for the promise of a voice in the Directory. We shall see by and by what was attempted in this way. The display which Barras made might not, in itself, have been useless, for the chiefs of a state ought to associate much with men, in order to study them, to learn their characters, and to make a proper choice of them; but he surrounded himself not only with men of business, but with intriguers of all sorts, dissolute women, and rogues. A scandalous grossness prevailed in his saloons. Those clandestine connexions, over which, in well-regulated society, people strive to throw a veil, were publicly avowed. His visitors went to Gros-Bois to indulge in orgies, which furnished the enemies of the republic with powerful arguments against the government. Barras himself was not anxious to conceal any part of his conduct, and, according to the custom of debauchees, he was fond of proclaiming his excesses. He would

* "Lareveillère, intrusted with the moral part of the government, was desirous of introducing, under the name of Theophilanthropy, a form of deistical worship, which the committee of public safety had ineffectually attempted to establish by the festival of the Supreme Being. But such a creed could not long continue general; it could only be individual. The Theophilanthropists became the object of ridicule, for their worship was opposed both to the opinions of the catholics and the unbelief of the revolutionists."

Mignet. E

himself relate before his colleagues his exploits at Gros-Bois and the Luxembourg, for which they sometimes severely reproached him. He would tell them how he had forced a celebrated contractor of that day to take a mistress of whom he began to be tired, and whose extravagance he could no longer supply; how he had revenged himself upon the Abbé Poincelin, a newspaper writer, for some personal invectives against him; and how, after enticing him to the Luxembourg, he had made his servants give him a flogging. This conduct, such as one would expect from an ill-bred prince, was, in a republic, extremely prejudicial to the Directory, and would have deprived it of all respect, had not the high reputation and the virtues of Carnot and Lareveillère counterbalanced the ill effect of the excesses of Barras.

The Directory, instituted the day after the 13th of Vendémiaire, formed in hatred of counter-revolution, composed of regicides, and furiously attacked by the royalists, could not but be warmly republican. But each of its members participated more or less in the opinions that divided France. Lareveillère and Rewbel possessed that moderate but rigid republicanism, which was as adverse to the violent proceedings of 1793 as to the royalist excesses of 1795. To gain them over to the counter-revolution was impossible. The unerring instinct of the parties taught them that from such men nothing was to be obtained either by seductions or by newspaper flatteries. Accordingly, they had nothing but the severest censure to bestow on those two directors. As for Barras and Carnot, they were in a different predicament. Barras, though he met everybody, was in reality an ardent revolutionist. The fauxbourgs held him in high esteem, and had not forgotten that he had been the general of Vendémiaire. The conspirators of the camp of Grenelle had reckoned upon him. Accordingly, the patriots loaded him with praise; and the royalists, for the same reason, overwhelmed him with invectives. Some secret agents of royalism, brought in contact with him by a common spirit of intrigue, might indeed, calculating upon his depravity, conceive some hopes; but this was an opinion which they kept to themselves. The mass of the party abhorred and attacked him with fury.

Carnot, ex-Mountaineer, formerly member of the committee of public welfare, and who, after the 9th of Thermidor, had well nigh fallen a victim to the royalist reaction, ought certainly to be a decided republican, and he really was so. At the first moment of his entrance into the Directory, he had strongly supported the appointment of all persons selected from among the Mountaineer party; but, by degrees, in proportion as the terrors of Vendémiaire subsided, his dispositions had changed. Carnot, even in the committee of public welfare, had never liked the herd of the turbulent revolutionists, and had powerfully contributed to destroy the Hebertists. On seeing Barras, who was anxious to continue king of the *canaille*, surround himself with the relics of the Jacobin party, he had become hostile to that party; he had displayed great energy in the affair of the camp of Grenelle, and so much the more as Barras was compromised in that rash attempt. Nor was this all. Carnot was annoyed by recollections. The charge preferred against him of having signed the most sanguinary acts of the committee of public welfare tormented him. In his estimation, the very natural explanations which he had given were not sufficient; he would have wished to prove by all means that he was not a monster; and he was capable of many sacrifices to prove this. Parties know everything, guess everything; they are not difficult in regard to persons, unless when they are victorious; but, when they are vanquished, they recruit themselves in all possible ways

and are particularly careful to flatter the chiefs of armies. The royalists were soon aware of Carnot's dispositions in regard to Barras and the patriot party. They had discovered his anxiety to reinstate himself in the good opinion of the public; they were aware of his military importance and they took care to treat him differently from his colleagues, and to speak of him in the manner which they knew to be most likely to touch him. Hence, while the herd of their journals had nothing but gross abuse for Barras, Lareveillère, and Rewbel, they had nothing but praise for the ex-Mountaineer and regicide, Carnot. In gaining Carnot, they would have Letourneur, and thus they should make sure of two voices by a vulgar artifice, but a potent one, like all those which address themselves to self-love. Carnot had the weakness to yield to this kind of seduction; and, without ceasing to follow his internal convictions, he formed with his friend Letourneur a kind of opposition in the Directory, somewhat like that which the new third formed in the two Councils. On all questions, in fact, on which the Directory had to deliberate, he pronounced in favour of the opinion adopted by the opposition. Thus, on all questions relative to peace and war, he voted for peace, after the example of the opposition, which affected continually to demand it. He had strongly recommended that the greatest sacrifices should be made to the emperor, and that peace should be signed with Naples and Rome, without insisting on too rigorous conditions.

No sooner have such discordances broken out than they make rapid progress. The party desirous of profiting by them bestows the most extravagant praise on those whom it wishes to gain, and pours a torrent of censure on the others. These tactics had been attended with their usual success. Barras and Rewbel, already enemies to Carnot, hated him still more for the praise which was lavished upon him, and imputed to him the severity with which they were themselves attacked. Lareveillère strove in vain to appease these animosities; but discord nevertheless made baneful progress. The public, apprized of what was passing, divided the Directory into majority and minority, classing Lareveillère, Rewbel, and Barras, in the former, and Carnot and Letourneur in the latter.

The ministers also were classed. As people made a point of finding fault with the direction of the finances, they fell foul of Ramel, the minister, an excellent public functionary, who was obliged by the distressed state of the exchequer to resort to expedients censurable at any other time, but inevitable under the existing circumstances. The taxes came in but slowly, owing to the terrible irregularities in the collection. It had been found necessary to reduce the land-tax, and the indirect contributions yielded much less than had been expected. There were frequently no funds whatever in the exchequer; and, in these emergencies, the funds of the ordinary expenses were taken to defray those which were extraordinary, or the government anticipated the receipts, and made all the absurd and onerous bargains to which situations of this kind give rise. An outcry against abuses and peculations was then raised, whereas, on the contrary, it was the government that needed assistance. Ramel, who performed the duties of his office with equal integrity and intelligence, was the butt of every attack, and was treated as an enemy by all the newspapers. It was the same with Truguët, the minister of the marine, well known as a frank republican, as a friend of Hoche's, as a supporter of all the patriot officers; the same with Delacroix, the minister for foreign affairs, capable of forming a good administrator, but a bad diplomatist, too pedantic, and too rude in his intercourse with the ministers of foreign powers; the same with Merlin,

who, in his administration of justice, displayed all the fervour of a *Mcuntaineer* republican. As for Benezech, Petiet, and Cochon, the ministers of the interior, of war, and of the police, they were classed entirely by themselves. Benezech had sustained so many attacks from the Jacobins for having proposed to restore a free trade in articles of consumption, and to cease to supply Paris with provisions, that he had become agreeable on account of them to the counter-revolutionary party. An able public functionary, but trained under the old system, the overthrow of which he regretted, he partly deserved the favour of those who praised him. Petiet, minister at war, acquitted himself ably of his functions; but, being a creature of Carnot's, he shared precisely the same fate as the latter with the contending parties. As for Cochon, he was also recommended by his connexion with Carnot, and since the discovery which he had made of the plots of the Jacobins, and the zeal which he had shown, in prosecuting them, he had won the favour of the opposite party, which praised him with affectation.

Notwithstanding these disagreements, the government was still sufficiently united to rule with vigour, and to prosecute with glory its operations against the powers of Europe. The opposition was still repressed by the conventional majority remaining in the legislative body. The elections, however, were approaching, and the moment was at hand when a new third, chosen under the influence of the moment, would succeed another conventional third. The opposition flattered itself that it would then acquire the majority, and emerge from the state of submission in which it had lived. Accordingly, its language in the two Councils became more lofty, and it betrayed its hopes. The members composing this minority met at Tivoli, to discuss their plans, and to concert their measures. This meeting of deputies had become a most violent club, known by the name of the club of Clichy. The journals participated in this movement. A great number of young men, who, under the old system, would have composed scraps of poetry, declaimed, through fifty or sixty leaves, against the excesses of the Revolution and against the Convention to which they imputed those excesses. They were not finding fault, they said, with the republic, but with those who had imbrued its cradle in blood. The assemblies of electors were forming beforehand, and such were the means employed to influence their choice. In every thing the language, the spirit, and the passions of Vendémiaire were manifested: the same sincerity and the same credulity in the mass, the same ambition in certain individuals, the same perfidy in certain conspirators labouring clandestinely in favour of royalty.

This royalist faction, always beaten, but always credulous and intriguing, was incessantly raising its head again. Wherever there is a pretension backed by some succour in money, there will be found intriguers ready to serve it by miserable projects. Though Lemaitre had been condemned to death, La Vendée quelled, Pichegru deprived of the command of the army of the Rhine, the intrigues of the counter-revolution had not ceased; they were prosecuted, on the contrary, with extreme activity. The situations of all the royalist party were singularly changed. The Pretender, called by turns Count de Lille and Louis XVIII., had left Venice, as we have seen, to proceed to the army of the Rhine. He had stopped for a moment in the camp of the Prince of Condé, where an accident placed his life in jeopardy. Standing at a window, he was fired at and slightly grazed by the ball. This attempt, the author of which remained unknown, could not fail to be attributed to the Directory, which was not silly enough to pay for a crime that would have been profitable to the Count d'Artois alone. The Pre

tender did not stay long with the Prince of Condé. His presence in the Austrian army was disapproved of by the cabinet of Vienna, which had refused to recognise him, and was aware that his presence would only serve to aggravate the quarrel with France—a quarrel already too sanguinary and too expensive. An intimation was given him to depart, and on his refusal, a detachment was sent to enforce his compliance. He then retired to Blankenburg, where he continued to be the centre of all the correspondence. The Count d'Artois, after his vain schemes respecting La Vendée, had retired to Scotland, whence he still corresponded with some intriguers, going to and fro between La Vendée and England.

Lemaître being dead, his associates had taken his place, and succeeded him in the confidence of the Pretender. These were, as we have already seen, the Abbé Brottier, once a schoolmaster, Laville-Heurnois, formerly a master of requests, a Chevalier Despomelles, and a naval officer named Duverne de Presle.* The old system of these agents, stationed in Paris, was to do everything by the intrigues of the capital, while the Vendéans pretended to accomplish everything by armed insurrection, and the Prince of Condé by means of Pichegru. La Vendée being subdued, Pichegru doomed to retirement, and a threatening reaction breaking out against the Revolution, the Paris agents were the more fully persuaded that they ought to expect everything from a spontaneous movement of the interior. To control the elections, then by the elections to control the councils, by the councils the Directory and the high offices, seemed to them a sure way to re-establish royalty with the very means furnished them by the republic. For this purpose, however, it was necessary to put an end to that divergence of ideas which had always been seen in the plans of counter-revolution. Puisaye, who remained secretly in Bretagne, was dreaming there, as formerly, of an insurrection in that province. In Normandy M. de Frotte was striving to excite a rising similar to that which had taken place in La Vendée, but neither of them would have anything to do with the Paris agents. The Prince of Condé, duped in his intrigue with Pichegru upon the Rhine, wished still to carry it on by himself, without suffering the Austrians or the Pretender to have any hand in it, and he was sorry that he had let them into the secret. To give some unity to these incoherent projects, and more especially to obtain money, the Paris agents sent one of their number into the western provinces, England, Scotland, Germany, and Switzerland. Duverne de Presle was the person selected for this mission. Being unable to deprive Puisaye of his command, they strove, by the influence of the Count d'Artois, to force him to join the system of the Paris agents, and to come to an arrangement with them. They obtained from the English the most important thing, some assistance in money. They procured powers from the Pretender, which placed all the intrigues under the direction of the Paris agency. Their messengers saw the Prince of Condé, who was not to be rendered either intelligent or manageable. He saw M. de Précý, who was still the secret promoter of the disturbances at Lyons and in the South. At last a general plan was concerted, which had no harmony or unity but upon paper, and which did not prevent every one

* "Duverne-de-Presle, a naval officer, was denounced by Malo, the chief of a squadron, as one of the contrivers of a royalist conspiracy, at the head of which was Laville Heurnois. He was in consequence brought before the Directory, and condemned to death with a commutation of his punishment for ten years' imprisonment. He afterwards purchased his pardon by turning evidence against the persons accused with him. *Biographie Moderne*. E.

from acting in his own way, and agreeably to his personal interests and pretensions.

It was agreed that all France should be divided into two agencies, one comprising the East and the South, the other the North and the West. M de Pr cy was to be at the head of the former, the Paris agents were to direct the latter. These two agencies were to arrange together all their operations, and to correspond directly with the Pretender, who was to give them his orders. Secret associations were planned on the model of those formed by Babouf. They were to have no connexion with one another, and to be kept ignorant of the names of the chiefs, that, if one of the parties were apprehended, this circumstance might not lead to the seizure of all the conspirators. These associations were to be adapted to the state of France. As it had been observed that the greater part of the population, without desiring the return of the Bourbons, wished for order and quiet, and imputed to the Directory the continuance of the revolutionary system, a sort of masonic society was formed, called the Philanthropists, who engaged to use their electoral rights, and to exercise them in favour of men opposed to the Directory. The Philanthropists were unacquainted with the secret aim of these proceedings, and nothing was to be avowed to them but the mere intention of strengthening the opposition. Another association, more secret, more concentrated, less numerous, and entitled the Faithful, was to be composed of those more resolute and devoted men, to whom the secret of the faction might be divulged. The Faithful were to be secretly armed and ready for any *coup-de-main*. They were to enrol themselves in the national guard, which was not yet organized, and under cover of that uniform, to execute the more securely the orders that should be given them. It was to be their bounden duty, independently of every plan of insurrection, to watch the elections, and if the parties should come to blows, as had been the case in Vend miaire, to fly to the assistance of the opposition party. The Faithful were to aid moreover in concealing emigrants and priests, in forging passports, in persecuting the revolutionists, and the purchasers of the national domains. These associations were to be under the direction of military chiefs, who were to correspond with the two principal agencies and to receive orders from them. Such was the new plan of the faction, a chimerical plan, which history would disdain to record, did it not make us acquainted with the dreams with which parties feast themselves in their defeats. Notwithstanding this pretended unity, the association of the South did nothing more than produce some anonymous companies, acting without direction and without aim, and following only the inspiration of revenge and plunder. Puisaye, Frott , and Rochecot, in Bretagne and Normandy, laboured apart to make a new rising like that of Vend e, and disavowed the mixed counter-revolution of the Paris agents. Puisaye even published a manifesto, declaring that Bretagne would never second any plans which did not tend to restore by open force absolute and entire royalty to the family of Bourbon.

The Prince of Cond  continued on his part to correspond directly with Pichegru, whose singular and absurd conduct nothing but the embarrassment of his situation can account for. This general, the only commander recorded in history to have voluntarily suffered himself to be beaten,* had

* "Pichegru, having determined in one way or other to serve his new allies and betray his country, had allowed himself to be beaten at Heidelberg, had compromised the army of Jourdan, evacuated Mannheim, raised the siege of Mayence with considerable loss, and exposed the frontier."—*Mignet*. E.

himself demanded his dismissal. This conduct must appear surprising, for it was depriving himself of all means of influence, and consequently rendering it impossible for him to accomplish his pretended designs. We shall, nevertheless, have no difficulty to comprehend it, if we examine Pichegru's position. He could not continue general, without, at length, putting in execution the plans which he had engaged to accomplish, and for which he had received considerable sums. Pichegru had before his eyes three examples, each very different from the others, that of Bouillé, that of La Fayette, and that of Dumouriez, which proved to him that it was impossible to seduce a whole army. He wished, therefore, to put it out of his power to attempt anything; and this accounts for the offer of his resignation which the Directory did not accept at first without regret, being wholly ignorant of his treason. The Prince of Condé and his agents were extremely surprised at the conduct of Pichegru, and conceived that he had swindled them out of their money, and that, in reality, he had never intended to serve them. But no sooner had he relinquished the command than he returned to the banks of the Rhine, upon pretext of selling his carriages, and then proceeded into the Jura, which was his native country. Thence he continued to correspond with the agents of the prince, to whom he represented his resignation as a profound combination. He should be considered, he said, as a victim of the Directory; he was going to connect himself with all the royalists of the interior and to form an immense party; his army, in the command of which he was to be succeeded by Moreau, would deeply regret him, and on the first reverse that it should sustain, it would not fail to call for its old general and to revolt in order to obtain his reinstatement. He should take advantage of this moment to throw off the mask, hasten to his army, assume the dictatorship, and proclaim royalty. This ridiculous plan, had it been sincere, would have been thwarted by the success of Moreau, who, even during his famous retreat, had never ceased to be victorious. The Prince of Condé, the Austrian generals, to whom he had been obliged to communicate the secret, and Wickham, the English minister in Switzerland, began to believe that Pichegru had cheated them. They would have dropped the correspondence; but, at the earnest desire of the intermediate agents, who never like to have made a vain attempt, the correspondence was continued, to see whether any profit was to be derived from it. It was carried on through Strasburg, by means of some spies, who crossed the Rhine, and proceeded to the Austrian general, Klinglin; and through Basle with Wickham, the English minister. Pichegru staid in the Jura without refusing or accepting the embassy to Sweden, which had been offered him, but striving to get himself elected deputy, paying the agents of the prince with the most wretched promises, and continually receiving considerable sums. He held out hopes of the most important results from his nomination to the Five Hundred; he boasted of an influence which he did not possess; he pretended to be giving the Directory perfidious advice and inducing it to adopt dangerous determinations; he attributed to himself the long resistance of Kehl, which, he said, he had recommended for the purpose of compromising the army. Very little faith was placed in these pretended services. The Count de Bellegarde wrote, "We are in the situation of the gambler, who wishes to regain his money, and who goes on risking more to recover what he has lost." The Austrian generals continued, nevertheless, to correspond, because, if great designs were out of the question, they at least obtained valuable particulars concerning the state and the movements of the French army. The infamous

agents of this correspondence sent to General Klingen such statements and plans as they could procure. During the siege of Kehl they had been continually indicating the points upon which the enemy's fire might be directed with the greatest effect.

Such was then the miserable part performed by Pichegru. With an understanding not above mediocrity, he was cunning and wary, and had sufficient tact and experience to believe any plan of counter-revolution impracticable at the moment. His everlasting delays, and his fables to amuse the credulity of the prince's agents, prove his conviction on this point; and his conduct in important circumstances will prove it still more clearly. He received, nevertheless, the price of the plans which he would not execute, and had the art to cause it to be offered to him without his asking for it.

Such, it is true, was the conduct of all the agents of royalism. They lied most impudently, boasted of an influence which they had not, and pretended to sway the most important persons, to whom frequently they had never spoken in their lives. Brottier, Duverne de Presle, and Laval-Heurnois, boasted that they had at their disposal a great number of the deputies in the two Councils, and gave assurances that they should have many more after the new elections. Such was not the fact. They had no communication except with Lemerer, the deputy, and one Mersan, who had been excluded from the legislative body by virtue of the law of the 3d of Brumaire against the relatives of emigrants. By means of Lemerer they pretended to influence all the deputies belonging to the club of Clichy. They judged from the speeches and the votes of those deputies that they would probably applaud the restoration of the monarchy, and hence they deemed themselves authorized to assure the King of Blankenburg of their attachment and even of their repentance. These wretches imposed on this king, and calumniated the members of the club of Clichy. There were among them ambitious men, who were enemies of the Conventionists, because the Conventionists had the entire government in their hands, men exasperated against the Revolution, dupes who suffered themselves to be led, but very few men bold enough to think of royalty, and of sufficient capacity to labour usefully for its re-establishment. Yet it was upon such foundations that the agents of royalism built their projects and their promises!

It was England that furnished all the funds for the presumed counter-revolution. She sent from London to Bretagne the succour demanded by Puisaye. Wickham, the English minister in Switzerland, was directed to supply the two agencies of Lyons and Paris with money, and to send some direct to Pichegru, who, to use the language of the correspondence, was "stowed away for great occasions."

The agents of the counter-revolution had the impudence to take the money of England and to laugh at her. They had agreed with the Pretender to receive her funds, without ever following any of her views, and without ever complying with any of her suggestions, which, they alleged, it was right to distrust. England was not their dupe, and felt for them all the contempt that they deserved. Wickham, Pitt, and all the English ministers, did not place the least reliance on the operations of these gentry, and had no hope whatever of a counter-revolution by their means. They needed restless spirits, who should disturb France, who should excite uneasiness by their projects, and who, without putting the government in real peril, should fill it with exaggerated apprehensions. To

this object they cheerfully devoted a million or two per year. Thus the agents of the counter-revolution deceived themselves in supposing that they were deceiving the English. With all their determination to commit a swindling trick, they were unsuccessful. England never reckoned upon greater results than those which they were capable of producing.

Such were then the projects and the means of the royalist faction. Cochon, minister of the police, was acquainted with part of them: he knew that there were in Paris correspondents of the court of Blankenburg; for, in our long revolution, during which plots were incessantly succeeding one another, there is no instance of a conspiracy having remained unknown. He attentively watched their proceedings, surrounded them with spies, and waited for some decisive attempt on their part, that he might seize them with advantage. They soon furnished him with occasion for doing so. Agreeably to their notable plan of gaining over the authorities, they first thought of securing the military authorities of Paris. The principal forces of the capital consisted of the grenadiers of the legislative body, and those in the camp of Sablons. The grenadiers of the legislative body were a picked corps of twelve hundred men, whom the constitution had placed about the two Councils as a guard of safety and honour. Their commandant, Adjutant-general Ramel, was known for his moderate sentiments, and in the estimation of the silly agents of Louis XVIII. this was a sufficient reason to set him down for a royalist. The armed force assembled at Sablons amounted to nearly twelve thousand men. The commander of this armed force was General Hatry, a brave man, whom they had no hope of gaining over. They turned their eyes to the colonel of the 21st dragoons, named Malo, who had so briskly charged the Jacobins at the time of their ridiculous attempt on the camp of Sablons. They argued respecting him as they did about Ramel, and because he had repulsed the Jacobins, it was concluded that he would welcome the royalists. Brottier, Laville-Heurnois, and Duverne de Presle, sounded both of them, and made proposals, which were listened to and immediately denounced to the minister of the police. The latter enjoined Ramel and Malo to continue to lend an ear to the conspirators, in order to get at their whole scheme. Accordingly, they were encouraged to enter into a long development of their plans, their means, and their hopes, and another interview was appointed, at which they were to exhibit the powers that they had received from Louis XVIII. Advantage was to be taken of this opportunity for securing them. The interviews took place in the apartments occupied by Malo in the Military School. Gendarmes and witnesses were concealed in such a manner as to hear everything, and to be able to show themselves at a given signal. Accordingly, on the 11th of Pluviose, these wretched dupes attended, bringing with them the powers of Louis XVIII., and again detailed their plans. The interview over, they were just departing, when they were seized by the agents employed for the purpose and taken before the minister of the police. Messengers were immediately sent to their residences, and all their papers were secured in their presence. Among them were found letters which furnished sufficient proofs of the conspiracy, and in part revealed the details. It was seen, for example, that those gentry composed an entire government at their pleasure. They meant, for the moment, and till the return of the king from Blankenburg, to suffer part of the existing authorities to remain. Among others, they proposed to retain Benezech in the department of the interior, and Cochon in that of the police; and, if the royalists should feel shy of the latter as a

regicide, they designed to put M. Siméon or M. Portalis, in his place. They meant, moreover, to give the superintendence of the finances to M. Barbé-Marbois, "who," they said, "possesses talents and information, and is reputed an honest man." They had, to be sure, not consulted Messrs. Portalis, Siméon, Benezech, Barbé-Marbois, and Cochon, to whom they were totally unknown; but they had disposed of them, as they were accustomed to do, without their knowledge, and on their presumed opinions.

The discovery of this plot produced a strong sensation, and proved that it behoved the republic to be continually upon its guard against its old enemies. It excited a positive astonishment in the whole of the opposition, which tended to royalism without being aware of it, and which was not at all in the secret. This astonishment proved how those wretches boasted when they sent assurances to Blankenburg, that they had at their disposal a great number of the members of both Councils. The Directory proposed to give them up immediately to a military commission. They denied its competence, asserting that they had not been taken in arms or making any attempt by main force. Several deputies, united in sentiment to their cause, supported them in the Councils; the Directory, nevertheless, persisted in sending them to a military commission for trial, because they had attempted to seduce military officers.

Their system of defence was plausible enough. They avowed their quality of agents of Louis XVIII., but declared that they had no other commission than to prepare the public opinion and to expect from that alone, and not from force, a return to monarchical ideas. They were condemned to death, but their punishment was commuted to that of imprisonment, in consequence of the revelations of Duverne de Presle. The latter made a long confession to the Directory, which was inserted in the secret register, and in which he disclosed all the intrigues of the royalists. The Directory abstained from publishing these details, lest it should apprise the conspirators that it was acquainted with their whole plan. Duverne de Presle gave no information concerning Pichegru, whose intrigues, being carried on directly with the Prince of Condé, were unknown to the Paris agents; but he declared vaguely, from hearsay, that attempts had been made to gain partisans in one of the principal armies.

This apprehension of their chief agents might have thwarted the intrigues of the royalists, if they had had a well-combined plan; but, as each of them proceeded in his own way, the arrest of Brottier, Laville-Heurnois, and Duverne de Presle, did not prevent M. de Puisaye and M. de Frotté from intriguing in Normandy and in Bretagne, M. de Precy at Lyons, and the Prince of Condé in the army of the Rhine.

About the same time, Babœuf and his accomplices were brought to trial; they were all acquitted, excepting Babœuf and Darthé, who underwent the punishment of death.*

The most important affair was that of the elections. Out of opposition to the Directory, or from royalism, a great number of persons were taking pains to influence them. In the Jura, great efforts were made to secure the return of Pichegru; at Lyons, that of M. Imbert Colomés, one of the agents of Louis XVIII. in the South; and at Versailles, that of M. de Vauvilliers, who was seriously compromised in the recently-discovered plot

* "The final dispersion of the old democratic party, which had been diminishing more and more every day, may be dated from this period. Under the reaction it remained united, and under Babœuf presented a formidable association. From that time democrats still existed, but the party was disorganized." *Wignat. E.*

Everywhere, in short, exertions were making in behalf of persons hostile to the Directory. In Paris, the electors of the Seine had met to concert their nominations. They proposed to ask the candidates the following questions: *Hast thou purchased national domains? Art thou a newspaper writer? Hast thou written, acted, or done anything during the Revolution?* All who should answer these questions in the affirmative were to be considered as ineligible. Such preparations showed how violent was the reaction against all those who had taken part in the Revolution. A hundred journals declaimed with vehemence, and actually stunned the public mind. The Directory had no means of repressing them but the law which awarded the punishment of death to writers advocating the return to royalty. No judges would ever have consented to the enforcement of so cruel a law. It applied for the third time to the two Councils for new legislative enactments, which were again refused. It proposed, also, to make the electors take an oath of hatred to royalty. A warm discussion took place concerning the efficacy of the oath, and the proposal was modified by changing the oath into a mere declaration. Every elector was to declare that he was an enemy to anarchy as well as to royalty. The Directory, without descending to any of the disgraceful means so frequently employed by representative governments for influencing elections, contented itself with choosing as commissioners to the assemblies men known for their republican sentiments, and setting Cochon, the minister, to write circulars, in which he recommended to the electors the candidates of its choice. A great outcry was raised against these circulars, which were only an insignificant exhortation, and by no means an injunction; for the number and independence of the electors, especially in a government in which almost all places were elective, placed them above the reach of the influence of the Directory.

While preparations were thus making for the elections, the choice of a new director also excited great discussion. The question was, which of the five should be designated by lot to quit the Directory; whether it should be Barras, Rewbel, or Lareveillère-Lepeaux, the opposition made sure, with the assistance of the new third, of carrying the nomination of a director of its choice. It hoped that it should then have a majority in the government; on which point it flattered itself egregiously, for its follies would not have failed very soon to make Carnot and Letourneur its enemies.

The club of Clichy turbulently discussed the choice of the new director. Cochon and Barthélemy were there proposed. Cochon had lost somewhat in the opinion of the counter-revolutionists since the apprehension of Brotier and his accomplices, and especially since his circulars to the electors. They preferred Barthélemy, our ambassador in Sweden, whom they believed to be secretly connected with the emigrants and the Prince of Condé.

Amidst this agitation, the most absurd reports were propagated. It was said that the Directory intended to apprehend the deputies just elected, and to prevent their assembling; it was even asserted that it meant to put them to death. Its friends, on their part, declared that an act of accusation was preparing against it at Clichy, and that the framers were only waiting for the new third, in order to submit it to the Five Hundred.

THE DIRECTORY.

STATE OF EUROPE IN 1797 (YEAR V)—MARCH OF BONAPARTE AGAINST THE ROMAN STATES; PEACE OF TOLENTINO WITH THE POPE—NEW CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE AUSTRIANS—PASSAGE OF THE TAGLIAMENTO; BATTLE OF TARWIS; PASSAGE OF THE JULIAN ALPS; MARCH UPON VIENNA—PASSAGE OF THE RHINE AT NEUWIED AND AT DIRSHEIM—PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE SIGNED AT LEOBEN—PERFIDY OF THE VENETIANS; MASSACRE OF VEROONA; DOWNFALL OF THE REPUBLIC OF VENICE.

WHILE the contending parties were bestirring themselves in expectation of an event which was to alter the majorities, and to change the direction of the government of the republic, a new campaign was preparing, and everything indicated that it would be the last. The powers were divided nearly in the same manner as in the preceding year. France, united with Spain and Holland, had to struggle against England and Austria. The sentiments of the court of Spain were not, and could not be, favourable to the French republicans; but its policy, directed by the Prince of the Peace, was entirely favourable to them. She considered their alliance as the surest means of being protected against their principles, and justly flattered herself that they would not desire to revolutionize her, so long as they should find in her a powerful naval auxiliary. Besides, she bore an old grudge against Austria, and hoped that the union of all the navies of the continent would furnish her with the means of avenging her injuries. The Prince of the Peace, seeing that his existence depended on this policy, and aware that he must perish along with it, employed all his influence with the queen to secure it the ascendancy over the sentiments of the royal family, and his efforts were completely successful. The consequence of these dispositions was that the French were individually ill-treated in Spain, while the government, on the contrary, obtained the utmost deference to its wishes. Unfortunately, the French legation there did not behave with the respect due to a friendly power, or with the firmness requisite for protecting French subjects. Spain, by allying herself with France, had lost the important colony of Trinidad. She flattered herself that, if France should this year get rid of Austria, and turn all her forces against England, all the advantages gained by the latter might be wrested from her. The queen, in particular, flattered herself with an aggrandizement in Italy, for her son-in-law, the Duke of Parma. There was an idea also of an enterprise against Portugal, and, amidst that vast convulsion of states, the court of Madrid was not without some hope of uniting the whole of the Peninsula under one sceptre.

As for Holland, her situation was very deplorable. She was torn by all the passions that a change of constitution excites. The rational persons

who wished for a government in which the old federative system should be combined with the unity necessary for giving strength to the Batavian republic, had to combat three equally dangerous parties; in the first place, the Orangists, comprising all the creatures of the stadtholder, the placemen, and the populace; secondly, the federalists, including all the wealthy and powerful families, who were desirous of maintaining the former state of things, with the exception of the stadtholdership, which wounded their pride; lastly, the democrats, a turbulent, daring, and implacable party, composed of hotheaded persons and adventurers. These four parties combated one another with extreme animosity, and retarded the constitution of the country. Besides these embarrassments, Holland was still in dread of an invasion by Prussia, which was not awed by the successes of France. She found her commerce annoyed in the North by the English and the Russians; lastly, she was losing all her colonies, through the treachery of most of her governors. The Cape of Good Hope, Trincomalee, and the Moluccas, were in the hands of the English. The French troops, encamped in Holland, to cover her against Prussia, observed the strictest and most praiseworthy discipline; but the public departments and the military chiefs there behaved neither with delicacy nor with honesty. The country was, therefore, horribly drained. Hence, it might be inferred that Holland had done wrong by connecting herself with France, but this would be a hasty conclusion. Holland, situated between the two belligerent masses, could not escape the influence of the conquerors. Under the stadtholder, she was the subject of England and sacrificed to her interests; she had, moreover, internal slavery. By allying herself with France, she ran the risks attached to the nature of that continental rather than maritime power, and compromised her colonies; but she might some day, by the union of the three navies of the continent, recover what she had lost; she might hope for a reasonable constitution under French protection. Such is the lot of states. If they are strong, they make their revolutions themselves, but they have to undergo all the disasters attending them, and are drowned in their own blood; if they are weak, they see their neighbours come to revolutionize them, by force of arms, and undergo all the inconveniences arising from the presence of foreign armies. They do not murder one another, but they pay the soldiers who come to keep them in order. Such was the destiny of Holland and her situation in regard to us. In this state, she had not been of any great use to the French government. Her army and her navy were very slowly reorganizing themselves. The Batavian rescriptions, with which the war indemnity of one hundred millions had been paid, were circulating for next to nothing and the advantages of the alliance had become nearly null to France; ill-humour had been the consequence. The Directory reproached the Dutch government with not keeping its engagements, and the Dutch government reproached the Directory with putting it out of its power to fulfil them. Notwithstanding these clouds, the two states were proceeding towards the same goal. A squadron and an army to embark in it were preparing in Holland, to concur in the projects of the Directory.

As regarded Prussia, great part of Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland, France was still in the same relations of strict neutrality with them. Clouds had arisen between France and America. The United States behaved towards us with equal injustice and ingratitude. Old Washington had suffered himself to be drawn into the party of John

Adams* and the English, which was desirous of bringing America back to the aristocratic and monarchical state. The injuries suffered from certain privateers, and the conduct of the agents of the committee of public welfare, served them for a pretext—a pretext very ill-founded, for the wrongs done by the English to the American navy were of a far more serious nature; and the conduct of our agents was censured at the time and ought to be excused. These favourers of the English party alleged that France meant to obtain from Spain the cession of the Floridas and of Louisiana; that by means of those provinces and of Canada, she would encompass the United States, sow democratic principles in them, successively detach all the States from the Union, thus dissolve the American federation, and form a vast democracy between the Gulf of Mexico and the five lakes. There was not the slightest foundation for the rumour; but these falsehoods served to heat minds and to make enemies to France. A treaty of commerce had just been concluded with England. It contained stipulations which transferred to that power advantages formerly reserved for France alone, and due to the services which she had rendered to the American cause. In the French government there were persons in favour of a rupture with the United States. Monroe,† who was ambassador to Paris, gave the Directory the most prudent advice on this occasion. War with France, said he, will force the American government to throw itself into the arms of England and to submit to her influence; aristocracy will gain supreme control in the United States, and liberty will be compromised. By patiently enduring, on the contrary, the wrongs of the present president, you will leave him without excuse, you will enlighten the Americans, and decide a contrary choice at the next election. All the wrongs of which France may have to complain will then be repaired. This wise and provident advice had its effect upon the Directory. Rewbel, Barras, and Lareveillère, had accused it to be adopted in opposition to the opinion of the systematic Carnot, who, though in general favourably disposed to peace, insisted on the cession of Louisiana, with a view to attempt the establishment of a republic there.

Such were the relations of France with the powers that were her allies or merely her friends. England and Austria had concluded in the preceding year a triple alliance with Russia, but the great and wily Catherine was just dead. Her successor, Paul I., whose reason, not very strong, was enlightened only by transient gleams—a circumstance not unusual in his family—had paid great attentions to the French emigrants, but shown very little anxiety to execute the conditions of the treaty of

* "John Adams, a distinguished patriot of the American revolution, was born in 1735. His ancestors had fled from England with other puritans in the year 1630. In his earlier days he practised at the bar, and in 1770 was elected one of the representatives of the town of Boston, when he distinguished himself by his hostility to the despotism of the mother-country. He took his seat in congress in 1774, the first day of their session, and was a member of the committees which drew up a statement of the rights of the colonies, and prepared the address to the king. He also contributed to the celebrated Declaration of Independence. In 1785 he was appointed the first American minister to London. In the year 1797 he succeeded to the Presidency of the United States, vacated by the resignation of General Washington. He died at an advanced age in the year 1826."—*Encyclopædia Americana*. E.

† "James Monroe was born in Virginia in 1758, and in 1776 entered the American revolutionary army as a cadet. In 1794 he was appointed minister plenipotentiary to France, but was recalled by Washington in 1796 with an implied censure. In 1817 he was chosen President of the United States, and re-elected in 1821. He died at New York in the year 1831."—*Encyclopædia Americana*. E.

triple alliance. This prince seemed to be struck by the colossal power of the French Revolution,* and one would suppose that he comprehended the danger of rendering it more formidable by combating it; at least the language which he used to a Frenchman celebrated for his acquirements and his abilities would lead to that conclusion. Without breaking the treaty, he had urged the state of his army and of his exchequer, and advised England and Austria to have recourse to negotiation. England had endeavoured to induce the King of Prussia to join the coalition, but without success. That prince felt that it was not to his interest to afford assistance to his most formidable enemy, the emperor. France promised him an indemnity in Germany for the stadtholder, who had married his sister; he had, therefore, nothing to desire for himself. He merely wished to prevent Austria, beaten and despoiled by France, from indemnifying herself for her losses in Germany. He would fain even have prevented her from receiving indemnities in Italy. Accordingly, he had declared that he never would consent to the cession of Bavaria to Austria, in exchange for the Netherlands; and at the same time he sent to propose an alliance to the republic of Venice, offering to guarantee her integrity, in case France and Austria should attempt to accommodate their differences at her expense. His object, therefore, was to prevent the emperor from obtaining equivalents for the losses which he had sustained in the contest with France.

As Russia still held back from the conflict, and Prussia persisted in her neutrality, England and Austria alone remained in the field. England was in a very melancholy situation. She no longer dreaded, at least not for the moment, an expedition to Ireland, but her Bank was threatened more seriously than ever; she placed no dependence whatever on Austria, whom she saw out of breath, and she expected that France, after conquering the continent, would fall upon her with her united forces. Austria, notwithstanding the occupation of the *têtes de pont* of Kehl and Huningen, was aware that she had ruined herself by her perseverance in gaining those two fortresses, instead of marching all her forces into Italy. The disasters of Rivoli and La Favorita, and the capture of Mantua, placed her in imminent danger. She was obliged to weaken her army upon the Rhine, and to reduce herself to an absolute inferiority on that frontier, in order to transfer her forces and her Prince Charles to Italy. But during the interval that the troops would take to perform the march from the Upper Rhine to the Piave and the Isonzo, she would be left defenceless to the blows of an adversary, who was an adept in the art of seizing the advantages of time.

All these fears were well founded, and France was actually preparing to strike terrible blows.

The army of the Sambre and Meuse, reinforced by great part of the army of the Ocean, had been increased to eighty thousand men. Hoche, who had been appointed to the command of it, had stopped a very short time in Paris, on his return from the expedition to Ireland, and had hastened to proceed to his head-quarters. He had employed the winter in organizing his troops, and in supplying them with necessaries. Drawing considerable resources from Holland and the provinces between the Meuse

* "Paul," said Napoleon, "was at first strongly prejudiced against the French Revolution, and every person concerned in it; but afterwards I had rendered him reasonable, and changed his opinions altogether."—*A Voice from St. Helena* E.

and the Rhine, which were treated as conquered countries, he had secured his army against those wants to which the army of the Rhine was exposed. Devising a different distribution of the various arms, he had given it greater unity and a more powerful organization. He was impatient to march at the head of his eighty thousand men, and saw no obstacle to prevent him from advancing into the very heart of Germany. Solicitous to illustrate his political views, he wished to imitate the examples of the general in Italy, and in his turn to create a republic. The provinces between the Meuse and the Rhine, which had not been like Belgium declared constitutional territory, were provisorily under military authority. If, at the conclusion of peace with the Empire, they were refused to France, in order not to give her the line of the Rhine, she might at least obtain their constitution into an independent republic, an ally and friend of her own. This republic, by the name of Cisrhene Republic, might be indissolubly attached to France, and as useful to her as if it had been one of her provinces. Hoche availed himself of the moment to give it a provisory organization, and to prepare it for the republican state. He had formed at Bonn a commission, which had the twofold object of organizing it and drawing from it the resources necessary for the French troops.

The army of the Upper Rhine, under Moreau, was far from being in so satisfactory a state. It left nothing to be desired in regard to the valour and the discipline of the troops; but it lacked necessities, and the want of money, not admitting even of the acquisition of a bridge equipage, delayed its taking the field. Moreau urgently solicited a few hundred thousand francs, with which it was impossible for the treasury to furnish him. In order to obtain them, he had applied to General Bonaparte, but was obliged to wait till the latter had finished his excursion into the Roman states. This circumstance, of course, retarded the operations on the Rhine.

The most violent and the most sudden blows were about to be struck in Italy. Bonaparte, ready to destroy the last Austrian army at Rivoli, had given notice that he should afterwards make an incursion of a few days into the states of the Pope, in order to subject them to the republic, and to wring from him the money which the army stood in need of. He added that if a reinforcement of thirty thousand men were sent him, he would cross the Julian Alps, and boldly march for Vienna. This plan, so vast, was chimerical, in the preceding year, but now it had become possible. The policy alone of the Directory might have thrown obstacles in the way; it might have rendered it averse to placing all the operations of the war in the hands of this young commander, so absolute in his determinations. The benevolent Lareveillère, however, strongly insisted on his being furnished with the means of executing so grand a plan, and which would put so speedy an end to the war. It was decided that thirty thousand men should be sent to him from the Rhine. Bernadotte's division was taken from the army of the Sambre and Meuse, and Delmas's division from that of the Upper Rhine, to be marched across the Alps in the depth of winter. Moreau made the utmost efforts to place the division of Delmas on such a footing as to be a worthy representative of the army of the Rhine in Italy; he selected his best troops and emptied his magazines to equip them. It was impossible to be actuated by a more honourable and a more delicate sentiment. Those two divisions, forming twenty and some odd thousand men, passed the Alps in January, before any one was aware of their march. When just ready to cross, a tempest overtook them. The guides advised a halt: a charge was sounded, and they defied the tempest, with drums

beating and colours flying. These two divisions were already descending into Piedmont before their departure from the Rhine was known.

No sooner had Bonaparte signed the capitulation of Mantua than he set out, without waiting to see Marshal Wurmser file off before him,* and proceeded to Bologna to give law to the Pope. The Directory was desirous that he should at length destroy the temporal power of the Holy See; but it had not absolutely insisted on his doing so, and had left him at liberty to act according to circumstances and his own discretion. Bonaparte had no intention whatever of undertaking such an enterprise. While preparations were making in Upper Italy for a march across the Julian Alps, he meant to wrest one or two provinces from the Pope, and to impose on him a contribution which should defray the expenses of the new campaign. To attempt to do more would be to compromise his plan against Austria. It was even requisite that Bonaparte should make great haste, that he might get back speedily to Upper Italy; above all, it behoved him to conduct himself in such a manner as to avoid a war of religion, and to overawe the court of Naples, which had signed a peace, but did not consider itself at all bound by its treaty. That power felt an inclination to interfere in the quarrel, either to obtain a share of the spoils of the Pope, or to prevent the establishment of a republic at Rome, by which the revolution would be brought to its own doors. Bonaparte collected at Bologna Victor's division and the new Italian troops raised in Lombardy and in the Cispadane, and marched at their head, to execute in person an enterprise, which, in order to be well conducted, required all his tact and promptness.

The Pope was in the most painful anxiety. The emperor had promised him his alliance, but only on the hardest conditions, that is, at the price of Ferrara and Commachia; but even this alliance could not be of any benefit to him, since Alvinzy's army had been destroyed. The Holy See had, therefore, compromised itself to no purpose. The correspondence of Cardinal Busca, secretary of state, and a sworn enemy of France, had been intercepted. The designs against the French army, which it was proposed to attack in the rear, were disclosed; there was no longer any excuse for appealing to the clemency of the conqueror, to whose proposals the Papal government had for a year past refused to listen. When Cacault, the French minister, published the general's manifesto, and applied for leave to retire, it durst not detain him from a feeling of pride, but it was in the most cruel embarrassment. Soon, nothing was listened to but the counsels of despair. The Austrian general, Colli, who arrived at Rome with some officers, was placed at the head of the Papal troops; fanatical sermons were preached throughout the Roman states; heaven was promised to all who should devote themselves for the Holy See, and efforts were made to stir up a Vendée around Bonaparte. Urgent entreaties were addressed to the court of Naples for the purpose of awakening all its ambition and religious zeal.

Bonaparte advanced rapidly, that he might not allow the conflagration time to spread. On the 16th of Pluviose, year V (February 4, 1797), he marched for the Senio, where the Papal army was intrenched. It consisted

* "Napoleon paid a delicate and noble-minded compliment in declining to be present when the veteran Wurmser had the mortification to surrender his sword, together with his garrison. This self-denial did him as much credit nearly as his victory; and may be justly compared to the conduct of the Black Prince to his royal prisoner, King John of France."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon* E

of seven or eight thousand regular troops, and a great number of peasants armed in haste, and headed by their monks. This army exhibited a most ludicrous appearance. A flag of truce came to intimate that if the army of Napoleon persisted in advancing, it would be fired upon. It advanced, nevertheless, towards the bridge over the Senio, which was strongly intrenched. Lannes ascended the river with a few hundred men, forded it, and drew up in order of battle in the rear of the Papal army. General Lahoz, with the Lombard troops, then marched to the bridge, and soon carried it. The new Italian troops steadily bore the fire, which for a short time was very brisk. Four or five hundred prisoners were taken, and some of the peasants put to the sword. The papal army retreated in disorder. It was pursued to Faenza; the gates of the town were forced, and the French entered to the sound of the tocsin, and amidst the shouts of an infuriated populace. The soldiers demanded leave to pillage. Bonaparte refused it. He assembled the prisoners taken in the battle on the banks of the Senio, and addressed them in Italian.* The unfortunate wretches imagined that they were about to be put to death. Bonaparte cheered them, and informed them, to their great amazement, that he gave them their liberty, on condition that they should go and enlighten their fellow-countrymen respecting the intentions of the French, who were not come to destroy either religion or the Holy See, but who merely wished to remove the evil councillors by whom the Pope was surrounded. He then ordered them to be supplied with refreshments, and dismissed them. Bonaparte advanced rapidly from Faenza to Forli, Cesena, Rimini, Pesaro, and Sinigaglia. Colli, who had but about three thousand regular troops left, intrenched them in a good position before Ancona. Bonaparte surrounded, and took great part of them. He gave them their liberty on the same conditions as before. Colli retired with his officers to Rome. Bonaparte had now only to march to that capital. He proceeded first to Loreto, the treasury of which had been emptied: scarcely a million was found in it. The old wooden image of the Virgin was sent to Paris as a curiosity. Leaving the coast, he marched from Loreto, by Macerata for the Apennines, intending to cross them and to debouch upon Rome, if that should be necessary. He arrived at Tolentino on the 26th of Pluviose (February 13), and waited there to see what effect his rapid march and the deliberation of his prisoners would produce. He had sent for the general of the Camaldulenses, an ecclesiastic in whom Pius VI. placed great confidence, and directed him to repair to Rome with offers of peace. He particularly wished the Pope to submit, and to accept the conditions which he resolved to impose upon him. He was not disposed to lose time in exciting a revolution in Rome, which might have detained him longer than suited him, which would, perhaps, have provoked the court of Naples to take up arms, and which, in overthrowing the established government, would, for the moment, ruin the Roman finances, and prevent him from drawing from the country the twenty or thirty millions which he wanted. He conceived that the Holy See, deprived of its finest provinces in favour of the Cispadane, and exposed to the vicinity of the new republic, would soon be infected with the revolutionary contagion and fall in a very short time. This was good policy, and time proved its correctness. He awaited, therefore, at Tolentino, the effects of clemency and fear.

* "I am the friend," said Napoleon, "of all the nations of Italy, and particularly of the people of Rome. You are free; return to your families, and tell them that the French are the friends of religion, order, and the poor."—*Montheleon*. E.

The prisoners whom he had sent home had, in fact, gone to all parts of the Roman states, and especially to Rome, spreading the most favourable reports of the French army, and appeasing the resentments excited against it. The general of the Camaldulenses arrived at the Vatican at the moment when the Pope was about to enter his carriage and to leave Rome. The prince, cheered by the message brought by that ecclesiastic, relinquished his intention of quitting the capital, dismissed Busca, the secretary of state, and despatched Cardinal Mattei, the prelate Galeppi, Marquis Massimi, and his nephew, the Duke of Braschi, to Tolentino, to treat with the French general. They had full powers to treat, provided the general required no sacrifice connected with the faith. The treaty was thereby rendered perfectly easy, for on the articles of faith the French general laid no stress whatever. The treaty was concluded in a few days, and signed at Tolentino on the 1st of Ventose (February 19). Its principal conditions were these. The Pope revoked all treaties of alliance against France, acknowledged the republic, and declared himself in peace and good understanding with her. He ceded to her all his rights on the Venaissin, and gave up definitively to the Cispadane republic the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, and likewise the fine province of La Romagna. The town and the important citadel of Ancona were to remain in the hands of France until the general peace. The two provinces of the duchy of Urbino and Macerata, which the French army had occupied, were to be restored to the Pope on payment of the sum of fifteen millions. A like sum was to be paid, agreeably to the armistice of Bologna, not yet executed. These thirty millions were payable, two-thirds in money and one-third in diamonds or precious stones. The Pope was, moreover, to furnish eight hundred cavalry horses and eight hundred draught horses, buffaloes, and other productions of the states of the Church. He was to disavow the murder of Basseville, and to pay three hundred thousand francs for the benefit of his heirs and of others who had suffered by the same event. All the works of art and manuscripts ceded to France by the armistice of Bologna were to be sent off immediately to Paris.

Such was the treaty of Tolentino,* which gained for the Cispadane republic not only the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, but also the beautiful province of La Romagna, and procured for the army a subsidy of thirty millions, more than enough for the campaign that was about to commence. A fortnight had sufficed for this expedition. While this treaty was negotiating, Bonaparte had contrived to awe the court of Naples, and to rid himself of it. Before he left Tolentino he performed a remarkable act, and one which demonstrated his personal policy thus early in his career. Italy, and the Papal states in particular, were full of exiled French priests. These unfortunate men, retired in convents, were not always received there with much charity. The ordinances of the Directory forbade their stay in countries occupied by our armies; and the Italian monks were not sorry to be delivered from them by the approach of our troops. These unfortunate men were reduced to despair. Long separated from their country, exposed to all the disdain of foreigners, they wept at the sight of our soldiers. They even recognized some of them, whose ministers they had been in the vil-

* "One of the papal negotiators of this treaty observed to Bonaparte, that he was the only Frenchman that had marched against Rome since the Constable Bourbon; but what rendered this circumstance still more singular was, that the history of the first expedition, under the title of 'The Sacking of Rome,' was written by Jacopo Bonaparte an ancestor of him who executed the second."—*Las Cases*. E.

lages of France. Bonaparte was easily moved; besides, he was anxious to appear exempt from every kind of revolutionary and religious prejudice; he issued an order commanding all the convents of the Holy See to receive the French priests, to subsist them, and to give them pay. Thus, instead of putting them to flight, he improved their condition. He wrote to the Directory, explaining the motives which had induced him to commit this violation of its ordinances. "By continually hunting down these unfortunate men," said he, "you force them to return home. It is better that they should be in Italy than in France; they will be useful to us there. They are less fanatical than the Italian priests; they will enlighten the people, who are excited by all means against us. Besides," added he, "they weep on seeing us; how is it possible not to pity their misfortunes!" The Directory approved of his conduct. This act and this letter were published, and produced a very strong sensation.

He returned immediately to the Adige, to execute the boldest military march recorded in history. After once crossing the Alps to enter Italy, he was about to cross them a second time, to throw himself beyond the Drave and the Mur into the valley of the Danube, and to advance upon Vienna. Never had French army yet appeared in sight of that capital. To execute this vast plan, it was necessary to brave many dangers. He left all Italy upon his rear—Italy, struck with terror and admiration, but still impressed with the notion that the French could not long maintain possession of the country.

The late campaign of Rivoli and the capture of Mantua had appeared to put an end to those doubts; but a march into Germany was about to revive them all. The governments of Genoa, Tuscany, Naples, Rome, Turin, Venice, indignant at seeing a focus of revolution placed beside them in the Cispadane republic and Lombardy, might take advantage of the first reverse to rise. In uncertainty as to the result, the Italian patriots watched one another, that they might not compromise themselves. Bonaparte's army was far inferior to what it ought to have been to parry all the dangers of his plan. The divisions of Bernadotte and Delmas, just arrived from the Rhine, numbered no more than twenty thousand men; the old army of Italy did not exceed forty thousand; and these, with the Lombard troops, amounted to about seventy thousand. But it was necessary to leave at least twenty thousand in Italy, and to guard the Tyrol with fifteen or eighteen thousand, so that there remained but thirty and some odd thousand to march upon Vienna—an unexampled temerity. In order to obviate these difficulties, Bonaparte strove to negotiate an offensive and defensive alliance with Piedmont, which he had long aimed at. This alliance would procure him ten thousand good troops. The king, who at first was not satisfied with the guarantee of his dominions in return for the services that he was to render, was content with it now that he saw the Revolution gaining all minds. He signed the treaty, which was sent to Paris. But this treaty was contrary to the views of the French government. The Directory, approving of Bonaparte's policy in Italy, which consisted in awaiting the very speedy downfall of the governments and in not provoking it, in order to avoid both the trouble and the responsibility of revolutions, was neither for attacking nor guaranteeing any prince. The ratification of the treaty was, therefore, extremely doubtful, and besides it would take a fortnight or three weeks. The Sardinian contingent would then have to be set in motion, and by that time Bonaparte would be beyond the Alps. Bonaparte

was, above all, desirous of concluding a similar treaty of alliance with Venice. The government of that republic was equipping considerable armaments, the object of which could not be doubtful. The lagoons were full of Sclavonian regiments. Ottolini, podesta of Bergamo, the blind instrument of the state inquisitors, had distributed money and arms among the mountaineers of the Bergamasco, and held them in readiness for any favourable opportunity. That government, equally weak and perfidious, was nevertheless unwilling to compromise itself, and persisted in its pretended neutrality. It had refused the alliance of Austria and of Prussia, but it was in arms; and if the French, after entering Austria, should sustain reverses, it had determined to take a decided part, and to slaughter them in their retreat. Bonaparte, who was as crafty as the Venetian aristocracy, was aware of this danger, and urged an alliance rather to secure himself against its hostile designs, than to obtain its assistance. On crossing the Adige, he sent for Pezaro, the proveditore, whom he had so terrified the year before at Peschiera, and made him the most frank and friendly overtures. The whole *terra firma*, said he, is imbued with revolutionary ideas; a single word from the French would be sufficient to excite all the provinces to insurrection against Venice; yet the French, if Venice were to ally herself with them, would abstain from instigating to revolt. They would strive to pacify public opinion; they would guarantee the republic against the ambition of Austria; and, without demanding the sacrifice of her constitution, they would confine themselves to recommending some modifications indispensable for her welfare. Nothing could be more prudent or more sincere than this advice. It is not true that, at the moment it was given, the Directory and Bonaparte were thinking of giving up Venice to Austria. The Directory had as yet no idea on this point. If, while awaiting the issue of events, it had any intention at all, it was rather to emancipate Italy than to give up any part of it to Austria. As for Bonaparte, he sincerely wished to make an ally of Venice; and if Venice had listened to him, if she had joined them, and consented to modify her constitution, she would have saved her territory and her ancient laws. Pezaro answered in an evasive manner. Bonaparte, finding that he had nothing to hope for, then resolved to take his precautions, and to make amends for all his deficiencies by his ordinary means, that is, by the rapidity and the vehemence of his blows.

He had sixty and some thousand men such as Europe had never yet seen. He resolved to leave ten thousand in Italy; these, joined to the Lombard and Cispadane battalions, would form fifteen or eighteen thousand men, capable of awing the Venetians. He would then have fifty and some odd thousand left, which he meant to dispose in the following manner. Three roads lead across the Rhætian, Noric, and Julian Alps to Vienna: the first, on the left, traversing the Tyrol at Mount Brenner; the second, in the centre, traversing Carinthia, at Mount Tarwis; the third, on the right, crossing the Tagliamento and the Isonzo, and leading into Carniola. The Archduke Charles had the bulk of his forces on this latter road, guarding Carniola and covering Trieste. Two corps, one at Feltre and Belluno the other in the Tyrol, occupied the other two roads. Owing to the blunder committed by Austria, in not despatching her forces to Italy till very late, six fine divisions coming from the Rhine had not yet arrived. This blunder might have been partly repaired, had the Archduke Charles, fixing his head-quarters in the Tyrol, determined to operate upon our left. He would have been joined by the six divisions from the Rhine at least a fort-

night earlier; and then Bonaparte, instead of filing off on the right by Carinthia or Carniola, would certainly have been obliged to fight him and to finish with him before he ventured beyond the Alps. He would then have found him with his best troops, and would not have had so very easy a task. But the archduke had orders to cover Trieste, the only seaport of the monarchy. He fixed himself, therefore, at the outlet from Carniola, and placed only subordinate corps on the roads from Carinthia and the Tyrol. Two of the divisions from the Rhine were to reinforce General Kerpen in the Tyrol; the four others were to file away behind the Alps, through Carinthia and Carniola, and to proceed to the head-quarters in the Friule. It was now Ventose (March). The Alps were covered with snow and ice. Who would imagine that Bonaparte could think of climbing at that moment the summit of the Alps!

Bonaparte conceived that, by falling upon the archduke before the arrival of the principal forces from the Rhine, he should more easily carry the passes of the Alps, then cross them, beat in succession, as he had always done, the separate bodies of the Austrians, and, if he were supported by a movement of the armies of the Rhine, advance to Vienna.

In consequence, he reinforced Joubert, who had at Rivoli proved himself worthy of all his confidence, with the divisions of Baragui d'Hilliers and Delmas, and thus composed for him a corps of eighteen thousand men. He directed him to ascend into the Tyrol, to fight Generals Laudohn and Kerpen to the utmost extremity, to drive them beyond the Brenner, to the other side of the Alps, and then to file off to the right through the Pusterthal, in order to join the grand army in Carinthia. Laudohn and Kerpen might, to be sure, return into the Tyrol, when Joubert should have rejoined the principal army; but it would take time for them to recover from a defeat, to obtain reinforcements, and to descend again into the Tyrol; meanwhile Bonaparte would be at the gates of Vienna. To quiet the Tyrolese, he recommended to Joubert to show much regard for the priests, to speak well of the emperor and ill of his ministers, to touch the imperial coffers only, and to make no change in the administration of the country. He directed the intrepid Massena, with his fine division, ten thousand strong, to march upon the corps which was in the centre towards Feltre and Belluno, to hasten to the gorges of the Ponteba, which precede the great Mount Tarwis, to make himself master of the gorges of that mountain, and thus to secure the outlet of Carinthia. He resolved to march with three divisions, twenty-five thousand strong, upon the Piave and the Tagliamento, to push the archduke before him into Carniola, then to descend towards the Carinthia road, to join Massena at Mount Tarwis, to cross the Alps at that mountain, to descend into the valley of the Drave and the Mur, pick up Joubert, and march for Vienna. He reckoned upon the impetuosity and the audacity of his attack, and upon the impression which his prompt and terrible blows were accustomed to leave.

Before he commenced his march, he gave to General Kilmaine the command of Upper Italy. Victor's division, placed *en échelon* in the states of the Pope, till the thirty millions should be paid, was to return in a few days to the Adige, and there form with the Lombards the corps of observation. An extraordinary ferment prevailed in the Venetian provinces. The peasants and the mountaineers, devoted to the priests and the aristocracy and the towns, agitated by the revolutionary spirit, were ready to come to blows. Bonaparte enjoined General Kilmaine to observe the strictest neutrality, and set out to execute his vast projects. He issued, as usual, an

energetic proclamation,* calculated to increase the enthusiasm of his soldiers, had it been capable of exultation. On the 20th of Ventose, year V (March 10, 1797), the cold being intense and the snow several feet deep on the mountains, he set his whole line in motion. Massena commenced his operation upon the centre corps, push it upon Feltre, Belluno, and Cadore, took from it about a thousand prisoners, among whom was General Lusignan, descended upon Spilimbergo, and entered the gorges of the Ponteba, which precede Mount Tarwis. Bonaparte advanced with three divisions upon the Piave; Serrurier's division, which had distinguished itself before Mantua, Augereau's division, now under the command of General Guyeux, because Augereau had gone with the colours to Paris, and Bernadotte's division, which had come from the Rhine. This last formed a strong contrast, by its simplicity and its austere bearing, with the old army of Italy, enriched in the beautiful plains which it had conquered, and composed of brave, fiery, and intemperate Southerners. The soldiers of Italy, proud of their victories, laughed at the soldiers of the Rhine, and called them the contingent, in allusion to the contingents of the circles of Germany, which were very backward in doing their duty in the emperor's armies. The men of the Rhine, veterans in arms, were impatient to prove their valour to their rivals in glory. Some sabre-cuts had already been exchanged on account of these raileries, and they were anxious to exhibit their prowess before the enemy.

On the 23d (March 13), the three divisions crossed the Piave, and had nearly lost one man only, who was on the point of drowning, when a female sutler swam to him and saved his life.† Bonaparte gave the woman a gold chain. The enemy's advanced guards fell back, and sought refuge behind the Tagliamento. All the troops of Prince Charles in the Friule were assembled there to dispute the passage. The two young adversaries were about to meet. The one, in saving Germany by a happy conception, had, in the preceding year, acquired high reputation. He was brave, not wedded to German routine, but very uncertain of success, and extremely alarmed for his glory. The other had astonished Europe by the fecundity and the boldness of his combinations. He feared nothing whatever. Modest till the battle of Lodi, he now deemed no genius equal to his own,‡ no soldier

* "Soldiers!" said Napoleon, addressing his troops, "the capture of Mantua has put an end to the war of Italy. You have been victorious in fourteen pitched battles and seventy actions; you have taken 100,000 prisoners, 500 fieldpieces, 2,000 heavy cannon, and four pontoon-trains. The contributions laid on the countries you have conquered, have fed, maintained, and paid the army; besides which you have sent thirty millions to the minister of finance for the use of the public treasury. You have enriched the museum of Paris with three hundred masterpieces of ancient and modern Italy, which it had required thirty centuries to produce. You have conquered for the republic the finest countries in Europe. The Kings of Sardinia and Naples, the Pope, and the Duke of Parma, are separated from the coalition. You have expelled the English from Leghorn, Genoa, and Corsica. Still higher destinies await you. You will prove yourselves worthy of them. Of all the foes who combined to stifle our republic in its birth, the emperor alone remains." E.

† "The river is pretty deep, and a bridge would have been desirable; but the good will of the soldiers supplied that deficiency. A drummer was the only person in danger, and he was saved by a woman who swam after him."—*Montholon*. E.

‡ "Napoleon was characterized by nothing more strongly than by the spirit of self exaggeration. His strong original tendency to pride, fed and pampered by strange success and unbounded applause, swelled almost into an insane conviction of superhuman greatness. This insolent exaltation of himself above the race to which he belonged, broke out in the beginning of his career. His first victories in Italy gave him the tone of a master, and he never laid it aside to his last hour."—*Dr. Channing*. E

equal to the French soldier. On the 26th of Ventose (March 16), in the morning, Bonaparte directed his three divisions by Valvasone to the bank of the Tagliamento. That river, the bed of which is imperfectly marked, descends from the Alps over gravel, and divides into a great number of branches, all fordable. The Austrian army was drawn up on the other bank, covering the borders of the river with its balls, and keeping its fine cavalry deployed on its wings, ready to seize any opportunity for employing it on those plains so favourable to evolutions.

Bonaparte left Serrurier's division in reserve at Valvasone, and despatched Guyeux's and Bernadotte's divisions, the former to the left, facing the village of Gradisca, where the enemy was lodged; the latter to the right, facing Godroipo. The cannonade began, and some cavalry skirmishes took place on the sands. Bonaparte, finding the enemy too well prepared, feigned to give some rest to his troops, ordered the firing to cease, and directed them to begin to cook their soup. The enemy imagined that, as these divisions had marched all night, they were about to halt and to take some rest. But, at noon, Bonaparte all at once ordered them again under arms. Guyeux's division deployed on the left, Bernadotte's on the right. Battalions of grenadiers were formed. At the head of each division was placed the light infantry, ready to disperse as sharpshooters, then the grenadiers, who were to charge, and the dragoons, who were to support them. The two divisions were deployed in rear of these two advanced guards. Each demi-brigade had its first battalion deployed in line, and the two others compressed into close column on the wings of the first. The cavalry was destined to move about on the wings. The army advanced in this manner towards the banks of the river, in the same order and with the same coolness as on a parade.

General Dammartin on the left, and General Lespinasse on the right, ordered their artillery to draw up. The light infantry dispersed and covered the banks of the Tagliamento with a swarm of riflemen. Bonaparte then gave the signal. The grenadiers of the two divisions entered the water, supported by the squadrons of cavalry, and advanced to the other bank. "Soldiers of the Rhine!" exclaimed Bernadotte, "the army of Italy is watching you!" Both divisions dashed on with equal bravery. They rushed upon the enemy's army and drove it back on all sides. Prince Charles, however, had placed a strong corps of infantry at Gradisca, towards our left, and kept his cavalry towards our right wing, in order to turn and charge us by favour of the plain. General Guyeux, at the head of his division, furiously attacked Gradisca, and carried it. Bonaparte disposed his reserve cavalry towards our threatened wing, and threw it, under the command of General Dugua and Adjutant-general Kellermann, upon the Austrian cavalry. Our squadrons charged with skill and impetuosity took prisoner the general of the enemy's cavalry, and put it to the rout. Along the whole line, the Tagliamento was cleared and the enemy in flight. We made four or five hundred prisoners; the ground, being open, did not permit more to be taken.

Such was the battle of the 26th of Ventose (March 16), called the battle of the Tagliamento. While it was taking place, Massena, on the centre road, attacked Osopo, made himself master of the gorges of the Ponteba, and pushed the relics of Lusignan's and Orksay's division upon Tarwis.

The Archduke Charles was aware that, in order to guard the Carniolæ road and to cover Trieste, he must lose the road of Carinthia, which was the most direct and the shortest, and that which Bonaparte meant to follow

in marching for Vienna. The Carniola road communicates with that of Carinthia and with Mount Tarwis, by a cross-road, which runs through the valley of the Isonzo. The Archduke Charles despatched the division of Bayalitsch, by this route towards Mount Tarwis, to anticipate Massena, if possible. He retired with the rest of his forces upon the Friule, in order to dispute the passage of the Lower Isonzo.

Bonaparte followed him, and took possession of Palma-Nova, a Venetian town, which the archduke had occupied, and which contained immense magazines. He then marched upon Gradisca, a town situated in advance of the Isonzo. He arrived there on the 29th of Ventose (March 19). Bernadotte's division advanced from Gradisca, which was weakly intrenched, but guarded by three thousand men. Meanwhile, Bonaparte sent Serrurier's division a little below Gradisca, to cross the Isonzo there, and to cut off the retreat of the garrison. Bernadotte, without waiting for the result of this manœuvre, summoned the place to surrender. The commandant refused. The soldiers of the Rhine demanded permission to storm, that they might enter the town before the soldiers of Italy. They rushed upon the intrenchments, but a shower of balls and grape struck down more than five hundred of them. Fortunately, Serrurier's manœuvre put an end to the combat. The three thousand men in Gradisca laid down their arms, and gave up their colours and cannon.

Meanwhile, Massena had at last reached Mount Tarwis, and, after a very brisk action, made himself master of that pass of the Alps. The division of Bayalitsch, proceeding across the sources of the Isonzo to anticipate Massena at Tarwis, would consequently find the outlet closed. The Archduke Charles, foreseeing this result, left the rest of his army on the Friule and Carniola road, with orders to rejoin him behind the Alps at Clagenfurt. He then flew himself to Villach, where numerous detachments were arriving from the Rhine, to make a fresh attack on Tarwis, with a view to drive Massena from it and to reopen the road for the division of Bayalitsch. Bonaparte, on his side, left Bernadotte's division to pursue the corps which were retreating into Carniola, and with Guyeux's and Serrurier's divisions, proceeded to harass the division of Bayalitsch in its rear, while passing through the valley of the Isonzo.

Prince Charles, after rallying behind the Alps the wrecks of Lusignan and Orksay, who had lost Mount Tarwis, reinforced them with six thousand grenadiers, the finest and bravest soldiers in the imperial service, and again attacked Mount Tarwis, where Massena had left scarcely a detachment. He succeeded in recovering it, and established himself there with the corps of Lusignan and Orksay, and the six thousand grenadiers. Massena collected his whole division in order to regain it. Both generals were sensible of the importance of this point. Tarwis retaken, the French army would be master of the Alps, and would take the entire division of Bayalitsch. Massena rushed on headlong with his brave infantry, and paid, as usual, with his person. Prince Charles was not less sparing of himself than the republican general, and several times ran the risk of being taken by the French riflemen. Mount Tarwis is the loftiest of the Noric Alps. It overlooks Germany and Dalmatia. The combatants fought above the clouds, amidst snow, and upon plains of ice.* Whole lines of

* "The troops on both sides fought with the utmost resolution, and both commanders exposed their persons like the meanest of the soldiers; the cannon thundered above the clouds; the cavalry charged on fields of ice; the infantry struggled through drifts of

cavalry were thrown down and broken on this frightful field of battle. At length, after having brought forward his last battalion, the Archduke Charles relinquished Tarwis to his obstinate adversary, and found himself compelled to sacrifice the division of Bayalitsch. Massena, left master of Tarwis, fell upon that division as it came up, attacked it in front, while it was pressed in rear by Guyeux's and Serrurier's divisions, united under the command of Bonaparte. That division had no other resource than to surrender. A great number of soldiers, natives of Carniola and Croatia, escaped across the mountains, after throwing away their arms; but five thousand were left in the hands of the French, together with all the baggage, &c., and the artillery of the Austrian army, which had followed this route. Thus Bonaparte had reached in a fortnight the summit of the Alps, and had completely realized his object, so far as he had proceeded.

In the Tyrol, Joubert justified his confidence by fighting battles of giants. The two Generals, Laudohn and Kerpen, occupied the two banks of the Adige. Joubert had attacked and beaten them at St. Michael, killed two thousand of their men, and taken three thousand. Pursuing them without intermission upon Neumark and Tramin, and taking from them two thousand more men, he had thrown Laudohn to the left of the Adige into the valley of the Meran, and Kerpen to the right, to the foot of the Brenner. Kerpen, reinforced at Clausen by one of the two divisions coming from the Rhine, had been again beaten. He had again been reinforced, at Mittenwald, with the second division of the Rhine, had been beaten for the last time, and finally retired beyond the Brenner. Joubert, having thus swept the Tyrol, had turned to the right-about, and was marching through the Pusterthal to rejoin his general-in-chief. It was the 12th of Germinal (April 1), and already Bonaparte was master of the summit of the Alps, had taken nearly twenty thousand prisoners, was about to reunite Joubert and Massena with his principal corps, and to march with fifty thousand men for Vienna. His adversary, broken, was using his utmost exertions to rally the wrecks of his army, and to join them to the troops coming from the Rhine. Such was the result of this rapid and daring march.

But while Bonaparte was obtaining such speedy results, all that he had foreseen and apprehended on his rear was coming to pass. The Venetian provinces, agitated by the revolutionary spirit, had risen. They had thus furnished the Venetian government with a pretext for calling out considerable forces, and placing itself in a condition to crush the French army in case of reverse. The provinces on the right bank of the Mincio were most infected with this revolutionary spirit, owing to the vicinity of Lombardy. In the towns of Bergamo, Brescia, Salò, and Crema, were numbers of great families to which the yoke of the nobility of the golden book was intolerable, and which, supported by a numerous *bourgeoisie*, formed powerful parties.* By following the advice of Bonaparte, by open-

snow. At length the obstinate courage of Massena prevailed over the persevering resolution of his adversary; and the archduke was compelled to yield the possession of the blood-stained snows of Tarwis to the republican soldiers."—*Alison*. E.

* "Venice, that city of lofty remembrances—the Tyre of the middle ages—whose traders were princes, and her merchants, the honourable of the earth, fallen as she was from her former greatness, still presented some appearance of vigour. But the inhabitants of her provinces were not unanimous, especially those of the *terra firma*; or mainland, who, not being enrolled in the *golden book* of the insular nobility of Venice, were discontented, and availed themselves of the encouragement and assistance of the newly-created republics on the Po to throw off their allegiance. Brescia and Bergamo, in particular, were clamorous for independence."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E

ing the pages of the golden book, by introducing some modifications into the ancient constitution, the government of Venice would have disarmed the formidable party which had sprung up in all the provinces of the mainland; but the usual blindness of all aristocracies had prevented this concession, and rendered a revolution inevitable. It is easy to determine the participation of the French in this revolution, notwithstanding all the absurdities invented by malice and repeated by stupidity. The army of Italy was composed of Southern revolutionists, that is, ardent revolutionists. In all their intercourse with Venetian subjects, it could not be otherwise than that they should communicate a similar spirit and excite revolt against the most odious of European aristocracies. But this was inevitable, and it was not in the power of the government or of the French generals to prevent it. As for the intentions of the Directory and of Bonaparte, they were clear enough. The Directory wished for the natural downfall of all the Italian governments; but it had determined not to take any active part in bringing this about; and, besides, it relied entirely on Bonaparte to conduct the political and military operations in Italy. As for Bonaparte himself, he had too much need of union, tranquillity, and friends in his rear, to think of revolutionizing Venice. An arrangement between the two parties would have suited him much better. This arrangement and our alliance being refused, he purposed to insist, at his return, on what he had not been able to obtain by gentle means. But, for the moment, he meant to do nothing. His intentions on this point were positively expressed to his government, and he had given General Kilmaine the most formal order not to take any part in political events, and to maintain tranquillity to the utmost of his power.

The towns of Bergamo and Brescia, the most agitated of the *terra firma*, had much communication with Milan. Secret revolutionary committees were everywhere formed, for the purpose of corresponding with the Milanese patriots. They solicited the aid of the latter to shake off the yoke of Venice. The victories of the French left no further doubt of the definitive expulsion of the Austrians; the patrons of the aristocracy were therefore conquered. Though the French affected neutrality, it was clear that they would not employ their arms to rivet the yoke again on the necks of people who should have thrown it off. All those, therefore, who rose in insurrection would be likely to continue free. Such was the reasoning of the Italians. The inhabitants of Bergamo, who were nearest to Milan, wrote to that city, and secretly inquired of the Milanese chiefs if they could rely upon their support, and upon the assistance of the Lombard legion commanded by Lahoz. Ottolini, podesta of Bergamo, the same faithful agent of the state inquisitors who gave money and arms to the peasants and mountaineers, had spies among the Milanese patriots; he was acquainted with the plot that was hatching, and obtained the names of the principal agents of the revolt residing at Bergamo. He lost no time in despatching a courier to Venice, to carry their names to the state inquisitors, and to cause their apprehension. The inhabitants of Bergamo, apprized of the danger, sent messengers after the bearer of the despatch, who overtook and secured him, and published the names of those of their fellow-townsmen who were compromised. This circumstance decided the explosion. On the 11th of March, at the moment when Bonaparte was marching for the Piave, the tumult began in their town. Ottolini, the podesta, issued threats, which were not attended to. The French commandant, whom Bonaparte had placed in the citadel with a garrison to watch the motions of the mountaineers of the Bergamasco, redoubled his

vigilance and reinforced all his posts. Both sides claimed his assistance. He replied that he could not interfere in the quarrels of Venetian subjects with their government, and said that the doubling of the posts was only a precaution for the safety of the place committed to his charge. In executing his orders and remaining neutral, he did a great deal for the people of Bergamo. They assembled on the following day, March 12, formed a provisional municipality, declared the town of Bergamo free, and drove away Ottolini, the podesta, who retired with the Venetian troops. They immediately sent an address to Milan to obtain the support of the Lombards. The conflagration could not fail to spread rapidly to Brescia, and to all the neighbouring cities. No sooner had the inhabitants of Bergamo asserted their freedom, than they sent a party to Brescia. The presence of these Bergamascans excited the Brescians to rise. Bataglia, the same Venetian who had given such prudent counsel in the deliberations of the senate, was podesta of Brescia. Conceiving himself unable to resist, he withdrew. The Revolution of that city took place on the 15th of March. The flame continued to spread, proceeding along the foot of the mountains. From Bergamo and Brescia it communicated to Salò, where the Revolution was accomplished in like manner by the arrival of Bergamascans and Brescians, by the retreat of the Venetian authorities, and in presence of the French garrisons, which remained neuter, and whose aspect, though they said nothing, filled the revolted with hope. This rising of the patriotic party in the towns could not fail of course to determine the rising of the opposite party in the mountains and in the country. The mountaineers and the peasants, armed long before by Ottolini, received the signal from the Capuchins and the monks who came to preach in the hamlets. They prepared to go and sack the insurgent towns and to butcher the French, if they could. From that moment, the French generals could no longer remain inactive, although they wished to continue neuter. They were too well acquainted with the intentions of the mountaineers and of the peasants to suffer them to take up arms; and, without wishing to give support to either party, they found themselves obliged to interfere, and to quell that which entertained and proclaimed hostile intentions against themselves. Kilmaine immediately ordered General Lahoz, commanding the Lombard legion, to march towards the mountains to oppose their arming. It was not his wish any more than his duty, to throw obstacles in the way of the operations of the Venetian regular troops, if they came to act against the insurgent towns; but he could not suffer a rising, the result of which was incalculable in case of a defeat in Austria. He immediately despatched couriers to Bonaparte, and sent to hasten the march of Victor's division, which was returning from the Papal states.

The government of Venice, like all blind governments, which will not prevent danger by granting what is indispensable, was alarmed at these events, as if they had been unforeseen. It immediately despatched the troops which it had long been collecting, and marched them towards the towns on the right bank of the Mincio. At the same time, persuaded that the French were the secret influence which it was necessary to conciliate, they addressed themselves to Lallemand, the minister of France, inquiring if, in this emergency, the republic of Venice could rely on the friendship of the Directory. Lallemand's reply was simple, and dictated by his position. He declared that he had no instructions from his government for this case, which was true: but he added that, if the Venetian government would introduce into its constitution such modifications as were

required by the wants of the times, he thought that France would cheerfully support it. Lallemand could not have given any other answer; for, if France had offered her alliance to Venice against the other powers, she had never offered it to her against her own subjects; and she could not offer it to her against them, but on condition of the adoption of wise and rational principles. The great council of Venice deliberated on Lallemand's reply. It was several centuries since the proposal of a change of constitution had been publicly made. Out of two hundred votes it obtained but five. About fifty were for the adoption of energetic measures; but one hundred and eighty declared in favour of a slow, gradual reform, deferred till quiet times, that is, in favour of an evasive determination. It was resolved to send immediately two deputies to Bonaparte, to sound his intentions and to solicit his aid. One of the sages of the *terra firma*, J. B. Cornaro, and Pezaro, the well-known provveditore, whom we have seen more than once in the presence of the general, were the persons selected for this mission.

Kilmaine's couriers and the Venetian envoys reached Bonaparte at the moment when his bold manœuvres had insured to him the line of the Alps, and opened the hereditary states. He was at Gorice, settling the capitulation of Trieste. He learned with real pain the events that were occurring on his rear, and to be certain of this, it is sufficient to consider the audacity and the danger of his march upon Vienna. Besides, his despatches to the Directory attest the concern which he felt, and it shows but little judgment to assert that he did not express his real sentiments in those despatches, since he made no scruple of avowing his least creditable artifices against the Italian governments. But what could he do under such circumstances? It would not be generous in him to repress by force the party which proclaimed our principles, which welcomed, which caressed, our troops, and to give the triumph to a party which was ready, in case of a reverse, to annihilate our principles and our armies. He resolved to avail himself of this circumstance to make one more attempt to obtain from the envoys of Venice the concessions and the succours which he had not yet been able to wring from them. He received the two envoys politely, and gave them an audience on the 5th of Germinal (March 25). "For me to arm against my friends," said he, "against those who welcome us and are ready to defend us, in favour of my enemies, in favour of those who detest and would fain slaughter us, is an absolute impossibility. This base policy is as far from my heart as from my interest. Never will I lend my aid against the principles for which France has achieved her revolution, and to which I owe in part the success of my arms. But I offer you once more my friendship and my advice. Ally yourselves frankly with France; draw nearer to her principles; make modifications indispensably necessary to your constitution; then I will answer for everything, and, without employing violence, to which I cannot possibly resort, I will obtain by my influence over the people of Italy, and by the assurance of a more rational system, the restoration of order and of peace. This result would be for your own advantage as well as mine."

This language, which was sincere, and the wisdom of which needs no demonstration, was not relished by the Venetian envoys, and especially by Pezaro. This was not what they wanted. They were desirous that Bonaparte should restore the fortresses which he had occupied by way of precaution in Bergamo, Brescia, and Verona; that he should permit the arming of the fanatic party against the patriotic party, and that he should

thus allow another war like that of Vendée to be raised up against him in his rear. This was not the way to come to an arrangement. Bonaparte, whose temper was soon ruffled, abused the two deputies, and, reminding them of the proceedings of the Venetians towards the French army, declared that he was acquainted with their secret dispositions and designs; but that he was able, and that he had an army in Lombardy to watch them. The conference grew warm. They passed from these questions to that of supplies. Hitherto Venice had furnished the French army with provisions, and she had authorized Bonaparte to demand them of her by supplying the Austrian army. The Venetians wished that Bonaparte, having entered the hereditary states, should cease to be subsisted at their expense. This was not at all his intention, for he meant not to require any thing of the inhabitants of Austria, in order to conciliate them. The contractors whom Venice had secretly employed to supply the French army had ceased to do so, and the general had been obliged to levy requisitions in the Venetian states. "This is a vicious expedient," said Bonaparte; "it vexes the inhabitant, and affords occasion for abominable peculations; this campaign will not be a long one; give me a million per month while it lasts; the French republic will afterwards settle with you, and will feel more obliged for this million than for all the harm which you sustain from the requisitions. Besides, you have fed all my enemies, you have afforded them an asylum, you owe me reciprocity." The two envoys replied that the treasury was ruined. "If it is ruined," answered Bonaparte, "take money out of the treasury of the Duke of Modena, whom you have harboured to the detriment of my allies, the Modenese; take it from the property of the English, of the Russians, of the Austrians, of any of my enemies, deposited with you." The parties separated in an ill-humour.

A fresh interview took place on the following day.* Bonaparte, in a calm mood, repeated all his proposals; but Pezaro did nothing to satisfy him, and merely promised to inform the senate of all his demands. Bonaparte, whose irritation began to break forth, then grasped the arm of Pezaro, and said, "I assure you that I am aware of your intentions; I know what you are preparing for me; but beware! If, while I am

* The following is the account of this interview given by Napoleon himself, when at St. Helena, to Las Cases.

"Have I kept my word?" said Napoleon. "The Venetian territory is covered with my troops; the Germans are flying before me; I shall be in Germany in a few days. What does your republic desire? I have offered her the alliance of France; does she accept it?"—"No," said Pezaro, "Venice rejoices in your triumphs; she knows well that she can only exist by means of France; but, constant to her ancient wise policy, she wishes to remain neutral. Besides, what good could we do you? Under Louis XII. or Francis I. we were of some weight in the scale of battle; but now, with such immense armies, with whole populations under arms, what value can you set on our assistance?"—"But do you still continue your armaments?"—"We must do so," said Pezaro. Brescia and Bergamo have raised the standard of rebellion. Our faithful subjects are threatened at Crema, Chiari, and Verona; Venice itself is disturbed!"—"Well," replied the French general, "are not these additional reasons for accepting the proposals I have made you? They would put an end to all these troubles. But your fate hurries you on; reflect, however; it is a more decisive moment for your republic than you think. I leave a greater force in Italy, than would suffice to subject you; I am quitting Italy to penetrate deep into Germany; if there should be troubles in my rear, through your fault,—if my soldiers should be insulted through your exciting your troops against the Jacobins; that which would have been no crime while I remained in Italy will be an unpardonable one when I am in Germany; your republic would cease to exist; you would have pronounced its condemnation. If I have reason to complain of you, whether I am victorious or defeated, I will make peace at your expense." Pezaro, of course, made many protestations and excuses, and then took his leave. E.

engaged in a distant enterprise, you murder my sick, if you attack my depots, if you threaten my retreat, you will have decided your ruin. What I might forgive while in Italy, would be an unpardonable crime while I am engaged in Austria. If you take up arms, you decide either my ruin or your own. Think of this, and do not hazard the infirm lion of St. Mark against the fortune of an army which would find in its depots and its hospitals wherewithal to cross your lagoons and to destroy you." This energetic language frightened, without convincing, the Venetian envoys, who immediately communicated the result of this conference. Bonaparte also wrote immediately to Kilmaine, ordering him to exercise redoubled vigilance in punishing the French commandants if they overstepped the bounds of neutrality, and to disarm all the mountaineers and peasants.

Events had advanced so far that it was impossible for them to stop. The insurrection of Bergamo had taken place on the 22d of Ventose (March 12); that of Brescia on the 27th (March 17); that of Salo on the 4th of Germinal (March 24). On the 8th of Germinal (March 28), the town of Crema effected its revolution, and the French troops found themselves forcibly implicated in it. A detachment which preceded Victor's division, returning to Lombardy, presented itself at the gates of Crema. It was in a moment of agitation. The sight of the French troops could not fail to increase the hopes and the boldness of the patriots. The Venetian podesta, who was frightened, at first refused admission to the French; he then introduced forty of them, who made themselves masters of the gates of the town, and opened them to the rest of the French troops that followed. The inhabitants seized the opportunity, rose, and drove away the Venetian podesta. The French had done this merely to open themselves a passage; the patriots took advantage of it to rise. When such dispositions exist, everything becomes a cause, and the most involuntary circumstances have results which lead to inferences of collusion where there is none whatever. Such was the situation of the French, who, it is true, individually wished well to the revolution, but who officially observed neutrality.

The mountaineers and the peasants overran the country, excited by the agents of Venice and by the sermons of the Capuchins. The Sclavonian regiments, landed from the lagoons upon *terra firma*, advanced towards the insurgent towns. Kilmaine had issued orders, and set in motion the Lombard legion to disarm the peasants. Several skirmishes had already taken place; villages had been burned, and peasants seized and disarmed. But the latter, on their part, began to sack the towns, and to slaughter the French, whom they designated by the name of Jacobins. They had even already murdered, in a horrible manner, all those whom they met with singly. They first effected a counter-revolution at Salo. A body of the inhabitants of Bergamo and Brescia, supported by a detachment of the Poles of the Lombard legion, immediately marched upon Salo to expel the mountaineers. But some persons sent to parley were enticed into the town and put to death. The detachment was surrounded and beaten. Two hundred Poles were taken prisoners and sent to Venice. The known partisans of the French were seized at Salo, at Verona, and in all the Venetian towns; they were confined under the leads, and the state inquisitors, emboldened by this paltry success, showed a disposition to take cruel vengeance. It is asserted that it was forbidden to cleanse the canal of Orfano, which was appropriated, as it is well known, to the horrible purpose of drowning prisoners of state. The government of Venice,

however, while preparing to exercise the utmost rigour, strove to deceive General Bonaparte by acts of apparent compliance, and granted the million per month which he had demanded. The French, nevertheless, continued to be murdered wherever they were found. Their situation became extremely critical; and Kilmaine despatched fresh couriers to Bonaparte. The latter, when apprized of the battles fought by the mountaineers, the events at Salo, where two hundred Poles had been made prisoners, the confinement of all the partisans of France, and the murders committed upon the French, was filled with rage. He immediately sent a thundering letter to the senate, in which he recapitulated all his grievances, and insisted on the disarming of the mountaineers, and the liberation of the Polish prisoners and of the Venetian subjects imprisoned under the leads. He charged Junot to carry this letter and to read it to the senate, and ordered Lallemand, the minister, to quit Venice immediately and to declare war against it, if all the satisfaction demanded were not granted.*

Meanwhile, he descended at a giant's pace from the summit of the Noric Alps into the valley of the Mur. His principal hope, in this rash march, was that the armies of the Rhine would speedily take the field, and soon arrive upon the Danube. But he received a despatch from the Directory, which took from him all hope of this kind. The distress of the treasury was so great that it could not furnish General Moreau with the few hundred thousand francs which he needed for procuring a bridge equipage and crossing the Rhine. Hoche's army, which had two bridges, and which was quite ready, desired to march, but the government durst not risk it alone beyond the Rhine, while Moreau remained on this side of it. Carnot, in his despatch, even exaggerated the obstacles which were likely to retard the opening of the campaign by the armies of Germany, and left Bonaparte no hope of being supported. The general was extremely disconcerted by this letter. He possessed a warm imagination, and he passed from extreme confidence to extreme distrust. He fancied either that the Directory wished for the destruction of the army of Italy and of its commander, or that the other generals would not second him. He wrote a bitter letter respecting the conduct of the armies of the Rhine. He said that a line of water never was an obstacle, and that his conduct was a proof of this; that when one was determined to cross a river, one could always do it; that when men made a point of never risking their glory, they sometimes lost it; that he had crossed the Alps over snow and ice three feet deep, and that if he had calculated, like his colleagues, he would not have dared to attempt it; that, if the soldiers of the Rhine left the army of Italy exposed by itself in Germany, *they could not have any blood in their veins*; that, for the rest, that brave army, if it were abandoned, would fall back, and Europe would be judge between it and the other armies of the republic. Like all passionate and proud men, Bonaparte was fond of complaining and of exaggerating the subject of his complaints. Whatever he might say, he had no thought either of retiring or of stopping, but of striking terror into Austria by a rapid march and of forcing her to consent to peace. Many circumstances favoured

"Napoleon sent his aide-de-camp, Junot, with a menacing letter to the senate, in which he threatened them with the whole weight of republican vengeance, if they did not instantly liberate the Polish and French prisoners, surrender to him the authors of the hostilities, and disband all their armaments. Junot was received by the senate, to whom he read the thundering letter of Napoleon; but they prevailed on him to suspend his threats; and despatched two senators to the republican head-quarters, to endeavour to bring matters to an accommodation."—*Alison*. E.

this design. Terror pervaded Vienna; the court was inclined to treat Prince Charles strongly advised that course. The ministry alone, devoted to England, still held out. The conditions prescribed to Clarke, and which were anterior to Arcole and Rivoli, were so moderate that it would be easy to obtain the adhesion of Austria to those conditions, and even to much harder. When joined by Joubert and Massena, Bonaparte would have forty-five or fifty thousand men under his command; and with such a force he was not afraid of a general battle, whatever might be the power of the enemy. For all these reasons, he resolved to make an overture to Prince Charles, and, if he received no answer, to fall upon him with impetuosity, and to strike so sudden and so violent a blow, that Austria would no longer reject his offers. What glory for him, if, alone, unsupported, having penetrated into Austria by so extraordinary a route, he should impose peace upon the emperor!

He was at Klagenfurt, the capital of Carinthia, on the 11th of Germinal (March 31). Joubert, on his left, was completing his movement, and on the point of rejoining him. Bernadotte, whom he had detached by the Carniola road, had taken possession of Trieste, of the rich mines of Idria, and of the Austrian magazines, and was returning by way of Laybach and Klagenfurt. On the same day, the 11th (March 31), he wrote a memorable letter to the Archduke Charles. "General-in-chief," said he, "brave soldiers make war and desire peace. Has not this war lasted six years? Have we not slain men enough, and inflicted calamities enough on suffering humanity? It cries out on all sides. Europe, which had taken up arms against the French republic, has laid them down. Your nation alone is left, and yet blood is about to be spilt more abundantly than ever. This sixth campaign is announced by sinister omens. Be its issue what it may, we shall kill on either side some thousand men, and we must come to an arrangement at last, since everything has an end, not excepting even the passion of hatred.

"The Executive Directory of the French republic communicated to his majesty the emperor its desire to put an end to the war which afflicts both nations. The intervention of the court of London has opposed this wish. Is there then no hope of an arrangement; and must we continue to slaughter one another for the interests and the passions of a nation which knows nothing of the calamities of a war? You, general, who are by birth so near to the throne, and above all the petty passions which so frequently actuate ministers and governments, are you determined to merit the title of benefactor of the whole human race, and of the real saviour of Germany? Imagine not, general, that I mean by this that it is not possible to save her by force of arms; but, even supposing that the chances of war turn in your favour, Germany will not on that account be the less ravaged. As for me, general, if the overture which I have the honour to make to you can save the life of a single man, I shall be the prouder of the civic crown, which I shall feel that I have deserved, than of the melancholy glory which can result from military successes."

The Archduke Charles could not accede to this overture, for the Aulic Council had not yet come to any determination. At Vienna, the valuable effects of the crown and papers of importance were shipped on the Danube and the young archdukes and archduchesses were sent to Hungary. The court prepared, in case of extremity, to quit the capital. The archduke replied to general Bonaparte that he wished for peace as much as he could, but that he had no authority to treat, and that he must address himself

directly to Vienna.* Bonaparte advanced rapidly across the mountains of Carinthia, and, in the morning of the 12th of Germinal (April 1), pursued the enemy's rear-guard upon St. Veith and Freisach, and overthrew it. In the afternoon of the same day, he encountered the archduke, who had taken position in advance of the narrow gorges of Neumark, with the remains of his army of Friule, and with four divisions from the Rhine, those of Kaim, Mercantin, and the Prince of Orange, and the reserve of grenadiers. A furious battle ensued in these gorges. Massena had again all the honour of it. The soldiers of the Rhine challenged the old soldiers of the army of Italy. They tried which could advance the quickest and the farthest. After an obstinate action, in which the archduke lost three thousand men on the field of battle and twelve hundred prisoners, everything was carried at the point of the bayonet, and the gorges were taken. On the following day, Bonaparte marched without intermission from Neumark upon Unzmark. Between these two points terminated the cross-road connecting the high-road of the Tyrol with that of Carinthia. It was by this road that Kerpen was coming, pursued by Joubert. The archduke, wishing to gain time for Kerpen to rejoin him, proposed a suspension of arms, that, as he said, he might take into consideration the letter of the 11th (March 31). Bonaparte replied that they could negotiate and fight at the same time, and continued his march. On the following day, the 14th (April 3), another severe action took place at Unzmark, where he took fifteen hundred prisoners; he then entered Knittelfeld, and found no further obstacle as far as Leoben. The advanced guard entered that place on the 18th of Germinal (April 7). Kerpen had made a great circuit to rejoin the archduke, and Joubert had given the hand to the principal army.

On the very day that Bonaparte entered Leoben, Lieutenant-general Bellegarde, and Major-general Meerfeld arrived at the head-quarters, and desired a suspension of arms for ten days in the name of the emperor, who was intimidated by the rapid march of the French. Bonaparte was aware that a suspension of arms for ten days would give the archduke time to receive the last reinforcements from the Rhine, to rally all the detached portions of his army, and to take breath. But he himself had great need to do so, and he would be a gainer on his side by the junction of Bernadotte and Joubert. Besides he believed that there was a sincere desire to treat, and he granted a suspension of arms for five days, to allow plenipotentiaries time to arrive and to sign preliminaries. The convention was signed on the 18th (April 7), and was to last only till the 23d (April 12). He fixed his head-quarters at Leoben, and pushed forward Massena's advanced guard upon Simmering, the last height of the Noric Alps, which is twenty-five leagues distant from Vienna, and whence the steeples of that capital may be discerned. He issued a proclamation to the inhabitants to satisfy them respecting his intentions, and he added deeds to words, for nothing was taken without being paid for by the army.

Bonaparte awaited the expiration of the five days, ready to strike a fresh

* "Unquestionably, sir, said the archduke, in his reply, I desire as much as you, the attainment of peace for the happiness of the people and of humanity. Considering, however, that in the situation which I hold, it is no part of my business to inquire into and determine the quarrel of the belligerent powers; and that I am not furnished, on the part of the emperor, with any plenipotentiary powers for treating, you will excuse me, general, if I do not enter into negotiation with you touching a matter of the highest importance, but which does not lie within my department. Whatever shall happen, either respecting the future chances of the war, or the prospect of peace, I request you to be equally convinced of my distinguished esteem."—*Montholon*. E.

blow, and to increase the consternation of the imperial court, if it was not yet sufficiently frightened. But there was every disposition at Vienna to put an end to this long and cruel struggle, which had lasted five years, and in which torrents of blood had been spilt. The English party in the ministry had entirely lost its influence. Thugut was on the point of falling into disgrace. The people of Vienna loudly demanded peace; the Arch duke Charles himself, the hero of Austria, recommended it, and declared that the empire could no longer be saved by arms. The emperor inclined to this opinion. At length, a determination was taken; and Count de Meerfeld, and the Marquis de Gallo, ambassador of Naples at Vienna, were immediately despatched to Leoben. The latter was chosen through the influence of the empress, who was the daughter of the Queen of Naples, and who interfered much in public affairs. Their instructions were to sign preliminaries which should serve as a basis for afterwards negotiating a definitive peace. They arrived on the morning of the 24th of Germinal (April 13), at the moment when the truce had expired, and Bonaparte was preparing to attack the advanced posts. They declared that they had full powers to settle the basis of peace. A garden in the vicinity of Leoben was declared neutral ground, and the negotiations were carried on amidst the bivouacs of the French army. The young general, who had all at once become a negotiator, had not served a diplomatic apprenticeship; but for a year past he had had to treat of the most important affairs that can be discussed in this world. He had acquired a celebrity which made him the most distinguished character of his times, and the language he used was as striking. He formed, therefore, a glorious representative of the French republic. He had no commission to negotiate. It was Clarke who was invested with all the powers for that purpose, and Clarke, whom he had sent for, had not yet arrived at the head-quarters. But he might consider the preliminaries of peace as an armistice, and this was within the powers of generals; besides it was certain that Clarke would sign all that he desired to have done: he therefore entered immediately into negotiation. The chief concern of the emperor and of his envoys was for the settlement of etiquette. According to ancient custom, the emperor had the honour of precedence before the kings of France; he was always named first in the preamble of treaties; and his ambassadors had precedence of the French ambassadors. He was the only sovereign to whom this honour was conceded by France. The emperor's two envoys immediately consented to acknowledge the French republic, if the ancient etiquette were maintained. "The French republic," proudly replied Bonaparte, "has no need to be acknowledged; it is in Europe like the sun above the horizon: so much the worse for those blind wretches who can neither see nor profit by it."* He refused the article of acknowledgment. As for etiquette, he declared that such matters were quite indifferent to the republic; that they might settle that point with the Directory, which would probably not object to sacrifice such interests to real advantages; that for the moment, they would treat on a footing of equality; and that France and the emperor should by turns have the precedence.

They then proceeded to the consideration of the essential questions. The first and most important article was the cession of the Belgic provinces

* "This was gallantly spoken; but how strange to reflect, that the same individual, in three or four years afterwards, was able to place an extinguisher on this sun of the republic, without even an eclipse being the consequence!"—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E

to France. Austria could no longer entertain any intention of refusing them. It was first agreed that the emperor should cede to France all the Belgic provinces; that, moreover, he should consent, as a member of the Germanic empire, to the extension of the limits of France to the Rhine. The point was to find indemnities, and the emperor had required sufficient indemnities to be procured for him either in Germany or in Italy. There were two ways of procuring them for him in Germany, either by giving him Bavaria, or by secularizing several ecclesiastical states of the empire. The first plan had more than once engaged the attention of European diplomacy. The second originated with Rewbel, who had devised this expedient as the most convenient, and the most conformable with the spirit of the Revolution. In fact, it was no longer the time for bishops to be temporal sovereigns, and it was ingenious to make the ecclesiastical power pay for the aggrandizements which the French republic was to receive. But the aggrandizements of the emperor in Germany would scarcely have obtained the assent of Prussia. Besides, if Bavaria were given to him, it would be necessary to find indemnities for the prince to whom it belonged. Lastly, the states of Germany being under the immediate influence of the emperor, he would not gain much by acquiring them, and he far preferred aggrandizements in Italy, which would really add new territories to his power. It was therefore requisite to think of seeking indemnities in Italy.

Had the French general consented to the immediate restoration to the emperor of Lombardy which he had lost; had he engaged to maintain the republic of Venice in its present state, and not to bring democracy to the frontiers of the Alps; he would instantly have consented to the peace, and acknowledged the Cispadane republic, composed of the duchy of Modena, the two legations, and La Romagna. But to replace Lombardy under the yoke of Austria—Lombardy, which had shown such attachment to the French, which had made such efforts and such sacrifices for them, and whose principal inhabitants were so deeply compromised—would be an odious act and a weakness; for our situation allowed us to require more. It behoved us then to insure the independence of Lombardy, and to seek in Italy such indemnities as would compensate Austria for the twofold loss of Belgium and of Lombardy. There was a very simple arrangement which had more than once occurred to European diplomatists, which had more than once been a subject of hope to Austria and of fear to Venice; this was, to indemnify Austria with the Venetian states. The Illyrian provinces, Istria, and the whole of Upper Italy, from the Isonzo to the Oglio, formed rich possessions, and were capable of furnishing ample indemnities for Austria. The manner in which the Venetian aristocracy had conducted itself towards France, its constant refusals to ally itself with her, its secret armaments, the evident object of which was to fall upon the French in case of a reverse, the recent rising of the mountaineers and peasants, and the murder of Frenchmen, had filled Bonaparte with indignation. Besides, if the emperor, for whom Venice had secretly armed, accepted her spoils, Bonaparte, against whom she had set on foot those armaments, could not have any scruple to cede them. For the rest, there would yet be indemnities left to offer to Venice. There were Lombardy, the duchy of Modena, the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, and La Romagna, rich and extensive provinces, part of which formed the Cispadane republic. Venice might be indemnified with some of these provinces. This arrangement appeared the most suitable; and here was for the first time laid down the principle of

indemnifying Austria with the provinces of Venice on the *terra firma*, and compensating Venice with other Italian provinces.

The plan was referred to Vienna, from which the negotiators were scarcely twenty-five leagues distant. This kind of indemnity was accepted; the preliminaries of peace were immediately settled and formed into articles, which were to serve as the basis of a definitive negotiation. The emperor ceded to France all his possessions in the Netherlands, and consented, as a member of the Empire, that the republic should acquire the boundary of the Rhine. He renounced Lombardy also. As an indemnification for these sacrifices, he was to receive the Venetian territories on *terra firma*, Illyria, Istria, and Upper Italy as far as the Oglio. Venice was to remain independent, to retain the Ionian islands, and to receive compensations taken from the provinces at the disposal of France. The emperor acknowledged the republics which were about to be founded in Italy. The French army was to retire from the Austrian states, and to take up its quarters on the frontiers of those states; that is, it was to evacuate Carinthia and Carniola, and to place itself on the Isonzo and at the outlets of the Tyrol. All the arrangements relative to the Venetian provinces and government, were to be made in concert with Austria. Two congresses were to be opened, one at Berne for the separate peace with the emperor, the other in a city of Germany for the peace with the Empire. The peace with the emperor was to be concluded in three months, upon pain of nullity of the preliminaries.* Austria had another strong reason for hastening the conclusion of the definitive treaty, namely, that she might take possession as speedily as possible of the Venetian provinces, so that the French might not have time to propagate revolutionary ideas there.

Bonaparte's plan was to dismember the Cispadane republic, composed of the duchy of Modena, the two legations, and the Romagna; to unite the duchy of Modena with Lombardy, and to form with them a single republic, having Milan for its capital, and to be called the Cisalpine republic, from its situation with respect to the Alps. He then purposed giving the two legations and La Romagna to Venice, taking care to humble its aristocracy and to modify its constitution. Thus there would be in Italy two republics allied with France, owing their existence to her and disposed to concur in her plans. The Cisalpine would have for its frontier the Oglio, which it would be easy to intrench. It would not possess Mantua, which, with the Mantuan, would continue to belong to the emperor, but Pizzighitone on the Adda might be made a first-rate fortress; and the walls of Bergamo and Crema might be rebuilt. The republic of Venice with her islands, with the Dogado and the Polesino, which Bonaparte would strive to preserve for her, with the two legations and the Romagna, which were to be given to her with the province of Massa-Carrara, and the Gulf of Spezzia, which was to be annexed to her territory in the Mediterranean, would be a maritime power, bordering at once upon two seas.

* "On the 27th of April, the Marquis de Gallo presented the preliminaries, ratified by the emperor, to Napoleon at Gratz. It was in one of those conferences that one of the plenipotentiaries, authorized by an autograph letter of the emperor, offered Napoleon, to procure him, on the conclusion of a peace, a sovereignty of two hundred and fifty thousand souls in Germany, for himself and his family, in order to place him beyond the reach of republican ingratitude. The general smiled; he desired the plenipotentiary to thank the emperor for this proof of the interest he took in his welfare, and said that he wished for no greatness nor riches, unless conferred on him by the French people' — *Moniteur*. E.

It may be asked why Bonaparte did not avail himself of his position to exclude the Austrians entirely from Italy; why, above all, he indemnified them at the expense of a neutral power, and by an outrage similar to the partition of Poland. In the first place, was it possible entirely to emancipate Italy? Would it not have been requisite to convulse Europe once more, in order to make it consent to the overthrow of the Pope, of the King of Sardinia, of the Grand-duke of Tuscany, of the Bourbons of Naples, and of the Duke of Parma? Was the French republic capable of the efforts which such an enterprise would have demanded? Was it not achieving a great deal to have sown in this campaign the seeds of liberty, by constituting two republics, whence she could not fail soon to extend herself to the farthest extremity of the Peninsula? The partition of the Venetian states had no resemblance to that celebrated enormity with which Europe has so frequently been reproached. Poland was partitioned by the very powers which had urged her to rise, and which had promised her their assistance. Venice, to whom the French had sincerely offered their friendship, had refused it, and prepared to betray them, and to surprise them in a moment of danger. If she had reason to complain, it was of the Austrians, for whose benefit she intended to betray the French. Poland was a state whose limits were distinctly marked on the map of Europe, whose independence was in a manner commanded by Nature, and was of importance to the quiet of the West; whose constitution, though vicious, was generous; whose citizens, though unworthily betrayed, had exhibited a noble courage, and deserved the interest of civilized nations. Venice, on the contrary, had no natural territory but her lagoons, for her power had never resided in her possessions on the mainland; she was not destroyed because some of her provinces were exchanged for others; her constitution was the most unjust in Europe; her government was abhorred by her subjects; her perfidy and her cowardice gave her no claim to interest or to existence. Nothing, then, in the partition of the Venetian states could be compared with the partition of Poland, unless it were the conduct of Austria.

Besides, it was impossible to avoid giving such indemnities to the Austrians, without expelling them from Italy, and this could only be done by treating in Vienna itself. But for this the concurrence of the armies of the Rhine would have been requisite; and Bonaparte had received intimation that they could not take the field in less than a month. He would have had no alternative in this situation but to fall back, to await their taking the field; and this course would have been liable to many inconveniences, for it would have given time to the archduke to prepare a formidable army against him, and to Hungary to rise *en masse* and fall upon his flanks. Moreover, he would have been obliged to fall back, and almost to confess the rashness of his march. In accepting the preliminaries, he had the honour of extorting peace single-handed; he reaped the fruit of his very daring march; he obtained conditions which, in the situation of Europe, were extremely brilliant, and much more advantageous than those which had been specified for Clarke, since they stipulated for the line of the Rhine and the Alps, and for a republic in Italy. Thus, partly for political and military reasons, partly from personal considerations, he determined to sign the preliminaries. Clarke had not yet arrived at the headquarters. With his accustomed boldness and the assurance inspired by his glory, his name, and the general wish for peace, Bonaparte overstepped his powers, and signed the preliminaries, as though they had related to a mere

armistice. The signature was given at Leoben, on the 29th of Germinal, year V (April 18, 1797).

Had he known at the moment what was passing on the Rhine, he would not have been in such haste to sign the preliminaries of Leoben; but he knew no more than had been intimated to him, and it had been intimated to him, that the inaction would be long. He immediately sent off Massena to carry the preliminaries to Paris. This brave general was the only one whom he had not sent to carry colours, and to receive the honours of triumph. Bonaparte deemed this a fine opportunity for sending him, and one that was worthy of the important services which he had rendered. He also despatched couriers to the armies of the Rhine and of the Sambre and Meuse, who travelled through Germany, in order to arrive the sooner, and to put an end to all hostilities if they had commenced.

They had, in fact, begun at the very moment of the signature of the preliminaries. Hoche, long impatient to enter into action, was incessantly demanding permission to commence hostilities. Moreau had hastened to Paris, to solicit the funds necessary for the purchase of a bridge equipage. Orders were at length issued. Hoche, at the head of his fine army, debouched by Neuwied, while Championnet, with the right wing debouched by Düsseldorf, and marched upon Uckerath and Altenkirchen. Hoche attacked the Austrians at Heddersdorf, where they had thrown up considerable intrenchments, killed a great number of them, and took five thousand prisoners. After this brilliant action, he advanced rapidly upon Frankfort, always beating Kray, and striving to cut off his retreat. He was on the point of enveloping him by a skilful manœuvre, and perhaps of taking him, when Bonaparte's courier arrived, with the news of the signature of the preliminaries. This circumstance stopped Hoche amidst his victorious march, and caused him deep mortification, for he once more saw himself stopped short in his career. If the couriers had but been sent first to Paris, he should have had time to take Kray and his whole corps, which would have added a glorious exploit to his life, and had the greatest influence on the subsequent negotiations. While Hoche was advancing thus rapidly upon the Nidda, Desaix, who had been authorized by Moreau to cross the Rhine, attempted one of the boldest actions recorded in the history of the war. He had chosen a point much lower down than Strasburg for crossing the Rhine. After grounding, with his troops, upon an island of gravel, he had at length landed on the opposite bank. There he had remained for twenty-four hours, liable to be thrown into the Rhine, and obliged to struggle against the whole Austrian army, in order to maintain himself in copses and marshes, till a bridge should be thrown across the river. At length the passage was effected; the Austrians had been pursued into the Black Mountains, and part of their baggage taken. Here, also, the army was stopped amidst its success, by the courier from Leoben; and there was reason to regret that the false statements sent to Bonaparte should have induced him to sign so soon.

The couriers then went forward to Paris, where the news gave great joy to those who wished for peace, but not to the Directory, which, deeming our situation formidable, was disappointed to see that it had not been turned to a more profitable account. Lareveillère and Rewbel desired, as philosophers, the entire emancipation of Italy; Barras, like a fiery revolutionist, wished that the republic should humble the powers; Carnot, who, for some time past, affected moderation, who, in general, supported the

views of the opposition, approved of the peace, and asserted that, in order to obtain a durable peace, it was requisite that the emperor should not be humbled too much. Warm discussions on the subject of the preliminaries took place in the Directory; nevertheless, in order not to excite too much dissatisfaction in the public mind and not to appear to make everlasting war, it was decided that the bases fixed at Leoben should be approved of.

During these occurrences on the Rhine and in France, important events were breaking forth in Italy. We have seen that Bonaparte, apprized of the disturbances prevailing in the Venetian states, of the rising of the mountaineers against the towns, of the check of the Brescians before Salò, of the capture of the two hundred Poles, of the murder of a great number of Frenchmen, and of the imprisonment of all their partisans, had written at Leoben a furious letter to the senate of Venice. He had ordered Junot, his aide-de-camp, to read it himself to the senate, then to demand the liberation of all the prisoners, and the search after and the delivery to the French of the murderers; and he had instructed him to cause a declaration of war to be posted up and to quit Venice immediately, if complete satisfaction were not given. Junot was introduced to the senate on the 26th of Germinal (April 15). He read the threatening letter of his general, and he behaved with all the rudeness of a soldier, and of a victorious soldier.* He was assured that the armaments which had taken place had no other object than to maintain subordination in the territories of the republic; that, if murders had been committed, it was an involuntary misfortune which should be repaired. Junot would not be put off with empty words. He threatened to post up the declaration of war if the state prisoners and the Poles were not set at liberty, and if orders were not issued to disarm the mountaineers, and to search after the perpetrators of all the murders. However, the efforts made to pacify him at length succeeded, and it was settled with him, and the French minister, Lallemand, that the senate should write to General Bonaparte, and send two deputies to arrange with him as to the satisfaction upon which he meant to insist. The two deputies appointed were Francis Donat and Leopold Justiniani.

Meanwhile the agitation in the Venetian territories continued. The towns were still in hostility with the population of the country and of the mountains. The agents of the aristocratic and monkish party circulated the falsest reports relative to the state of the French army in Austria. They asserted that it was surrounded and destroyed, and they appealed to two facts as authorizing their false rumours. Bonaparte, in drawing to him the two corps of Joubert and Bernadotte, which he had ordered to march, the one through the Tyrol, the other through Carniola, had uncovered his wings. Joubert had beaten and driven Kerpen beyond the Alps; but he had left Laudohn in a part of the Tyrol, whence the latter had soon issued again, raising the whole loyal population of those mountains, and descending the Adige to march upon Verona. General Servier, left with twelve hundred men to guard the Tyrol, retired foot by foot upon Verona, to seek refuge with the French troops remaining in Upper Italy. At the same time, a corps of similar strength, left in Carniola, retired before the Croats, who had risen like the Tyrolese, and fell back upon Palma Nova. These were unimportant occurrences, and Lallemand, the French minister, strove

* "Junot, introduced into the senate, made the threats of his master ring in the astounded ears of the members, and, by the blunt and rough manner of a soldier who had risen from the ranks, added to the dismay of the trembling nobles."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E.

to demonstrate their insignificance to the government of Venice, in order to spare it fresh imprudences; but all these arguments were useless, and while Bonaparte was obliging the Austrian plenipotentiaries to come to his head-quarters to treat, it was reported in the territory of Venice that he was beaten, surrounded, and must inevitably perish in his mad expedition. The party hostile to the French and to the Revolution, at the head of which were several members of the Venetian government, though the government itself did not appear to belong to it, was in higher spirits than ever. At Verona, in particular, the agitation was most violent. This was the most important city in the Venetian states; it was the first exposed to the revolutionary contagion, for it stood next to Salò upon the line of the insurgent towns. The Venetians were anxious to save it, and to expel the French from it. To this attempt they were encouraged as well by the disposition of the inhabitants, as by the concourse of the mountaineers and the approach of General Laudohn. There were already in the city Italian and Slavonian troops in the service of Venice. More were sent, and very soon all the communications with the neighbouring towns were intercepted. General Balland, who commanded at Verona, found himself separated from the other commandants posted in the environs. More than twenty thousand mountaineers inundated the country. The French detachments were attacked on the roads; Capuchins preached to the populace in the streets, and a false manifesto of the podesta of Verona, was circulated, encouraging the people to slaughter the French.* The name of Bataglia, subscribed to this manifesto, was sufficient to prove it to be a forgery; nevertheless, it could not fail to contribute to inflame people's minds. At length a message was sent by the chiefs of the party in Verona to inform General Laudohn that he might approach, and that the place should be delivered up to him. It was on the 26th and 27th of Germinal (April 15 and 16), that all these circumstances occurred. No accounts had arrived from Leoben, and the moment actually appeared most seasonable for an explosion.

General Balland kept upon his guard. He had given his troops orders to retire into the forts on the first signal. He complained to the Venetian authorities of the treatment experienced by the French, and particularly of the preparations which he saw making; but he obtained only evasive replies, and no real satisfaction. He wrote to Mantua and to Milan, demanding succours, and was in readiness to shut himself up any moment in the

* "I arrived in the Venetian territory at the moment when the insurrection against the French was on the eve of breaking out. Thousands of peasants were instigated to rise, under the pretext of appeasing the troubles of Bergamo and Brescia. I passed through Verona on the 16th of April, the eve of the signature of the preliminaries of Leoben, and of the revolt of Verona. Easter Sunday was the day which the priests selected for preaching that it was lawful, and even meritorious, to kill Jacobins. 'Death to all Frenchmen!' was their rallying-cry. After stopping two hours at Verona, I proceeded on my journey, without being aware of the massacre which threatened that city. When about a league from the town, however, I was stopped by a party of insurgents on their way thither, consisting of about two thousand men. They only desired me to cry 'Long live St. Mark!' an order with which I speedily complied, and passed on. What would have become of me had I been in Verona on the Monday? On that terrible day the bells were rung while the French were butchered in the hospitals. Every one met in the streets was put to death. The priests headed the assassins. On the very day of the insurrection of Verona some Frenchmen were assassinated between that city and Vicenza, through which I had passed on the day before without danger; and scarcely had I passed through Padua, when I learned that others had been massacred there. Thus the assassinations travelled as rapidly as the post."—*Bourbonnais*. E.

forts. On the 28th of Germinal (April 17), which was Easter Monday, an extraordinary agitation took place in Verona; bands of peasants entered, shouting "Death to the Jacobins!" Balland withdrew his troops into the forts, left only detachments at the gates, and gave notice that on the first act of violence, he would fire upon the city. But about noon whistlings were heard in the streets: the people fell upon the French; armed bands attacked the detachments left to guard the gates, and butchered those who had not time to regain the forts. Ferocious murderers threw themselves upon the French who were detained by their functions in Verona, stabbed them with poniards, and threw them into the Adige. They did not even spare the hospitals, and imbrued their hands in the blood of part of the sick.* Meanwhile, those who could get away, but had not time to run to the forts, fled to the government-house, where the Venetian authorities afforded them an asylum, that the massacre might not appear to be their work. Already more than four hundred unfortunate persons had perished, and the French garrison shuddered with rage at seeing the French slaughtered, and their bodies floating at a distance upon the Adige. General Balland immediately issued orders to fire, and covered the city with balls. He had it in his power to reduce it to ashes. But if the mountaineers who had entered concerned themselves but little about this, the inhabitants and the Venetian magistrates resolved to parley in order to save their city. They sent a flag of truce to General Balland, to confer with him, and to prevent the disaster. General Balland consented to a parley, with a view to save the unhappy individuals who had taken refuge in the palace of the government, and upon whom the Veronese threatened to revenge all the damage done to the city. Among the number were women and children belonging to the officers of the civil administrations, and sick escaped from the hospitals; and it was of importance to extricate them from the danger. Balland insisted that they should be delivered up to him immediately, that the mountaineers and the Sclavonian regiments should be sent away, that the populace should be disarmed, and that some of the Venetian magistrates should be given him as hostages and guarantees for the submission of the city. The messengers desired that an officer might be sent to the palace of the government to treat. The brave *chef de brigade*, Beaupoil, had the courage to accept this mission. Passing through the waves of a furious populace, which would fain have torn him in pieces, he at length reached the Venetian authorities. The whole night was passed in vain discussions with the proveditore and the podesta, without coming to any arrangement. They would not disarm, they would not give hostages, they wanted guarantees against the vengeance that General Bonaparte would otherwise not fail to take on the rebellious city. But, during this parley, the agreement not to fire while the conference lasted, was not observed by the ferocious hordes which had taken possession of Verona: they exchanged a fire of musketry with the forts, and our troops made sorties. Next morning, the 29th of Germinal (April 18), Beaupoil returned to the forts, amidst the most imminent dangers, without obtaining any concession. News was brought that the Venetian magistrates, unable to govern the furious multitude, had withdrawn. The firing of musketry against the fort was renewed. General Balland then ordered his guns again to play, and kept up an incessant fire upon the city. It was in flames in several quarters.

* Napoleon, when mentioning this circumstance at St. Helena, said, "The fury of the people carried them so far, that they actually murdered four hundred who were lying sick in the hospitals."—E.

Some of the principal inhabitants assembled in the palace of the government, in order to assume the direction of the city in the absence of the authorities. A fresh parley took place; it was agreed that the firing should cease; but this convention was not better executed than the former by the insurgents, who never ceased firing upon the forts. The ferocious peasants who covered the country fell upon the garrison of the fort of La Chiusa, situated on the Adige, and slaughtered it. They treated in the same manner the French scattered in the villages around Verona.

But the moment of vengeance was at hand. Couriers had been despatched from all quarters to acquaint General Kilmaine with what had happened. Troops hastened up from all sides. Kilmaine ordered General Chabrand to march immediately with twelve hundred men; Laboz, commander of the Lombard legion, to advance with eight hundred; and Generals Victor and Baraguay-d'Hilliers to march with their divisions. While the troops were executing these movements, General Loudon received intelligence of the signature of the preliminaries, and halted upon the Adige. After a sanguinary battle, which General Chabrand had to fight with the Venetian troops, the city of Verona was surrounded on all sides; and then the furious wretches who had massacred the French passed from the most atrocious violence to the deepest despondency. They had never ceased parleying and firing from the 1st to the 5th of Floreal (April 20-25). The Venetian magistrates had made their appearance again; they still demanded guarantees against the vengeance which threatened them; twenty-four hours were given them to decide; again they withdrew. A provisional municipality supplied their place; and, on seeing the French troops masters of the city and ready to reduce it to ashes, it surrendered unconditionally. General Kilmaine did what he could to prevent pillage, but he could not save the Mont de Piété, which was partly plundered. He ordered some of the known leaders of the insurrection taken in arms to be shot; he imposed upon the city a contribution of eleven hundred thousand francs for the pay of the army, and sent out his cavalry upon all the roads to disarm the peasants and to cut in pieces such as should resist. He then exerted himself to restore order, and immediately despatched a report to the general-in-chief, awaiting his decision relative to the rebel city. Such were the massacres known by the name of *Veronese Easter*.*

During these occurrences at Verona, an act still more odious, if possible, was committed in Venice itself. An ordinance forbade armed vessels of the belligerent powers to enter the port of Lido. A lugger, commanded by Captain Laugier, belonging to the French flotilla in the Adriatic, chased by Austrian frigates, had taken shelter under the batteries of Lido and saluted them with nine guns. He was ordered to put off again, notwithstanding the danger from the weather, which was bad, and from the enemy's ships that were in pursuit of him. He was about to obey, when, without giving him time to get away, the batteries fired upon the unfortunate vessel, and riddled her without mercy. Captain Laugier, with a generous self-devotion, made his crew go below, and went himself upon deck, with a speaking trumpet, to repeat that he was retiring; but he fell dead upon the

* "These sanguinary proceedings sufficiently verify the old observation, that pusillanimity and cruelty are allied to each other, and that none are so truly humane as the brave and the free. They do not in the slightest degree palliate the treachery of the French or the rapacity of the Imperialists, but they go far to diminish the regret which otherwise would be felt at the success of unprincipled ambition, and the fall of the oldest republic of the Christian world."—*Alison*. E.

deck, with two of his crew. At the same moment the lugger was boarded by some Venetian boats, manned by Sclavonians, who rushed upon deck and murdered the crew, with the exception of two or three unfortunate men, who were carried to Venice. This deplorable event happened on the fourth of Floreal (April 23).

At this moment news arrived not only of the massacres at Verona, but of the capture of that city, and of the signature of the preliminaries. The government found itself completely compromised, and could no longer reckon upon the ruin of General Bonaparte, who, so far from being surrounded and beaten, was on the contrary victorious, and just dictated peace to Austria. It would now have to deal with that all-powerful general, whose alliance it had refused, and whose soldiers it had slaughtered. It was overwhelmed with consternation. That it had officially ordered either the massacres at Verona or the cruelties perpetrated at the port of Lido was by no means probable; and whoever supposes so must be ignorant of the course pursued by governments swayed by factions. Governments in this situation have no occasion to give orders for the execution of what they wish; they need only suffer the faction whose sentiments they participate to act. They give up their means to it, and do by it what they dare not do themselves. The insurgents of Verona had cannon; they were supported by Venetian regular regiments; Ottolini, podesta of Bergamo, had been supplied wholesale with all that was necessary for arming the peasants; thus, after furnishing the means, the government had only to suffer them to be employed; and thus it was that it conducted itself. In the first moment, however, it committed an imprudence in decreeing a reward to the commandant of the Lido, for having, as it said, enforced respect for the laws of Venice. It could not, therefore, hope to find excuses that would avail it with General Bonaparte. It sent fresh instructions to the two deputies, Donat and Justiniani, who were at first directed only to reply to the demands made by Junot on the 28th of Germinal (April 13). The occurrences at Verona and the Lido were not then known; but now the two deputies had a very different task to perform, and very different events to explain. They advanced amidst shouts of joy excited by the news of the peace, and they were soon aware that they alone had cause to be sad amidst these important events. They learned on the road that Bonaparte, to punish them for the refusal of his alliance, for their severity to his partisans, and for some murders committed singly upon Frenchmen, had ceded part of their territories to Austria. What would he do, when he should be acquainted with the atrocious circumstances which had since occurred!

Bonaparte was already returning from Leoben, and withdrawing his army, according to the tenor of the preliminaries, towards the Alps and the Isonzo. They found him at Gratz, and were introduced to him on the 5th of Floreal (April 25). At this moment he had heard only of the massacres at Verona, which had begun on the 28th of Germinal (April 17), and not of the affair of the Lido, which took place on the 4th of Floreal (April 23). They were furnished with a letter from a brother of the general's, in order that they might be the more graciously received. They accosted trembling that man "truly extraordinary," to use their own words, "for the vivacity of his imagination, the promptness of his understanding, and the invincible force of his sentiments." He received them with politeness, and, repressing his indignation, permitted them to explain themselves at great length. Then, breaking silence, he asked, "Are my

prisoners released? Are the murderers punished? Are the peasants disarmed? I want no empty words: my soldiers have been massacred; I must take signal vengeance." The two envoys reverted to the circumstances which had obliged them to provide against the insurrection, to the disorders inseparable from such events, to the difficulty of discovering the real murderers. "A government so well served by spies as yours," replied Bonaparte sharply, "ought to know the real instigators of those murders. I am aware, to be sure, that it is as despised as it is despicable, and that it cannot now disarm those whom it has armed. I will disarm them for it. I have made peace; I have eighty thousand men; I will break in pieces your leads. I will be a second Attila for Venice. I will have no inquisition, no golden book; those are institutions of the barbarous ages. Your government is superannuated; it must be demolished. When I was at Gorice, I offered M. Pezaro my alliance and rational advice. He rejected them. You were waiting for my return to cut off my retreat: well, here I am. I will treat no longer; I am determined to give law. If you have nothing else to say, I can only tell you that you may retire."

These words, angrily uttered, appalled the Venetian envoys. They solicited a second interview, but they could not draw any other expressions from the general, who persisted in his intentions, and whose evident determination it was to give law to Venice, and to destroy by force an aristocracy which he could not persuade by his counsels to amend itself. But they had soon additional cause for apprehension when they became acquainted with the particulars of the massacres at Verona, and especially with the atrocious cruelty committed in the port of the Lido. Not daring to call on Bonaparte, they ventured to write him a most submissive letter, offering him all the explanations that he could desire. "I cannot receive you," he replied, "covered all over with French blood. I will listen to you when you have delivered to me the three state inquisitors, the commandant of the Lido, and the officer who superintends the police of Venice." However, as they had received a last courier relative to the event at the Lido, he consented to see them, but refused to listen to any proposal, till they had delivered up to him the persons whom he demanded. The two Venetians, then seeking to use a power which their republic had frequently employed with effect, began to propose to him a reparation of a different kind. "No, no," replied the irritated general; "if you were to cover your beach with gold, all your treasures, all the treasures of Peru, could not pay for the blood of one of my soldiers."*

Bonaparte dismissed them. It was the 13th of Floreal (May 2). He immediately published a manifesto declaring war against Venice. The French constitution did not permit either the Directory or the generals to declare war, but it authorized them to repel hostilities already commenced. Bonaparte, supporting himself upon this authority and upon the events at Verona and at the Lido, declared that hostilities had commenced, gave notice to Lallemand, the minister, to quit Venice, caused the lion of St. Mark to be taken down in all the provinces of the *terra firma*, the towns to be municipalised, the overthrow of the Venetian government to be everywhere proclaimed, and, till the arrival of his troops, which were returning

* "The terrified deputies next ventured to touch with delicacy on the subject of pecuniary atonement. Napoleon's answer was worthy of a Roman. 'If you could proffer me,' he said, 'the treasures of Peru—if you could strew the whole district with gold, it could not atone for the French blood which has been so treacherously spilt.'"—*Dessu. E.*

from Austria, he ordered General Kilmaine to proceed with the divisions of Baraguay-d'Hilliers and Victor to the border of the lagoons. His determinations, as prompt as his anger, were instantly executed. In the twinkling of an eye, the ancient lion of St. Mark disappeared everywhere between the banks of the Isonzo and those of the Mincio, and was replaced by the tree of liberty. Troops advanced from all sides, and the French cannon roared on those shores which for so long a period had not heard an enemy's guns.

The ancient city of Venice, seated amidst her lagoons, could still present almost insuperable difficulties even to the general who had just humbled Austria. All her lagoons were armed. She had thirty-seven galleys, and one hundred and sixty-eight gun-boats, carrying seven hundred and fifty guns and eight thousand five hundred seamen and gunners. She had a garrison of three thousand five hundred Italians and eleven thousand Slavonians, provisions for eight months, fresh water for two, and the means of renewing these supplies. We were not masters of the sea: we had no gun-boats for crossing the arms which separate the lagoons; we should be obliged to advance, with sounding-line in hand, along those canals unknown to us, and under the fire of innumerable batteries. Brave and daring as were the conquerors of Italy, they might be stopped by such obstacles, and doomed to a siege of several months. And how many events might produce a delay of several months! Austria, having rested herself, might reject the preliminaries, enter the lists again, and give rise to fresh chances.

But if the military situation of Venice presented resources, her internal state did not allow an energetic use to be made of them. Like all superannuated bodies, this aristocracy was divided. It had neither the same interests nor the same passions. The high aristocracy, possessing the public offices and honours, and having great wealth at its disposal, had less ignorance and fewer prejudices and passions than the inferior nobility; it had, above all, the ambition of power. The mass of the nobility, excluded from public employments, living upon succour, ignorant and furious, was full of genuine aristocratic prejudices. In conjunction with the priests, it excited the people, who belonged to it, as is the case in all states in which the middle class is not yet sufficiently powerful to draw them to it. These people, composed of seamen and artisans, coarse, superstitious, and half savage, were ready to indulge in any excesses. The middling class, composed of merchants, tradesmen, lawyers, physicians, &c., wished, as everywhere else, for the establishment of civil equality, rejoiced at the approach of the French, but durst not manifest its joy, for fear of a populace which might be urged to the greatest excesses before a revolution was effected. Lastly, to all these discordant elements was added another not less dangerous. The Venetian government was served by Slavonians. This barbarous soldiery, foreign to the people of Venice, and frequently in hostility with them, only awaited an occasion to gratify its longing for plunder, without intending to serve any party.

Such was the internal situation of Venice. That worn-out body was ready to fall to pieces. The great, in possession of the government, were struck with certain considerations. Though it might have been possible to resist an attack, they were afraid of a conflict with such a warrior as Bonaparte. They dreaded the horrors of a siege, the fury with which the two irritated parties would not fail to be inflamed, the excesses in which the Slavonian soldiery might indulge, the dangers to which Venice, with

her maritime and commercial establishments, would be exposed: they were above all, apprehensive lest their possessions, all situated on the *terra firma* should be sequestered by Bonaparte and threatened with confiscation. They even had fears on account of the pensions upon which the inferior nobility lived, and which would be lost if, pushing the conflict to extremity, they exposed themselves to a revolution. They conceived that by negotiating, they might save the ancient institutions of Venice by means of modifications; retain the power which is always assured to those who are accustomed to wield it; save their estates and the pensions of the petty nobility; and spare the city of Venice the horrors of sack and pillage. These men, consequently, who had neither the energy of their ancestors nor the passions of the mass of the nobility, thought of treating.* The principal members of the government assembled at the doge's. These were the six councillors of the doge, the three presidents of criminal guarantee, the three chiefs of the council of ten, and the three avogadors. This meeting, an extraordinary one, and even contrary to established usage, had for its aim to provide for the preservation of Venice. Consternation pervaded it. The doge, enfeebled by age, had his eyes full of tears. He said that they were not sure of sleeping the next night quietly in their beds. Each suggested different measures. One member proposed to employ Haller, the banker, to soften Bonaparte. This proposition was deemed ridiculous and useless. Besides, Quirini, the ambassador, had orders to do whatever could be done in Paris, and even to buy votes in the Directory, if possible.† Others proposed that they should defend themselves. This scheme was thought imprudent, and worthy of young and silly heads. At length it was decided to propose to the great council a modification of the constitution, in order to appease Bonaparte by that course. The great council, composed in general of all the nobility, and representing the Venetian nation, was convoked. Six hundred and nineteen members, that is, rather more than half, were present. The proposition was made amidst a dead silence. This question had already been discussed in consequence of a communication from Lallemand, the minister, to the senate, and it had been voted to defer the modifications till other times. But on this occasion it was obvious that it was no longer possible to have recourse to dilatory means. The doge's proposition was adopted by five hundred and ninety-eight votes. It purported that two commissioners, to be sent by the senate, should be authorized to negotiate with General Bonaparte, and even to treat of objects within the competence of the great council, that is, of constitutional objects, subject to ratification.

The two commissioners set out immediately, and found Bonaparte on the border of the lagoons, at the bridge of Marghera. He was disposing his troops, and the French artillerymen were already exchanging balls with the Venetian gun-boats. The two commissioners delivered to him the resolution of the great council. For a moment he appeared struck with that determination; then, resuming a sharp tone, he said to them, "And are the three state inquisitors and the commandant of the Lido in confine-

* "Nothing would have been more easy than to defend the lagoons against an enemy who, notwithstanding Napoleon's bravado, had not even a single boat. But the proposal, had it been made to an abbess and a convent of nuns, could scarce have appeared more extraordinary, than it did to these degenerate nobles."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E.

† "Two hundred thousand crowns, as a private bribe, were placed at the disposal of Barras."—*Hardenberg*. E.

ment? I must have their heads. No treaty till French blood has been avenged. Your lagoons shall not deter me. I find them just what I expected. In a fortnight I shall be in Venice. Your nobles shall not escape death except by going like the French emigrants and dragging their misery all over the world." The two commissioners did their utmost to gain a delay of a few days, in order to obtain the consent of the council to the satisfaction which he demanded. He would not grant more than twenty-four hours. He nevertheless consented to grant a suspension of arms for six days, to give the Venetian commissioners time to rejoin him at Mantua, with the adhesion of the great council to all the conditions which he imposed.

Bonaparte, satisfied with having struck terror into the Venetians, had no intention of coming to real hostilities, because he was aware of the difficulty of carrying the lagoons, and he foresaw the interference of Austria. If he entered by force, complaints of the violation of the preliminaries would be made at Vienna; and in any case it would suit him better to induce them to submit. Satisfied with having frightened them, he set out for Mantua and Milan, not doubting that they would soon follow to make their full and entire submission.

The assembly of all the members of the government, already formed at the doge's, met afresh to receive the report of the commissioners. There were no longer any means of resisting the demands of the general; they were obliged to consent to them all, for the danger daily became more imminent. It was said that the citizens were conspiring and intended to murder the nobility; and that the Sclavonians would avail themselves of the occasion to pillage the city. It was agreed to submit a new proposition to the great council, tending to accede to all that General Bonaparte demanded. On the 13th of Floreal (May 4), the grand council was again assembled. By a majority of seven hundred and four voices to ten, it decided that the commissioners should be authorized to treat on all the conditions with General Bonaparte, and that proceedings should be immediately commenced against the three state inquisitors and the commandant of the Lido.

The commissioners, furnished with new powers, followed Bonaparte to Milan, to lay the proud constitution of Venice at his feet. But six days were not sufficient, and the truce had nearly expired before they could come to an arrangement with the general. During this interval the consternation kept increasing in Venice. At one moment, the terror was so great, that the commandant of the lagoons was authorized to capitulate to the French generals invested with the command in the absence of Bonaparte. The government merely recommended to him the independence of the republic, religion, the safety of persons and of the foreign ambassadors, public and private property, the mint, the bank, the arsenal, and the archives. A prolongation of the truce was, however, obtained from the French generals, in order to allow the Venetian envoys time to negotiate with Bonaparte.

The arrest of the three state inquisitors had disorganized the police of Venice. The most influential persons of the *bourgeoisie* bestirred themselves and openly manifested an intention of acting, for the purpose of hastening the fall of the aristocracy. They surrounded Villetard, the French chargé d'affaires, who had remained at Venice after the departure of Lallemand, the minister, and who was an ardent patriot. They sought and hoped to find in him a supporter of their projects. At the same time the Sclavonians were in a state of insubordination, which afforded reason to

apprehend the most horrible excesses. They had had quarrels with the people of Venice, and the *bourgeoisie* seemed even to excite these quarrels, which produced division among the forces of the aristocratic party. On the 20th of Floreal (May 9), terror had reached its height. Spada and Zorzi, two very influential members of the revolutionary party, entered into communication with some of the members of the extraordinary meeting formed at the doge's. They insinuated that they ought to address themselves to the French chargé d'affaires, and to arrange with him the means of preserving Venice from the calamities which threatened her. Donat and Bataglia, two patricians, whom we have already seen prominent during these troubles, addressed themselves to Villetard on the 9th of May. They asked him what would be, in the present danger, the most likely mode of saving Venice. He replied that he had no authority whatever from the general-in-chief to treat, but that, if they wished to have his private opinion, he should advise the following measures: The embarking and sending away of the Sclavonians; the institution of a civic guard; the introduction of four thousand French into Venice, and the occupation by them of all the fortified points; the abolition of the ancient government, and the formation in its stead of a municipality of thirty-six members, chosen from among all classes, and having the existing doge for mayor; and the liberation of all prisoners confined on account of their opinions. Villetard added, that on these terms Bonaparte would, no doubt, pardon the three state inquisitors and the commandant of the Lido.

These propositions were submitted to the council assembled at the doge's. They were extremely severe, since they involved a complete revolution in Venice. But the heads of the government dreaded a revolution steeped in blood by the projects of the reforming party, by the popular fury, and by the cupidity of the Sclavonians. Two of them made a vehement resistance. Pezaro said that it would be better to retire to Switzerland, than consummate with their own hands the ruin of the ancient government of Venice. The opposition, however, was overcome, and it was resolved that the propositions should be laid before the great council. This was summoned to meet on the 23d of Floreal (May 12). Meanwhile, the arrears of pay due to the Sclavonians were discharged, and they were embarked to be sent back to Dalmatia. A contrary wind, however, prevented them from leaving the harbour, and their presence in the waters of Venice only served to keep up the prevailing agitation and terror.

On the 23d of Floreal (May 12), the great council was solemnly assembled for the purpose of voting the abolition of this ancient aristocracy. An immense concourse of people was collected. On the one hand was perceived the *bourgeoisie* exulting to see at last the power of its masters overthrown, and, on the other, the populace, excited by the nobility, ready to fall upon those whom it considered as the instigators of this revolution. The doge addressed the assembly with tears, and proposed to it to abdicate the sovereignty. They were about to deliberate, when reports of musketry were heard. The nobility conceived themselves threatened with a massacre. "To the vote! to the vote!" was shouted on all sides. Five hundred and twelve voices voted the abolition of the old government. According to the statutes, there should have been six hundred. There were twelve opposition votes and five null. The great council gave up the sovereignty to the entire Venetian nation; it voted the institution of a municipality and the establishment of a provisional government, composed of deputies of all the Venetian states; it consolidated the public debt and

the pensions granted to the poor nobles, and decreed the admission of French troops into Venice. No sooner were these resolutions adopted, than a flag was hoisted from a window of the palace. At this sight, the *bourgeoisie* was filled with joy, but the enraged populace, carrying along with them the image of St. Mark, paraded the streets of Venice, and attacked the houses of the inhabitants accused of having wrung this determination from the Venetian nobility.* The houses of Spada and Zorzi were broken open and plundered: the uproar was at its height, and a terrible convulsion was apprehended. Meanwhile, a certain number of the inhabitants interested in the public tranquillity assembled, placed at their head an old Maltese general, named Salembeni, who had been long persecuted by the state inquisition, and rushed upon the rioters. After a combat on the bridge of the Rialto, they dispersed them, and restored order and tranquillity.

The Sclavonians were at length embarked and sent home, after committing great excesses in the villages of Lido and Malamocco. The new municipality was instituted; and on the 27th of Floreal (May 16) the flotilla went to fetch a division of four thousand French, which quietly established itself in Venice.†

During these occurrences in Venice, Bonaparte was signing in Milan, and on the same day, with the Venetian plenipotentiaries, a treaty conformable in every respect with the revolution which had just taken place. It stipulated the abdication of the aristocracy, the institution of a provisional government, the introduction of a French division upon the plea of protection, and the punishment of the three state inquisitors and of the commandant of the Lido. Secret articles stipulated, moreover, exchanges of territory, a contribution of three millions in money, and three millions in naval stores, and the delivery to France of three sail of the line and two frigates. This treaty was to have been ratified by the government of Venice; but this ratification was rendered impossible, since the abdication had already taken place, and it would have been useless, because all the articles of the treaty were already executed. The provisional municipality, nevertheless, thought it right to ratify the treaty.

Bonaparte had thus gained his end, without compromising himself with Austria, without engaging in the arduous undertaking of a siege. He had

* "Yielding to the tempest which they could not withstand, the Venetian oligarchy assembled in mournful silence on the 12th of May, and, after passing in review the exhausted resources and distracted state of the republic, voted, amidst the tears of all friends to their country, by a majority of five hundred and twelve to fourteen voices, the abdication of their authority. Shouts from the giddy multitude rent the sky; the tree of liberty was hoisted on the place of St. Mark; the democrats entered, amidst bloodshed and plunder, upon the exercise of their new-born sovereignty; and the revolutionary party fondly imagined they were launched into a boundless career of glory. But the real patriots, the men of sense and firmness, lamented the decision of the senate, and, retiring in silence to their homes, exclaimed, 'Venice is no more—St. Mark has fallen!' No sooner was the mournful act communicated to the people, than they flocked together from all quarters, and with loud cries demanded the restoration of the standard of St. Mark, and arms to combat for the independence of their country. The cannon of the republicans dispersed the frantic assemblages; and, amidst the shouts of the insane revolutionists, the French troops were conducted by Venetian boats to the place of St. Mark, where a foreign standard had not been seen for fifteen hundred years, but where the colours of independence were never again destined to wave."—*Alison*. E.

† "The French troops entered Venice on the 16th of May. The partisans of liberty immediately met in a popular assembly. The aristocracy was destroyed for ever; the democratic constitution of twelve hundred was proclaimed. Dandolo was placed at the head of the city. The Lion of St. Mark and the Corinthian horses were carried to Paris."—*Montholon*. E.

overthrown the absurd aristocracy which had betrayed him; he had placed Venice in the same situation as Lombardy, the Modenese, the Bolognese and the Ferrarese; he could now, without any embarrassment, make such arrangements of territory as he should think fit. In ceding to the emperor the whole of the *terra firma* extending from the Isonzo to the Oglio, he had the means of indemnifying Venice, by giving to it Bologna, Ferrara, and the Romagna, which at this time formed part of the Cispadane republic. Giving these provinces to revolutionized Venice was not placing them again under the yoke. There would then be left the duchy of Modena and Lombardy, with which it would be easy to compose a second republic, allied with the first. A still better thing might be done, that is, if it were possible to put an end to local rivalries, namely, to unite all the provinces emancipated by the French arms, and to form with Lombardy, the Modenese, the Bolognese, the Ferrarese, the Romagna, the Polesina, Venice, and the Greek islands, a powerful republic, which should bear sway both on the continent and in the seas of Italy.

The secret articles relative to the three millions in naval stores, and to the three ships of the line and two frigates, furnished the means of laying hands on the whole Venetian navy. The comprehensive mind of Bonaparte, whose foresight embraced all objects at once, would not have that happen to us with the Venetians which had before happened to us with the Dutch, namely, that the naval officers or the governors of the islands, dissatisfied with the revolution, should deliver up to the English the ships and islands under their command. He laid particular stress upon the important Greek islands belonging to Venice, Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia, Santa Maura, and Cerigo. He immediately ordered them to be occupied. He wrote to Toulon, desiring that a certain number of seamen might be sent to him by land, promising to pay their expenses and to equip them on their arrival in Venice. He solicited the Directory to order Admiral Brueys* to sail immediately with six ships in order to collect the whole of the Venetian navy, and to proceed with it to take possession of the Greek islands. He sent of his own accord two millions to Toulon, that the commissioner of the navy there might not be stopped by want of funds. In this particular he went beyond the regulations of the treasury, in order to avoid delay. Meanwhile, fearing lest Brueys should arrive too late, he united the little flotilla which he had in the Adriatic with the ships found at Venice, intermixed the Venetian crews with the French crews, put on board two thousand troops, and despatched them immediately to take possession of the islands. He would thus secure the most important posts in the Levant and the Adriatic, and take a position which, becoming daily more imposing, could not fail to have a powerful influence on the definitive negotiations of Austria.

The revolution was daily making fresh progress, since the signature of preliminaries of Leoben had fixed the fate of Italy, and insured the influence of France. It was now certain that the greater part of Upper Italy would be constituted into a democratic republic. It was an alluring example, which agitated Piedmont, the duchy of Parma, Tuscany, and the states of the Pope. The French general excited none, but seemed ready to welcome those who should throw themselves into his arms. At Genoa, the public mind was violently incensed against the aristocracy, less absurd

* This was the same admiral who was afterwards so signally defeated by Nelson at the memorable battle of the Nile. E.

and less enfeebled than that of Venice, but, if possible, more obstinate. France, as we have seen, had treated with her for the purpose of securing her rear, and had limited her demand to two millions for indemnities, two millions for pay, and the recall of the families exiled for their attachment to France. But the patriot party kept within no bounds, as soon as Bonaparte had imposed peace upon Austria. It met at the house of one Morandi, and had there formed an extremely violent club. A petition was drawn up and presented to the doge, demanding modifications in the constitution. The doge obtained the appointment of a commission for the purpose of examining this proposition. Meanwhile, the agitation went on. The citizens of Genoa and the hotheaded young men concerted together, and held themselves in readiness to take up arms. The nobles, on their part, aided by the priests, excited the populace, and armed the porters and the charcoal-burners. The minister of France, a mild and moderate man, rather restrained than excited the patriot party. But, on the 22d of May, when the occurrences at Venice became known, the *Morandists*, as they were called, appeared in arms, and endeavoured to make themselves masters of the principal posts of the city. A most violent conflict ensued. The patriots, opposed by the whole of the populace, were beaten, and a cruel revenge was wreaked upon them. The victorious rabble committed great excesses, and did not spare the French families, many of whom were maltreated. If the minister of France remained unmolested, it was only because the doge had taken care to send him a guard. When Bonaparte heard of these events, he saw that he could no longer delay interfering. He despatched Lavalette,* his aide-de-camp, to claim the French who

* "Marie Chamans, Count de Lavalette, was born in the year 1769, of obscure parents. He was destined for the clerical profession, and wore the habit of an abbé for some time, but afterwards took to the law. The Revolution gave a new direction to his ambition. He became an officer in the national guards, and afterwards served in the armies of the Rhine and of Italy. Bonaparte made him his aide-de-camp, intrusted him with his secret correspondence, and gave him in marriage Josephine's niece. On the establishment of the Consulate, Lavalette was made count and commander of the Legion of Honour. In 1815, when Louis fled from the Tuileries, he assumed the direction of the post-office, and used his utmost efforts to accelerate the progress of Napoleon. In consequence, on the second restoration, he was condemned to death as an accomplice of the Emperor. He contrived, however, to escape from prison in the disguise of his own wife, and was assisted in his endeavours to quit France by Messrs. Bruce and Hutchinson and Sir Robert Wilson. After some years of exile he was pardoned, and returned to his native country in 1821."—*Encyclopedia Americana*. E.

"Lavalette was no bad representation of Bacchus. A lady might have been proud of his pretty little white hand, and red, well-turned nails. His two little eyes and immoderately little nose, placed in the midst of a very fat pair of cheeks, gave to his countenance a truly comic expression, in aid of which came the extraordinary arrangement of his head. Not the locks only, but the individual hairs might be counted; and they received distinguishing names from the wits of the staff—as the invincible, the redoubtable, the courageous; and one, in particular, which defied the discipline of the comb or the hand, and pertinaciously stood upright, was called the indomitable. But notwithstanding this personal appearance, and an address almost burlesque, Lavalette knew how to enforce respect. He had sense and wit; had seen much and retained much; and related anecdotes with remarkable grace, resulting from a cast of ideas at once quiet, brilliant, and acute. He was a good father, a good husband, and a faithful friend. He married, a few days before his departure for Egypt, Emile de Beauharnois, daughter of Madame Bonaparte's brother-in-law. This young lady was of extreme beauty, gentle, and well-educated. Her husband, however, had not reached Egypt before she took the small-pox, and lost her beauty. She was in despair; and though by degrees the traces of the malady subsided, she could not reconcile herself to the change of which she felt conscious her husband, on his return, must be sensible. The delicacy of his conduct, however, never gave her reason to suppose that his attachment was diminished; but her profound melancholy and weariness of life showed that she could not overcome her own apprehensions."—*Duchess d'Abrantes*. E.

were confined, to demand reparations in their behalf, and, above all, to insist on the apprehension of the three state inquisitors accused of having put arms into the hands of the populace. The patriot party, supported by this powerful influence, rallied, regained the ascendancy, and obliged the Genoese aristocracy to abdicate, as that of Venice had done. A provisional government was installed, and a commission sent to Bonaparte, to confer with him on the subject of the constitution that it was expedient to give to the republic of Genoa.

Thus, after having in two months enforced the submission of the Pope, crossed the Julian Alps, imposed peace upon Austria, recrossed the Alps, and punished Venice, Bonaparte was in Milan, exercising supreme authority over all Italy, awaiting, without hastening, the march of the revolution, setting hands to work upon the constitution of the emancipated provinces, creating a navy in the Adriatic, and rendering his situation more and more imposing for Austria. The preliminaries of Leoben had been approved in Paris and in Vienna: the exchange of the ratifications had taken place between Bonaparte and M. de Gallo, and the immediate opening of the conferences for a definitive peace was expected. Bonaparte in Milan, a mere general of the republic, possessed greater influence than all the potentates in Europe. Couriers incessantly going and coming, indicated that the destinies of the world were there to be decided. The enthusiastic Italians waited for whole hours to see the general come forth from the Serbelloni palace. Young and beautiful women surrounded Madame Bonaparte, and composed a brilliant court for her. Then commenced that extraordinary existence which has since dazzled and swayed the world.

THE DIRECTORY.

EMBARRASSING SITUATION OF ENGLAND; FRESH PROPOSALS FOR PEACE; CONFERENCES AT LILLE—ELECTIONS OF THE YEAR V—STRUGGLE OF THE COUNCILS WITH THE DIRECTORY—PLOT OF THE ROYALIST FACTION—STROKE OF POLICY OF THE EIGHTEENTH OF FRUCTIDOR.

THE conduct of Bonaparte in regard to Venice was bold. It had nevertheless not exceeded the limit of the laws. He had grounded the manifesto of Palma Nova upon the necessity of repelling hostilities already commenced; and, before the hostilities had changed into a declared war, he had concluded a treaty, which rendered it unnecessary for the Directory to submit the declaration of war to the two Councils. Thus the republic of Venice had been attacked, destroyed, and erased from the list of European powers, without the general's having scarcely consulted the Directory, or the Directory the Councils. Nothing was left to be done but to announce the treaty. Genoa had, in like manner, been revolutionized, apparently without the government having been consulted; and all these facts, which were attributed to General Bonaparte in a much greater degree than they really belonged to him, produced an extraordinary idea of the authority which he assumed in Italy, and of the power which he arrogated to himself. The Directory was sensible, in fact, that General Bonaparte had evaded a great many questions; yet it could not reproach him with having materially exceeded his powers. It was obliged to acknowledge the utility and the seasonableness of all his operations; and it durst not disapprove the conduct of a victorious general, and of one possessing such great authority over the public mind. M. Querini, the Venetian ambassador in Paris, had employed all possible means with the Directory to gain votes in favour of his country. He made use of a Dalmatian, a cunning intriguer, who was acquainted with Barras, to gain over that director. It appears that the sum of six hundred thousand francs in bills was given, on condition of defending Venice in the Directory. But Bonaparte, informed of the intrigue, denounced it. Venice was not saved, and payment of the bills was refused. These facts, known to the Directory, occasioned explanations and even the commencement of proceedings; but in the end the affair was hushed up. The conduct of Bonaparte in Italy was approved of, and the first days which followed the tidings of the preliminaries of Leoben were devoted to unbounded joy. The enemies of the Revolution and of the Directory, who had so loudly called for peace, that they might have a pretext for accusing the government, were extremely mortified at bottom to see the preliminaries signed. The republicans were transported with joy. They could have wished, it is true, the entire emancipation of Italy; but they were delighted to see the republic recognized, and in some measure

sanctioned, by the emperor. The great mass of the population was glad to see an end put to the horrors of war, and occasion to hope for a reduction of the public burdens. The sitting at which the Councils received the notification of the preliminaries was a scene of enthusiasm. It was declared that the armies of Italy, of the Rhine, and of the Sambre and Meuse, had deserved well of the country and of mankind, in conquering peace by their victories. All the parties lavished expressions of the warmest enthusiasm on Bonaparte, and it was proposed to give him the surname of *Italicus*, as in Rome that of *Africanus* had been conferred on Scipio.

Austria conquered, the whole continent was at peace with France. England alone was left for her to contend with. England, reduced herself, was in a really perilous situation. Hoche, stopped short at Frankfort amidst the most glorious triumphs, was impatient to open for himself a new career. His attention was still directed to Ireland, and he had by no means relinquished his plan of the preceding year. He had nearly eighty thousand men between the Rhine and the Nidda; he had left about forty thousand in the environs of Brest; the squadron equipped in that port was quite ready to sail. A Spanish fleet collected at Cadiz was only waiting for a gale of wind to oblige the English admiral, Jervis,* to quit his station off that port, to sail from it, and proceed to the Channel to combine its efforts with that of the French navy. The Dutch had, at length, succeeded in assembling a squadron and reorganizing part of their army. Hoche had therefore at his disposal immense means for exciting Ireland to insurrection. He proposed to detach twenty thousand men from the army of the Sambre and Meuse, and to march them off for Brest, to be embarked afresh. He had selected his best troops for this important operation, the object of all his thoughts. He proceeded himself to Holland under the strictest incognito, having given out that he was going to pass a few days with his family. There he superintended with his own eyes all the preparations. Seventeen thousand Dutch, excellent troops, were embarked, and the squadron only waited for the signal to sail, and join the expedition prepared at Brest. These forces, when united with those expected from Spain, would evidently threaten England with incalculable dangers.

Pitt was in the greatest consternation. The defection of Austria, the preparations making in the Texel, the squadron collected in Cadiz, from which the blockading fleet might be blown by a gale—all these circumstances were alarming. Spain and France were uniting their efforts to force Portugal to make peace, and the defection of this ancient ally too was to be apprehended. These events had seriously affected credit, and produced a crisis long foreseen and frequently predicted. The government still had recourse to the Bank, and had obtained from it enormous advances, either by making it purchase stock or discount exchequer-bills. It was only by a profuse issue of notes that the Bank was enabled to furnish these advances. The public being alarmed, and a report being circulated that the Bank had lent considerable sums to the government, every one hastened to turn his notes into specie. Thus, in the month of March, at the moment when Bonaparte was advancing towards Vienna, the Bank was obliged to apply for authority to suspend its payments. This application was complied with, and it was released from an obligation which it was incapable

* Admiral Sir John Jervis, afterwards created Earl St. Vincent, in honour of his celebrated naval victory of that name, died a few years since, at an advanced age E.

of executing.* But its credit and its existence were not saved, for all that. A statement of its securities and liabilities was immediately published. The former amounted to 17,597,280*l.*; the latter to 13,770,390*l.*; so that its securities exceeded its liabilities by 3,826,890*l.* But it was not said how much of the former consisted of government securities. So much as consisted in bullion or bills of exchange was safe enough; but stocks and exchequer-bills, which constituted the greater part of the securities, had lost their credit with the policy of the government. Its notes fell immediately more than 15 per cent. The bankers, in their turn, solicited the faculty of paying in notes, otherwise they should be obliged to suspend their payments. It was natural that the same favour should be granted to them as to the Bank; nay, it was no more than just that it should, for it was the refusal of the Bank to fulfil its engagements in cash which rendered it impossible for them to discharge theirs in that manner. But from that moment the forced currency of money would be given to notes. To obviate this inconvenience, the principal merchants and traders in London met and exhibited a remarkable proof of public spirit and intelligence. Aware that the refusal to take bank-notes in payment would produce an inevitable catastrophe, in which all fortunes would suffer alike, they resolved to prevent it, and unanimously agreed to receive notes in payment. England struck, on this occasion, into the track of paper-money. It is true that this paper-money, instead of being forced, was voluntary; but it had only the solidity of paper, and was eminently dependent on the political conduct of the cabinet. To render it fitter for the purpose of money, it was divided into small sums. The Bank, whose smallest notes had been for 5*l.*, was authorized to issue notes for 1*l.* and 2*l.* This was one way of rendering them serviceable for the payment of the labouring classes.

Though the good spirit of English commerce had rendered this catastrophe less mischievous than it might have been, yet the situation was not less perilous; and, that it might not become disastrous, it was requisite to disarm France and to prevent the Spanish, French, and Dutch squadrons from uniting to kindle a conflagration in Ireland. The royal family was still as hostile as ever to the Revolution and to peace; but Pitt, who had no other view than the interest of England, considered a respite as indispensably necessary at the moment. Whether the peace should be definitive or not, a temporary repose was requisite. Perfectly agreeing on this point with Lord Grenville, he induced the cabinet to set on foot a *bonâ fide* negotiation, which should afford two or three years' relaxation to the overstrained springs of the British power. To dispute the possession of the Netherlands, now ceded by Austria, was wholly out of the question.

* "The aspect of public affairs in Britain had never been so clouded since the commencement of the war, nor, indeed, during the whole of the nineteenth century, as it was at the opening of the year 1797. Party spirit raged with uncommon violence in every part of the empire. Insurrections prevailed in many districts of Ireland; commercial embarrassments were rapidly increasing; and the continued pressure on the Bank threatened a total dissolution of public credit. The pressure arising from all these causes, together with the great drains upon the specie of the country which the extensive loans to the Imperial government had occasioned, was brought to a crisis in the close of 1796, by the run upon the country banks. The bankers, as the only means of averting bankruptcy, applied from all quarters to the Bank of England; the panic speedily reached the metropolis; and such was the run upon that establishment, that they were reduced to payment in sixpences; and were on the verge of insolvency, when an order in council was interposed for their relief, suspending all payments in cash, until the sense of parliament could be taken on the best means of restoring the circulation."—*Alison*. E.

The colonies were all that could now be a subject of dispute; and consequently there were both means and hopes of coming to an arrangement. Not only the situation of affairs indicated the intention of treating, but the choice of the negotiator proved it also. Lord Malmesbury was again appointed; and, at his age, a man would not have been employed twice successively in a vain representation. Lord Malmesbury, celebrated for his long diplomatic career, and for his dexterity as a negotiator, was weary of business, but wished to retire from it, after a brilliant and successful negotiation. None could be more brilliant than a pacification with France after so obstinate a struggle; and, if he had not been certain that his cabinet was desirous of peace, he would not have consented to play a parade part, which would become ridiculous by the repetition. He had, in fact, received secret instructions, which left him no doubt. The English cabinet applied for passports for its negotiator; and by common consent the place for the conferences was fixed not in Paris but at Lille. The Directory preferred receiving the English minister in a provincial town, because it was less afraid of his intrigues there. The English minister, on his part, had no wish to be brought face to face with a government whose forms had some rudeness, and was better pleased to treat through the medium of its negotiators. Lille was therefore selected, and a formal legation was prepared on both sides. Hoche was, nevertheless, to continue his preparations with vigour, in order to give more authority to the French negotiators.

Thus France, victorious on all sides, was in negotiation with the two great European powers, and appeared to be on the eve of a general peace. Events so auspicious and so brilliant should have left room for joy only in all hearts; but the elections for the year V had just given a dangerous strength to the opposition. We have seen how busy the adversaries of the Directory were at the approach of the elections. The royalist faction had considerably influenced their result. It had lost three of its principal agents by the apprehension of Brottier, Laville-Heurnois, and Duverne de Presle; but that did it little harm, for, so great was the confusion which prevailed in it, that it could scarcely be increased by the loss of its leaders. There still existed two associations, one of men devoted to and capable of taking up arms; the other of doubtful men, fit only to vote at elections. The Lyons agency was yet intact. Pichegru, conspiring apart, was still corresponding with Wickham, the English minister, and the Prince of Condé. The elections, influenced by these intriguers of all kinds, and especially by the spirit of reaction, had the result which had been foreseen. Almost the whole of the second third was composed, like the first, of men who were enemies to the Directory, either from attachment to royalty or hatred of terror. Those who were devoted to royalty were, it is true, very few in number; but they meant to avail themselves, as usual, of the passions of others. Pichegru was elected deputy in the Jura. At Colmar one Chemblé was chosen, who was employed in the correspondence with Wickham; at Lyons, Imbert Colomès, one of the members of the royalist agency in the South, and Camille Jordan,* a young man of good sentiments and a lively imagination, but who displayed a ridiculous enmity against the

* Camille Jordan was a young Lyonese deputy, distinguished by his eloquence and courage, but who entertained some unreasonable opinions, and was the great panegyrist of the clergy in the younger council. He was known by the nickname of *Chiming Jordan*, and *Jordan of the Bells*, because he wished to decree the re-establishment of bells and the independence of the clergy.—*Mignet*. E.

Directory; at Marseilles, General Willot, who had been removed from the army of the Ocean to command in the department of the Bouches-du-Rhone, and who, so far from curbing parties, had suffered himself to be won, perhaps without being aware of it, by the royalist faction; at Versailles, one Vauvilliers, implicated in Brottier's conspiracy, and destined by the agency for administrator of articles of consumption; at Brest, Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse, who had fallen out with Hoche, and, consequently, with the government on occasion of the expedition to Ireland. A great many other selections were made equally significant with the above. General Jourdan, who had resigned the command of the army of the Sambre and Meuse after the unsuccessful termination of the preceding campaign, was nominated deputy by his department. He was worthy of representing the army in the legislative body, and of avenging the dishonour which the treason of Pichegru was about to cast upon it. It was a singular circumstance that Barrère was elected by the department of the Hautes-Pyrénées.

The new members hastened to Paris. They were to be installed on the 1st of Prairial. Meanwhile they were taken to the club of Clichy, which daily became more and more violent. The councils themselves no longer manifested their former moderation. The members of the first third, seeing that the moment when they were to be reinforced was approaching, began to throw off the reserve in which, for fifteen months past, they had enveloped themselves. They had hitherto followed in the track of the constitutionalists, that is, of those deputies who pretended to be neither friends nor enemies of the Directory, but to be attached to the constitution alone, and to oppose the government only when it deviated from that. This direction had particularly prevailed in the Council of the Ancients. But as the day of the junction approached, the opposition in the Five Hundred began to employ a more threatening language. It was said that the Ancients had too long led the Five Hundred, and that it was time for the latter to throw off their dependence. Thus, in the club of Clichy as well as in the legislative body, the party that was about to acquire the majority manifested its joy and its audacity.

The constitutionalists, duped, like all those who from the commencement of the Revolution had suffered themselves to be drawn into the opposition, fancied that they were about to become the masters of the movement, and that the new comers would only be a reinforcement for them. Carnot was at their head. Continuing to pursue the false direction which he had taken, he had never ceased supporting in the Directory the opinion of the legislative minority. In the discussion of the preliminaries of Leoben, in particular, he had given vent to an animosity hitherto kept within the bounds of decorum, and supported the concessions made to Austria with a zeal which could not have been expected from his past life. Carnot, blinded by his self-love, conceived that he could lead at pleasure the constitutional party both in the Five Hundred and in the Ancients, and saw in the newly elected only additional partisans. In his zeal to bring together the elements of a party of which he hoped to be the chief, he sought to connect himself with the most distinguished of the new deputies. He had even anticipated Pichegru, who was far from showing politeness to any of the members of the Directory, and called to see him. Pichegru, making a very ill return for his civilities, had only manifested aversion and almost disdain. Carnot had made the acquaintance of many other deputies of the first and second third. His apartments at the Luxembourg had

become the rendezvous of all the members of the new opposition ; and his colleagues daily saw their most irreconcilable enemies coming to visit him.

The great question was that of the choice of a new director. The lot was to decide who should go out. If the lot fell upon Lareveillère, Rewbel, or Barras, the course of the government would be changed ; for the director nominated by the new majority could not fail to vote with Carnot and Letourneur.

It was said that the five directors had agreed among themselves which of them should retire ; that Letourneur had consented to resign his functions, and that the ballot was to be only illusory. This was an absurd surmise, as the surmises hazarded by parties in general are. The five directors, Lareveillère alone excepted, clung closely to their places. Moreover, Carnot and Letourneur, hoping to become masters of the government, if the lot should turn out one of their three colleagues, would not consent to abandon their post voluntarily. One circumstance might have authorized this rumour. The five directors had stipulated among themselves that the member going out should receive from each of his colleagues an indemnity of ten thousand francs, which would make forty thousand, so that the poor directors might not pass all at once from the pomp of power to indigence. This arrangement led to a conjecture that, in order to decide Letourneur, his colleagues had agreed to give up to him part of their salaries. This, however, was not the case. It was said also that it had been agreed that he should resign before the 1st of Prairial, that the nomination of the new director might take place before the admission of the second third into the councils—another combination irreconcilable with the presence of Carnot.

The society of Clichy was very active in its endeavours to prevent the arrangements just mentioned. It contrived to get a proposal submitted to the Five Hundred, tending to oblige the directors to draw the lots in public. This proposal was unconstitutional, for the constitution did not prescribe the mode of drawing, and depended for its regularity on the interest of each of the directors. It passed nevertheless in the councils. Lareveillère-Lepeaux, without ambition, but firm, represented to his colleagues that this measure would be an encroachment on their prerogatives, and exhorted them not to acknowledge its legality. The Directory replied that it would not carry it into execution because it was unconstitutional. The councils rejoined that the Directory had no right to judge of a decision of the legislative body. The Directory was about to insist, and to answer that the constitution was placed by a fundamental article under the safeguard of each of the powers, and that the executive power was bound not to constitute an unconstitutional measure ; but Carnot and Letourneur abandoned their colleagues. Barras, who was violent but by no means firm, prevailed upon Rewbel and Lareveillère-Lepeaux to give way, and there was no further dispute about the mode of drawing the lots.

The turbulent club of Clichy devised fresh propositions to be submitted to the councils before the 1st of Prairial. The most important in its estimation was the repeal of the noted law of the 3d of Brumaire, which excluded the relatives of emigrants from public functions, and closed the doors of the legislative body against several members of the first and second third. The proposition was actually made to the Five Hundred, a few days before the 1st of Prairial, and adopted after a stormy discussion. This unhopèd-for success, even before the junction of the second third, proved the influence which the opposition began to exercise over the legislative body, though still composed of two-thirds Conventionals. How

ever, the party calling itself constitutional was stronger in the Ancients. It was offended at the wilfulness of the deputies, who had hitherto seemed to submit to its direction, and it refused to repeal the law of the 3d of Brumaire.

The 1st of Prairial having arrived, the two hundred and fifty new members repaired to the legislative body, and took the place of two hundred and fifty Conventionals. Among the seven hundred and fifty members of the two councils, there were left, therefore, no more than two hundred and fifty belonging to the great assembly which had consummated and defended the Revolution. When Pichegru appeared at the Five Hundred, the greater part of the assembly, not knowing that it had a traitor in its bosom, and regarding him only as an illustrious general disgraced by the government, rose from an impulse of curiosity. Out of four hundred and forty-four votes, he obtained three hundred and eighty-seven for the presidency. The moderate and constitutional party would fain have called General Jourdan to the bureau, in order to pave the way for him to the chair, and to raise him to it after Pichegru; but the new majority, proud of its strength, and throwing off already all kind of delicacy, rejected Jourdan. The members of the bureau were Messrs. Simeon, Vaublanc, Henri Larivière, and Parisot. The exclusion of Jourdan was unwise, and could not but deeply wound the armies. During the sitting, the election for the Hautes Pyrénées, which had returned Barrère to the legislative body, was annulled. The result of the drawing of lots by the Directory was communicated. By a singular chance, the lot had fallen on Letourneur, which served to confirm the prevailing opinion of a voluntary agreement among the directors.* The choice of a successor next occupied all minds. That choice was now a matter of much less consequence, since it could not change the directorial majority; but still it was the support of one voice given to Carnot; and besides, as people were not well acquainted with the sentiments of Lareveillère-Lepeaux, as he was known to be a moderate, and one of the persons proscribed in 1793, they flattered themselves that he might, in certain cases, join Carnot, and change the majority. The Constitutionals, who entertained the wish and the hope to modify the march of the government, without overthrowing it, would fain have nominated a man attached to the existing system, but decided against the Directory, and ready to support Carnot. They proposed Cochon, the minister of the police, and a friend of Carnot's. They also thought of Beurnonville; but the members of the club of Clichy were hostile to Cochon, though they had, at first, shown him great favour on account of his energy against the Jacobins. They were now embittered against him for the apprehension of Brottier, Duverne de Presle, and Laville-Heurnois, but especially for his circulars to the electors. They rejected Cochon and even Beurnonville. They proposed Barthelemy, our ambassador in Switzerland, and the negotiator of the treaties of peace with Prussia and Spain. It was certainly not the diplomatic pacificator whom they meant to honour

* It is asserted in a great number of historical works that Letourneur went out by a voluntary arrangement. Lareveillère-Lepeaux, the director, in his valuable and yet unpublished memoirs, declares the contrary. To every one acquainted with that virtuous citizen, who was incapable of falsehood, his assertion is proof sufficient. But Carnot's memorial, written after the 18th of Fructidor, leaves no doubt on the subject. In that memorial, full of gall, and which is to be deplored for the glory of Carnot, he assures us that all those arrangements are but mere conjecture. He certainly had no interest in justifying his colleagues, against whom he was filled with resentment.

in his person, but the supposed accomplice of the Pretender and the emigrants. However, the royalists, who hoped to have a traitor in him, and the republicans, who were afraid of finding him one, were alike mistaken. M. Barthelemy was but a weak man, of moderate abilities, faithful to the reigning power, and not even possessing the boldness necessary for betraying it. To decide his election, which met with obstacles, it was reported that he would not accept the office, and that his nomination would be a homage paid to the man who had commenced the reconciliation of France with Europe. This fable contributed to his success. In the Five Hundred, he obtained three hundred and nine votes, and Cochon two hundred and thirty. In the list of the candidates presented to the Ancients appeared the names of Massena, supported by one hundred and eighty-seven votes; Kleber, by one hundred and seventy-three; Augereau, by one hundred and thirty-nine. There were a number of deputies who wished to call to the government one of the most distinguished generals of division in the armies.

Barthelemy was elected by the Ancients, and, in spite of the fable invented to gain votes for him, he immediately replied that he accepted the functions of director. His introduction into the Directory instead of Letourneur, produced no change of influence whatever. Barthelemy was not more capable of acting upon his colleagues than Letourneur; he proceeded to vote in the same manner, and to do from position, what Letourneur had done from attachment to the person of Carnot.

The members of the society of Clichy, the Clichyans, as they were called, fell to work immediately on the 1st of Prairial, and indicated the most violent intentions. Few of them were in the confidence of the royalist agents. Lemerer, Versan, Imbert Colomès, Pichegru, and perhaps Willot, were alone in the secret. Pichegru, at first in correspondence with Condé and Wickham, had just been put in direct communication with the Pretender. He received great encouragement, magnificent promises, and fresh funds, which he again accepted, without being more certain than before what use he could make of them. He promised much, and said that, before he could come to any determination, he must observe the new march of affairs. Cold and reserved, he affected, towards his accomplices and everybody, the mystery of a profound mind and the earnestness of a great character. The less he spoke, the greater were supposed to be his combinations and his means. The majority of the Clichyans were unacquainted with his secret mission. The government itself was ignorant of it, for Duverne de Presle knew nothing of it, and of course could not communicate it.

Among the Clichyans, some were actuated by ambition, others by a natural leaning towards monarchy, and the greater number by the remembrance of the Reign of Terror, and by the fear of seeing it renewed. Collected together by various motives, they were led, as is almost always the case with bodies of men, by the most ardent among them. After the 1st of Prairial, they formed the wildest plans. The first was to place the councils in permanence. They then meant to demand the removal of the troops which were in Paris; they purposed to arrogate to themselves the police of the capital, by interpreting the article of the constitution which gave to the legislative body the police of the place of its sittings, and by construing the word *place* as the word *town* or *city*. They purposed also to put the directors under accusation, to appoint others, to repeal *en masse* the laws called revolutionary, that is, to annul, by favour of that *term*, the entire revolution. Thus, Paris being in their power, the chiefs

of the government overthrown, the authority placed in their hands to be disposed of at their pleasure, they could hazard anything, even the restoration of royalty. These propositions of some violent spirits were, nevertheless, rejected. More moderate men, seeing that they were tantamount to an attack by main force upon the Directory, opposed them, and caused others to be adopted. It was agreed to have recourse, in the first place, to the power of the majority, for the purpose of changing all the commissions, reforming certain laws, and thwarting the course then pursued by the Directory. Legislative tactics were preferred for the moment to attacks by main force.

Having once determined upon this plan, they immediately put it in execution. After annulling Barrère's election, they recollected that four members of the first third had been excluded in the preceding year, by virtue of the law of the 3d of Brumaire. The refusal of the Ancients to repeal this law was not an obstacle. The deputies, shut out from the legislative body, were recalled as unconstitutionally excluded. Their names were Ferrand-Vaillant, Gault, Polissart, Job Aymé of the Drôme, and Mersan, one of the agents of royalism. They then devised a new method of repealing the law of the 3d of Brumaire. The repeal of that law, having been proposed some days before, and rejected by the Ancients, could not be again proposed for a year to come. A new form was employed, and it was decided that the law of the 3d of Brumaire should be repealed in so far as related to exclusion from public functions. This was nearly the whole of the law. The Ancients adopted the resolution under this form. The members of the new third, excluded as relatives of emigrants or as included in the amnesty for revolutionary offences, were allowed to be introduced. To this resolution M. Imbert Colomès of Lyons was indebted for the privilege of entering the legislative body.* It benefited Salicetti also, who had been compromised in the events of Prairial and included in the amnesty with several members of the Convention. Having been returned as deputy in Corsica, his election was confirmed. From an appearance of impartiality, the leaders of the Five Hundred obtained the repeal of a law of the 21st of Floreal, which removed from Paris the Conventionals not invested with public functions. This was done in order to appear to abrogate all the revolutionary laws. They proceeded immediately to the verification of the elections, and, as it might naturally be expected, they annulled all that were doubtful, in case a republican deputy had been returned, and confirmed them when they had brought in an enemy to the Revolution. They caused all the commissions to be renewed; and, pretending that everything ought to date from the day of their introduction into the legislative body, they demanded accounts of the finances up to the 1st of Prairial. They then got special commissions formed, for examining the laws relative to emigrants, priests, religion, public instruction, the colonies, &c. The intention of laying hands on everything was sufficiently evident.

Two exceptions had been made in the laws which banished emigrants for ever; the one in favour of the workmen and farmers who had fled from

* "Imbert Colomès, deputed from Lyons to the Council of Five Hundred, was erased from the list of emigrants, and, showing himself hostile to the Directorial party, was sentenced to transportation, and again placed on the list of emigrants. He then retired to Germany, and was one of those proscribed persons whom the Consuls did not recall in 1799. During the early period of the Revolution, he filled the station of first alderman of Lyons, where he behaved with firmness and moderation, but showed little favour to the democratic party."—*Biographie Moderne* E.

the Haut Rhin to escape the persecutions of St. Just and Lebas, during their mission in 1793; the other in favour of the persons compromised and obliged to flee in consequence of the events of the 31st of May. The refugees from Toulon, who had delivered up that place, and escaped in the English squadron, were alone deprived of the benefit of this second exception. Under favour of these two dispositions, a multitude of emigrants had already returned. Some passed themselves off for artisans or farmers of the Haut Rhin, others as having been proscribed on the 31st of May. The Clichyans moved and carried a prorogation of the delay granted to the fugitives of the Upper Rhine, and caused the time to be prolonged to six months. They even obtained a decision that the Toulonese fugitives might avail themselves of the exception granted to the persons proscribed on the 31st of May. Though this favour was merited by many of the Southerners who had fled to Toulon, and from Toulon on board the English squadron, merely to withdraw themselves from the proscription incurred by the federalists, it nevertheless recalled attention to, and seemed to grant an amnesty for the most criminal act of the revolutionary faction, and could not but excite the indignation of the patriots. The discussion on the subject of the colonies, and on the conduct of the agents of the Directory in St. Domingo, led to a violent scene. The commission to whom this subject was referred, consisting of Tarbé, Villaret-Joyeuse, Vaublanc, and Bourdon of the Oise, presented a report in which the Convention was treated with the greatest acrimony. Marec, the Conventionalist, was accused in it of not having resisted tyranny with the energy of virtue. At these words, which indicated the intention already often manifested of insulting the members of the Convention, all those who had still seats in the Five Hundred rushed to the tribune, and demanded a report drawn up in a manner more worthy of the legislative body. The scene was most violent. The Conventionalists, supported by the moderate deputies, obtained a decision that the report should be referred to the commission. Carnot influenced the commission by means of Bourdon of the Oise, and the dispositions of the projected decree were modified. At first it had been proposed to deprive the Directory of the faculty of sending agents to the colonies; that power was left it, but the number of agents was limited to three, and the duration of their mission to eighteen months. Santhonax was recalled. The Constitutionalists, seeing that, by joining the Conventionalists, they had been able to check the impetuosity of the Clichyans, conceived that they were about to become the moderators of the legislative body. But the succeeding sittings soon showed how much they were mistaken.

Among the most important subjects to which the new members proposed to direct their attention were religion and the laws concerning the priests. The commission charged with this momentous subject appointed for its reporter young Camille Jordan, whose imagination had been excited amidst the horrors of the siege of Lyons, and whose sensibility, though sincere, was not free from pretension. The reporter made a long and very inflated dissertation on the freedom of worship. It was not sufficient, he said, to allow to every one the exercise of his religion, but, in order that the liberty should be real, nothing should be required of him that was in contradiction with his creed. Thus, for instance, the oath required of the priests, though it did not interfere at all with their creed, yet, having been unfavourably interpreted by them, and considered as contrary to the doctrines of the Catholic church, ought not to be imposed upon them. It was a tyranny, the result of which was to create a class of proscriptions, and of

dangerous proscripts, because they had great influence on minds; and, assiduously concealed from the researches of the authorities by the pious zeal of the people, they laboured in secret to excite rebellion. As for the ceremonies of religion, it was not sufficient to permit them in closed temples. It was right, while forbidding all external shows that could occasion disturbance, to permit certain indispensable practices. Thus, bells were indispensable for assembling the Catholics at certain hours; they were a necessary part of their worship; to forbid them was to cramp its liberty. Besides, the people were accustomed to those sounds, they were fond of them, they had not yet consented to do without them; and in the country the law against bells had not been carried into execution. To permit them, then, was to satisfy an innocent want, and to put an end to the scandal of an unexecuted law. The case was the same in regard to cemeteries. While forbidding public exhibitions to all religions, it was nevertheless necessary to allow each to have its own enclosed grounds devoted to burial, and in which it should be at liberty to place its peculiar signs. In virtue of these principles, Camille Jordan proposed the abolition of the oaths, the repeal of the oppressive laws which had been the consequence, permission to use bells, and to have cemeteries, in which each religion could place such religious signs as it pleased upon the graves. The principles of this report, though expressed with dangerous emphasis, were just. It is true that there is but one way of destroying old superstitions, namely, indifference and want. By tolerating all religions, and granting salaries to none, governments would amazingly accelerate their end. The Convention had already restored to the Catholics the buildings which served them for churches. The Directory would have done well to allow them bells and crosses in the cemeteries, and to abolish the oath and the laws against the priests who refused to take it. But were the right forms employed, was the proper moment chosen, for bringing forward such claims? If, instead of making them one of the grievances in the grand indictment preferred against the Directory, their authors had waited for a more seasonable moment, and allowed passions time to subside and the government time to consolidate itself, they would infallibly have obtained the desired concessions. But because the counter-revolutionists made them a condition, for that very reason the patriots opposed them; for men will always oppose the opinions of their enemies. On hearing the sound of the bells, they would have fancied that they heard the tocsin of counter-revolution. Each party wishes its own passions to be comprehended and satisfied; but it will neither comprehend nor admit those of the contrary party. The patriots had their passions, composed of errors, fears, and animosities, which it was equally necessary to comprehend and to make allowance for.

This report produced an extraordinary sensation, for it touched the keenest and the deepest resentments.* It was the most striking and perhaps the most dangerous act of the Clichyans, though at bottom the best founded. The patriots made a bad reply to it, by saying that their adversaries proposed to reward the violation of the laws by the repeal of the violated laws. It is in fact but right to repeal laws that are impracticable.

* "Camille Jordan's report occasioned great surprise and produced violent opposition. All that remained of enthusiasm was still of a patriotic kind, and people were therefore astonished at the exhibition of so different a description of enthusiasm, as that of religion they had in the last age, and during the Revolution, been totally unaccustomed to it and they could not now comprehend it."—*Mignet*. E.

To all these demands the Clichyans added vexations of all kinds against the Directory on the subject of the finances. This was the important object by means of which they hoped to harass and paralyze it. We have already shown, in giving a sketch of the financial resources of the year V (1797), what were the presumed receipts and expenses for that year. Ordinary expenses of 450 millions had to be supplied by 250 millions from the land-tax, 50 millions from personal contribution, and 150 millions from the stamp-duty, registration, patents, posts, and customs. The extraordinary expense of 550 millions was to be defrayed by the last fourth of the price of the national domains sold in the preceding year, amounting to 100 millions and required in bills from the purchasers; by the produce of the woods and the rents of national property, by the arrears of the contributions, by the Batavian rescriptions, by the sale of the national moveable property, by various accessory revenues, lastly, by the everlasting resource of the domains yet unsold. But all these means were insufficient and very much below their presumed value. The receipts and expenditure of the year being but provisorily regulated, orders had been issued for the levy, on the provisional assessments, of three-fifths of the land-tax and personal contribution. But the assessments made by the local administrations being faulty, as we have already stated, on account of the continual variation of the fiscal laws, loaded with marginal amendments, gave rise to continual difficulties. The unwillingness of the payers added to these difficulties, and the receipt was very slow. Besides the inconvenience of tardiness in coming in, the amount was far below what had been expected. The land-tax afforded a prospect of 200 millions at the utmost, instead of 250. The different revenues, such as stamp-duty, registration, patents, customs, and posts, gave hopes of no more than 100 millions instead of 150. Such was the deficit in the ordinary revenues destined to provide for the ordinary expenses. It was not less in the extraordinary. The bills given by the purchasers of the national property for the last fourth of the price had been negotiated at a great disadvantage. To avoid suffering the same losses on the Batavian rescriptions, they had been pledged for a sum very inferior to their value. The domains sold very slowly, consequently the distress was extreme. The army of Italy had subsisted upon the contributions which it levied; but the armies of the Rhine, of the Sambre and Meuse, of the interior, and the naval forces, had suffered most severely. The troops had several times been ready to mutiny. The public establishments and the hospitals were in extreme penury. The public functionaries were unpaid.

It had been found necessary to recur to expedients of all kinds. The first, as we have already related, had been to resort to delay for the acquittal of certain obligations. The *rentiers* were paid only one-fourth in cash and three-fourths in bills payable in national domains, and thence called *three-quarter bills*. The amount of the consolidated debt, the life debt, and pensions, was 248 millions; consequently there were only 62 millions to pay, and the ordinary expense was thus reduced to 186 millions. But, notwithstanding this reduction, the expenditure exceeded the income. Notwithstanding the distinction made between the ordinary and extraordinary expense, this distinction was not observed in the payments of the treasury. The extraordinary expense was defrayed by resources destined for the ordinary expense; that is, in default of money to pay the troops, or the contractors who supplied them, it was taken from the sums destined for the salaries of the public functionaries, the judges, and the administrators of all classes. Not only were the two kinds of funds blended, but the receipts

were anticipated, and orders given upon this or that receiver, payable with the first funds that should come into his hands. The contractors had orders given them upon the treasury, the minister of which fixed the order of payment according to the urgency of the wants. This method gave rise sometimes to abuses, but it afforded the means of providing for what was most pressing, and of frequently preventing contractors from being disheartened and relinquishing the service. Lastly, in default of every other resource, bills were given upon the national domains—a paper which was negotiated to the purchasers. Such was the method adopted, since the destruction of the paper-money, for anticipating the sales. Owing to this state of the finances, none but the worst kind of contractors, that is, adventurous contractors, surrounded the government, and obliged it to submit to the most onerous bargains. They would not take the paper that was given them but at a very low rate, and they raised the price of articles of consumption in proportion to the chances or the delay of payment. The government was frequently obliged to make the most singular arrangements, in order to supply particular wants. Thus, the minister of the marine bought flour for the fleet, on condition that the contractor, on delivering the flour at Brest, should give part in money, in order to pay the seamen, who were ready to mutiny. The compensation for this advance of cash, was, of course, to be obtained from the high price of the flour. All these losses were inevitable, and resulted from the existing state of affairs. It would be an injustice to impute them to the government. Unfortunately, the conduct of one of the directors, who secretly shared in the profits of the contractors, and who took no pains to conceal either his prodigality or the growth of his fortune, furnished a pretext for all sorts of calumnies. It was certainly not the disgraceful profits made by one individual which involved the state in distress, but people took occasion from them to accuse the Directory of ruining the finances.

Here, indeed, a violent and factious opposition might find ample matter for declamation and for mischievous projects. It did actually form one that was extremely dangerous. It had composed the commission of the finances of men of its own choice, who were most unfavourably disposed towards the government. The first thing which this commission did was to present to the Five Hundred, through the reporter, Gilbert Desmolières, an incorrect statement of the income and expenditure. It exaggerated the one, and greatly diminished the other. Obligated to acknowledge the inadequacy of the ordinary resources, such as the land-tax, the registration, the stamp-duty, the patents, the posts, and the customs, it nevertheless refused all the taxes devised for supplying the deficiency. Ever since the commencement of the Revolution, it had been found impossible to re-establish the indirect taxes. A tax on salt and tobacco was proposed: the commission alleged that it would frighten the people. A lottery was proposed: that it rejected as immoral. A toll upon the high-roads was proposed: this it considered as liable to great difficulties. These objections were all more or less just, but it was absolutely necessary to seek and to find resources. As the sole resource, the commission intimated that it was about to take into consideration a duty on the registry of judicial acts. As for the deficit of the extraordinary receipts, so far from providing for that, it sought to increase it, by forbidding the Directory the use of those expedients by means of which it had contrived to live from day to day. The course which it pursued was this:—

The constitution had detached the treasury from the Directory and made

it a separate establishment, under the control of independent commissioners, appointed by the Councils, who had no other duty than to receive the revenue and to make the disbursements. Thus, the Directory had not the management of the funds of the state; it gave orders upon the treasury, which the latter paid till the credits opened by the Councils were exhausted. Nothing could be more vicious than this system, for the management of the funds is an affair of execution, which ought to belong to the government, like the direction of the military operations, and in which the deliberating bodies can no more interfere than in the plan of a campaign. In many cases, even it occurs, that by a clever and skilful management, a minister contrives to create temporary resources on an emergency. Thus, the two Councils had, in the preceding year, authorized the treasury to execute all the negotiations ordered by the Directory. The new commission resolved to cut short the expedients which enabled the Directory to exist, by depriving it of all power over the treasury. In the first place, it desired that the Directory should cease to possess the faculty of ordering the negotiation of securities. When non-circulating securities were to be realized, the commissioners of the treasury were to negotiate them themselves, upon their personal responsibility. It then proposed to take from the Directory the faculty of fixing the arrangement in which the orders for payment were to be discharged. It proposed also to prohibit any anticipation of the funds that were to be received by the chests of the departments. It even desired that all orders already delivered upon funds not yet received, should be carried back to the treasury, verified and paid in their turn; which would interrupt and annul all the operations that had already taken place. It proposed, moreover, to render obligatory the distinction made between the two natures of expenses and receipts, and to require that the ordinary expenses should be paid out of the ordinary receipts, and the extraordinary expenses out of the extraordinary receipts—a mischievous measure, at a moment when it was absolutely necessary to supply every urgent want out of the first disposable funds. To all these propositions it added a last, more baneful than the preceding. We have already stated that, as the domains sold slowly, the government anticipated upon their sale, by giving bills which were receivable in payment of their value. The contractors were satisfied with these bills, which they afterwards negotiated to purchasers. Hence, it is true, there was a rivalry between this paper and the *three-quarter bills* delivered to the *rentiers*, the value of which was diminished by the competition. Upon pretext of protecting the unfortunate *rentiers* against the greediness of the contractors, the commission proposed no longer to allow the national domains to be paid for by the bills given to the contractors.

All these propositions were adopted by the Five Hundred, the majority of whom, blindly hurried away, ceased to observe any moderation. They were disastrous, and threatened the interruption of all the public services. The Directory, in fact, being no longer allowed to negotiate at pleasure the securities which it had in its hands;—having no longer the power to fix the order of the payments according to the urgency of the services, to anticipate on an emergency funds not yet received, to take from the ordinary for the extraordinary, and lastly, to issue a voluntary paper, payable in national domains;—was deprived of all the means which had hitherto enabled it to live, and was permitted, in the impossibility to provide for all wants, to give he preference to the most urgent. The measures adopted, though well suited to restore order in a quiet time, were alarming in the existing state of the

country. The constitutionalists made vain efforts to oppose them in the Five Hundred. They passed, and the only hope left was in the Council of Ancients.

The constitutionalists, moderate enemies of the Directory, saw with great pain the course pursued by the Council of the Five Hundred. They had hoped that the junction of a new third would be rather serviceable than prejudicial to them, that it would have no other effect than that of changing the majority, and that they should become masters of the legislative body. Carnot, their chief, had conceived the same illusive ideas; but both found themselves far beyond their goal, and they could perceive, on this, as on all other occasions, that behind every opposition lurks counter-revolution, with its mischievous designs. They possessed much more influence in the Council of Ancients than in that of Five Hundred, and they strove to provoke the rejection of the resolutions relative to the finances. Carnot had a devoted friend there in the deputy Lacuée; he was also connected with Dumas, formerly a member of the Legislative Assembly. He could reckon upon the influence of Portalis, Tronçon-Decoudray, Lebrun, and Barbé-Marbois, all moderately hostile to the Directory, and censuring the extravagance of the Clichyan party.* Owing to the united efforts of these deputies, and to the dispositions of the Council of Ancients, the first propositions of Gilbert Desmolières, those which forbade the Directory to manage the negotiations of the treasury, to fix the order of the payments, and to blend the ordinary with the extraordinary, were rejected. This rejection gave great satisfaction to the constitutionalists, and to all moderate men in general, who dreaded a conflict. Carnot was extremely rejoiced at it. He again conceived hopes that the Clichyans might be curbed by means of the Council of Ancients, and that the direction of affairs would remain in his hands and those of his friends.

But this was only a moderate palliative. The club of Clichy rang with the most violent declamations against the Ancients, and with fresh schemes of accusation against the Directory. Gilbert Desmolières resumed his first propositions rejected by the Ancients, in order to present them in another form, and to obtain their adoption upon a second deliberation. Resolutions of all kinds against the government succeeded one another in the Five Hundred. Deputies were forbidden to accept places for a year before their leaving the legislative body. Imbert-Colomès, who corresponded with the court of Blankenburg, proposed to take from the Directory the faculty, which it possessed by law, of examining letters coming from abroad. Aubry, the same who had brought about a reaction in the army after the 9th of Thermidor, and who had displaced Bonaparte in 1795, proposed to deprive the Directory of the right of removing officers, which would strip it of one of its most important constitutional prerogatives. He proposed also to add to the twelve hundred grenadiers composing the guard of the legislative body, a company of artillery and a squadron of dragoons, and to give the command of the whole of this guard to the inspectors of the hall of the legislative body—a ridiculous proposition, and which seemed to

* "The two parties were watching each other; the position of the one was in the Directory, the club of Salm, and the army; that of the other, in the councils, at Clichy, and in the salons of the royalists. The multitude were spectators. Each party was inclined to act in the revolutionary fashion towards the other. An intermediate party, whose principles were of a constitutional and pacific nature, attempted to prevent this struggle, and what was altogether impossible, to re-establish harmony. Carnot was at the head of this party, and some members of the Council of Five Hundred, directed by Thibaudeau, together with a considerable number of the Ancients, supported his scheme."—*Mignet*. E.

denote preparations for war. The remittance of a million to the commissioner of the navy at Toulon, made direct by Bonaparte, without sending it through the medium of the treasury, in order to hasten the departure of the squadron which he needed in the Adriatic, was denounced. That million was seized by the treasury and conveyed to Paris. Similar remittances, made in the same manner by the army of Italy to the armies of the Alps, the Rhine, and the Sambre and Meuse, were denounced. A long report on the relations of France with the United States was presented; and, though the Directory had right on its side in the differences which had arisen between it and that power, it was censured with acrimony. At length the rage for denouncing and finding fault with all the operations of the government, hurried the Clichyans into a last step, which was an egregious imprudence on their part. All Europe had rung with the events at Venice. Since the manifesto of Palma Nova, that republic had been annihilated and that of Genoa revolutionized, though the Directory had not communicated a single word on the subject to the two Councils. The reason of this silence lay, as we have seen, in the rapidity of the operations, a rapidity so great that Venice had ceased to exist, before the war could be submitted for deliberation to the legislative body. The treaty since concluded had not yet been laid before it, but was to be discussed in a few days. It was not so much the silence of the Directory that excited dissatisfaction, as the fall of the aristocratic governments and the progress of the Revolution in Italy. Dumolard, that diffuse speaker, who, for nearly two years, had not ceased to attack the Directory in the Council of Five Hundred, resolved to make a motion relative to the events of Venice and Genoa. The attempt was a bold one; for it was impossible to attack the Directory without attacking General Bonaparte. In order to effect this, it was requisite to defy an admiration now become universal, and an influence which had become colossal since the general had compelled Austria to make peace, and since, at once negotiator and warrior, he seemed to rule at Milan the destinies of Europe. All the Clichyans who were not maddened by factious views, strove to dissuade Dumolard from his intention; but he persisted, and, in the sitting of the 5th of Messidor (June 23), he made a motion of order with regard to the events of Venice. "Rumour," said he, "whose flight it is impossible to restrain, has everywhere diffused the report of our conquests over the Venetians, and of the astonishing revolution which has crowned them. Our troops are in their capital; their navy is delivered up to us; the most ancient government in Europe is annihilated; in the twinkling of an eye, it again appears under democratic forms; and our soldiers, braving the billows of the Adriatic, are on their way to Corfu to complete the new revolution. Admit these events as certain, and it follows that the Directory has in disguised terms made war and peace, and in certain respects a treaty of alliance with Venice, and all without your concurrence. Are we then no longer that nation which has proclaimed in principle and maintained by force of arms, that no foreign power has a right, upon any pretext, to interfere in the form of government of another state? Insulted by the Venetians, was it on their political institutions that we had a right to declare war? Victors and conquerors, was it for us to take an active part in their revolution, in appearance unlooked-for? I shall not here inquire what is the fate reserved for Venice? and particularly for her provinces on *terra firma*. I shall not examine whether the invasion of them, contemplated, perhaps, before the transactions which served as motives for it, is not destined to figure in history, as a worthy companion to the partition

of Poland. I shall waive these reflections, and, with the constitutional act in my hand, I ask how the Directory can justify the absolute ignorance in which it seeks to leave the legislative body concerning this multitude of extraordinary events." Passing from the affairs of Venice, Dumolard then adverted to the transactions at Genoa, which, he said, exhibited the same character, and justified the supposition of the interference of the French army and its leaders. He spoke also of Switzerland, with which, he said they were at variance relative to a right of navigation; and he asked if the government purposed to render democratic all the states in alliance with France. Taking frequent occasion to praise the heroes of Italy, he made mention only once of the commander-in-chief, whose name no lips then omitted an opportunity of pronouncing and eulogizing. Dumolard concluded by proposing a message to the Directory, applying for explanations concerning the events of Venice and Genoa, and the relations of France with Switzerland.

This motion caused general astonishment, and proved the boldness of the Clichyans. It was destined soon to cost them dearly. Until, however, they were doomed to feel its melancholy consequences, they were full of arrogance. They loudly expressed the strongest hopes, and seemed confident of becoming in a short time masters of the government. There prevailed everywhere the same assurance and the same imprudence as in Vendémiaire. The emigrants returned in multitudes. Great quantities of false passports and false certificates of residence were sent from Paris to all parts of Europe. A traffic was carried on with them at Hamburg. The emigrants introduced themselves into the French territory by way of Holland, Alsace, Switzerland, and Piedmont. Actuated by the fondness which the French feel for dwelling in their own fine country, and by the hardships and disgusts endured abroad; having, besides, nothing to hope from war, since the commencement of negotiations with Austria; having even to apprehend the disbanding of the corps of Condé, they came back to attempt, by means of peace and intrigues at home, that counter-revolution which they had not been able to effect by the league of the European powers. In default of a counter-revolution, they wished at least to see their country again, and to recover part of their property. Owing in fact to the interest which they everywhere excited, they had a thousand facilities for redeeming it. The jobbing in the different papers taken in payment for national domains, the facility for obtaining these papers at a low price, the favour of the local administrations towards the old proscribed families, and the complaisance of the bidders, who drew back whenever a former proprietor wished to purchase his estates under a fictitious name, enabled the emigrants to recover possession of their patrimony with very small sums. The priests, in particular, had returned in crowds. They were cordially received by all the devout in France, who lodged them, fed them, fitted up chapels for them in their houses, and supplied them with money which they collected. The old ecclesiastical hierarchy was clandestinely re-established. None of the new circumscriptions of the civil constitution of the clergy was acknowledged. The old dioceses still existed. Bishops and archbishops secretly administered them, and corresponded with Rome. Through them and their ministry all the ceremonies of the Catholic church were practised; they confessed, baptized, married, the persons who adhered to the old religion. All the Chouans who had nothing to do hastened to Paris, and joined the emigrants, whose number there was said to exceed five thousand. Seeing the conduct of the Five Hundred and the

perils of the Directory, they conceived that it would take but a few days to bring about the long wished-for catastrophe. Their correspondence with foreign countries was full of these hopes. All who were about the Prince of Condé, whose corps was retiring to Poland, the pretender who was at Blankenburg, and Count d'Artois who was in Scotland, were overjoyed. Amidst this intoxication, which had been manifested at Coblenz, when the emigrants expected to come back in a fortnight in the train of the King of Prussia, they formed plans for their return. They talked of it and joked about it, as of an event that would immediately take place. The towns bordering on the frontiers were full of people awaiting with impatience the moment for revisiting France. Lastly, to all this must be added the violent language of part of the royalist journals, whose fury increased with the temerity and the hopes of the party.

The Directory was informed by its police of all these movements. The conduct of the emigrants, the proceedings of the Five Hundred, sufficiently corresponded with the declaration of Duverne de Presle to demonstrate the existence of a real plot. Duverne de Presle had asserted that one hundred and eighty deputies were accomplices in it. He had mentioned no names but those of Lemerer and Mersan, and had said that all the others belonged to the club of Clichy. In this he was mistaken, as we have seen. Most of the Clichyans, excepting perhaps five or six, acted as they did under the influence of opinion, and not from connivance. But the Directory, misled by appearances and by the declaration of Duverne de Presle, believed them to be knowingly engaged in the plot, and regarded them as conspirators. A discovery made in Italy by Bonaparte had just revealed to them an important secret, and increased their alarm. The Count d'Entraigues,* an agent of the pretender's through whom he communicated with the intriguers of France, and the confidant of all the secrets of the emigration, had sought refuge in Venice. When the French entered that city, he was seized and delivered up to Bonaparte. The latter might have sent him to France to be shot as an emigrant and a conspirator; but he suffered himself to be moved, and chose rather to make use of him and his indiscretions than to doom him to death. He assigned the city of Milan for his prison, gave him some assistance in money, and drew from him all the secrets of the pretender. He thus learned the whole history of Pichegru's treason, which had remained unknown to the government, and of which Rewbel alone had entertained some suspicions, to which his colleagues refused to listen. D'Entraigues related to Bonaparte all that he knew, and made him acquainted with all the intrigues of the emigrants. Besides these verbal revelations, very curious particulars were obtained by the seizure of the papers found at Venice in the portfolio of d'Entraigues. Among other papers there was one of great importance containing a long conversation between d'Entraigues and the Count de Montgaillard, in which the latter gave an account of the first negotiation opened with Pichegru, and which proved fruitless through the obstinacy of the Prince of Condé. D'En-

* "The Count d'Entraigues was one of the second emigration, who left France during Robespierre's ascendancy. He was employed as a political agent by the court of Russia, after the affair of Venice, which proves that he was not at least convicted of treachery to the Bourbon princes. In July, 1812, he was assassinated at his villa near London, by an Italian domestic, who, having murdered the count and countess, shot himself through the head, leaving no clue to discover the motive of his villany. It was remarked that the villain used Count d'Entraigues' own pistols, which, apprehensive of danger, as a political intriguer, he had always ready prepared in his apartment"—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E.

traigues had committed this conversation to writing, and it had been found among his papers. Berthier, Clarke, and Bonaparte, immediately signed it, for the purpose of attesting its authenticity, and sent it to Paris.*

The Directory kept it secret, like the declaration of Duverne de Presle, waiting for an occasion to employ it to good purpose. But it had no longer any doubt concerning the part acted by Pichegru in the Council of Five Hundred, which explained his defeats, his absurd conduct, his ill-behaviour, his refusal to go to Stockholm, and his influence over the Clichyans. It concluded that, at the head of one hundred and eighty deputies, his accomplices, he was preparing a counter-revolution.

The directors were divided since the new direction which Carnot had taken, and which had been followed by Barthelemy. Barras, Rewbel, and Lareveillère-Lepeaux, alone continued devoted to the system of the government. These three directors themselves were not very closely united, for Rewbel, a moderate Conventionalist, hated Barras as a partisan of Danton, and had, moreover, a great aversion for his manners and character. Lareveillère had some acquaintance with Rewbel, but very little intercourse with Barras. The three directors harmonized only in the habitual conformity of their votes. All three were highly irritated, and decidedly hostile to the faction of Clichy. Barras, though admitting emigrants, in consequence of his supple manners, never ceased to declare that he would mount his horse, and proceed, sword in hand, at the head of the faubourgs, to cut in pieces all the counter-revolutionists of the Five Hundred. Rewbel did not express himself in that manner; he imagined that all was lost; and, though resolved to do his duty, he conceived that no other resource would soon be left for him and his two colleagues but flight. Lareveillère-Lepeaux, endowed with as much courage as integrity, thought that they ought to make head against the storm, and to strain every nerve to save the republic. With a heart free from hatred, he might serve as the connecting link between Barras and Rewbel, and such he resolved to make himself. He first addressed himself to Rewbel, whose probity and intelligence he highly appreciated, and, explaining his intentions, asked him if he would consent to save the Revolution. Rewbel met his overtures with cordiality, and promised him entire devotion. The question now was to make sure of Barras, whose energetic language was not sufficient to satisfy his colleagues. Giving him no credit for either integrity or principle, seeing him surrounded by men of all parties, they deemed him just as capable of selling himself to the emigrants, as of putting himself some day at the head of the faubourgs and attempting some horrible *coup de main*. They were as apprehensive of one of these things as of the other. They wished to save the republic by an act of energy, but not to compromise it by fraternal murders. Alarmed by the manners of Barras,

* M. de Montgaillard, in his work, full of calumnies and errors, has asserted that this piece contained real facts, but that it was spurious, and had been fabricated by Bonaparte, Berthier, and Clarke. The contrary is certain; and it is easy to conceive what an interest M. de Montgaillard must have had in clearing his brother from the conversation which is attributed to him in this paper. But it is scarcely to be supposed, in the first place, that three persons of such importance would have dared to commit a forgery. Such acts are as rare in our days as poisoning. Clarke was dismissed in consequence of events of Fructidor, and he belonged to Carnot's party. It is not at all probable that he would lend himself to fabricate papers in order to support the proceedings of Fructidor. Besides, the paper would have been very insufficient for the use intended to be made of it, and had it been forged it would have been made sufficient. Everything then, serves to prove the falsehood of M. de Montgaillard's assertion.

they distrusted him too much. Lareveillère undertook to speak to him Barras, delighted to coalesce with his two colleagues and to insure their support, flattered above all by their alliance, acquiesced entirely in their plans, and appeared to fall in with all their views. From that moment they were sure of forming a compact majority, and of completely annulling by their three united votes the influence of Carnot and Barthelemy. It now became a question, what means were to be employed to counteract the conspiracy, which was supposed by them to have such extensive ramifications in the two councils. To have recourse to judicial proceedings, to denounce Pichegru and his accomplices, to demand of the Five Hundred an act of accusation against them, and then to bring them to trial, was absolutely impossible. In the first place, they had no names but those of Pichegru, Lemerer, and Mersan; it was believed that the others might be easily recognised by their connexions, their intrigues, their violent propositions, in the club of Clichy and in the Five Hundred, but they were nowhere named. To procure the condemnation of Pichegru and two or three deputies would not be destroying the conspiracy. Besides, they had not the means of insuring the condemnation of Pichegru, Lemerer, and Mersan; for the proofs obtained against them, though carrying moral conviction, were not sufficient to enable the judges to pronounce a condemnation. The declaration of Duverne de Presle and that of d'Entraigues were insufficient without the aid of oral depositions. But this was not the greatest difficulty. If they had obtained against Pichegru and his accomplices all the evidence which was wanting, it would be requisite to wring the act of accusation from the Five Hundred; and though the proofs had been as clear as day, still it would be impossible to obtain an act of accusation from the existing majority: it was like sending a culprit to be tried by his own accomplices.

These reasons were so self-evident, that Lareveillère and Rewbel, notwithstanding their preference of a legal course, were obliged to relinquish all idea of a regular trial, and to make up their minds to a stroke of policy—a sad and deplorable resource, but which, in their situation and with their alarms, was the only possible one. Having determined upon extreme measures, they purposed, nevertheless, not to have recourse to sanguinary means, and strove to curb the revolutionary propensities of Barras. Without having yet decided upon the mode and the moment of execution, they adopted the idea of apprehending Pichegru and his one hundred and eighty supposed accomplices, denouncing them to the purified legislative body, and demanding from it an extraordinary law, which should decree their banishment without trial. In their extreme distrust they made a great mistake respecting Carnot. They forgot his past life, his rigid principles, his obstinacy, and looked upon him as almost a traitor. They feared that, united with Barthelemy, he was implicated in Pichegru's plot. The pains which he took to collect the opposition around him and to make himself its chief, appeared to their prejudiced eyes so many proofs of criminal connivance. Still they were not yet convinced; but, having determined upon a bold stroke, they would not act by halves; and they were ready to strike the guilty, even at their sides and in the very bosom of the Directory.

They agreed to prepare everything for the execution of their plan, and to watch their enemies closely, in order to seize the moment when it should become urgent to strike them. Disposed to so bold an act, they had need of support. The patriot party, which could alone furnish it, was divided as formerly into two classes. Some, still furious ever since the

9th of Thermidor, had not cooled in the space of three years; they comprehended nothing whatever of the forced march of the Revolution, considered the legal system as a concession made to counter-revolutionists, and panted for vengeance and proscriptions. Though the Directory had struck them in the person of Babœuf, they were ready, with their usual self-devotion, to fly to its aid. But they were too dangerous to be employed, and the utmost that could be done was, in the day of extreme danger, to form them into regiments, as on the 13th of Vendémiaire, and to reckon upon the sacrifice of their lives. They had sufficiently proved, by the side of Bonaparte and on the steps of the church of St. Roch, of what they were capable in the hour of danger. Besides these ardent patriots, almost all compromised by their zeal or their active participation in the Revolution, there were moderate patriots of a superior class, who, approving more or less the conduct of the Directory, desired, nevertheless, that the republic should be supported upon the laws, and saw the imminent peril to which it was exposed by the reaction. These perfectly answered the intentions of Rewbel and Lareveillère, and could lend the aid, if not of force, at least of opinion to the Directory. They were to be seen alternately in the drawing-rooms of Barras, who kept up a kind of state for his col-leagues, or in those of Madame de Staël, who had not quitted Paris, and who, by the charms of her superior mind, collected around her all the most shining characters in France. M. Benjamin Constant occupied the first rank among them, for his talents and for the works which he had already published in favour of the Directory. There, too, was seen M. de Talleyrand,* who, erased from the list of emigrants during the latter times of the Convention, had come to Paris with the desire of again entering upon the career of high diplomatic employments. This assemblage of distinguished men, composing the government society, had resolved to form an association to counterbalance the influence of Clichy, and to discuss political questions in a contrary spirit. It was called the Constitutional Circle. It soon comprised all the persons whom we have just designated, and the members of the councils who voted with the Directory; that is, nearly the whole of the last conventional third. The members of the legislative body, who called themselves constitutionalists, would naturally have been expected to join the new Circle, for their opinion was the same; but embroiled from self-love with the Directory by their discussions in the legislative body, they persisted in keeping aloof between the Constitutional Circle and

* "Talleyrand," said Napoleon, "is a corrupt man, who has betrayed all parties and persons. Wary and circumspect; always a traitor, but always in conspiracy with fortune; Talleyrand treats his enemies as if they were one day to become his friends; and his friends, as if they were to become his enemies. He is a man of unquestionable talent, but venal in everything. Nothing could be done with him but by means of bribery."—*Voices from St. Helena*. E.

We subjoin M. Bourrienne's character of Talleyrand, which, it will be observed, is wholly at variance with that drawn by Napoleon: "History will speak as favourably of Talleyrand, as his contemporaries have spoken ill of him. When a statesman, throughout a great, long, and difficult career, makes and preserves a number of faithful friends, and provokes but few enemies, it may justly be inferred that his character is honourable, his talent profound, and that his political conduct has been wise and moderate. It is impossible to know Talleyrand without admiring him. All who have that advantage, judge him, no doubt, as I do." E.

This celebrated statesman died in Paris, at an advanced age, in May of the present year (1838), leaving behind him some MS. memoirs—containing, it is supposed, the history of his own times—which, as ordered in his will, are not to be opened till thirty years after his death. E.

Clichy, after the example of Carnot and Barthelemy, the directors, and the deputies Tronçon-Ducoudray, Portalis, Lacuée, Dumas, Doucet-Pontécoulant, Simeon, and Thibaudeau. M. Benjamin Constant spoke several times in the Constitutional Circle. M. de Talleyrand also delivered his sentiments there. This example was imitated; and circles of the same kind, composed, it is true, of men of an inferior class, and of less temperate patriots, were formed in all quarters. The Constitutional Circle was opened on the 1st of Messidor, a month after the 1st of Prairial. In a few days there were similar associations all over France; the warmest patriots joined them, and, from a perfectly natural reaction, the Jacobin party almost seemed to be forming itself anew.

But this was a worn-out implement, and of little use. The clubs had lost their importance in France, and were deprived by the constitution of the means of again becoming efficacious. The Directory had fortunately another support, namely, the armies, in which republican principles seemed to have taken refuge ever since the sufferings of the Revolution had produced so violent and so general a reaction in the interior. The whole army is attached to the government that organizes, maintains, and rewards it; but the republican soldiers viewed the Directory not merely as the heads of the government, but as the heads of a cause for which they had risen *en masse* in 1793, and for which they had fought and conquered for six years. Nowhere was the attachment to the Revolution so strong as in the army of Italy. It was composed of the revolutionists of the South, as impetuous in their opinions as in their bravery. Generals, officers, and soldiers, were loaded with honours, gorged with money, revelling in pleasure. They had conceived an extraordinary pride on account of their victories. They were informed of what was passing in the interior from the newspapers, which were given to them to read, and they talked of nothing but recrossing the Alps, and cutting in pieces the aristocrats of Paris. The rest which they enjoyed ever since the signature of the preliminaries, contributed by idleness to augment their excitement. Massena, Joubert, and Augereau, in particular, set them the example of the most ardent republicanism. The troops which had come from the Rhine, without being less republican, were cooler, more moderate, and had contracted under Moreau more sobriety and discipline. It was Bernadotte who commanded them. He affected a polished education, and strove to distinguish himself from his colleagues by more elegant manners. In his division, the appellation of *Monsieur* was employed, whereas in the whole of the old army of Italy, no other title than that of *Citizen* was tolerated. The old soldiers of Italy, licentious, insolent, and quarrelsome as southerners and as the spoiled children of Victory, were already rivalled in bravery by the soldiers of the Rhine; and now they began to be in rivalry with the latter, not in opinion but in manners and habits. They would not be called *Monsieur*, and on this account they had frequent duels with their comrades of the Rhine. Augereau's division, in particular, which was distinguished, like its general, for its revolutionary exaltation, was the most restless. It required an energetic proclamation from its chief to repress it and to put a stop to duels. The appellation of *Citizen* was alone authorized.

General Bonaparte viewed with pleasure the spirit of the army, and encouraged its flights. His first successes had all been gained against the royalist faction, whether before Toulon, or on the 13th of Vendémiaire. With that faction he was therefore in hostility from the outset. It had since made a point of depreciating his triumphs, because their lustre was reflected upon the Revolution.

Its last attacks, especially, had filled the general with indignation. He could not contain himself when he read Dumolard's motion, and learned that the treasury had seized the million sent to Toulon. But, besides his particular reasons for detesting the royalist faction, he had another more general and more profound; it lay in the glory and the greatness of the part which he was acting. What could a king do for his destiny? To whatever height he might exalt him, that king would still be above him. Under the republic, on the contrary, not a head was lifted higher than his. Whether he had any presentiment of his wonderful destiny or not, he foresaw, at least, in the republic an audacity and an immensity of enterprises which suited the audacity and the immensity of his genius. With a king, on the contrary, France would have been brought back to an obscure and limited existence. However he might act towards the republic, whether he served or oppressed it, Bonaparte could not be great unless with and by it, and he could not but cherish that in which his own destiny was involved. That a Pichegru should suffer himself to be allured by a mansion, a title, and a few millions, is not surprising; the ardent imagination of the conqueror of Italy required a different prospect. It required the prospect of a new world, revolutionized by his hands.

He wrote, therefore, to the Directory that he and his army were ready to fly to its aid,* in order to plunge the counter-revolutionists into their former nothingness. He was not afraid to give advice, and he earnestly exhorted the Directory to sacrifice a few traitors, and to break up a few presses.

In the army of the Rhine, the state of opinion was more calm. It contained some bad officers placed in the ranks by Pichegru. The mass of the army was nevertheless republican, but quiet, disciplined, poor, and less intoxicated with success than that of Italy. An army is always formed in the image of the general. His spirit is imparted to his officers, and by his officers it is communicated to his soldiers. The army of the Rhine was modelled after Moreau. Moreau, flattered by the royalist faction, which insisted on placing his clever retreat above the wonderful exploits in Italy, felt less hatred for it than Bonaparte. He was, moreover, careless, moderate, cool, and his taste for politics was but equal to his capacity. Hence he kept in the background, without striving to render himself conspicuous. He was, nevertheless, a republican, and not a traitor, as it has been asserted. He was at this moment in possession of proofs of Pichegru's treason, and had it in his power to render an immense service to his government. We have already stated that he had taken a baggage-wagon belonging to General Klinglin, containing a great quantity of papers. These papers comprehended the whole correspondence in cipher of Pichegru with Wickham, the Prince of Condé, &c. Moreau, therefore, could have furnished proofs of the treason, and rendered judicial means more practicable. But Pichegru had been his commander-in-chief and his friend; he would not betray him; and he strove to discover the cipher of this correspondence without informing the government of its existence. It contained the very proof of Moreau's fidelity to the republic. Pichegru, after resigning the command, had only one way of retaining importance; namely, to say that Moreau was at his disposal, and that, relying upon him for the direction of the army,

* "Napoleon was resolved to support the Directory to the utmost, both because he was aware that the opposite party had determined on his dismissal, and because their principles, being those of moderation and peace, were little likely to favour his ambitious projects. He despatched Augereau, therefore, a general of decided character, and known revolutionary principles, to Paris, to support the government."—*Alison*. E

he was going himself to conduct the intrigues in the interior. Now Pichegru was continually repeating to his correspondents that they must not address themselves to Moreau, because he would not listen to any overture.* Moreau then was cold, but faithful. His army was one of the finest and bravest that the republic ever possessed.

All was different in the army of the Sambre and Meuse. This was, as we have elsewhere observed, the army of Fleurus, of the Ourthe, and of the Roer, an army brave and republican like its old general. Its ardour was increased when young Hoche, appointed to command it, had come and imparted to it all the energy of his character. This young man, who from sergeant in the French Guards had become, in one campaign, commander-in-chief, loved the republic as his mother and his benefactress. In the dungeons of the committee of public welfare his fondness had not cooled; in La Vendée it had been strengthened while contending with the royalists. In Vendémiaire he was quite ready to fly to the aid of the Convention, and he had already set twenty thousand men in motion, when the vigour of Bonaparte on the 13th rendered it unnecessary for them to advance farther. Having in his political capacity a reason for meddling in affairs which Moreau had not, feeling no jealousy of Bonaparte, but impatient to overtake him in the career of glory, he was heartily devoted to the republic, and ready to serve it in every way, on the field of battle, or amidst political tempests. We have already had occasion to observe that to consummate prudence he joined an ardour and a perseverance which were extraordinary. Ever prompt to play a part in events, he offered his arm and his life to the Directory. Thus the government was not destitute of material force, but it was requisite to employ it prudently, and, above all, seasonably.

Of all the generals, Hoche was the man whom it best suited the Directory to employ. If the glory and the character of Bonaparte could excite some umbrage, this was not the case with Hoche. His victories at Weissenburg, in 1793, his admirable pacification of La Vendée, his recent victory at Neuwied, threw around him a brilliant and a varied glory, in which esteem for the statesman was blended with esteem for the warrior; but his existence had nothing that could alarm liberty. If a general must be solicited to interfere in the troubles of the state, it would be better to apply to him than to the giant who ruled in Italy. He was the favourite general of the republicans, and the one upon whom their thoughts rested without any fear. Besides, his army was nearest to Paris. If it were requisite, twenty thousand men might in a few marches reach the capital, and second by their presence the vigorous stroke which the Directory had resolved to strike.

Hoche, then, was the man whom the three directors, Barras, Rewbel, and Lareveillère, thought of. However, without apprizing his colleagues, Barras, who was extremely bustling, and very clever at intrigue, and who was desirous in this new crisis to take upon himself the honour of the execution, wrote to Hoche, with whom he had some acquaintance, and demanded his interference in the events that were preparing. Hoche did not hesitate. A most convenient opportunity offered for directing troops upon Paris. He was labouring with the greatest assiduity to get his new expedition against Ireland ready. He had gone to Holland to superintend

* If M. de Montgaillard had read Klinglin's correspondence, he would not have asserted, on the authority of a statement of King Louis XVIII., that Moreau was betraying France ever since the year 1796.

the preparations making in the Texel. He had resolved to detach twenty thousand men from the army of the Sambre and Meuse, and to march them off for Brest. On their way through the interior, it would be easy to stop them when at the point nearest to Paris, and to employ them in the service of the Directory. He offered still more : money would be wanted, as well for the column on march as for a *coup de main*. This he secured in a very clever way. We have seen that the provinces between the Meuse and the Rhine had but an uncertain existence until peace should be made with the empire. They had not been, like Belgium, divided into departments and incorporated with France; they were administered according to martial law and with great prudence by Hoche, who wished to infuse republican ideas into them, and, if he could not obtain their express union with France, to form them into a Cisrhene republic, attached to the French as a daughter to her mother. He had established at Bonn a commission charged with the administration of the country and with receiving the contributions levied as well on this as on the other side of the Rhine. Two millions and some hundred thousand francs were in the coffers of this commission. Hoche forbade it to transfer them to the chest of the army paymaster, because they would then be under the authority of the treasury, and would perhaps even be withdrawn for purposes foreign to the army. He directed the column which he was about to set in motion to be paid up, and nearly two millions to be kept in reserve, either to be offered to the Directory or to be employed for the expedition to Ireland. It was out of political zeal that he committed this infraction of the established regulations, for this young general, who had greater opportunities for enriching himself than any other, was very poor. In doing all this, Hoche conceived that he was executing the orders not of Barras only, but also of Lareveillère-Lepeaux and Rewbel.

Two months had elapsed since the 1st of Prairial, that is, since the opening of the new session : it was now the end of Messidor. Propositions decided upon at Clichy, and submitted to the Five Hundred, had followed one another without intermission. A fresh proposition was preparing, on which the royalist faction laid particular stress. The organization of the national guards was not yet decreed ; the principle was merely introduced into the constitution. The Clichyans were desirous to prepare a force to oppose to the armies, and to get again under arms that youth which had risen in Vendémiaire against the Convention. They had just obtained the appointment of a commission in the Five Hundred to present a plan of organization. Pichegru was its president and reporter. Besides this important measure, the commission of finance had again disguisedly taken up the propositions rejected by the Ancients, and sought to present them in a different manner, in order to procure their adoption in a new shape. These propositions of the Five Hundred, formidable as they were, alarmed the three directors less than the conspiracy at the head of which they saw a celebrated general, and which they supposed to have very extensive ramifications in the councils. Determined to act, they meant first to make certain changes in the ministry, which they deemed necessary for giving more homogeneity to the administration of the state, and more steadiness and decision to the march of the government.

Cochon, minister of the police, though somewhat in disgrace with the royalists, since the prosecution of the three agents of the pretender and the circulars relative to the elections, was not the less entirely devoted to Carnot. With the plans entertained by the Directory, it could not leave

the police in the hands of Cochon. Petiet, minister at war, was in high repute with the royalists; he too was a devoted tool of Carnot's. It would be necessary to exclude him also, that there might not be an enemy to the channel of communication between the armies and the directorial majority. Benezech, minister of the interior, an excellent public functionary, and a docile courtier, was not to be feared by either party; but he was suspected on account of his known partialities and the indulgence shown him by the royalist journals. It was proposed to remove him too, were it but to have in his stead one on whom more reliance could be placed. The three directors had entire confidence in Truguet, minister of the marine, and Charles Delacroix, minister for foreign affairs; but reasons grounded on the interest of the service induced the directors to decide upon changing them. Truguet was a mark for all the shafts of the royalist faction, and he partly deserved their attacks on account of his haughty and violent temper. He was a man of integrity and of great resources, but did not treat individuals with that urbanity which is necessary at the head of a great administration. Besides, he might be employed with advantage in the diplomatic career; and he was himself desirous of superseding General Perignon in Spain, in order to obtain the concurrence of that power in his great plans respecting India. As for Delacroix, he has since proved himself capable of conducting the affairs of a department with ability; but he had neither the dignity nor the information requisite for representing the republic with the European powers. Besides, the directors had a strong desire to see another person, M. de Talleyrand, at the head of the foreign department. The enthusiastic spirit of Madame de Staël was delighted with the cool, keen, and profound mind of M. de Talleyrand. She had placed him in communication with M. Benjamin Constant,* and Benjamin Constant had undertaken to place him in communication with Barras. M. de Talleyrand contrived to make a friend of Barras, as he would have won over to himself more subtle men. After he had been introduced by Madame de Staël to Benjamin Constant, and by Benjamin Constant to Barras, he induced Barras to introduce him to Lareveillière, and he had the art to gain the honest man, as he had gained the dissolute one. He appeared to all a person greatly to be pitied, odious to the emigrants as a partisan of the revolution, disliked by the patriots as a man of high family, and the victim at once of his opinions and his birth. It was agreed to appoint him minister for foreign affairs. The vanity of the directors was flattered by attaching to themselves so distinguished a personage; and they were moreover sure that they were committing the foreign affairs to a clever, well-informed man, and one who was personally acquainted with the whole European diplomacy.

* We quote here the following anecdotes of Benjamin Constant and Madame de Staël, because—although it refers to a rather later period—it is singularly characteristic of these two celebrated personages, and the opportunity of introducing it may not again present itself.

"M. Constant, who was one of Madame de Staël's chief favourites, was a *tribun* in 1799, and had determined to make a speech in his place against the dawning ambition of Napoleon. The night before, he found her in the midst of a brilliant circle of wits and agreeable people; and, observing how much she seemed to be delighted with their society, he took her aside and said, 'If I make my speech to-morrow, this pleasing scene must pass away.'—'Never mind,' she replied, 'we must do what is right.' The speech was spoken accordingly; and next night, before five o'clock, she had ten apologies; and at last sat down in the midst of an empty hall. This proves rather the servility of the good company of Paris, and of Madame de Staël's own select society, than the absolute tyranny of their ruler."—*Edinburgh Review* E.

There were left Ramel, minister of the finances, and Merlin of Douai, minister of justice, who were more hateful to the royalists than all the others together, but who performed the duties of their respective offices with equal zeal and ability. These the three directors would not remove on any account. Thus, out of the seven ministers, they purposed to change Cochon, Petiet, and Benezech, for the sake of public opinion; Truguet and Dalacroix, for the benefit of the service; and to retain only Merlin and Ramel.

In every state whose institutions are representative, whether monarchy or republic, it is by the choice of the ministers that the government indicates its spirit and its march. It is also for the choice of the minister that parties bestir themselves, and they are desirous of influencing the choice as much for the interest of their opinion as for that of their ambition. But if, among the parties, there is one that wishes for more than a mere modification in the system of the government, and aspires to overthrow the existing order of things, that party, dreading reconciliations, wants something more than a change of ministers, abstains from interfering in it, or interferes in order to prevent it. Pichegru and the Clichyans, who were in the secret of the plot, cared but little about the change of the ministry. They, nevertheless, sought admission to Carnot, to converse with him on the subject; but it was rather with a view to sound him and to discover his secret intentions, than to arrive at a result which was in their estimation most insignificant. Carnot had frankly expressed his sentiments to them, and in writing, in his replies to the members who had made overtures to him. He had declared that "he would perish before he would suffer the constitution to be injured, or the powers which it had constituted to be dishonoured"—the literal expressions of one of his letters. He had, therefore, obliged those who came to sound him to confine their remarks to constitutional projects, such as a change of ministers. As for such of the Clichyans as were not initiated in the secrets of the faction, and the constitutionalists, they sincerely desired to obtain a ministerial revolution and to stop there. They rallied, therefore, around Carnot. The members of the Ancients and of the Five Hundred, who have already been named, such as Portalis,* Tronçon-Ducoudray, Lacuée, Dumas, Thibaudeau, Doucet-Pontécoulant, Simeon, Emery, had interviews with Carnot and Barthelemy, and discussed the changes to be made in the ministry. The two ministers whom they particularly desired to have changed were Merlin, the minister of justice, and Ramel, minister of the finances. Having especially attacked the financial system, they were more hostile to the minister of the finances than to any other. They wished also for the removal of Truguet and Charles Delacroix. They were desirous, of course, to retain Cochon.

* "Portalis was a lawyer before the Revolution, and was deputed to the Council of Ancients in 1795, where he showed himself constantly adverse to the directorial party. In 1796 he was chosen president. He was one of the most violent opponents of the law which decreed the sharing of the property of the relations of emigrants with the nation, which he said was a law in opposition to one of the first principles consecrated by legislators, which is, that crimes are personal. In 1797 he voted against popular societies, and proposed to reject, as insufficient, the resolution which suppressed divorce on account of incompatibility of temper. He was soon after inscribed on the transportation list of 1797, but succeeded in withdrawing himself. In 1801 Portalis was intrusted with all the affairs that concerned divine worship. In 1805 he was decorated with the red ribbon, and named grand officer of the Legion of Honour. His published work 'On the Duties of Historians,' gained the prize at the academy of Stockholm, in 1800."—*Biographie Moderne*. E.

Petiet, and Benezech. The two directors, Barthelemy and Carnot, were not difficult to persuade. The weak Barthelemy had no personal opinion. Carnot saw all his friends in the ministers who were to be retained, all his enemies in those to be dismissed. But to this scheme, so readily formed in the coteries of the constitutionalists, it was not so easy to gain the assent of the other three directors, who, having decided upon their course, were for turning out the very men whom the constitutionalists were solicitous to retain.

Carnot, who was unacquainted with the union formed between his three colleagues, Rewbel, Lareveillère, and Barras, and who knew not that Lareveillère was the link which connected the two others, hoped that he would be the easiest to win. He, therefore, advised the constitutionalists to address themselves to him, in order to endeavour to bring him over to their views. They, accordingly, called upon Lareveillère, but found under his moderation an invincible firmness. Lareveillère, unaccustomed, like all the men of his time, to the tactics of representative governments, did not conceive that people could negotiate for the choice of ministers. "Stick to your part," said he, "that is, make laws; leave to us our duties, that of choosing the public functionaries. It is our duty to give a preference according to our conscience and our opinion of the merit of individuals, and not according to the requisitions of parties." He knew not then, neither did any one yet know, that a ministry ought to be composed of influential persons; that these persons ought to be taken from among the existing parties; and that the choice of this or that minister, being a guarantee of the course which is about to be pursued, may fairly become a subject of negotiation. Lareveillère had other reasons for rejecting any compromise. He was conscious that he and his friend Rewbel had never wished or voted but for what was right; he was sure that the directorial majority, whatever might be the personal views of the directors, had never voted otherwise; that in its financial arrangements, without being able to prevent all the subaltern malversations, its administration had been upright and as little vicious as possible under the circumstances; that, in politics, it had never had any personal ambition, and done nothing to extend its prerogatives; that, in the direction of the war, it had aspired only to a speedy, but honourable and glorious peace. Lareveillère could not, therefore, comprehend and admit the reproaches levelled at the Directory. His good conscience rendered them unintelligible to him. Henceforward he beheld in the Clichyens only perfidious conspirators, and in the constitutionalists men whose self-love was galled. He, more than any one, was yet ignorant that the dislike of parties, whether well or ill founded, must be acquiesced in, and that among all other pretensions must be reckoned even those of wounded self-love. Besides, in what the constitutionalists offered there was nothing very attractive. The three coalesced directors wished to give themselves an homogeneous ministry, in order to strike the royalist faction. The constitutionalists, on the contrary, required a ministry totally opposite to that which the directors deemed necessary in the existing danger, and they had nothing to offer in return but their votes, which were by no means numerous, and which, moreover, they would not promise on any question. Their alliance, therefore, had nothing sufficiently alluring to induce the Directory to listen to them and desist from its projects. Lareveillère gave them no satisfaction. In their communications with him they employed Faujas de St. Fonds, the geologist, with whom he was connected by conformity of tastes and studies. All was to no purpose. He con-

cluded with this reply: "Whenever you attack us, you will find us ready. We shall kill you, but politically. You want our blood, but yours shall not be spilt. You shall merely be deprived of the power to injure us."

This firmness caused them to despair of Lareveillère. Carnot advised them to apply to Barras, strongly doubting of success, for he was aware of his hatred. Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse, one of the ardent members of the opposition, and whose fondness for pleasure had frequently brought him into the company of Barras, was commissioned to speak to him. The easy Barras, who promised everybody, though, at bottom, his sentiments were sufficiently decided, was apparently less intractable than Lareveillère. Out of the four ministers whose removal the constitutionalists demanded, namely, Merlin, Ramel, Truguet, and Delacroix, he was willing to change two. It had been so agreed with Rewbel and Lareveillère. He could, therefore, promise for those two, and he engaged that they should be dismissed. But whether, with his usual facility, he promised more than he intended to perform, whether he meant to deceive Carnot and to induce him to demand himself the change of the ministers, or whether his generally ambiguous language was interpreted too favourably, the constitutionalists went and informed Carnot that Barras consented to everything, and would vote with him relative to each of the ministers. The constitutionalists insisted that the change should take place immediately. Carnot and Barthelemy, doubtful of Barras, hesitated to take the initiative. Barras was urged to take it, and he replied, that the journals being extremely inveterate at the moment, the Directory would appear to yield to their violence. Means were tried to silence the journals; but meanwhile Rewbel and Lareveillère, ignorant of these intrigues, themselves took the initiative.

On the 28th of Messidor, Rewbel declared in the sitting of the Directory, that it was high time to come to a decision, that they ought to put an end to the fluctuations of the government, and direct their attention to the change of ministers. He proposed that they should proceed immediately to the ballot. The ballot was secret. Truguet and Delacroix, whom all were for displacing, were unanimously excluded. As for Ramel and Merlin, whom the constitutionalists alone wished to remove, they had but the two votes of Barthelemy and Carnot against them, and they were retained by those of Rewbel, Barras, and Lareveillère. Cochon, Petiet, and Benezech, were turned out by the votes of the same three who had supported Merlin and Ramel. Thus the plan of reform agreed upon by the directorial majority was accomplished. Carnot saw himself beaten, and tried to defer, at least, the appointment of successors, saying that he had not made up his mind on the subject. He was drily told that a director ought always to be prepared, and that he ought not to remove a functionary till he had fixed upon a successor. He was required to vote immediately. The five successors were appointed by the same majority. Ramel was retained in the department of the finances, and Merlin in that of justice; M. de Talleyrand was placed at the head of the foreign affairs, and over the marine an old and brave seaman and an excellent administrator, Pleville le Peley; over the interior François de Neufchâteau, a distinguished writer, but more ingenious than practical; over the police Lenoir Laroche, a prudent and enlightened man, who contributed excellent political articles to the *Moniteur*; lastly, over the war department, the young and illustrious general, to whose aid the three directors resolved to have recourse—Hoche. The latter was not of the age required by the constitution, namely, thirty years. This was well known, but Lareveillère

had proposed to his two colleagues, Rewbel and Barras, to appoint him, even at the risk of being obliged in two days to supersede him, in order to attach him to them and to pay a flattering tribute to the armies. Hence, every one concurred in this change, which became decisive, as we shall presently see. It is common enough to see parties contributing to one and the same event, which they conceive likely to prove beneficial to them. They concur in producing it, but the strongest decides the result in his favour.

Even if he had not possessed the most irritable pride, Carnot must have been indignant, and have conceived himself tricked by Barras. The members of the legislative body who had taken part in the negotiation hastened to him, obtained all the particulars of the sitting of the Directory which had just taken place, inveighed against Barras, called him a cheat, and manifested the warmest indignation. But another event presently increased the agitation, and raised it to the highest pitch. Hoche, on the recommendation of Barras, had set his troops in motion, with the intention of directing them, in reality, upon Brest, but of stopping them for a few days in the vicinity of the capital. He had chosen the legion of the Franks, commanded by Humbert; Lemoigne's division of infantry; the division of horse chasseurs, commanded by Richepanse;* and a regiment of artillery; consisting in the whole of fourteen or fifteen thousand men. Richepanse's division of chasseurs had already arrived at La Ferté-Alais, eleven leagues from Paris. This was an imprudence, for the constitutional radius was twelve leagues, and, till the moment for action arrived, the legal limit ought not to have been overstepped. This imprudence was owing to the error of a commissary at war, who had transgressed the law without being aware of it. To this unlucky circumstance others were added. The troops, seeing the direction which they were ordered to take, and knowing what was passing in the interior, had no doubt that there was an intention of making them march against the Councils. The officers and soldiers said to each other by the way, that they were going to bring the aristocrats of Paris to reason. Hoche had merely apprized the minister at war of a general movement of troops towards Brest, for the expedition against Ireland.

The news of the arrival of Richepanse's chasseurs, the particulars of their march and of their language, reached Petiet, the minister, on the 28th of Messidor. Petiet communicated them to Carnot; and, at the moment when the deputies had hastened in a crowd to pour forth their resentment against the directorial majority, and to express their regrets to the dismissed ministers, they were informed of the march of the troops. Carnot said that the Directory had not to his knowledge issued any order, that, perhaps, the three other directors had held a private deliberation, but in that case, it must be entered in the secret register; that he would ascertain that point, and that it was not right to promulgate the circumstance before he had examined whether there existed any orders. But the deputies were too much irritated to observe any moderation.

The dismissal of the ministers, the march of the troops, and the appoint-

* "Richepanse, son of an officer in the horse regiment of Conti, was born in 1770 became chief of a squadron in 1794, and general of division in 1800. He was distinguished by uncommon presence of mind and intrepidity. His devotion to the Directory having gained him the confidence of Hoche, that general gave him the command of the troops whom he sent to Paris. Richepanse took a brilliant part in the battle of Hohenlinden, and died at Guadaloupe in 1802."—*Biographie Moderne* E

ment of Hoche in the place of Petiet, left no doubt whatever respecting the intentions of the Directory. An outcry was raised that the Directory evidently meant to attack the inviolability of the Councils, to bring about a new 31st of May, and to proscribe the deputies who were faithful to the constitution. A meeting was held at the house of Tronçon-Ducoudray, who was one of the most influential members of the Ancients. The Clichyans, according to the usual custom of extreme parties, had seen with pleasure the moderates, that is, the constitutionalists, disappointed in their hopes, and thwarted in their scheme for composing a ministry to their wishes. They considered them as duped by Barras, and rejoiced at the trick. The danger, nevertheless, appeared serious, when they saw the troops advancing. Their two generals, Pichegru and Willot, knowing that the deputies were assembling at Tronçon-Ducoudray's to confer upon the passing events, repaired thither, though the meeting was composed of men who did not follow the same direction. Pichegru had not yet any real means in his hands; his only resource consisted in the passions of the parties, and wherever they burst forth, thither he was obliged to hasten, either to watch or to act. This meeting was attended by Portalis, Tronçon-Ducoudray, Lacuée, Dumas, Simeon, Doulcet-Pontécoulant, Thibaudeau, Villaret-Joyeuse, Willot, and Pichegru. Great warmth was manifested, as might naturally be expected. They talked of the plans of the Directory; they quoted expressions used by Rewbel, Lareveillère, and Barras, indicating a resolution taken; and they concluded from the change of ministry and the march of troops that this resolution was a *coup de main* against the legislative body. The most violent resolutions were proposed, such as to suspend the Directory, to place it under accusation, or even to outlaw it. But to execute all these resolutions a force would have been requisite, and Thibaudeau, who did not participate in the general excitement, asked where they were to find it. To this it was replied, that they had the twelve hundred grenadiers of the legislative body, part of the 21st regiment of chasseurs, commanded by Malo, and the national guard of Paris; that, during the reorganization of that guard, they could send into every district of the capital companies of grenadiers to rally around them the citizens who had taken arms in Vendémiaire. After much discussion, nothing was agreed upon, as is almost always the case when the means are not real. Pichegru, cold and reserved as usual, made some observations on the insufficiency and danger of the means proposed, the sedateness of which formed a contrast to the general excitement. The meeting broke up, and the members returned to Carnot's and to the residences of the dismissed ministers. Carnot disapproved of all the plans proposed against the Directory. A second meeting was held at Tronçon-Ducoudray's; but Pichegru and Willot were not there. Much discussion again took place, and the members, not daring to recur to violent measures, at length resolved to intrench themselves in constitutional means. They agreed to demand the law relative to the responsibility of ministers, and the immediate organization of the national guard.

At Clichy, they declaimed as elsewhere, and to no better purpose; for, if the passions were more violent, the means were not more effective. They particularly regretted the police, which had just been taken from Cochoy, and reverted to one of the favourite schemes of the faction, that of wresting the police of Paris from the Directory and giving it to the legislative body, by straining the meaning of an article of the constitution. It was proposed at the same time to give the direction of this police to

Cochon; but the proposition was so bold, that none *dut* move it. They agreed upon the idea of quibbling about the age of Barras, who, they said, was not forty years old at the time of his appointment to the Directory, and of demanding the instantaneous organization of the national guard.

Accordingly, on the 30th of Messidor, there was a great tumult in the Five Hundred. Delahaye, the deputy, denounced the march of the troops, and moved that the report on the national guard should be presented immediately. Others warmly censured the conduct of the Directory; painted in alarming colours the state of Paris, and the arrival of a multitude of known revolutionists; and demanded that a discussion should be opened with regard to the political societies. It was decided that the report on the national guard should be made the day after the next, and that immediately afterwards the discussion respecting the clubs should be opened. On the day after the next, the 2d of Thermidor, further particulars had arrived concerning the march of the troops and their number, and it was known that there were already four regiments of cavalry at La Ferté-Alais.

Pichegru made the report on the organization of the national guard. His *projet* was conceived in the most perfidious manner. All the French enjoying the quality of citizens were to be inscribed in the list of the national guard; but all were not to compose the effective force of that guard. Those who were to be on duty were to be chosen by the others, that is, to be elected by the mass. In this manner the national guard was to be formed, like the Councils, by the electoral assemblies; and the result of the elections showed what kind of guard would be obtained by these means. It was to be composed of one battalion per canton; in each battalion there was to be a company of grenadiers and of chasseurs, so as to re-establish those select companies, which were always composed of the most violent men, and were usually employed by the parties for the execution of their views. It was proposed to vote the adoption of the plan immediately. The fiery Henri Larivière declared that everything announced a 31st of May. "Let us go then! let us go!" cried some voices of the left, interrupting him. "Yes!" he resumed, "but I am cheered when I consider that this is the 2d of Thermidor, and that we are near the 9th, a day fatal to tyrants." He proposed that the *projet* should be instantly voted and that a message should be sent to the Ancients, requesting them to remain sitting, that they too might vote it before they broke up. Thibaudeau, the leader of the constitutional party, justly remarked that, whatever diligence might be used, the national guard could not be organized in less than a month; that their precipitation to vote an important *projet* would therefore be unavailing to secure the legislative body from the dangers with which it was threatened; that the national representation ought to envelop itself in its rights and its dignity, and not to seek its force in means which at the moment were impotent. He proposed a deliberate discussion. An adjournment of twenty-four hours for the consideration of the *projet* was adopted, but the principle of the reorganization was immediately afterwards decreed. At this moment a message arrived from the Directory, giving explanations concerning the march of the troops. This message stated that the troops bound for a distant destination could not help passing near Paris; that, owing to the inadvertence of an army commissary, they had overstepped the constitutional limit; that the error of the commissary was the sole cause of this infraction of the laws; and that, moreover, the troops had received orders to fall back immediately. This explanation was not satisfactory. After much extremely violent declamation, a commission was

appointed to examine this message, and to make a report on the state of Paris and the march of the troops. On the following day the discussion of Pichegru's *projet* commenced, and four of its articles were voted. The assembly then turned its attention to the clubs, which were springing up on all sides, and seemed to indicate a rally of the Jacobin party. It was proposed to prohibit them absolutely, because the laws which restricted them were always evaded. It was decreed that no political assembly should be permitted for the future.

Thus the society of Clichy committed a sort of suicide, and consented to its own dissolution on condition of destroying the Constitutional Circle, and the other subordinate clubs which were forming in all quarters. The leaders of the Clichy had, in fact, no need of that tumultuous assemblage for concerting their measures, and they could sacrifice it without depriving themselves of any great resource. Willot then denounced Barras as not having attained the age required by the constitution at the time when he was appointed director; but an examination of the registers of the war-office proved that this was a mere quibble. Meanwhile other troops had arrived at Rheims. Fresh alarm was excited. The Directory repeated the former explanation, which was declared insufficient, and the commission already appointed was directed to investigate and report.

Hoche had arrived in Paris, for he must have gone thither, whether he had to proceed to Brest or to execute a stroke of policy. He presented himself without fear to the Directory, certain that, in ordering his divisions to march, he had obeyed the directorial majority. But Carnot, who was at this moment president of the Directory, strove to intimidate him. He asked by virtue of what order he had acted, and threatened him with an accusation for having passed the constitutional limits. Unfortunately, Rewbel and Lareveillère, who were not informed of the order given to Hoche, could not support him. Barras, who had given the order, had not the courage to speak, so that Hoche was left exposed to the peremptory questions of Carnot. He replied that he could not go to Brest without troops. Carnot rejoined that there were still forty-three thousand men in Bretagne, a number sufficient for the expedition. At length Lareveillère, perceiving the embarrassment of Hoche, stepped in to his aid, expressed in the name of the majority of the Directory the esteem and confidence which his services had merited, assured him that an accusation against him was out of the question, and broke up the sitting.* Hoche hastened to Lareveillère's, to thank him. He there learned that Barras had not informed either Rewbel or Lareveillère of the movement of the troops, that he had given the order without their knowledge; and he was indignant against Barras, who, after compromising, had not the courage to defend him. It was evident that Barras, in acting separately, without apprizing his two colleagues, was desirous of holding singly in his own hand the means of execution. Hoche, incensed, treated Barras with his usual haughtiness, and gave all his esteem to Rewbel and Lareveillère. Nothing was yet ready for the execution of the design contemplated by the three directors; and Barras, in calling Hoche, had compromised him to no purpose. Hoche returned immediately to his head-quarters, which were at Wetzlar, and ordered the troops which he had brought to be cantoned in the environs of

* "Carnot, from this moment, became convinced that his ruin had been determined on by his colleagues. Barras and Lareveillère had long borne him a secret grudge, which sprung from his having signed the warrant, during the Reign of Terror, for the arrest of Danton, who was the leader of their party."—*Alison*. E.

Rheims and Sedan, where they would still be at hand to march for Paris. He was extremely disgusted by the conduct of Barras towards him; but he was ready to devote himself again, if Lareveillère and Rewbel should give him the signal. He was deeply compromised: some talked of accusing him; but he awaited with firmness at his head-quarters what the majority of the Five Hundred, incensed against him, might attempt. His age being a bar to his acceptance of the ministry at war, Scherer was appointed to it in his stead.

The sensation which had been produced no longer admitted of the employment of Hoche in the execution of the projects of the Directory. Besides, the importance which such a participation must give him might excite the jealousy of the other generals. It was not impossible that Bonaparte might take it amiss that any but himself should be applied to. It was thought that it would be better not to make use of any of the generals-in-chief, but to select one of the most distinguished generals of division. The directors conceived the idea of asking Bonaparte for one of the generals who had gained such celebrity under his command; which would have the advantage of satisfying him personally, and at the same time of not offending any of the generals-in-chief. But, while they were thinking of addressing themselves to him, he interfered in the quarrel in a manner most annoying to the counter-revolutionists, and embarrassing at least to the Directory. He chose the anniversary of the 14th of July, corresponding with the 26th of Messidor, for giving a festival to the armies, and causing addresses to be drawn up relative to the events which were preparing. He ordered a pyramid to be erected at Milan, bearing trophies and the names of all the officers and soldiers who had fallen during the campaign in Italy. Around this pyramid the festival was held. It was magnificent. Bonaparte attended it in person, and addressed to his soldiers a threatening proclamation:

"Soldiers!" said he, "this day is the anniversary of the 14th of July. You see before you the names of your companions in arms who have died on the field of honour for the liberty of the country. They have left you an example. You owe yourselves wholly and entirely to the republic; you owe yourselves wholly and entirely to the happiness of thirty millions of French; you owe yourselves wholly and entirely to the glory of that name which has received fresh lustre from your victories.

"Soldiers! I know that you are deeply affected by the calamities which threaten the country. But the country cannot incur any real dangers. The same men who have caused it to triumph over coalesced Europe, are there. Mountains separate us from France; you will cross them with the rapidity of the eagle, in case of need, to maintain the constitution, to defend liberty, to protect the government and the republicans.

"Soldiers! the government is watching over the laws which are committed to its care. The royalists, the moment they appear, will have ceased to live. Be not uneasy, but let us swear by the manes of the heroes who have died by our side for liberty, let us swear upon our new colours, implacable war against the enemies of the republic, and of the constitution of the year III!"

There was afterwards an entertainment, at which the most energetic toasts were given by the generals and the officers. The general gave for the first toast, the brave Stengel, Laharpe, and Dubois, who had fallen in the field of honour. "May their manes," said he, "watch over us, and protect us from the ambuscades of our enemies!" The company then drank to the constitution of the year III, to the Directory, to the Council

of the Ancients, to the French murdered in Verona, to the *re-emigration of the emigrants*, to the union of the French republicans, to the destruction of the club of Clichy. At this last toast the trumpets sounded a charge. Similar festivities took place in all the towns where there were divisions of the army, and they were celebrated with the same parade. Addresses were afterwards drawn up in each division. These were still more significant than the proclamation of the general-in-chief.* He had observed a certain dignity; but the whole Jacobin phraseology of 1793 was introduced into the addresses of the different divisions of the army; and especially into those of Massena's, Joubert's, and Augereau's division. That of Augereau, in particular, exceeded all bounds. "Tremble," it said, "O conspirators! From the Adige and the Rhine to the Seine is but a step. Tremble! your iniquities are numbered, and the price of them is at the point of our bayonets!"

These addresses were subscribed by thousands of signatures and sent to the commander-in-chief. He packed them up and transmitted them to the Directory with his proclamation, that they might be printed and published in the newspapers. Such a step indicated clearly enough that he was ready to march to put down the faction formed in the Councils, and to lend his assistance to the execution of a stroke of policy. At the same time, knowing the Directory to be divided, seeing that the scene was becoming complicated, and wishing to be informed of everything, he selected one of his aides-de-camp, M. de Lavalette, in whom he placed great confidence, and who possessed the penetration necessary for forming a correct judgment of events. He sent him off to Paris, with orders to observe everything and to collect all the information he could. At the same time, he made an offer of funds to the Directory, in case it should need them, if it intended to attempt any act of vigour.

When the Directory received these addresses, it was extremely embarrassed. They were in some measure illegal, for the armies had no right to deliberate. To give them a favourable reception, and to publish them, was to authorize the armies to interfere in the government of the state, and to deliver up the republic to the military power. But how was it to escape this danger? In addressing itself to Hoche, in applying to him for troops, in asking Bonaparte for a general, had not the government itself provoked this interference? Obligated to have recourse to force, to overstep the bounds of legality, could it apply to other supporters than the armies? To receive these addresses was but the consequence of what it had done, of what it had been obliged to do. Such was the destiny of our unfortunate republic, that, to extricate itself from its enemies, it was obliged to put itself in the power of the armies. It was the dread of a counter-revolution, which, in 1793, had thrown the republic into the excesses and horrors whose melancholy history we have seen; it was the dread of counter-revolution which now obliged it to throw itself into the arms of the soldiery; in short, it was always to avoid the same danger that it had recourse sometimes to passions, at others to bayonets.

* The address of one of the divisions commenced in the following significant manner: "Of all the animals produced by the caprice of nature, the vilest is a king, the most cowardly is a courtier, the worst is a priest. If the scoundrels who disturb France are not crushed by the forces you (the Directory) possess, call to your aid the 29th demi-brigade; it will soon discomfit all your enemies; Chouans, English, all will take to flight. We will pursue the unworthy citizens even into the chambers of their unworthy patron, George . . .!" E.

The Directory would fain have kept these addresses secret, and not published them, on account of the bad example; but it would have grievously offended the general, and perhaps have pushed him towards the enemies of the republic. It was, therefore, compelled to print and circulate them. They struck terror into the Clichyan party, and made it sensible of the egregious imprudence which it had committed in attacking, by Dumolard's motion, the conduct of General Bonaparte at Venice. They gave rise to fresh complaints in the Councils, to invectives against this interference of the armies; it was said that they had no right to deliberate, and herein was discovered a new proof of the designs imputed to the Directory.

Bonaparte caused the Directory fresh embarrassment by the general of division whom he sent it. Augereau excited a kind of agitation in the army by the violence of his opinions, every way worthy of the fauxbourg St. Antoine. He was ready to fall out with any one who was less violent than himself, and Bonaparte was afraid of a quarrel among his generals. To get rid of him, he sent him to the Directory,* conceiving that he would be very fit for the purpose for which he was destined, and that he would be better in Paris than at head-quarters, where want of occupation rendered him dangerous. Augereau was delighted; for he was as fond of the agitations of clubs as of fields of battle; and he was not insensible to power. He set out immediately, and arrived in Paris in the middle of Thermidor. Bonaparte wrote to his aide-de-camp, Lavalette, that he sent him because he could not keep him any longer in Italy; he cautioned him to be on his guard against him, and desired him to continue his observations, keeping himself constantly aloof from him. He also recommended to him to show the greatest civility to Carnot; for, though he declared decidedly in favour of the Directory against the counter-revolutionary faction, he wished not to enter in the slightest degree into the personal quarrels of the directors.

The Directory was far from pleased to see Augereau arrive. That general was the right sort of man for Barras, who liked to have Jacobins and patriots of the fauxbourgs about him, and who was always talking of mounting his horse; but he did not suit Rewbel and Lareveillère, who wished for a prudent, temperate general, and one who could make common cause with them against the schemes of Barras. Augereau could not have been better pleased than to find himself in Paris on such a mission. He was a brave man and an excellent soldier, but a great braggart; he possessed a generous heart, but a weak head. He went about in Paris, receiving entertainments, enjoying the celebrity gained by his exploits, but attributing to himself part of the operations of the army of Italy, willingly allowing it to be supposed that he had suggested to the general-in-chief his most brilliant plans, and incessantly repeating that he would soon bring the aristocrats to reason. Lareveillère and Rewbel, sorry for this, resolved

"Bonaparte despatched Augereau to Paris, ostensibly for the purpose of presenting the standards taken at Mantua, but in reality to command the armed force which the majority of the Directory had determined to employ against their dissentient colleagues, and the opponents of their measures in the national councils. Augereau was a blunt, bold, stupid soldier, a devoted Jacobin, whose principles were sufficiently well known to warrant his standing upon no constitutional delicacies. But, in case the Directory failed, Napoleon kept himself in readiness to march upon Lyons at the head of fifteen thousand men. There, rallying the republicans, he would, according to his own well-chosen expression, have crossed the Rubicon at the head of the popular party, and ended, doubtless, like Cæsar, by usurping the supreme command."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E.

to court him, and, by addressing his vanity, to bring him back to some degree of moderation. Lareveillère caressed him much, and succeeded in taming him, partly by clever flatteries, partly by the respect with which he contrived to inspire him. He made him sensible that he was not wanted to dishonour himself by a sanguinary affray, but to acquire the title of saviour of the republic by a wise and energetic act, which should disarm the factions without spilling blood. He calmed Augereau, and at length rendered him more reasonable. He was immediately invested with the command of the 17th military division, comprehending Paris. This new step sufficiently denoted the intentions of the Directory. Its resolutions were fixed. Hoche's troops were within a few marches. There needed but a signal to bring them to the capital. It was only waiting for the funds promised by Bonaparte, as it would not take money from the treasury, lest it should compromise Ramel, the minister who was so strictly watched by the commission of finance. These funds were partly destined to gain the grenadiers of the legislative body, who were twelve hundred in number, and who, without being formidable, might, by resisting, bring on a battle, which the Directors were particularly solicitous to avoid. This business was intrusted to Barras, ever fertile in intrigues, and this was the motive for deferring the meditated blow.

The events in the interior had a most pernicious influence on the highly important negotiations opened between the republic and the powers of Europe. The implacable faction leagued against the liberty and the repose of France, was about to add to its long catalogue of faults that of compromising the peace which had been so long expected. Lord Malmesbury had arrived at Lille, and the Austrian ministers had conferred at Montebello with Bonaparte and Clarke, the two plenipotentiaries appointed to represent France. The preliminaries of Leoben, signed on the 29th of Germinal (April 18), purported that two congresses should be opened, the one general at Berne, for peace with the emperor and his allies, the other particular at Rastadt, for peace with the Empire; that the peace with the emperor should be concluded within three months, otherwise the preliminaries were to be null and void; that nothing should be done in the Venetian states unless in concert with Austria, but that the Venetian provinces should not be occupied by the emperor till after the conclusion of peace. The occurrences at Venice seemed to derogate somewhat from these conditions, and Austria showed much haste to derogate from them more formally, on her part, by occupying the Venetian provinces of Istria and Dalmatia. Bonaparte winked at this infraction of the preliminaries, in order to spare recriminations in regard to what he had done at Venice, and what he was about to do in the islands of the Levant. The exchange of the ratifications took place at Montebello, near Milan, on the 5th of Prairial (May 24). The Marquis de Gallo, the Neapolitan minister at Vienna, was the emperor's envoy. After the exchange of the ratifications, Bonaparte conferred with M. de Gallo, for the purpose of inducing him to forego the idea of a congress at Berne, and to prevail on him to treat separately in Italy, without calling in the other powers. The reasons which he had to assign, tending even to the interest of Austria herself, were excellent. How could Russia and England, if they were called to this congress, allow Austria to indemnify herself at the expense of Venice, whose possessions they coveted themselves? It was impossible, and the very interest of Austria, as well as the necessity of a speedy conclusion, required that they confer immediately, and in Italy.

M. de Gallo, a sagacious and intelligent man, felt the force of these reasons. In order to decide him and to gain the Austrian cabinet, Bonaparte made a concession of etiquette, to which the cabinet of Vienna attached great importance. The emperor still apprehended that the republic would reject the ancient ceremonial of the kings of France, and insist on the alternative in the protocol of the treaties. The emperor was yet solicitous to be named first, and to retain for his ambassadors the precedence before the ambassadors of France. Bonaparte, who had, at his desire, been authorized by the Directory to concede such trifles, assented to the demand of M. de Gallo. The joy was so great that M. de Gallo immediately adopted the principle of a separate negotiation, and wrote to Vienna to obtain powers in consequence. But old Thugut, infirm, a humourist, entirely attached to the English system, and every moment tendering his resignation, since the courts, influenced by the Archduke Charles, seemed to incline to a contrary system—Thugut had other views. He was displeased with the peace; the internal disturbances in France excited hopes which he was fond of indulging, though they had so often proved deceitful. Though Austria had been led into many false steps and a disastrous war, by giving ear to the emigrants, still Pichegru's new conspiracy suggested to Thugut the idea of deferring the conclusion of peace. He resolved to oppose wilful delays to the urgency of the French plenipotentiaries. He caused the proceeding of the Marquis de Gallo to be disavowed, and another negotiator, Major-general Count de Meerveldt, to be despatched to Montebello. This negotiator arrived on the 1st of Messidor (June 19), and demanded the execution of the preliminaries, that is, the assembling of the congress at Berne. Bonaparte, indignant at this change of system, returned a very warm reply. He repeated all that he had previously urged in regard to the impossibility of obtaining the adhesion of England and Russia to arrangements the basis of which had been fixed at Leoben; he added, that a congress would occasion fresh delay; that two months had already elapsed since the signing of the preliminaries of Leoben; that, according to those preliminaries, peace ought to be concluded in three months, and it would be impossible to conclude it in that time, if all the powers were to be summoned. These reasons again left the Austrian plenipotentiaries without reply. The court of Vienna appeared to give way, and fixed the conferences at Udine, in the Venetian states, that the place of negotiation might be nearer to Vienna. They were to recommence on the 13th of Messidor (July 1).

Bonaparte, whom business of high importance detained at Milan* amidst the new republics that were about to be founded, and who, moreover, was anxious to watch the events at Paris as closely as possible, would not suffer himself to be dragged to no purpose to Udine, merely to be there trifled with by Thugut. He, therefore, sent Clarke, and declared that he should

* "Napoleon established himself at the chateau of Montebello, near Milan. There the future Emperor of the West held his court in more than regal splendour; and there weightier matters were to be determined, and dearer interests were at stake, than had ever been submitted to European diplomacy since the iron crown was placed on the brows of Charlemagne. Josephine there received the homage due to the transcendent glories of her youthful husband; Pauline displayed those charms which afterwards shone with such lustre at the court of the Tuileries, and the ladies of Italy, captivated by the splendour of the spectacle, hastened to swell the illustrious train. Already Napoleon acted as a sovereign prince; his power exceeded that of any living monarch; and he had entered on that dazzling existence which afterwards entranced and subdued the world."—*Alison*. E.

not repair thither in person, until he was convinced, by the nature of the powers given to the two negotiators, and by their conduct in the negotiation, of the sincerity of the court of Vienna. It actually turned out that he was not mistaken. The cabinet of Vienna, more than ever imposed upon by the miserable agents of the royalist faction, flattered itself that it should be dispensed, by a revolution, from treating with the Directory, and it caused notes, strange in the then state of the negotiation, to be delivered. These notes, dated July 18 (Messidor 30), stated that the court of Vienna intended to adhere strictly to the preliminaries, and, consequently, to treat for a general peace at Berne; that the term of three months, fixed by the preliminaries for the conclusion of peace, could only be meant to commence from the meeting of the congress, otherwise it would have been too insufficient to be stipulated; that, in consequence, the court of Vienna, in accordance with the tenor of those preliminaries, demanded a general congress of all the powers. These notes, contained, likewise, bitter complaints on the occurrences at Venice and Genoa; they maintained that these occurrences were a serious infraction of the preliminaries of Leoben, and that France ought to give satisfaction for them.

On receiving these very strange notes, Bonaparte was filled with indignation. His first idea was to collect all the divisions of his army immediately, to resume the offensive, to advance once more upon Vienna, and to insist this time on less moderate conditions than at Leoben. But the internal state of France, and the conferences opened at Lille, checked this impulse, and he conceived that it was right, at this important juncture, to leave the Directory, placed as it was at the centre of all the operations, to decide the conduct to be pursued. He contented himself with instructing Clarke to draw up a vigorous note. This note was to the following effect: That it was no longer time to demand a congress, the impossibility of which had been acknowledged by the Austrian plenipotentiaries, and which the court had itself given up, in fixing the conferences at Udine; that this congress was not without motive, since the allies of Austria were separating themselves from her, and showing an intention of treating singly, which was proved by the conferences at Lille; that the term of three months could only be meant to commence from the day of the signature at Leoben, otherwise, by deferring the opening of the congress, there might be no end to delays, which France wished to prevent by fixing a positive term; that, finally, the preliminaries had not been violated in the conduct pursued towards Venice and Genoa; that those two countries had a right to change their government; that no one ought to find fault with them for it; and finally, that Austria had much more seriously violated the preliminaries in taking possession of Istria and Dalmatia, contrary to all the written conventions. After thus replying in a firm and dignified manner, Bonaparte referred the whole to the Directory, and awaited its orders, recommending to it as speedy a decision as possible, because it was of importance to resume hostilities before the arrival of the unfavourable season, if he should have to recommence them.

The negotiation, opened at Lille, was conducted with more sincerity, which cannot but appear singular, since it was with Pitt that the French negotiators had to treat. But Pitt was really alarmed at the situation of England. He had ceased to reckon at all upon Austria; he placed no confidence in the lying representations of the royalist agents, and wished to treat with France, before peace with the emperor should render her stronger and more exacting. If then he had in the last year desired only to shuffle,

for the purpose of satisfying public opinion and preventing an arrangement in regard to the Netherlands, this year he sincerely wished to treat, even though the peace should last no longer than two or three years. This downright Englishman could not, in fact, consent to leave the Netherlands definitively to France.

Everything proved his sincerity, as we have observed, both in the selection of Lord Malmesbury, and the secret instructions given to that negotiator. According to the practice of English diplomacy, all was so arranged that there should be two negotiations at once; the one official and apparent, the other secret and real. Mr. Ellis had been given to Lord Malmesbury, in order to conduct with his assent the secret negotiation, and to correspond directly with Pitt. This practice of English diplomacy is compulsory in a representative government. In the official negotiation nothing more is said than may be repeated in the two houses of parliament, and what cannot be published is reserved for the secret negotiation. When, in particular, the ministry is divided on the question of peace, the secret conferences are communicated to that portion of the ministry which authorizes and directs the negotiation. The English legation arrived at Lille with a numerous retinue, and in great state, on the 16th of Messidor (July 4).

The negotiators chosen to represent France were Letourneur, who had recently quitted the Directory, Pleville le Peley, who staid but a few days at Lille on account of his appointment to the ministry of the marine, and Hugues Maret, since Duke of Bassano.* Of these three ministers the latter alone was capable of performing a useful part in the negotiation. Young, initiated early into diplomatic life, he combined with much intelligence manners which had become rare in France since the Revolution. He was

* "Hugues Bernard Maret was born of a respectable family in 1763. Early in life he applied to the study of the law, but when the Revolution broke out turned his attention to diplomacy. He constantly attended the sittings of the States-general, and compressed on paper the substance of every remarkable harangue. By the advice of friends he published these reports daily, and their success was so great that he was engaged to contribute them to the *Moniteur*, which, in consequence, increased tenfold in a single month. The diplomatic career of Maret commenced at Hamburg as secretary of legation. He was afterwards transferred to Brussels with increased powers, but his most important duty was a mission to London, the object of which was to negotiate a peace. The negotiation, however, was indignantly broken off by our ministry, on learning the death of Louis XVI. On his return to Paris, Maret was nominated minister plenipotentiary to Naples, but on his way thither he was arrested by the Austrians and thrown into prison at Mantua, whence he was transferred to a healthier fortress in the Tyrol. Here he devoted his days to literary pursuits; formed a composition which served for ink; and with the stump of an old pen which he found in a corner of his room, wrote two or three comedies as well as one tragedy, on some slips of paper which he begged or stole from his gaoler. But this was not all; for with a piece of coal he actually covered the four walls of his dungeon with scientific disquisitions. After twenty-two months' confinement, Maret and some others were exchanged for the Duchess d'Angoulême; and he was appointed by the Directory to assist in the negotiations with Lord Malmesbury at Lille. For some time afterwards he remained without employment, but on the return of Bonaparte he assisted him in overthrowing the Directory. From this period the history of Maret becomes that of his master, to whom he proved a most useful acquisition. In 1811, having been previously created Duke of Bassano, he succeeded Champagny as minister for foreign affairs; on which occasion Talleyrand observed, 'In all France I know but one greater ass than Maret, and that is, the Duke of Bassano.' During the Hundred Days he was minister of the interior and secretary of state, and distinguished himself by his moderation. He was present at Waterloo, where he was nearly taken prisoner, and, on the return of the Bourbons, was exiled to Gratz, in Styria, but at the end of five years was permitted to return to France. In 1826 he was residing on his estate in Burgundy, and wholly devoted to the education and establishment of his children."—*Court and Camp of Bonaparte*. E.

indebted to M. de Talleyrand for his introduction to public affairs ; and on this occasion he had concerted with him that one of the two should have the ministry for foreign affairs, and the other the mission to Lille. M. Maret had been sent twice to London in the early period of the Revolution. He had been favourably received by Pitt, and had made himself well acquainted with the English cabinet. He was therefore a very fit person to represent France at Lille. He repaired thither with his two colleagues, and they arrived at the same time as the English legation. It is usually not in the public conferences that diplomatic business is really transacted. The English negotiators, full of tact and dexterity, would have been glad to meet the French negotiator on familiar terms, and had too much good sense to feel any dislike. On the contrary, Letourneur and Pleville le Peley, upright men, but unaccustomed to diplomacy, had much of the revolutionary wildness. They considered the two Englishmen as dangerous persons, ready to intrigue and to deceive, against whom it was necessary for them to be upon the guard. They refused to see them unless officially, being afraid of compromising themselves by any other communication. It was not in this manner that a good understanding could be brought about.

Lord Malmesbury notified his powers, in which the conditions of the treaty were left blank, and demanded the conditions of France. The three French negotiators stated the conditions which, as it may be conceived, were a very high *maximum*. They required that the King of England should renounce the title of King of France, which he continued to assume, according to one of those ridiculous customs retained in England ; that he should give up all the ships taken at Toulon ; that he should restore to France, Spain, and Holland, all the colonies which he had taken from them. In exchange for all these concessions, France, Spain, and Holland, offered nothing but peace, for they had not taken anything from England. France, it is true, was important enough to require much ; but to demand everything for herself and her allies, and to give up nothing, was to renounce any arrangement. Lord Malmesbury, who wished to arrive at real results, saw clearly that the official negotiation would lead to nothing and strove to bring about a more confidential intercourse. M. Maret, more familiar than his colleagues with diplomatic usages, readily assented to this, but he was obliged to negotiate with Letourneur and Pleville le Peley in order to prevail on them to meet the English envoys at the theatre. The young men of the two embassies were the first to associate together, and they were soon on the most friendly footing. France had so completely broken with the past since the Revolution, that it cost great pains to replace her in her old relations with the other powers. There had been nothing of the sort to do in the preceding year, because then the negotiation was not sincere ; the parties had only aimed at eluding one another ; but this year it was requisite to come to efficacious and kindly communications. Lord Malmesbury caused M. Maret to be sounded with a view to engage him in a private negotiation. Maret, before he assented to it, wrote to Paris to obtain authority to do so from the French ministry. This was granted without difficulty, and he immediately entered into conferences with the English negotiators.

There was no longer any idea of contesting the possession of the Netherlands or discussing the new position in which Holland was placed in regard to France ; but England was desirous of keeping some of the principal colonies which she had conquered, to indemnify herself as well for the expenses of the war as for the concessions which she should make us

She consented to restore to us all our colonies; she even agreed to renounce all pretensions to St. Domingo, and to assist us to re-establish our sway there; but she insisted on indemnifying herself at the expense of Holland and Spain. Thus she refused to restore to Spain the island of Trinidad, which she had taken, and which was a colony of high importance, from its position at the entrance of the sea of the Antilles. Among the possessions taken from the Dutch, she meant to keep the Cape of Good Hope, which commands the navigation of the two oceans, and Trincomalee, the principal port of the island of Ceylon; she was willing to exchange the town of Negapatnam, on the Coromandel coast, for the town and fort of Cochin, on the coast of Malabar, which was an important settlement for her. As for the renunciation of the title of the King of France, the English negotiators resisted it on account of the royal family, which was by no means disposed to peace, and whose vanity it was requisite to spare. With respect to the ships taken at Toulon, which had been already equipped and armed in the English fashion, they deemed it too ignominious to restore them, and offered an indemnity in money of twelve millions (500,000*l.*). Malmesbury assured Maret that he durst not return to London after restoring everything, and not retaining for the English people any of the conquests acquired at the expense of their blood and treasure. To prove his sincerity he moreover showed all the secret instructions sent to Mr. Ellis, which furnished evidence of the desire of Pitt to obtain peace. These conditions deserved consideration.

A circumstance which happened all at once, gave great advantage to the French negotiators. Besides the junction of the Spanish, Dutch, and French squadrons at Brest, a junction that depended on the first gale which should blow Admiral Jervis from Cadiz, England had another danger to apprehend. Portugal, terrified by France and Spain, had just abandoned her ancient ally and entered into a treaty with France. The principal condition was, that she should not admit more than six armed vessels belonging to the belligerent powers at once. England would thus lose her invaluable station in the Tagus. This unexpected treaty placed the English negotiators somewhat at the mercy of M. Maret. They began to discuss the definitive conditions. Trinidad was not to be wrested from them. As for the Cape of Good Hope, which was the most important object, it was at length agreed that it should be restored to Holland, but on one express condition, that France should never take advantage of her ascendancy over Holland to possess herself of it. This was what England most dreaded. She was less anxious to hold it herself than to keep it out of our hands, and the restitution of that colony was agreed to on condition that we should never have it. With regard to Trincomalee, which carried with it the possession of Ceylon, it was to be kept by the English, but still with the appearance of the alternative. A Dutch garrison was to take turns with an English garrison; but it was agreed that this should be a merely illusory formality, and that this port should actually belong to the English. As to the exchange of Cochin for Negapatnam, the English adhered to this point, but without making it a condition *sine quâ non*. The twelve millions were accepted for the ships taken at Toulon. As for the title of King of France, it was agreed that, without formally abdicating, the King of England should cease to assume it.

Such was the point, at which the reciprocal pretensions of the negotiators had stopped. Letourneur, who was left alone with Maret, since the departure of Pleville le Peley, appointed to the ministry of the marine, was

completely ignorant of the secret negotiation. M. Maret indemnified him for his nullity by yielding to him all the external honours, all the matters of state, of which this honest and easy man was very tenacious. M. Maret had communicated all the particulars of the negotiation to the Directory, and awaited its decisions. Never had France and England been so near a reconciliation. It was evident that the negotiation of Lille was wholly unconnected with that of Udine, and that England was acting on her part without seeking any concert with Austria.*

The decision to be adopted on the subject of these negotiations could not fail to agitate the Directory more than any other question. The royalist faction furiously demanded peace without wishing for it; the constitutionalists desired it sincerely, even at the price of some sacrifices; the republicans desired it without sacrifices, and they were tenacious above all of the glory of the republic. They would have insisted on the entire emancipation of Italy, and the restitution of the colonies of our allies, even at the price of a new campaign. The opinions of the five directors were dictated by their position. Carnot and Barthelemy voted for accepting the conditions of Austria and England; the other three directors maintained the contrary opinion. These questions served to complete the rupture between the two parts of the Directory. Barras bitterly censured Carnot for the preliminaries of Leoben, and spoke of him in no very measured terms. Carnot, on his part, said with reference to these conditions, that *it would not be right to oppress Austria*; which meant that, in order to render the peace durable, the conditions ought to be moderate. But his colleagues took these expressions highly amiss, and Rewbel asked him if he was a minister of Austria or a magistrate of the French republic. The three directors, on receiving Bonaparte's despatches, were for breaking immediately and resuming hostilities. But the agitated state of the republic, the fear of giving new arms to the enemies of the government, and of furnishing them with a pretext for saying that the Directory never would make peace, induced the directors to temporize longer. They wrote to Bonaparte, that they must wait till the measure of patience was full, and till the insincerity of Austria should be proved in an evident manner, and the resumption of hostilities could be imputed to her alone.

With respect to the conferences at Lille, the question was not less embarrassing. For France, the decision was easy, since everything was to be restored to her; but, as it concerned Spain, which was to be deprived of Trinidad, and Holland, which was to lose Trincomalee, the question was a difficult one to resolve. Carnot, whose new position obliged him to be always in favour of peace, voted for the adoption of these conditions, though not very generous, towards our allies. As the directors were greatly dissatisfied with Holland and the parties which divided her, Carnot advised that she should be left to herself, and that France should take no farther concern in her fate—a piece of advice equally ungenerous with that of sacrificing the colonies. Rewbel was extremely warm upon this question. A passionate advocate for the interests of France, even to injustice, he wished that, so far from abandoning Holland, the French should make themselves all-powerful in that country, and turn it into a province of the

* "The moderation of the demands made by England on this occasion, was such as to call forth the commendations even of her adversaries; and the negotiations might have terminated in a general pacification had it not been for the revolution of the 18th of Fructidor, which occurred soon after, and the consequent accession of violence and presumption which it brought to the French government."—*Alison*. E.

republic; and he particularly opposed, with all his might, the adoption of the article by which France renounced possession forever of the Cape of Good Hope. He maintained, on the contrary, that that colony and several others must some day be transferred to us in payment of our services. He defended, as we see, the interest of our allies, much more for our sake than for theirs. Lareveillère, who, from a spirit of equity, was very attentive to their interests, was adverse to the proposed conditions for totally different reasons. He considered it as disgraceful to sacrifice Spain, whom we had drawn into a quarrel, which was, in some measure, foreign to her, and whom we obliged, as the price of her alliance, to sacrifice an important colony. He regarded it as equally dishonourable to sacrifice Holland, who had been hurried by France into the career of revolution, of whose fate she had taken charge, and whom she was about to deprive at once of her richest possessions and to consign to a frightful anarchy. If, in fact, France were to withdraw her hand, Holland must fall into the most dangerous disorders. Lareveillère said that the Directory would be responsible for all the blood that should be spilt. This policy was generous. Perhaps it was not considerate enough. Our allies sustained losses; the question was, whether they might not suffer still greater by continuing the war. The sequel proved this. But the triumphs of France on the continent then encouraged a hope that, delivered from Austria, she would obtain triumphs as signal upon the seas. The desertion of our allies appeared disgraceful: a different course was adopted. It was resolved to address Spain and Holland, for the purpose of inquiring their intentions. They were to declare if they wished for peace, at the price of the sacrifices required by England; and, in case they should prefer a continuance of the war, they were, moreover, to declare what forces they proposed to collect for the defence of the common interests. Letters were sent to Lille, stating that no answer could be given to the proposals of England till the allies of France had been consulted.

These discussions completely embroiled the directors. The moment of the catastrophe approached. The two parties pursued their course and became daily more and more exasperated. The commission of the finances in the Five Hundred had retouched its measures, in order to induce the Ancients to pass them with some modifications.

The dispositions relative to the treasury had been slightly changed. The Directory was still to have nothing to do with the negotiation of securities. Without confirming or abolishing the distinction between the ordinary and the extraordinary, it was decided that the expenses relative to the pay of the armies should always have the preference. Anticipations were forbidden, but the anticipations which had already taken place were not revoked. Lastly, the new dispositions relative to the sale of the national domains were again brought forward, with an important modification, it is true; namely, that the orders of the ministers and the *bons* of the contractors were to be taken in payment for domains, like the *three-quarter bills*. These measures, thus modified, had been adopted; they were less subversive of the means of the treasury, but still extremely dangerous. All the penal laws against the priests were abolished; the oath was changed into a mere affirmation by which the priests declared that they submitted to the laws of the republic. Neither the question of the forms of worship nor of the bells was yet taken into consideration. The successions of the emigrants were no longer open in favour of the state, but in favour of the relatives. The families which had already been obliged to account to the

republic for the patrimonial share of an emigrant son or relative were to receive an indemnity in national domains. The sale of the parsonage-houses was suspended. Lastly, the most important of all the measures, the institution of the national guard, had been voted in a few days, on the bases stated above. The composition of this guard was to be effected by way of election. It was on this measure that Pichegru and his partisans reckoned most for the execution of their projects. Accordingly, they had obtained the addition of an article, agreeably to which the work of this organization was to commence ten days after the publication of the law. They were thus sure to have soon collected the Parisian guard, and with it all the insurgents of Vendémiaire.

The Directory, on its part, convinced of the imminence of the danger, and still supposing a conspiracy ready to break out, had assumed the most threatening attitude. Augereau was not alone in Paris. Cherin, chief of Hoche's staff; Generals Lemoine and Humbert, who commanded the divisions which had marched upon Paris; Kleber and Lefebvre, who had leave of absence, and lastly, Bernadotte, whom Bonaparte had sent to carry the colours that were yet to be presented to the Directory, were in Paris. Besides these superior officers, officers of all ranks, out of commission since the reduction of the staffs and looking out for employment, abounded in Paris, and held the most threatening language against the Councils. A great number of revolutionists had thronged thither from the provinces, as they always did when they hoped for a commotion. In addition to all these symptoms, the direction and destination of the troops could scarcely leave any doubt; they were cantoned in the environs of Rheims. It was alleged that, if they had been destined solely for the expedition to Ireland, they would have continued their march to Brest, and not have tarried in the departments contiguous to Paris, that Hoche would not have returned to his head-quarters, and, finally, that so large a body of cavalry would not have been collected for a naval expedition. A commission had been appointed, as we have seen, to investigate and to report upon all these circumstances. The Directory had given only very vague explanations to this commission. The troops, it was said, had been marched for a distant destination, by an order from General Hoche, who had received that order from the Directory, and if they had passed the constitutional limit, that was through the mistake of an army commissary. But the Councils had replied, through Pichegru, that troops could not be transferred from one army to another upon the mere order of the general-in-chief; that he ought to derive his orders from a higher authority; that he could not receive them from the Directory unless through the medium of the minister at war; that Petiet, the minister at war, had not countersigned that order; that, consequently, General Hoche had acted without a formal authority; that, finally, if the troops had received a distant destination, they ought to pursue their march and not to collect around Paris. These observations were well founded, and the Directory had good reasons for not answering them. The Councils decreed, in consequence of these observations, that a circle should be drawn around Paris, having a radius of twelve leagues, that columns should mark on all the roads the circumference of this circle, and that the officers of the troops who should pass it should be considered as guilty of high treason.

But fresh circumstances soon occurred to renew the alarm. Hoche had collected his troops in the departments of the North, around Sedan and Rheims, a few marches from Paris, and he had despatched fresh troops in

the same direction. These movements, the language held by the soldiers, the agitation which prevailed in Paris, and the quarrels of the officers on commission with the gilded youth, furnished Willot with the subject of a second denunciation. He ascended the tribune, spoke of a new march of troops, of the spirit which manifested itself in their ranks, of the fury excited in them against the Councils; and, while on this subject, he inveighed against the addresses of the army of Italy, and against the publicity given to them by the Directory. In consequence, he proposed that the inspectors of the hall should be directed to collect fresh information, and to make a new report. The deputies, called inspectors of the hall, were charged with the police of the Councils, and consequently it was their duty to provide for their safety.* Willot's proposal was adopted, and, on the suggestion of the commission of inspectors, several embarrassing questions were addressed to the Directory on the 17th of Thermidor (August 4). They reverted to the nature of the orders by virtue of which General Hoche had acted. Could, in short, the nature of those orders be explained? Had means been used to enforce the execution of the constitutional article which forbade the troops to deliberate?

The Directory resolved to reply by an energetic message to the new questions which were addressed to it, without, however, furnishing the explanations which it did not suit it to give. Lareveillère drew it up. Carnot and Barthelemy refused to sign it. This message was presented on the 23d of Thermidor (August 10). It contained nothing more concerning the movements of the troops. The generals of division, said the Directory, had received orders from General Hoche, and General Hoche from the Directory. The channel through which they had been transmitted was not yet mentioned. As to the addresses, the Directory said that the signification of the word *deliberate* was too vague for it to be possible to determine whether the armies had committed a fault in presenting them; that it admitted the danger of allowing armies to express their opinions, and that it would prevent fresh publications of that nature; but that, for the rest, before making a crime of the step which the soldiers of the republic had ventured to take, it was necessary to go back to the causes which had occasioned it; that these causes lay in the general agitation which had for some months past seized all minds; in the deficiency of the public revenue, which left all the departments of the administration in the most deplorable situation, and frequently deprived of their pay the men who for years had been spilling their blood and spending their strength in the service of the republic; in the persecutions and the murders perpetrated on the purchasers of the national domains, on the public functionaries, and on the defenders of the country; in the impunity of crime and the partiality of certain tribunals; in the insolence of the emigrants and the refractory priests, who, openly recalled and favoured, inundated every place, fanned the flame of discord, and excited contempt for the laws; in that multitude of newspapers, which deluged the army and the interior, and preached up nothing but royalty and the overthrow of the republic; in the interest, always ill dissembled and often boldly manifested, for the glory of Austria and England; in the efforts that were made to depreciate the just renown

* "The guard of the Councils, which had been subject to the Directory, was placed under the immediate orders of the inspectors of the hall; and it was proposed that the Councils should decree the removal of the troops. At the point at which the two parties had arrived, a victory was necessary, in order once more to decide the great question between the Revolution and the old government."—*Mignet*. E.

of our warriors ; in the calumnies diffused against two illustrious generals, who had, the one in the West, the other in Italy, added to their exploits the immortal honour of the most admirable political conduct ; finally, in the sinister projects announced by men who possessed more or less influence on the fortunes of the state. The Directory added, that it nevertheless entertained the firm resolution and the well-founded hope of saving France from the new convulsions with which she was threatened. Thus, instead of explaining and excusing its conduct, the Directory, on the contrary, recriminated, and openly manifested an intention to engage in the conflict, and a hope to come off victorious. This message was considered as a real manifesto, and excited an extreme sensation. The Five Hundred immediately appointed a commission to examine and to answer the message.

The constitutionalists began to be alarmed at the state of affairs. They saw, on the one hand, the Directory ready to support itself upon the armies ; on the other, the Clichyans ready to collect the band of Vendémiaire, under pretext of organizing the national guard. Those who were sincerely republicans would rather that the Directory should prove victorious, but they would all have preferred that there should not be any combat ; and they could not perceive how injurious their opposition had been in alarming the Directory and encouraging the reactors. They did not confess their faults, but they deplored the situation, imputing it as usual to their adversaries. Such of the Clichyans as were not in the secret of the counter-revolution, as did not even wish for it, as were actuated solely by an imprudent hatred against the excesses of the revolution, began to be terrified, and feared lest by their contradiction they had awakened all the revolutionary propensities of the Directory. Their ardour was cooled. The absolutely royalist Clichyans were in a great hurry to act, and were afraid of being anticipated. They surrounded Pichegru and urged him with warmth. The latter, with his usual phlegm, made promises to the agents of the Pretender, and still continued to temporize. He possessed, however, no real means ; for a few emigrants, a few Chouans in Paris, did not constitute a sufficient force ; and, until he should have the national guard at his disposal, he could not make any serious attempt. Cold and wary, he took a just view of his situation, and replied to all solicitations that it was requisite to wait. He was told that the Directory was about to strike ; he replied that the Directory durst not. For the rest, giving the Directory no credit for daring, finding his own means yet inadequate,* and having plenty of money at his disposal, it was natural that he should be in no hurry to act.

In this situation, prudent minds sincerely wished that a conflict might be avoided. They wished for an accommodation which, reconciling the constitutionalists and the moderate Clichyans with the Directory, should restore to it a majority which it had lost, and relieve it from the necessity of recurring to violent means of safety. Madame de Staël was so placed as to wish for, and to attempt, such an accommodation. She was the centre of that brilliant and enlightened society, which, though it deemed the government and its chiefs rather vulgar, was attached to the republic. Madame de Staël was fond of that form of government, as the fairest arena for the human mind. She had already placed one of her friends in an elevated post ; she hoped to place them all, and to become

* "The actual force at the command of the councils was extremely small. Their body consisted only of fifteen hundred grenadiers who could not be relied on, as the event soon proved, in a contest with their brethren in arms."—*Alison*. E.

their Egeria. She saw the peril to which this order of things, which had become dear to her, was exposed; she admitted men of all the parties, she listened to them, and could foresee a speedy collision. She was generous, active; she could not keep aloof from events; and it was natural that she should strive to use her influence in uniting men whom no profound antipathy dissevered. She assembled in her drawing-room the republicans, the constitutionalists, and the Clichyans; she endeavoured to soothe the violence of the discussions, by interposing herself between their self-loves with the tact of a kind and superior woman. But she was not more successful than people in general are in effecting party reconciliations; and the men most strongly opposed to one another began to keep away from her house. She strove to see the members of the two commissions appointed to reply to the recent message of the Directory. Some were constitutionalists, as Thibaudeau, Emery, Simeon, Tronçon-Ducoudray, and Portalis; through them it might be possible to exercise an influence on the language of the two reports; and these reports were extremely important, for they were the answer to the manifesto of the Directory. Madame de Staël was extremely active personally, and through her friends. The constitutionalists desired an accommodation, for they were sensible of the danger; but this accommodation required, on their part, sacrifices which it was difficult to wring from them. If the Directory had committed real faults, and had taken culpable measures, then a negotiation might have been opened for the revocation of certain of those measures, and a treaty concluded with reciprocal sacrifices; but, excepting the private misconduct of Barras, the majority of the Directory had conducted itself with as much zeal and attachment to the constitution as could possibly be desired. No arbitrary act, no usurpation of power, could be imputed to it. The administration of the finances, so severely censured, was the forced result of circumstances. The change of the ministers, the movement of the troops, the addresses of the armies, the appointment of Augereau, were the only facts that could be mentioned as indicating formidable intentions. But these were precautions rendered indispensable by the danger; and it was requisite to remove the danger entirely by restoring the majority to the Directory, in order to have a right to require it to renounce these precautions. The constitutionalists, on the contrary, had supported the new members in all their attacks, whether unjust or indiscreet; and it was for them alone to give way. Nothing, therefore, could be required of the Directory, but much of the constitutionalists; which rendered the exchange of sacrifices impossible.

Madame de Staël took great pains, personally and by her friends, to produce a conviction that the Directory was ready to run all hazards, that the constitutionalists would be the victims of their obstinacy, and that the republic would be ruined along with them. But these refused every sort of concession, and insisted that the Directory should give way to them. Rewbel and Lareveillère were spoken to. The latter, without repelling the discussion, entered into a long enumeration of the acts of the Directory, asking, at the mention of each of these acts, whether it was censurable. The interlocutors were without reply. As for sending back Augereau, and the revocation of all the measures which indicated a speedy resolution, Lareveillère and Rewbel were inexorable. They would not yield at all, and proved, by their cold firmness, that a great determination had been taken.

Madame de Staël, and those who seconded her in her laudable but

fruitless undertaking, were very urgent with the members of the two commissions, in order to prevail upon them not to propose too violent legislative measures, and, in particular, not to indulge in dangerous and irritating recriminations when replying to the grievances contained in the message of the Directory. All this trouble was thrown away; for there is no instance of a party having ever taken advice. In the two commissions there were Clichyans, and they very naturally would wish for the most violent measures. They insisted, in the first place, on a special transfer to the criminal jury of Paris of all offences committed against the safety of the legislative body, and the exclusion of all troops from the constitutional circle; they required, in particular, that the constitutional circle should not belong to any military division. The aim of this last measure was to take the command of Paris from Augereau, and to accomplish, by a decree, what could not be obtained by way of negotiation. These measures were adopted by the two commissions. But Thibaudeau and Tronçon-Ducoudray, directed to make the report, the one to the Five Hundred, the other to the Ancients, refused, with equal prudence and firmness, to present the last proposition. It was then given up, and the two former only were retained. Tronçon-Ducoudray made his report on the 3d of Fructidor, Thibaudeau on the 4th. They replied indirectly to the reproaches of the Directory, and Tronçon-Ducoudray, addressing the Ancients, exhorted them to interpose their wisdom and their dignity between the vivacity of the young legislators of the Five Hundred, and the susceptibility of the heads of the executive power. Thibaudeau strove to justify the Councils, to prove that they had not intended either to attack the government or to calumniate the armies. He referred to Dumolard's motion relative to Venice. He insisted that nobody meant to attack the heroes of Italy; but maintained that their creations would not be durable unless they had the sanction of the two Councils. The two insignificant measures proposed were adopted, and these two reports, from which so much had been expected, produced no effect. They clearly expressed the impotence to which the constitutionalists were reduced by their equivocal situation between the royalist faction and the Directory, resolved not to conspire with the one or to make concessions to the other.

The Clichyans complained much of the insignificance of these reports, and declaimed against the weakness of the constitutionalists. The most ardent wished for the combat, and especially for the means of engaging in it, and inquired what the Directory was doing towards organizing the national guard. This was precisely what the Directory had no wish to do, and, in fact, it had resolved not to organize it.

Carnot was in a still more singular position than the constitutional party. He had fairly quarrelled with the Clichyans on observing their conduct; he was useless to the constitutionalists, for he had taken no share in their attempts at accommodation, and he was too irritable to reconcile himself with his colleagues. He was alone, without support, amidst the void, having no longer any aim, for he had missed the aim of self-love which he had once had, and the new majority which he had dreamt of was impossible. Nevertheless, from a ridiculous perseverance in supporting the sentiments of the opposition in the Directory, he formally demanded the organization of the national guard. His presidency of the Directory was about to expire, and he availed himself of this circumstance to bring that subject under discussion. Lareveillère then rose with firmness, and, having never had any personal quarrel with him, he resolved to make one more

effort to reconcile him to his colleagues. Addressing him at once with mildness and assurance, he put several questions to him. "Carnot," said he, "hast thou ever heard us make any proposition tending to abridge the prerogatives of the Councils, to increase our own, to compromise the constitution of the republic?"—"No," replied Carnot, with embarrassment. "Hast thou," resumed Lareveillère, "ever heard us, in a matter of finance, war, or diplomacy, propose a measure that was not conformable with the public interest? As to what is personal to thyself, hast thou ever heard us depreciate thy merit, or deny thy services? Since thou hast separated thyself from us, canst thou accuse us of any disrespect for thy person? Has thy opinion been the less listened to when it appeared to us useful and sincerely proposed? For my own part," added Lareveillère, "though thou hast belonged to a faction which has persecuted both myself and my family, have I ever shown the least resentment against thee?"—"No, no," replied Carnot to all these questions. "Well, then," added Lareveillère "how canst thou separate from us to attach thyself to a faction which deceives thee, which would make use of thee to ruin the republic, which would ruin thee after making use of thee, and which in ruining, will dishonour, thee?" Lareveillère employed the most friendly and the most persuasive terms to convince Carnot of the error and the danger of his conduct. Rewbel and Barras even did violence to their hatred. Rewbel, from a sense of duty, Barras, from natural suppleness, talked to him almost as friends. But demonstrations of kindness serve only to irritate a certain sort of pride. Carnot remained cold, and, after all the pains taken by his colleagues, he drily repeated his proposal for discussing the organization of the national guard. The directors then broke up the sitting, and retired, convinced, as men easily are on such occasions, that their colleague was betraying them, and that he was acting in concert with the enemies of the government.

It was resolved that the meditated stroke should fall upon him and Barthelemy, as well as upon the principal members of the Councils. The plan definitively adopted was as follows. The three directors still believed that the deputies of Clichy were in the secret of the conspiracy. They had not obtained, either against them or against Pichegru, any fresh evidence that would admit of judicial proceedings. They were, therefore, obliged to have recourse to a stretch of power.

They had in the two Councils a decided minority, which would be joined by all those wavering men, whom half-measures irritate and estrange, but whom great energy overpowers and brings back. They purposed to close the halls in which the Ancients and the Five Hundred met, to appoint some other place for their sittings, to summon thither all the deputies on whom they could rely, to draw up a list containing the two directors, and one hundred and twenty deputies selected from among the most suspected, and to propose their banishment without judicial discussion and by an extraordinary legislative procedure. They meditated no person's death, but the forced removal of all the dangerous men. Many have thought that this stretch of authority had become useless, because the Councils, intimidated by the evident resolution of the Directory, appeared to relax. But this impression was transient. To every one acquainted with the course of the parties and their lively imagination, it is evident that the Clichyans, or seeing the Directory refrain from acting, would have again taken courage. If they had kept themselves quiet till the new election they would have redoubled their ardour on the arrival of the third, and would then have

displayed an irresistible energy. The Directory would not even have then found the conventional minority which remained in the Councils to support it, and to give a sort of legality to the extraordinary measures which it intended to adopt. Lastly, without taking into consideration this inevitable result of a new election, the Directory, in not acting, would have been obliged to execute the laws and to reorganize the national guard; that is, to give the army of Vendémiaire to the counter-revolution, which would have produced a frightful civil war between the national guards and the troops of the line. And, in fact, while Pichegru and a few intriguers had no other means than motions in the Five Hundred, and some emigrants or Chouans in Paris; their schemes were little to be feared; but, supported by the national guard, they would be able to give battle, and to commence the civil war.

In consequence, Rewbel and Lareveillère agreed that it was necessary to act without delay, and not to prolong the state of uncertainty. Barras alone held back, and gave some uneasiness to his two colleagues. They were still apprehensive lest he should treat with the royalist party, or join with the Jacobin faction to excite a commotion. They watched him closely, and still strove to win Augereau, by addressing themselves to his vanity, and endeavouring to render him sensible to the esteem of upright men. Still, some further preparations were requisite, as well to gain the grenadiers of the legislative body, as to prepare the troops, and to obtain funds. It was agreed to wait a few days longer. The directors would not apply to Ramel, the minister, for money, lest they should compromise him, and they were expecting that which Bonaparte had offered, but which had not yet arrived.

Bonaparte had, as we have seen, sent Lavalette, his aide-de-camp, to Paris, in order to obtain accurate information concerning all the intrigues. The aspect of Paris had produced a very unfavourable effect on M. de Lavalette, and he had communicated his impressions to Bonaparte.* So many

* The following statement relative to Lavalette's mission, and to the political intrigues of the period, is extracted from the Memoirs of that personage:

"I arrived in Paris in the month of May. The five members of government were, at that time, Barras, Rewbel, Carnot, La Reveillère, Lépaux, and Barthelemy. The first four had been members of the Convention; and although none of them had been famous during the Reign of Terror for any atrocious act, still the three first had voted the death of the King—a vote which, notwithstanding the fatal though powerful consideration that may be presented in alleviation, placed them amongst the most furious Jacobins, and was prejudicial to the respect with which they ought to have been invested. The people bore impatiently the yoke of men who recalled to their minds such fatal events; and they were especially disliked by the constitutionalists of 1791, who reproached them at once with the destruction of their edifice, and the persecutions which had so long weighed upon them. When I arrived, the contest was violent, and the antagonists of government made no secret of their wish to overthrow the majority. My first visit was to Barras, who seemed to have preserved favourable sentiments for General Bonaparte, and who expressed to me a wish to maintain the friendship which had so long united them. After him I saw Carnot, who spoke to me with a reserve commanded by the intimate connexion of General Bonaparte with Barras. A difference of systems and views on some points of government had created between these two directors an animosity which betrayed itself in invectives and threats, that left no opening for reconciliation. Carnot, however, expressed himself with candour. 'It is impossible,' he said, 'to go on any longer on the revolutionary road. If a lasting system of moderation be not adopted, all is lost. France feels horror for whatever brings to mind the deplorable measures to which the necessity of saving her has carried the country. The public mind is irritated, and, unless great care be taken, the effect will be to involve us again in a confusion, out of which we shall be extricated only to bend under the yoke of the Bourbons. The faction against which I am struggling does not blush to charge me with being a

personal resentments are mingled with political animosities that, on a close view of the parties, the sight becomes repulsive. Frequently too, if we suffer our minds to dwell exclusively on what is personal in political dissensions, we shall be tempted to believe that there is nothing generous, sincere, and patriotic, in the motives which divide men.

Such was precisely the effect likely to be produced by the struggles of the three directors, Barras, Lareveillère, and Rewbel, with Barthelemy and Carnot, and of the Conventionists with the Clichyans. It was a frightful fray, in which wounded vanity and self-interest would appear at first sight to act the principal part. The military officers in Paris added their pretensions to all those which were already at variance. Though irritated against the 'action of Clichy, they were not very well disposed towards the Directory. It is usual for men to become importunate and susceptible when they deem themselves necessary. Grouped around Scherer, the minister, these officers were disposed to complain, as if the government had not done enough for them. Kleber, the noblest but the most intractable of these characters, and who has been correctly delineated when it was said that he did not wish to be either the first or the second—Kleber had told the Directory in his original language, "I will fire upon your enemies if they attack you; but in facing them I shall turn my back upon you." Lefebvre, Bernadotte, and all the others, expressed themselves in the same manner. Struck with this chaos, M. de Lavalette wrote to Bonaparte in such a way as to induce him to remain independent. Thenceforward the latter, satisfied with having communicated the impulse, would not proceed farther, but resolved to await the result. He wrote no more. The Directory then addressed itself to the gallant Hoche, who, having alone a right

royalist; and, nevertheless, nobody is more convinced than I am of Pichegru's treason, and the necessity of punishing him; but they want to govern France as they would a club. Narrow views, a passionate, factious spirit, the prejudices of ignorance and fear, ever suspicious and blind, preside over all our acts; they prefer the violence that irritates, while moderation and firmness would be sufficient to smooth everything. My situation is painful; for I am forced to move with a party in which, exclusive of Pichegru, there are men to whom I am obnoxious, who perhaps conspire with him, and who will ruin the republic, without obtaining the secret aim of their endeavours. I have tried,' he added, 'to reclaim Pichegru; I was not personally acquainted with him; but the conversation I had with him convinced me that he is cleverer than I thought, and that he has taken his final resolutions. I do not know what are his means of execution, now that he is no longer with the army; but whatever they may be, they will miscarry when opposed by the firm vigilance of government, and by public opinion, which is strongly declared against the Bourbons.' This conversation, of which I have only recorded the most remarkable parts, was the only one I had with Carnot. The house of Barras was open to me, and I went there so often that Carnot could not but look upon me as a man entirely devoted to the party of that director: it was, however, not so. All his speeches breathed hatred and vengeance. A month before the catastrophe took place, it was secretly resolved to make it terrible, and the victims were marked out. My position and my duty forbade me taking any part in the contest, but I wrote the truth to General Bonaparte. I observed that he would tarnish his glory if he gave any support to acts of violence, which the situation of government did not justify; that nobody would pardon him if he joined the Directory in their plan to overthrow the constitution and liberty; that proscriptions were about to take place against the nation's representation, and against citizens whose virtues made them worthy of respect; that punishments would be inflicted without trial, and that the hatred resulting from such measures would extend not only to the Directory, but to the whole system of republican government. Besides, it was not certain that the party they were going to proscribe, really wished the return of the Bourbons; and in any case the legal punishment and banishment of Pichegru would be sufficient to destroy any plans of that sort. These considerations made so much impression on the mind of General Bonaparte, that he soon avoided, in his correspondence with the Directory, all allusion to the interior situation of France, and at last left off writing to them altogether." E.

to be dissatisfied, sent fifty thousand francs, forming the greatest part of his wife's portion.

It was now the first days of Fructidor. Lareveillère had just succeeded Carnot as president of the Directory; he was commissioned to receive Visconti, the envoy of the Cisalpine republic, and General Bernadotte, the bearer of some colours which the army of Italy had not yet sent to the Directory.* He resolved to speak out in the boldest manner, and thus to force Barras to come to a decision. He made two vehement speeches, in which he replied to the two reports of Thibaudeau and Tronçon-Ducoudray, but without mentioning them. Speaking of Venice and the recently emancipated people of Italy, Thibaudeau had said that their lot would not be fixed, till the legislative body of France should have been consulted. Alluding to this expression, Lareveillère said to Visconti that the people of Italy had wished for liberty, that they had a right to give it to themselves, and for this they had no need of the consent of anybody whatever. "That liberty," said he, "of which some would deprive both you and us, we will defend together, and find means to preserve." The threatening tone of the two speeches left no doubt of the dispositions of the Directory: men who talked in that manner must have their forces quite prepared. It was the 10th of Fructidor. The Clichyans were in the utmost alarm. In their fury, they resumed their design of placing the Directory under accusation. The constitutionalists dreaded such a procedure, because they were aware that it would be a motive for the Directory to break out, and they declared that they would, in their turn, set about procuring evidence of the treason of certain deputies, and demand their accusation. This threat checked the Clichyans, and prevented the preparation of an act of accusation against the five directors.

The Clichyans had long wished to add to the commission of the inspectors Pichegru and Willot, who were considered as the two generals of the party. But this addition of two new members, increasing the number to seven, was contrary to the regulation. They awaited, therefore, the renewal of the commission, which took place at the beginning of every month, and appointed Pichegru, Vaublanc, Delarue, Thibaudeau, and Emery. The commission of the inspectors was charged with the police of the hall; it gave orders to the grenadiers of the legislative body, and it was in some measure the executive power of the Council. The Ancients had a similar commission. It had united itself with that one of the Five Hundred, and both watched together over the common safety. A great number of deputies frequented this commission, without having a right to a seat in it; so that it was transformed into a new Clichy club, in which the most violent and the most useless motions were made. At first, it was proposed to organize a police, in order to gain information of the designs of the Directory. One Dossonville was placed at the head of it. As they had no funds, each contributed his share; but only a small sum was collected. Supplied as he had been, Pichegru could have contributed largely; but it does not appear that he employed on this occasion the funds received from Wickham. These police agents proceeded to pick up false reports in all sorts of places, and then alarmed the commissioners with them.

* "Napoleon's pretence for sending Bernadotte to Paris was, that he wished to transmit to the Directory four flags, which, out of the twenty-one taken at the battle of Rivoli, had been left by mistake at Peschiera. Bernadotte, however, did not take any great part in the political intrigues of the capital. He was always a prudent man."—*Bourrienne*. E.

Every day they said, "It is to-day, it is to-night, that the Directory intends to apprehend two hundred deputies, and to have them put to death in the fauxbourgs." These rumours struck terror into the commissions, and this terror gave rise to the most indiscreet schemes. The Directory received through its spies an exaggerated report of all these propositions, and it was filled in its turn with alarm. It was then said in the drawing-rooms of the Directory that it was high time to strike, if it did not mean to be anticipated; and threats were thrown out, which, repeated in their turn, repaid the Clichyans with fright for fright.

The constitutionalists, forming a separate party between the two, were daily more and more aware of their faults and their dangers. They were in the greatest consternation. Carnot, still more isolated than they, embroiled with the Clichyans, odious to the patriots, suspicious even to the moderate republicans, slandered, misunderstood, received daily the most alarming intelligence. He was told that he was about to be put to death by order of his colleagues. Barthelemy, threatened and apprized like him, was filled with consternation.

The same warnings were given to others. Lareveillère had been informed, in such a way as to leave no room to doubt the fact, that Chouans had been hired to assassinate him. Finding him the firmest of the three members of the majority, it was he who was fixed upon to be despatched, for the purpose of dissolving it. Certain it is that his death would have changed everything, for the new director nominated by the Councils would certainly have voted with Carnot and Barthelemy. The evident object of the crime, and the particulars given to Lareveillère, ought to have induced him to be upon his guard. Unmoved, however, he continued his evening walks to the Jardin des Plantes. Malo, *chef d'escadron* of the 21st dragoons, who had sabred the Jacobins at the camp of Grenelle, and afterwards denounced Brottier and his accomplices, was set on to insult him. This Malo was the creature of Carnot and Cochin, and he had, without intending it, inspired the Clichyans with hopes which rendered him suspected. Dismissed by the Directory, he attributed his dismissal to Lareveillère, and went to the Luxembourg to insult him. The intrepid magistrate was not to be daunted by a cavalry officer, and, seizing him by the shoulders, he turned him out of his apartment.

Rewbel, though strongly attached to the common cause, was more violent but less firm. Some one came to tell him that Barras was treating with an emissary of the pretender's, and was ready to betray the republic. The connexion of Barras with all the parties was liable to excite all sorts of apprehensions. "We are undone," said Rewbel; "Barras is betraying us; we shall be murdered; no other course is left us but flight; for it is no longer in our power to save the republic." Lareveillère, more calm, told Rewbel in reply, that, instead of giving way, they ought to go to Barras, talk sharply to him, oblige him to speak out, and overawe him by their firmness. Both of them accordingly went to Barras, questioned him with authority, and asked why he still delayed. Barras, engaged in making preparations with Augereau,* demanded three or four days more, and

* "Bonaparte had made choice of Augereau to second the revolution which was preparing against the Clichy party, because he knew his stanch republican principles, his boldness, and his deficiency of political talent. He thought him well calculated to aid a commotion, which his own presence with the army of Italy prevented him from directing in person; and besides, Augereau was not an ambitious rival who might turn events to his own advantage."—*Bourrienne*. E.

promised that there should be no longer delay. This was the 13th or 14th of Fructidor. Rewbel was satisfied and consented to wait.

Barras and Augereau had, in fact, prepared everything for the execution of the stroke which had been so long meditated. Hoche's troops were disposed around the constitutional limit, ready to cross it and to proceed in a few hours to Paris. A great part of the grenadiers of the legislative body had been gained by means of Blanchard, the second in command, and several other officers, who were devoted to the Directory. A sufficient number of defections in the ranks of the grenadiers to prevent a battle had thus been insured. Ramel, the commander-in-chief, had continued to be attached to the Councils, in consequence of his connexion with Cochin and Carnot; his influence was not much to be feared. One precaution had been taken. Orders were given that the troops of the garrison of Paris, and also the grenadiers of the legislative body, should be exercised in firing. These movements of troops, this din of arms, served to disguise the real day of execution.

The event was expected to take place every day. It was believed that it would be on the 15th of Fructidor, then on the 16th; but the 16th corresponded with the 2d of September, and the Directory would not have chosen that day of dreadful memory. Meanwhile, the terror of the Clichyans was extreme. The police of the inspectors, deceived by false indications, had persuaded them that the event was fixed for the night between the 15th and 16th. They assembled tumultuously in the evening in the hall of the two commissions. Rovère, the fierce reactor, one of the members of the commission of the Ancients, read a police report, according to which two hundred deputies were to be apprehended in the night. Others came, in breathless haste, to report that the barriers were closed, that four columns of troops were entering Paris, and that the directing committee had joined the Directory. They said, also, that the hotel of the minister of the police was completely illuminated. The tumult was at its height. The members of the two commissions, who ought to have been but ten, and who were about fifty, complained that they could not deliberate. At length, messengers were sent to the barriers and to the hotel of the police to verify the reports of the agents, and it was ascertained that the greatest tranquillity prevailed everywhere. It was stated that the police agents could not be paid on the following day for want of funds; each emptied his pockets to furnish the requisite sum. They then broke up. The Clichyans surrounded Pichegru, to persuade him to act. They proposed, in the first place, to make the Councils permanent, then to collect the emigrants and the Chouans whom they had in Paris, to add a number of young men to them, to march against the Directory, and to secure the three directors. Pichegru declared all these plans ridiculous and impracticable, and again repeated that there was nothing to be done. The silly heads of the party, nevertheless, resolved to commence on the following day with obtaining a declaration of the permanence.

The Directory was apprized by its police of the alarm of the Clichyans and of their desperate designs. Barras, who had in his hands all the means of execution, resolved to employ them that very night. Everything was so arranged that the troops could traverse the constitutional circle in a few hours. It was expected that, in the mean time, the garrison of Paris would be sufficient. Great manœuvres of troops were ordered for the next day, that a pretext might not be wanting. Neither the ministers, nor the directors, Rewbel and Lareveillère, nor any other person, were apprized

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THE BATTLE OF BATTLE

of the moment, so that everybody was ignorant of the event which was about to take place. That day, the 17th, passed off quietly; no proposition was made to the Councils. Many of the deputies absented themselves, in order to escape the catastrophe which they had so imprudently provoked. The sitting of the Directory was held as usual. The five directors were present. At four in the afternoon, at the moment when the sitting was over, Barras took Rewbel and Lareveillère aside, and told them that it would be necessary to strike the blow that very night, in order to anticipate the enemy. He had asked them for four days more, but would not wait that time lest he should be surprised. The three directors then went to Rewbel's, where they established themselves. It was agreed to summon all the ministers to Rewbel's, to shut themselves up there till the event was consummated, and not to allow any one to leave the place. They were to have no communication with any person outside excepting Augereau and his aides-de-camp.

This arrangement being decided upon, the ministers were convoked for the evening. All of them being assembled with the three directors, they fell to work to prepare the requisite orders and proclamations. The plan was, to surround the palace of the legislative body, to take from the grenadiers the posts which they occupied, to dissolve the commissions of the inspectors, to shut up the halls of the two Councils, to appoint another place of meeting, to summon thither such deputies as could be relied on, and to cause them to pass a law against those of whom the directors wished to rid themselves. They made sure that such as were enemies to the Directory would not venture to repair to the new place of meeting. In consequence, proclamations were drawn up, stating that a great plot had been formed against the republic; that its principal authors were members of the two commissions of inspectors; that it was from these two commissions that the conspirators were to set out; that, to prevent their attempt, the Directory commanded the halls of the legislative body to be closed, and fixed upon another place for the meeting of the deputies who remained faithful to the republic. The Five Hundred were to meet in the Odeon theatre, and the Ancients in the amphitheatre of the School of Medicine. An account of the conspiracy, supported by the declaration of Duverne de Presle and the paper found in the portfolio of d'Entraigues, was added to these proclamations. The whole was printed immediately, and was to be posted in the night on the walls of Paris. The ministers and the three directors remained shut up at Rewbel's, and Augereau set out with his aides-de-camp to execute the plan agreed upon.

Carnot and Barthelemy, having retired to their apartments in the Luxembourg, knew not what was preparing. The Clichyans, still greatly agitated, thronged the hall of the commissions. But Barthelemy, deceived, sent word that nothing could happen that night. Pichegru, on his part, had just left Scherer, and assured him that nothing was yet ready. Some movements of troops had been observed, but these, it was said, were occasioned by the exercises, and no alarm was felt on that account. Every one went home with renewed confidence. Rovère alone remained in the hall of the inspectors, and retired to a bed provided for the member on duty.

About midnight,* Augereau placed all the troops of the garrison about

* "On the night of the 17th of Fructidor the Directory moved all the troops in the neighbourhood into the capital, and the inhabitants at midnight beheld with breathless anxiety twelve thousand armed men defile in silence over the bridges with forty pieces of cannon, and occupy all the avenues to the Tuileries. Not a sound was to be heard

THE JAPANESE IN THE PHILIPPINES



TO THE
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the palace, and brought forward a numerous artillery. The greatest tranquillity pervaded Paris, where nothing was heard but the footfalls of the soldiers and the rolling of the gun-carriages. It was requisite, without striking a blow, to take from the grenadiers of the legislative body the posts which they occupied. About one in the morning, orders were transmitted to Ramel, the commandant, to go to the minister at war. He refused, guessing what was going forward, ran to waken Rovère, the inspector, who would not yet believe the danger, and then hastened to the barracks of his grenadiers, to get the reserve under arms. Nearly four hundred men occupied the different posts of the Tuileries; the reserve amounted to eight hundred. It was immediately put under arms, and drawn up in order of battle, in the garden of the Tuileries. The greatest order and the most profound silence prevailed in the ranks.

Nearly ten thousand troops of the line occupied the environs of the palace, and were preparing to force it. The firing of a cannon charged with powder, about three o'clock in the morning, served for a signal. The commandants of the columns presented themselves at the different posts. An officer went, in the name of Augereau, to order Ramel to give up the post of the Pont Tournant, which communicated between the garden and the Place Louis XV.; but Ramel refused. Fifteen hundred men having advanced to this post, the grenadiers, most of whom were gained over, surrendered it. The same thing occurred at other posts. All the outlets of the garden and of the Carrousel were given up, and the palace was surrounded on all sides by numerous bodies of infantry and cavalry. Twelve pieces of cannon, ready harnessed, were pointed at the palace. There was now left only the reserve of the grenadiers, eight hundred strong, drawn up in order of battle, and headed by Ramel, its commandant. Part of the grenadiers were disposed to do their duty; the others, won by the agents of Barras, were inclined, on the contrary, to join the troops of the Direc-

but the marching of the men and the rolling of the artillery, till the Tuileries were surrounded, when a signal-gun was discharged, which made every heart that heard it beat with agitation. Instantly the troops approached the gates, and commanded them to be thrown open. Murmurs arose among the guards of the Councils; the railings were closed, and every preparation made for resistance. But no sooner did the staff of Augereau appear at the gates than the soldiers of the adverse party seized their commander, and delivered him over to the assailants. By six o'clock in the morning all was concluded. Several hundreds of the most powerful of the party of the Councils were in prison; and the people, waking up from their sleep, found the streets filled with troops, the walls covered with proclamations, and military despotism established!"—*Alison*. E.

"I spent the night of the 17th, in beholding the preparations for the awful scene which was to take place in a few hours. None but soldiers appeared in the streets. The cannon brought to surround the palace where the legislative body assembled, were rolling along the pavements; but, except their noise, all was silence. No hostile assemblage was seen anywhere; nor was it known against whom all this apparatus was directed. Liberty was the only power vanquished in that fatal struggle. It might have been said that she was seen to fly, like a wandering spirit, at the approach of the day which was to shine upon her destruction."—*Madame de Staël*. E.

"At length came that terrible day, the 17th of Fructidor. I call it terrible, because the establishment of a republic in France, such as the fond dreams of our hearts represent it, may be impracticable; still we had one, even in the Directory. After the institution of this dictatorship—or of this royalty in five volumes—tatters of the republic had daily fallen under the blows of the Directory itself and the anarchists; at any rate, however, some part of it was left. But this awful day utterly destroyed it. The republic, whose foundations had been cemented by the pure and glorious blood of the martyrs of the Gironde, had vanished—was dispelled like a dream. The peal that gave the signal for this revolution came from Italy. It was the hand of Bonaparte that rang it."—*Duchess d'Abrantes*. E

tory. Murmurs arose in the ranks. "We are not Swiss," exclaimed several voices. "I was wounded by the royalists on the 13th of Vendémiaire," said an officer; "I will not fight for them on the 18th of Fructidor." Defection was thus introduced among these troops. Blanchard, second in command, excited it by his words and his presence. Ramel, the commandant, was still determined to do his duty, when he received an order, issued from the hall of the inspectors, forbidding him to fire. At that moment, Augereau arrived at the head of a numerous staff. "Commandant Ramel," said he, "do you recognise me as chief of the 17th military division?"—"Yes," replied Ramel. "Well, then, as your superior officer, I order you to place yourself under arrest." Ramel obeyed; but he was ill-treated by some furious Jacobins mingled among the staff of Augereau. The latter extricated him, and ordered him to be conducted to the Temple. The report of the cannon and the investment of the palace had awakened the whole city. It was five o'clock in the morning. The members of the commissions had hastened to their post and repaired to their hall. They were surrounded, and could no longer doubt the danger. A company of soldiers placed at their door, had orders to allow all who should present themselves with the medal of deputy, to enter, but to permit none to depart. They saw their colleague Dumas coming to his post; but they threw a note to him out of the window, to apprize him of the danger and to exhort him to escape. Augereau ordered the swords of Pichegru and Willot to be delivered to him, and sent them both to the Temple, as well as several other deputies, seized in the commission of the inspectors.

While this operation was being executed against the Councils, the Directory had ordered an officer to put himself at the head of a detachment, and to secure Carnot and Barthelemy. Carnot, warned in time, had left his apartments, and, having the key of a small door of the garden of the Luxembourg, had contrived to escape. As for Barthelemy, he had been found in his own room, and seized. His apprehension was an embarrassing circumstance for the Directory. The directors, with the exception of Barras, were delighted at the escape of Carnot; they sincerely wished that Barthelemy had done the same. They sent to propose to him to flee. Barthelemy answered that he would comply, if they would order him to be conveyed ostensibly and by his own name to Hamburg. The Directory could not engage to take such a step. As it purposed to banish several members of the legislative body, it could not show such favor to one of its colleagues. Barthelemy was conveyed to the Temple; he arrived there at the same time as Pichegru, Willot, and the other deputies, seized in the commission of the inspectors.

It was eight o'clock in the morning; many deputies, though forewarned, resolved courageously to repair to their post. Simeon, president of the Five Hundred, and Lafond-Ladebat, president of the Ancients, reached their respective halls, which were not yet closed, and took the chair in the presence of several deputies. But some officers arrived and brought them orders to retire. They had only time to declare that the national representation was dissolved. They retired to the residence of one of their number, and the most courageous meditated a new attempt. They resolved to meet a second time, to traverse Paris on foot, and to present themselves, with their president at their head, at the gates of the Legislative Palace. It was nearly eleven in the forenoon. All Paris was apprized of the event; the tranquillity of that great city was not disturbed by it

It was not now the passions that produced a commotion. It was a methodical act of authority against some of the representatives. A crowd of curious persons thronged the streets and the public places, without saying a word. Some detached groups from the fauxbourgs alone, composed principally of Jacobins, passed through the streets, shouting, *The Republic for ever! Down with the Aristocrats!* They found no echo, no resistance, in the mass of the population. It was around the Luxembourg that the groups were most numerous. They shouted, *The Directory for ever!* and some, *Barras for ever!*

The group of deputies passed in silence through the crowd collected in the Carrousel, and presented itself at the gates of the Tuileries. They were refused admittance; on their *demanding* entrance, a detachment drove them back, and pursued them till they were dispersed—a sad and deplorable spectacle, which betokened the speedy and inevitable domination of the Pretorians! Why was it decreed that a perfidious faction should oblige the Revolution to invoke the aid of bayonets? The deputies, thus pursued, retired some to the residence of Laford-Ladebat, the president, and others to a neighbouring house. They there deliberated tumultuously, and were engaged in drawing up a protest, when an officer came with an order for them to separate. A certain number of them were apprehended and conveyed to the Temple; these were Lafond-Ladebat, Barbé-Marbois, Tronçon-Ducoudray, Bourdon of the Oise, Goupil of Prefeln, and some others. They were carried to the Temple, whither they had been preceded by the members of the two commissions.

Meanwhile, the directorial deputies had repaired to the new place assigned for the meeting of the legislative body. The Five Hundred went to the Odeon, the Ancients to the School of Medicine. It was nearly noon, and they were still far from numerous; but the number increased every moment, either because the tidings of this extraordinary convocation were communicated by one to another, or because all the waverers, fearful of declaring their dissent, were eager to repair to the new legislative body. From time to time the members present were counted; and, at length, when the Ancients amounted to one hundred and twenty-six, and the Five Hundred to two hundred and fifty-one, being one more than half of both Councils, they began to deliberate. Both assemblies were under some embarrassment, for the act which they were called upon to legalize was a manifest stretch of power. The first thing done by both Councils, was to declare themselves permanent, and reciprocally to apprise one another that they were constituted. Poulain-Grandpré, a member of the Five Hundred, was the first who spoke. "The measures which have been taken," said he, "the building which we occupy, all indicate that the country has incurred, and is still incurring great dangers. Let us thank the Directory, for it to it we owe the salvation of the country.* But it is not enough that

* That the Directory were not the sort of men qualified to legislate for, or save, France, is evident from the following graphic sketch of one of their sittings about a fortnight previous to the decisive movement of Fructidor. The sketch is from the pen of Lavalette, who about that time had frequent communication with them. Though somewhat highly coloured, it bears the stamp of truth in every line:—"I saw our five kings dressed in the robes of Francis I., his hat, his pantaloons, and his lace; the face of Lareveillère looked like a cork upon two pins, with the black and greasy hair of Clodion. M. de Talleyrand, in pantaloons of the colour of wine-lees, sat in a folding chair at the feet of the Director Barras, in the court of the Petit Luxembourg; and gravely presented to his sovereigns an ambassador from the Grand-duke of Tuscany, while the French were eating his master's dinner, from the soup to the cheese. At the right hand there were fifty musicians, and singers of the Opera; and the actresses, now all dead of old

the Directory watches over it. It is our duty also to take measures, capable of insuring the public welfare and the constitution of the year III To this end, I move the formation of a commission of five members."

This motion was adopted, and the commission was composed of deputies devoted to the system of the Directory. These were, Sieyes, Poulain-Grandpré, Villers, Chazal, and Boulay of La Meurthe. Notice was given, that at six o'clock, a message would be sent by the Directory to the two Councils. This message contained an account of the conspiracy, as far as it was known to the Directory, the two documents which we have already mentioned, and fragments of letters found among the papers of the royalist agents. These papers contained nothing more than the proofs acquired; they proved that Pichegru was in negotiation with the pretender; that Imbert Colomès corresponded with Blankenburg, that Mersan and Lemerer were the agents of the conspiracy with the deputies of Clichy; and that a vast association of royalists extended throughout all France. There were no other names in them than those already mentioned. These papers, nevertheless, excited a great sensation. In producing the moral conviction, they proved the impossibility of proceeding in a judicial way, from the insufficiency of direct or positive evidence. The commission of Five had immediately to speak on the subject of this message. The Directory not having the initiative of propositions, it was for the commission of Five to take it; but that commission was in the secret of the Directory, and meant to propose the legalization of the stroke of policy determined beforehand. Boulay of La Meurthe, appointed to speak in the name of the commission, gave the reasons with which extraordinary measures are usually accompanied, reasons which, under the circumstances, were unfortunately but too well-founded. After observing that they were at that moment on a field of battle; that it was necessary to take a prompt and decisive measure; and without spilling a drop of blood to put it out of the power of the conspirators to do mischief; he made the propositions agreed upon. The principal consisted in annulling the electoral operations of forty-eight departments, in thus clearing the legislative body of deputies devoted to a faction, and in selecting from the number the most dangerous, who were to be banished. The Council had scarcely the option in regard to the measures to be taken; the circumstances admitted of no others than those which were proposed to it, and, besides, the Directory had assumed such an attitude that the assembly would not have dared to refuse them. The wavering portion of the members, those whom in a popular assembly energy always subdues, were ranged on the side of the directorialists, and ready to vote whatever they pleased. Chollet, however, demanded a delay of twelve hours, in order to examine the propositions. Cries of *Vote, vote*, imposed silence upon him. The assembly merely erased a few names from the list of persons destined to banishment, such as Thibaudeau, Doulcet de Pontécoulant, Tarbé, Crécy, Detorey, Normand, Dupont de Nemours, Remusat, and Bailly, some as being good patriots notwithstanding their

age, roaring a patriotic cantata. Facing them, on another elevation, there were two hundred young and beautiful women, with their arms and bosoms bare, all in ecstasy at the majesty of our Pentarchy and the happiness of the republic. They also wore tight, flesh-colour pantaloons, with rings on their toes! That was a sight that never will be seen again. A fortnight after this magnificent fête, thousands of families wept over their banished fathers; forty-eight departments were deprived of their representatives; and forty editors of newspapers were forced to go and drink the waters of the Elbe, the Sannamari, or the Ohio. It would be a curious disquisition to seek to discover what really were at that time the republic and liberty!" E.

opposition, others as too insignificant to be dangerous. After these retrenchments, the proposed resolutions were immediately voted. The electoral operations of forty-eight departments were cancelled. These departments were: Ain, Ardèche, Arriège, Aube, Aveyron, Bouches-du-Rhône, Calvados, Charante, Cher, Côte-d'Or, Côtes-du-Nord, Dordogne, Eure, Eure-et-Loire, Gironde, Herault, Isle-et-Vilaine, Indre-et-Loire, Loiret, Manche, Marne, Mayenne, Mont Blanc, Morbihan, Moselle, Deux-Nethes, Nord, Oise, Orne, Pas-de-Calais, Puy-de-Dôme, Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin, Rhône, Haute-Saône, Saône-et-Loire, Sarthe, Seine, Seine-Inférieure, Seine-et-Marne, Seine-et-Oise, Somme, Tarn, Var, Vaucluse, and Yonne.* The deputies returned by these departments were excluded from the legislative body. All the functionaries, such as judges or municipal administrators, elected by these departments were also deprived of their functions. The following persons were condemned to banishment to a place to be chosen by the Directory; in the Council of Five Hundred, Aubry, Job Aymé, Bayard, Blain, Boissy-d'Anglas, Borne, Bourdon of the Oise, Cadroi, Couchery, Delahaye, Delarue, Doumère, Dumolard, Duplantier, Duprat, Gilbert Desmolières, Henri Larivière, Imbert Colomès, Camille Jordan, Jourdan of the Bouches-du-Rhône, Gau, Lacarrière, Lemarchant-Gomicourt, Lemerer, Mersan, Madier, Maillard, Noailles, André, Mac-Curtin, Pavée, Pastoret, Pichegru, Polissart, Prairie-Montaud, Quatremère-de-Quincy, Saladin, Simeon, Vauvilliers, Vaublanc, Villaret-Joyeuse, Willot; in the Council of the Ancients, Barbé-Marbois, Dumas, Ferraut-Vaillant, Lafond-Ladebat, Laumont, Muraire, Murinais, Paradis, Portalis, Rovère, and Tronçon-Ducoudray.

Carnot and Barthelemy, the two directors, Cochon, the ex-minister of the police, Dossonville, his clerk, Ramel, commandant of the guard of the legislative body, and the three royalist agents, Bröttier, Laville-Heurnois, and Duverne de Presle, were also condemned to banishment. The directors did not stop there. The journalists had been not less dangerous than the deputies, and they possessed no more means of punishing them judicially. It was resolved to proceed revolutionarily in regard to them, as in regard to the members of the legislative body. The proprietors, editors, and publishers of forty-two newspapers, were condemned to banishment; for, no restrictions being then imposed on the political journals, their number was immense. Among the forty-two, figured *La Quotidienne*. To these dispositions against individuals, were added others for strengthening the authority of the Directory, and re-establishing the revolutionary laws which the Five Hundred had abolished or modified. Thus the Directory was to have the appointment of all the judges and municipal magistrates, whose election was annulled in the forty-eight departments. As for the places of deputies, they were left vacant. The articles of the noted law of the 3d of Brumaire, which had been repealed, were again put in force and even extended. The relatives of emigrants, excluded by this law from public functions until the peace, were excluded by the new law for the space of four years after the peace. They were deprived, moreover, of the electoral privileges. The emigrants, who had returned upon pretext of applying for their erasure, were to leave the communes in which they were within twenty-four hours, and the French territory in a fortnight. Such of them as should be taken in contravention, were to be subjected to the

* Though the author mentions forty-eight departments, he names only the above forty-six. E.

application of the laws, within twenty-four hours. The laws which recalled the banished priests, which released them from the oath, and imposed on them a mere declaration, were repealed. All the laws relative to the police of religious worship were re-established. The Directory was empowered to banish, by a mere ordinance, such priests as they knew to misconduct themselves. As for the newspapers, it was to have, in future, the power to suppress such as should appear dangerous to it. The political societies that is, the clubs, were re-established, but the Directory was armed against them with the same power as had been given to it against the journals. It could shut them up whenever it pleased. Lastly, and this was a point not less important than any of the others, the organization of the national guard was suspended and deferred till other times.

None of these dispositions were sanguinary, for the time for spilling blood was past; but they invested the Directory with a wholly revolutionary power.* They were voted in the evening of the 18th of Fructidor, in the Five Hundred. No voice was raised against their adoption. Some deputies applauded, but the majority was silent and submissive. The resolution which contained them was then carried to the Ancients, who were in permanence, like the Five Hundred, and waiting to be furnished with a subject for deliberation. The mere reading of the resolution and of the report, occupied them till the morning of the 19th. Wearied with too long a sitting, they adjourned for a few hours. The Directory, impatient to obtain the sanction of the Ancients, and to be enabled to support by a law the blow which it had struck, sent a message to the legislative body. "The Directory," it said, "has devoted itself to save liberty, but it relies on you to support it. This day is the 19th, and you have not yet done anything to second it." The resolution was immediately adopted as a law, and was sent to the Directory.

No sooner was it furnished with this law, than it made haste to use it, being determined to execute its plan with despatch, and immediately afterwards to restore everything to order. A great number of those who were condemned to banishment had fled; Carnot had secretly gone towards Switzerland. The Directory would have wished Barthelemy to escape also, but he refused for reasons which have been already stated. Out of the list of persons to be banished, it selected fifteen, who were considered as the most dangerous or the most culpable, and destined them for a transportation, which, to some of them, was as fatal as death itself. They were sent off the same day in grated carriages for Rochefort, whence they were to be conveyed in a frigate to Guiana. These were, Barthelemy, Pichegru,† and Willot, on account of their importance or their culpability; Rovère, on

* The Directory made a tyrannical use of the power which they obtained by their victory. They spilled, indeed, no blood, but otherwise their measures against the defeated party were of the most illegal and oppressive character. During this whole revolution the lower portion of the population, which used to be so much agitated on like occasions, remained perfectly quiet.—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E.

† "Astonishment was excited by the little respect which the soldiers showed for a general who had so often led them to victory; but he had been successfully represented as a counter-revolutionist—a name, which, when the public opinion is free, exercises in France a kind of magical power. Besides, Pichegru had no means of producing an effect on the imagination. He was a man of good manners, but without striking expression either in his features or his words. It has often been said that he was guided in war by the counsels of another. This is at least credible, for his look and conversation were so dull, that they suggested no idea of his being fit for becoming the leader of any enterprise."—*Madame de Staël*. E.

account of his known connexion with the royalist faction ; Aubry, on account of the part which he had performed in the reaction ; Bourdon of the Oise, Murinais, and Delarue, on account of their conduct in the Five Hundred ; Ramel, on account of his conduct at the head of the grenadiers ; Dossonville, on account of the functions which he had held under the commission of the inspectors ; Tronçon-Ducoudray, Barbé-Marbois, and Lafond-Ladebat, on account, not of their culpability, for they were sincerely attached to the republic, but their importance in the Council of the Ancients ; lastly, Brottier and Laville-Heurnois, on account of their conspiracy. Their accomplice, Duverne de Presle, was spared in consequence of his revelations. Hate had, no doubt, its usual share in the selection of the victims, for among these fifteen persons, Pichegru alone was really dangerous. The number was increased to sixteen, by the attachment of Letellier, Barthelemy's servant, who insisted on accompanying his master. They were despatched without delay, and exposed, as it always happens in such cases, to the brutality of the subalterns. The Directory, however, having been informed that General Dutertre, who commanded the escort, behaved ill towards the prisoners, immediately superseded him. These exiles on account of royalism, were bound for Sinamari, where they would find themselves in the company of Billaud-Varennes and Collot-d'Herbois. The destination of the others was the isle of Oleron.

During these two days, Paris continued perfectly quiet. The patriots of the faubourgs deemed the punishment of transportation too mild ; they were accustomed to revolutionary measures of a different kind. Relying upon Barras and Augereau, they expected something more. They formed groups beneath the windows of the Directory, and shouted : *The Republic for ever ! The Directory for ever ! Barras for ever !* They attributed the measure to Barras, and desired that the suppression of the aristocrats might be committed to him for a few days. These groups, however, which were far from numerous, disturbed not in the least the peace of Paris. The sectionaries of Vendémiaire, who, but for the law of the 19th, would soon have been reorganized as national guards, had no longer sufficient energy to take up arms spontaneously. They suffered the stroke of policy to be carried into effect without opposition. For the rest, public opinion continued uncertain. The sincere republicans clearly perceived that the royalist faction had rendered an energetic measure inevitable, but they deplored the violation of the laws and the intervention of the military power. They almost doubted the culpability of the conspirators on seeing such a man as Carnot mingled in their ranks. They apprehended that hatred had too strongly influenced the determinations of the Directory. Lastly, even though considering its determinations as necessary, they were sad, and not without reason ; for it became evident that that constitution, on which they had placed all their hope, was not the termination of our troubles and our discord. The mass of the population submitted and detached itself much on that day from political events. It had been seen on the 9th of Thermidor passing from hatred against the old *régime* to hatred against the system of terror. If it had since attempted to interfere in public affairs, it was only for the purpose of reacting against the Directory, which it confounded with the Convention and the committee of public welfare ; dismayed on this occasion by the energy of the Directory, it regarded the 18th of Fructidor as a warning to keep itself aloof from public events. Accordingly, from that day, political zeal began to cool.

Such were the consequences of the stroke of policy accomplished on the

18th of Fructidor. It has been asserted that it had become useless at the moment when it was executed; that the Directory, in frightening the royalist faction, had already succeeded in overawing it; that, by persisting in this stretch of power, it paved the way to military usurpation by setting an example of violation of the laws. But, as we have observed, the royalist faction was intimidated but for a moment; on the junction of the new third, it would infallibly have overturned everything, and mastered the Directory. Civil war would then have ensued between it and the armies. The Directory, in foreseeing this movement and timely repressing it, prevented a civil war; and, if it placed itself under the protection of the military, it submitted to a melancholy but inevitable necessity. Legality is an illusion in the train of such a revolution as ours. It was not under the shelter of the legal power that all the parties could lie down and rest themselves; it required a stronger power to repress them, to unite them, to blend them together, and to protect them all against Europe in arms; and that power was the military power. The Directory, therefore, by the 18th of Fructidor, prevented civil war, and substituted in its stead, a stroke of policy, executed with energy, but with all the calmness and moderation possible in times of revolution.

THE DIRECTORY.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE 18TH OF FRUCTIDOR—TARDY REVELATIONS AND DISGRACE OF MOREAU—DEATH OF HOCHÉ—REPAYMENT OF TWO-THIRDS OF THE DEBT—LAW AGAINST THE CI-DEVANT NOBLES—RUPTURE OF THE CONFERENCES AT LILLE WITH ENGLAND—CONFERENCES OF UDINE—OPERATIONS OF BONAPARTE IN ITALY; FOUNDATION OF THE CISALPINE REPUBLIC; ARBITRATION BETWEEN THE VALTELINE AND THE GRISONS; LIGURIAN CONSTITUTION; ESTABLISHMENT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN—TREATY OF CAMPO-FORMIO—RETURN OF BONAPARTE TO PARIS; TRIUMPHAL FESTIVAL.

THE 18th of Fructidor struck terror into the ranks of the royalists. The priests and the emigrants, who had already returned in great numbers, quitted Paris and the large towns to regain the frontiers. Those who were ready to re-enter France fled back into Germany and Switzerland. The consternation was profound and universal.* The Directory had just been re-armed with all the revolutionary power by the law of the 19th, and no one durst any longer defy it. It began by reforming the administrations, a course almost always pursued upon every change of system, and appointed decided patriots to most of the public offices. It had to nominate to all the elective functions in forty-eight departments, and it had thus opportunity for greatly extending its influence and multiplying its partisans. Its attention was first directed to the appointment of two directors in the place of Carnot and Barthelemy. Rewbél and Lareveillère, whose influence was singularly increased by the recent event, were unwilling to furnish a pretext for accusing them of having excluded two of their colleagues, in order that they might remain masters of the government. They insisted, therefore, that the legislative body should be immediately desired to nominate two new directors. This course was not approved by Barras, and still less by Augereau. That general was delighted with the proceedings of the 18th, and quite proud of having managed matters so well. By mingling in public events he had acquired a taste for politics and power, and had become ambitious of obtaining a seat in the Directory. He was desirous that the directors, without applying to the legislative body for colleagues, should call him to sit among them. As they would not gratify this pretension, he

* "The chief result of this last movement was the return of the revolutionary government a little modified. The two ancient privileged classes were again driven from society; the refractory priests were a second time exiled. The old nobles, as well as those recently created, were rendered incapable of exercising the rights of citizens until the expiration of seven years, after having served, as it were, their apprenticeship to the republic. Thus did this party, in its thirst for rule, bring back the dictatorship."—*Mignet*. E.

had no means left for becoming director but to obtain the majority in the Councils. But in this hope also he was disappointed. Merlin of Douai and François de Neufchâteau, minister of the interior, distanced all their competitors by a very considerable number of votes. Next to them, the two candidates who had most votes were Massena and Augereau. Massena had a few more than Augereau. The two new directors were installed with the accustomed formalities. They were republicans, rather after the manner of Rewbel and Lareveillère than after the manner of Barras; they had, besides, different habits and different manners. Merlin was a lawyer, François de Neufchâteau a literary man. Both of them lived in a style consistent with their profession, and they were fitted to agree with Rewbel and Lareveillère. Perhaps it would have been desirable, for the influence and the consideration of the Directory with the armies, that one of our celebrated generals had been called to a seat in it.

The Directory appointed two excellent administrators from the provinces to succeed the two ministers removed to its own body. It thus hoped to compose the government of men more foreign to the intrigues of Paris and less accessible to favour. It called to the department of justice Lambrechts, who was commissioner to the central administration of the department of the Dyle, that is to say, prefect. He was an upright magistrate. It appointed to the interior Letourneur, commissioner to the central administration of the Loire-Inférieure, an able, active, and honest public functionary, but so utter a stranger to the capital and its ways, as sometimes to appear ridiculous at the head of a great administration.

The Directory had reason to congratulate itself on the manner in which the events had passed off. It was only uneasy at the silence of General Bonaparte, who had neither written for a long time nor sent the promised funds. Lavalette, his aide-de-camp, had not appeared at the Luxembourg during the event, and it was suspected that he had prejudiced his general against the Directory, and given him false particulars concerning the state of things. M. de Lavalette had, in fact, never ceased to advise Bonaparte to hold back, to take no part in the meditated blow, and to confine himself to the aid which he had afforded to the Directory by his proclamations. Barras and Augereau sent for M. de Lavalette, threatened him, and said that he had no doubt deceived Bonaparte; they declared that, but for the regard due to his general, they would have caused him to be arrested. Lavalette set out immediately for Italy. Augereau lost no time in writing to General Bonaparte and to his friends in the army, in order to represent the circumstance in the most favourable colours.

The Directory, dissatisfied with Moreau, had resolved to recall him, when it received from him a letter which produced the greatest sensation. Moreau, in crossing the Rhine, had taken the papers of General Klinglin, among which he had found the whole correspondence of Pichegru with the Prince of Condé. This correspondence he had kept secret, but, on occasion of the 18th of Fructidor, he resolved to communicate it to the government. He asserted that he had decided on this step before he was acquainted with the events of the 18th, and in order to furnish the Directory with the evidence which it needed for confounding formidable enemies. But we are assured that Moreau had received by telegraph, intelligence of the events of the 18th on the very same day, and that he had then hastened to write, in order to make a denunciation which would not compromise Pichegru more than he was already compromised, and which would relieve himself from a heavy responsibility. Whatever ground there may be for

these different conjectures, it is clear that Moreau had long kept an important secret, and had not made up his mind to reveal it till the very moment of the catastrophe. Every body said that, not being republican enough to denounce his friend, he had not been a friend faithful enough to keep the secret to the end. Herein his political character showed itself as it really was, that is to say, weak, vacillating, and uncertain. The Directory summoned him to Paris to account for his conduct. On examining this correspondence, it found the confirmation of all that it had heard concerning Pichegru, and could not but regret not being sooner informed of it. In these papers it found also evidence of the fidelity of Moreau to the republic; but it punished him for his lukewarmness and his silence by taking his command from him and leaving him unemployed in Paris.

Hoche, still at the head of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, had passed a whole month in the most painful anxiety. He was at his headquarters in Wetzlar, having a carriage completely ready to start with his young wife for Germany, if the party of the Five Hundred should gain the ascendant. It was on that occasion that he had thought, for the first time, of his own interests, and of collecting a sum of money to supply his wants during his absence. We have seen that he had lent to the Directory the greatest part of his wife's portion. The news of the 18th of Fructidor filled him with joy, and relieved him from all apprehension on his own account. The Directory, to reward his zeal, united the two large armies of the Sambre and Meuse and of the Rhine into one, by the name of the army of Germany, and gave him the command of it. It was the most extensive command under the republic. Unfortunately, the health of the young general scarcely allowed him to enjoy the triumph of the patriots, and the testimonies of confidence bestowed by the government. For some time, a dry and frequent cough and nervous convulsions had alarmed his friends and his medical attendants. An unknown disease was consuming this young man, lately in such robust health, and who united with superior talents the advantage of the most manly beauty and strength. Notwithstanding the state of health, he set about organizing into one the two armies with the command of which he had just been invested, and he still meditated his expedition to Ireland, by means of which the Directory hoped to alarm England. But, towards the end of Fructidor, his cough became more violent, and he began to suffer excruciating pains. He was requested to suspend his operations, but he would not. He sent for his physician. "Give me," said he, "a remedy for fatigue, but let it not be rest." Overcome by illness, he betook himself to his bed, on the first complementary day of the year VI, and expired on the following day, amidst the most intense pains. The army was filled with consternation, for it adored its young general. The tidings spread with rapidity, and deeply afflicted all the republicans, who reckoned upon the talents and patriotism of Hoche. A report that he was poisoned was immediately circulated.* People could not believe that a man possessing such youth, such strength, such health,

"Hoche," said the Emperor, "died suddenly, and under singular circumstances, and as there existed a party who seemed to think that all crimes belonged to me of right, endeavours were made to circulate a report that I had poisoned him. There was a time when no mischief could happen, that was not imputed to me. Thus, when in Paris, I caused Kleber to be assassinated in Egypt; I blew out Desaix's brains at Marengo; I strangled and cut the throats of persons who were confined in prisons; I seized the Pope by the hair of his head; and a hundred similar absurdities"—*Les Causes. E.*

could have died a natural death. On a post-mortem examination by the faculty, the stomach and intestines were found full of black spots, and though the medical men did not declare these to be symptoms of poison, they seemed at least to believe them to be so. The poisoning was attributed to the Directory, which was absurd, for none of the Directory was capable of that crime so foreign to our manners, and, moreover, none had an interest in perpetrating it. Hoche was in fact the strongest support of the Directory, as well against the royalists as against the ambitious conqueror of Italy. It was conjectured, with much greater probability, that he had been poisoned in the West. His physician recollected, as he thought, that an alteration had taken place in his health ever since his last stay in Bretagne, whither he had gone to embark for Ireland. It was supposed, though without any proof, that the young general had been poisoned at an entertainment which he gave to persons of all parties, for the purpose of bringing them together.

The Directory ordered a magnificent funeral to be prepared. It took place in the Champ de Mars, and was attended by an immense concourse of people. A considerable army followed the corpse, headed by the aged father of the general, as chief mourner. This solemnity produced a profound impression, and was one of the most interesting of our heroic age.

Thus terminated the life of one of the most glorious and most interesting characters of the Revolution. In this instance, at least, it was not by the scaffold. Hoche was twenty-nine years old. A soldier in the French guards, he had educated himself in a few months. With the physical courage of the soldier, he united an energetic character, a superior understanding, great knowledge of mankind, skill in political matters, and, lastly, the all-powerful spring of the passions. His were ardent, and they were perhaps the sole cause of his death. A particular circumstance heightened the interest excited by his qualities. His fortune had always been interrupted by unforeseen accidents. Conqueror of Weissenburg, and just entering upon the most glorious career, he was all at once consigned to a dungeon; released from confinement, he went to waste his life in La Vendée, where he played a most useful political part; at the moment when he was about to execute a grand plan against Ireland, he was again stopped short by a storm and misunderstandings; removed to the army of the Sambre and Meuse, he gained a splendid victory, and found his progress suspended by the preliminaries of Leoben; lastly, while at the head of the army of Germany, and in the dispositions of Europe at that time, he had a grand prospect before him, he was suddenly seized in the midst of his career, and carried off by an illness of forty-eight hours. If a glorious memory, however, be any compensation for life, he could not be better compensated for having died so young. Victories, an important pacification, universality of talents, unimpeachable integrity, the idea entertained by all republicans that he would have singly opposed the conqueror of Rivoli and of the Pyramids, that his ambition would have continued republican, and would have proved an invincible obstacle to the great ambition which aspired to the throne—in short, brilliant exploits, noble plans, and twenty-nine years, such are the elements of which his memory is composed.* It is indeed glorious enough. Let us not pity him for

* "To-day, in the course of conversation, the name of Hoche having been mentioned some one observed that at a very early age he had inspired great hope. 'And what is still better,' said Napoleon, 'you may add that he fulfilled that hope. Hoche possessed a hostile, provoking kind of ambition. He was the sort of man who could conceive the

having died young. It will always be much more to the glory of Hoche, of Kleber, of Desaix, that they did not live to be marshals. They had the honour to die citizens and free men, without being obliged, like Moreau, to seek an asylum in foreign armies.

The government gave the army of Germany to Augereau, and thus got rid of his turbulence, which began to be annoying in Paris.

The Directory had made in a few days all the arrangements which circumstances required; but it had yet to direct its attention to the finances. The law of the 19th of Fructidor, by delivering it from its most formidable adversaries, by re-establishing the law of the 3d of Brumaire, by giving it new means of severity against the emigrants and the priests, by arming it with the power of suppressing the journals and shutting up the political societies whose spirit it disapproved, by permitting it to fill all the vacant places after the annulling of the elections, by adjourning indefinitely the reorganization of the national guards—the law of the 19th of Fructidor had given to it all that the two Councils intended to wrest from it, and had even added a kind of revolutionary omnipotence. But the Directory had advantages quite as important to recover in the department of finances; for the Councils had been not less desirous to reduce it in that respect than in every other. A vast project had been presented to it for the expenditure and the income of the year VI. The first thing to be done was to restore to the Directory the powers of which it had been deprived relative to negotiations of the treasury, the order of payments, in short, the management of the funds. All the articles on this subject adopted by the Councils before the 18th of Fructidor were repealed. It was necessary, in the next place, to think of the creation of new taxes, to relieve landed property which was too heavily burdened, and to raise the receipts to a level with the expenditure. The establishment of a lottery was authorized, a toll was imposed upon the roads, and a tax upon mortgages. The duty on registration was so regulated as to increase the produce considerably; and the duty on foreign tobacco was raised. Owing to these new sources of income, the land-tax could be reduced to 228 millions, and the personal tax to 50, and yet the total amount of the revenue for the year VI raised to 616 millions. In this sum the presumed sales of national domains were estimated at no more than 20 millions.

The receipts being raised to 616 millions by these different means, it became necessary to reduce the expenditure to the same sum. It was supposed that the war would not cost this year more than 283 millions even in case of a new campaign. The other general services were estimated at 247 millions, making a total of 530 millions. The service of the debt amounted alone to 258 millions; and if it had been entirely provided for, the expense would have amounted to a sum far superior to the means of the republic. It was therefore proposed to pay only one-third of it, or 86 millions. In this manner the war, the general services, and the debt, would raise the expenditure to no more than 616 millions, the precise amount of the receipts. But, in order to confine it within these limits, it would be requisite to take a decisive measure in regard to the debt. Since the abolition of paper money, and the return to specie, the payment of the

idea of coming from Strasburg with twenty-five thousand men to seize the reins of government by force.' The Emperor added that Hoche would ultimately either have yielded to him, or must have subdued him; and, as he was fond of money and pleasure, he doubted not he would have yielded to him."—*Las Cases*. E.

interest could not be very strictly kept up. One-fourth had been paid in cash, and the other three-fourths in bills on the national domains, called *three-quarter bills*. This was, in some respects, like paying one-fourth in money, and three-fourths in assignats. The debt, therefore, had hitherto been provided for only with resources arising from the national domains, and it became necessary to adopt some measure for the benefit of the state and of the creditors. A debt whose annual charge amounted to 258 millions was really enormous for that period. The resources of credit and the power of the sinking fund were not yet known. The revenue was much less considerable than it has since become; for there had not yet been time to reap the benefits of the Revolution, and France, which has since been enabled to furnish 1000 millions in general contributions, could then scarcely supply 616 millions. Thus the debt was overwhelming, and the state was in the situation of an individual who was insolvent. It was resolved, therefore, to continue to pay part of the interest of the debt in cash, and, instead of paying the remainder in *bons* upon the national domains, to pay off the capital itself in national domains. It was proposed to retain one-third only: the third retained was to be called *consolidated third*, and to remain on the great book with the quality of a perpetual *rente*. The other two-thirds were to be paid off at the rate of twenty times the *rente*, and in *bons* receivable in payment for national domains. It is true that these *bons* fell in commerce to less than one-sixth of their value, and that for those who did not wish to purchase lands it was an absolute bankruptcy.

Notwithstanding the quietness and the docility of the Councils since the 18th of Fructidor, this measure excited a strong opposition. The adversaries to the scheme of paying off the two-thirds maintained that it was a downright bankruptcy; that the debt, at the commencement of the Revolution, had been placed under the safeguard of the national honour, and that it was dishonouring the republic to pay off the two-thirds; that the creditors who would not buy domains would lose nine-tenths by negotiating their *bons*, for the issue of so large a quantity of paper would considerably lower its value; that even, without entertaining prejudices against the origin of the domains, most of the creditors of the state were too poor to buy lands; that associations for buying them jointly were impossible; that consequently, the loss of nine-tenths of their capital was real for most of them; that the third, said to be consolidated and secure from reduction in future, was only promised; that one-third promised was worth less than three-thirds promised; that, lastly, if the republic could not at the moment provide for the whole interest of the debt, it would be better for the creditors to wait as they had hitherto done, but to wait in the hope of seeing their lot ameliorated, rather than find themselves all at once stripped of their credit. There were even many persons who could have wished that a distinction should be made between the different species of *rentes* inscribed in the great book, and that those only should be liable to be paid off which had been acquired at a low rate. Some of them had actually been sold at the rate of 10 and 15 francs, and those who had bought them would still be considerable gainers by the reduction to one-third.

The partisans of the plan of the Directory replied that a state had a right, like a private individual, to give up its property to its creditors, when it could no longer pay them; that the debt far exceeded the means of the republic, and that, under these circumstances, it had a right to give up to them the pledge itself of this debt, that is, the domains; that, in buying

lands, they would lose very little; that these lands would rise rapidly in their hands, till they regained their former value, and that they would recover in this way as much as they had lost; that there would still be left domains to the amount of 1300 millions (the thousand millions promised to the armies having been transferred to the creditors of the state); that peace was near at hand; that, at the peace, the *bons* in which the debt had been paid off would alone be received in payment for national domains; that, consequently, the part of the capital paid off, amounting to about 3000 millions, would find wherewith to purchase 1300 millions worth of domains, and lose at most two-thirds, instead of nine-tenths; that, moreover, the creditors had not hitherto been treated otherwise; that they had always been paid in domains, whether assignats had been given to them or *three-quarter bills*; that the republic was obliged to give them what it had; that they would not be gainers by waiting, for it would never be in its power to provide for the whole debt; that, in being paid off, their lot was fixed; that the payment of the consolidated third would commence immediately, because there existed means of providing for it, and that the republic, on her part, would be relieved from an enormous burden; that she would enter upon regular ways; that she would present herself before Europe with a lightened debt, and that she would thus be more imposing and stronger for obtaining peace; that, lastly, it was impossible to make a distinction between the different *rentes* according to the price of acquisition, and that they must be all treated alike.

This measure was inevitable. The republic did in this instance as she had always done: all engagements beyond her ability she had fulfilled with lands, at the price to which they had fallen. It was in assignats that she had paid the old charges, as well as all the expenses of the Revolution, and it was with lands that she had paid off the assignats. It was in assignats, that is, with lands, that she had discharged the interest of the debt, and it was with lands that she now finished by discharging the capital itself. In short, she gave what she had. The debt of the United States had been liquidated in the same manner. The creditors had received nothing but the shores of the Mississippi in payment. Measures of this nature inflict, like revolutions, much individual hardship; but people must submit to them when they have become inevitable.

The measure was adopted. Thus by means of the new taxes, which raised the revenue to 616 millions, and the reduction of the debt, which allowed the expenditure to be limited to the same sum, the balance was re-established in our finances; and there was reason to hope that somewhat less embarrassment would be experienced for the year VI (September 1797 to September 1798).

To all these measures, the consequences of victory, the republican party wished to add another. It alleged that the republic would always be in danger, while a hostile caste, that of the *ci-devant* nobles, should be tolerated in her bosom; it proposed that all the families which had formerly been noble, or which had passed themselves off as such, should be exiled from France; that the value of their possessions should be given to them in French commodities, and that they should be obliged to carry their prejudices, their passions, and their persons, to other countries. This plan was warmly supported by Sieyès, Boulay of La Meurthe, and Chasal, all decided republicans, but was as strongly opposed by Tallien and the friends of Barras. Barras was a noble; the commander of the army of Italy was of gentle birth; many of the friends who shared the pleasures of Barras and

who filled his drawing-rooms, had also been nobles; and, though an exception was made in favour of those who had rendered services to the republic the saloons of the director were highly incensed against the proposed law. Without all these personal reasons it would have been easy to demonstrate the danger and the severity of that law. It was, nevertheless, submitted to the two Councils, and excited a sort of commotion, which obliged it to be withdrawn, that it might undergo great modifications. It was reproduced in another form. The *ci-devant* nobles were no longer to be doomed to exile, but to be considered as foreigners, and required, in order to recover the quality of citizens, to go through the formalities and submit to the terms of naturalization.* An exception was made in favour of those who had usefully served the republic either in the armies or in the assemblies. Barras, his friends, and the conqueror of Italy, whose birth people affected to call to mind on all occasions, were thus exempted from the consequences of this measure.

The government had resumed an energy absolutely revolutionary. The Opposition, which affected to become clamorous for peace in the Directory and the Councils, being removed, the government showed itself more firm and more exacting in the negotiations at Lille and Udine. It immediately ordered all soldiers having leave of absence to return; it replaced everything on the war footing, and sent fresh instructions to its negotiators. Maret at Lille had succeeded, as we have seen, in reconciling the pretensions of the maritime powers. Peace was concluded, provided that Spain would sacrifice Trinidad, and Holland Trincomalee, and provided that France would engage never to take the Cape of Good Hope for herself. Nothing more then was requisite than the consent of Spain and Holland. The Directory thought Maret too conciliating, and resolved to recall him. It sent Bonnier and Treilhard to Lille, with fresh instructions. According to these instructions, France required the unconditional restitution not only of her own colonies, but of those of her allies. With respect to the negotiations at Udine, the Directory was equally short and positive. It would no longer adhere to the preliminaries of Leoben, which gave Austria the limit of the Oglio in Italy; it insisted that all Italy as far as the Isonzo should be emancipated, and that Austria should be content to indemnify herself by the secularization of various ecclesiastical states in Germany. It recalled Clarke, who had been chosen and sent by Carnot, and who, in his correspondence, had not spared the generals of the army of Italy reputed to be the most republican. Bonaparte remained invested with the powers of the republic for treating with Austria.

The ultimatum delivered at Lille, agreeably to the orders of the Directory, by the new negotiators, Bonnier and Treilhard, broke off the negotiation when nearly brought to a close. Lord Malmesbury was extremely disconcerted at it, for he was desirous of peace, either to make a glorious finish to his career, or to procure a momentary respite for his government. He expressed the deepest regret, but it was impossible for England to

* "Two hundred thousand persons at once fell under the lash of these severe enactments. Their effect upon France was to the last degree disastrous. The miserable emigrants fled a second time in crowds from the country of which they were beginning to taste the sweets; and society, which was reviving from the horrors of Jacobin sway, was again prostrated under its fury. Finally, the Councils openly avowed a national bankruptcy: they cut off for ever two-thirds of the national debt of France; closing thus a sanguinary revolution by the extinction of freedom, the banishment of virtue, and the violation of public faith"—*Alison*. F.

renounce all her maritime conquests without obtaining anything in exchange. So sincere was Lord Malmesbury in his desire to treat, that he desired M. Maret to make inquiry in Paris whether it was not possible to influence the determination of the Directory, and he even offered several millions to purchase the vote of one of the directors. M. Maret refused to undertake any negotiation of this kind, and left Lille. Lord Malmesbury and Mr. Ellis set out immediately, and did not return.* Though the Directory laid itself open on this occasion to the charge of having rejected a certain and advantageous peace for France, still its motive was honourable. It would have been discreditable to us to forsake our allies and to impose sacrifices upon them, in return for their attachment to our cause. The Directory, flattering itself that it should shortly conclude peace with Austria, or at least that it should impose peace on that power by a movement of its armies, hoped soon to get rid of its continental enemies, and to be able to turn its whole force against England.

The ultimatum transmitted to Bonaparte displeased him exceedingly, for he had no hope of being able to obtain its acceptance. It would be difficult, in fact, to force Austria to renounce Italy entirely, and to be content with the secularization of a few ecclesiastical states in Germany, or to march upon Vienna. Now, Bonaparte could no longer pretend to that honour, for he had all the forces of the Austrian monarchy on his hands, and it was the army of Germany which would have the advantage of pushing on first, and penetrating into the hereditary dominions. To this cause of discontent was added another, when he learned the suspicions that were conceived of him in Paris. Augereau had sent one of his aides-de-camp with letters for many of the officers and generals of the army of Italy. This aide-de-camp appeared to be charged with some special mission, and to be sent to correct the opinion of the army concerning the 18th of Fructidor. Bonaparte soon perceived that he was an object of distrust: he lost no time in assuming the tone of an offended person, and complaining with the warmth and bitterness of a man who knows himself to be indispensable. He said that the government treated him with horrible ingratitude; that it behaved towards him as it had done towards Pichegru after Vendémiaire; and he applied for his dismissal.† This man, with a mind so great and so resolute, and who could assume so noble an attitude, here gave way to a gust of passion, like an unruly and froward child. The Directory took no notice of the application for his dismissal, and merely assured him that it had nothing to do with the letters or with the sending of the aide-de-camp. Bonaparte was pacified, but again applied to be reinstated in his functions of negotiator, and in those of organizer of the Italian republics. He repeated incessantly that he was ill, that he could no longer endure the fatigue of riding, and that it would be impossible for him to make another campaign. Still, though he was really ill, and overwhelmed by the prodigious toils in which he had been engaged for two years past, he had no wish to be superseded in any of his employments, and he was very sure of finding in his

* "Lord Malmesbury demanded his passports and returned to England, leaving Europe convinced that, on this occasion at least, the cabinet of St. James's had evinced more moderation than a Directory whose proceedings were worthy of the days of Robespierre."—*Jomini*. E.

† "It is evident," said Napoleon, in his letter to the Directory, "that the government is resolved to act by me as they did by Pichegru. I beseech you then to appoint a successor to me, and accept my resignation. No power on earth shall make me continue to serve a government which has given me such a scandalous proof of ingratitude, which I was far indeed from expecting."—*Napoleon's Confidential Despatches*. E.

mind, in case of emergency, that strength in which his body seemed to be deficient.

He resolved to prosecute the negotiation, and to add the glory of pacificator to that of first captain of the age. The ultimatum of the Directory annoyed him; but he was not more decided on this occasion than on many others, to obey his government implicitly. His labours, at this moment, were immense. He was organizing the Italian republics, creating a navy in the Adriatic, forming grand projects relative to the Mediterranean, and treating with the plenipotentiaries of Austria.

He had begun to organize the provinces which he had emancipated in Upper Italy in two distinct states. He had long since formed the Cispadane republic out of the duchy of Modena and the legations of Bologna and Ferrara. His plan was to unite this little state with revolutionized Venice, and thus to indemnify her for the loss of her continental provinces. He purposed to organize Lombardy separately, under the appellation of the Transpadane republic. But he soon changed his intentions, and preferred forming a single state out of the emancipated provinces. The spirit of locality which at first opposed the union of Lombardy with the other provinces, now on the contrary recommended their incorporation. Romagna, for instance, objected to be united with the legations and the duchy of Modena, but consented to be dependent on the central government established in Milan. Bonaparte soon perceived that, as each of these states detested its neighbour, it would be easier to subject them all to a single authority. Lastly, the difficulty of deciding upon the supremacy between Venice and Milan, and of preferring one of the two and making it the seat of government—that difficulty had ceased to be such for him. He had resolved to sacrifice Venice.* He disliked the Venetians; he saw that the change of government had not produced among them a change in opinion. The nobility, high and low, and the populace, were enemies of the French and of the Revolution, and well-wishers to the Austrians. A very small number of wealthy citizens approved the new order of things. The democratic municipality manifested the worst disposition towards the French. Almost every person in Venice seemed to desire that a turn of fortune would permit Austria to re-establish the late government. The Venetians, moreover, excited no esteem in Bonaparte in regard to another point which was important in his eyes—power. Their canals and ports were almost choked up; their navy was in the most deplorable state; they were themselves rendered effeminate by pleasure, and incapable of energy. “It is a soft, effeminate, and cowardly race,” he wrote, “without land or water, and we can do as we please with it.” He conceived the idea, therefore, of ceding Venice to Austria, on condition that Austria, renouncing the boundary of the Oglio, stipulated in the preliminaries of Leoben, would go back to the Adige. That river, which forms an excellent boundary, would then separate Austria from the new republic. The important fortress of Mantua, which, according to the preliminaries, was to be restored to Austria, would then belong to the Italian republic, and Milan would become the capital without any dispute. Bonaparte deemed it much better to form a single state, having Milan for its capital, and to give to this state the frontier of the Adige and Mantua, than to keep Venice; and it was for the interest

* “The whole infamy of the treaty which was so fatal to Venice, rests on the head of Napoleon. The French Directory is entirely blameless, except in not having had the courage to disown the treaty to which his signature was affixed.”—*Alison*. E.

of Italian liberty itself that he should do so. Unless he could emancipate all Italy as far as the Isonzo, it would be better to sacrifice Venice than the frontier of the Adige and Mantua. Bonaparte had perceived, in conversing with the Austrian negotiators, that the new arrangement was likely to be accepted. In consequence, he formed out of Lombardy, the duchies of Modena and Reggio, the legations of Bologna and Ferrara, the Bergamasco, the Bresciano, and the Mantuan, a state extending to the Adige, which possessed excellent fortresses, as Pizzighitone and Mantua, a population of three million six hundred thousand inhabitants, an admirable soil, rivers, canals, and harbours.

He immediately set about organizing it into a republic. He would have preferred a different constitution from that given to France. In that constitution he considered the executive power as too weak; and, even without having yet a decided partiality for any particular form of government, still, merely for the sake of composing a strong state, capable of combating the neighbouring aristocracies, he would have wished for a more concentric and more energetic organization. He desired that Sieyès should be sent to him, that he might confer with him on this subject; but the Directory did not approve his ideas, and insisted that the French constitution should be given to the new republic. It was obeyed, and our constitution was immediately adapted to Italy. The new republic was called the Cisalpine. It was proposed in Paris to call it the Transalpine: but that would have been taking Paris, as it were, for the centre, and the Italians desired to have it at Rome, because all their wishes tended to the emancipation of their country, to its unity, and to the re-establishment of the ancient metropolis. The term Cisalpine, therefore, was best adapted to it.* It was deemed most prudent not to leave to the choice of the Italians the first composition of the government. For this first time, Bonaparte appointed himself the five directors and the members of the two Councils. He took great pains to select the fittest persons, in so far, at least, as his situation permitted him. He appointed Serbelloni, one of the highest nobles of Italy, director; he caused national guards to be everywhere organized, and collected thirty thousand of them at Milan, for the federation of the 14th of July. The presence of the French army in Italy, its exploits, its glory, had begun to diffuse a military enthusiasm in that country, too unaccustomed to arms. Bonaparte strove to excite it by all possible means. He was well aware how weak the new republic was in a military point of view. The Piedmontese army was the only one in Italy that he esteemed, because the court of Piedmont alone had been engaged in war during the course of the century. He wrote to Paris that a single regiment of the King of Sardinia's would overthrow the Cisalpine republic; that it was necessary to give to that republic warlike manners; that then it would be an important power in Italy; but that this must be a work of time, and that such revolutions were not to be effected in a few days. He began, however, to succeed in his efforts, for he possessed in the highest degree the art of communicating to others the strongest of his partialities—fondness for arms. No one knew better how to employ his glory in order to make military success fashionable, and to direct to that point every species of vanity and ambition. From

* "The Cisalpine republic was the name fixed upon to designate the united commonwealth. It would have destroyed all classical propriety, and have confused historical recollections, if what had hitherto been called the ultra-montane side of the Alps, had, to gratify Parisian vanity, been termed the *Further* side of the same chain of mountains."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E.

that time a change of manners commenced in Italy. "The long loose coat, which was the fashionable dress for young men, was superseded by the uniform. Instead of passing their lives at the feet of the women, the young Italians frequented the riding-schools, the fencing-rooms, and the exercises of troops. The boys no longer played at chapel: they had tin soldiers, and imitated in their sports the events of war. In the comedies and in the street farces, there had always been represented an Italian, a great coward, though witty, and a sort of blustering captain, sometimes French, more frequently German, very strong, very brave, and very brutal, who finished by giving a sound drubbing to the Italian, amidst the applause of the spectators. The people would no longer suffer such allusions: dramatists introduced upon the stage, to the satisfaction of the public, brave Italians, putting foreigners to flight in support of their honour and their rights. A national spirit was formed. Italy had her songs, both patriotic and martial. The women rejected with contempt the homage of men who affected effeminate manners in order to please them." *

The revolution, however, had only just begun. The Cisalpine could not yet be strong except by the aid of France. The plan was to leave part of the army there, as in Holland, to rest from its fatigues, to enjoy its glory in quiet, and to animate the whole country with its martial ardour. Bonaparte, with that foresight which embraced everything, had formed a vast and magnificent project for the Cisalpine. That republic was to be an advance post for France. It was requisite that our armies should be able to reach it rapidly. Bonaparte had formed the plan of a road from France to Geneva, and running from Geneva through the Valais, crossing the Simplon, and descending into Lombardy. He was already in treaty with Switzerland on this subject; he had sent engineers to make an estimate of the expense, and he arranged all the details of execution with that precision which he displayed even in the most extensive and apparently chimerical projects. He meant this high-road, the first that should cross the Alps in a direct line, to be broad, safe, and magnificent—a masterpiece of liberty, and a monument of French power.

While he was thus engaged with a republic which owed its existence to him, he administered justice also, and was chosen as arbiter between two states. The Valteline had revolted against the sovereignty of the Grison league. The Valteline consists of three valleys, which belong to Italy, for they pour their waters into the Adda. They were subject to the yoke of the Grisons—a yoke which they found insupportable, for there is none so heavy as that which one people imposes upon another. There was more than one tyranny of this kind in Switzerland. That of Berne over the Pays de Vaud was notorious. The people of the Valteline rose, and desired to form part of the Cisalpine republic. They solicited the protection of Bonaparte, and, in order to obtain it, they appealed to ancient treaties, which placed the Valteline under the protection of the sovereigns of Milan. The Grisons and the people of the Valteline agreed to refer the matter to the tribunal of Bonaparte. With the permission of the Directory he accepted the mediation. He advised the Grisons to recognise the rights of the people of the Valteline, and to associate them with themselves as a new member of the Grison league. They refused to comply, and insisted on pleading the cause of their tyranny. Bonaparte fixed a time for hearing their arguments. At the appointed time, the Grisons, at the instigation of

* *Mémoires de Napoleon*, by Count de Montholon, tom. iv., p. 196.

Austria, refused to appear. Bonaparte, then, taking his stand on the acceptance of the arbitration and on ancient treaties, gave judgment against the Grisons in default, declared the people of the Valteline free, and permitted them to unite themselves with the Cisalpine republic. This sentence, founded in law and equity, excited a strong sensation in Europe. It terrified the aristocracy of Berne, delighted the Vaudois, and added to the Cisalpine a wealthy, brave, and numerous population.

Genoa took him at the same time for her adviser in the choice of a constitution. Genoa was not conquered. She had a right to choose her own laws, and on this point was wholly independent of the Directory. The two parties, aristocratic and democratic, were at variance there. An insurrection had broken out, in the first instance, as we have seen, in the month of May; there had been a second, more general, in the valley of La Polcevera, which had nearly proved fatal to Genoa. It was excited by the priests against the new constitution. The French general, Duphot, who was there with some troops, restored order. The Genoese addressed themselves to Bonaparte, who answered them in a severe letter, full of sound advice, in which he reproved their democratic intemperance. He made alterations in their constitution; instead of five magistrates invested with the executive power, he left only three. The Councils were far from numerous; the government was organized in a less popular, but in a stronger manner.* Bonaparte caused more advantages to be granted to the nobles and to the priests, to reconcile them with the new order of things; and, as it had been proposed to exclude them from public functions, he condemned that idea. "You would do," he wrote to the Genoese, "what they have done themselves." He took care to publish the letter containing this expression. It was a censure directed against the course pursued in Paris in regard to the nobles. He was delighted with the opportunity of thus interfering indirectly in politics, of giving an opinion, of giving it against the Directory, and, above all, of separating himself immediately from the victorious party; for he affected to remain independent, to approve, to serve none of the factions, to despise them, and to be above them all.

While he was thus the legislator, the arbiter, and the adviser, of the people of Italy, he was engaged in other plans not less vast, and which showed a foresight still more profound. He had seized the navy of Venice, and summoned Admiral Brueys to the Adriatic to take possession of the Greek islands belonging to Venice. He had thus been led to reflect on the Mediterranean, on its importance, and on the part which we might act there. He had thence concluded that, if we were doomed to meet with our masters on the ocean, we ought not to have any in the Mediterranean. Whether Italy should be entirely emancipated or not, whether Venice should be ceded to Austria or not, he desired that France should keep the Ionian islands, Corfu, Zante, St. Maura, Cerigo, and Cephalonia. The inhabitants of those islands were solicitous to become our subjects. Malta, the most important post in the Mediterranean, belonged to an obsolete order, which the influence of the French Revolution could not fail to sweep away. Malta must soon fall into the hands of the English, if France did not take possession of it. Bonaparte had caused the property of the knights in Italy

* "The deputies from the Genoese senate signed a convention at Montebello, which put an end to Doria's constitution and established the democratical government of Genoa. The people burned the *Golden Book*, and broke the statue of Doria to pieces. This outrage on the memory of that great man displeased Napoleon, who required the provisional government to restore it."—*Montholon*. E.

to be seized, with a view to complete their ruin. He had set on foot intrigues in Malta itself, which was guarded only by a few knights and a slender garrison, and his plan was to send thither his little squadron, and to make himself master of it. From these different posts, he wrote to the Directory, "we shall command the Mediterranean, we shall keep an eye upon the Ottoman empire, which is everywhere falling to pieces, and we shall be at hand to support it, or to secure our share of it. We shall be able to do more," added Bonaparte; "we shall have it in our power to render the dominion of the ocean almost useless to the English. They have disputed with us at Lille the possession of the Cape of Good Hope. We can do without it. Let us occupy Egypt. We shall be in the direct road for India, and it will be easy for us to found there one of the finest colonies in the world."

Thus it was in Italy, while turning his attention to the Levant, that he conceived the first idea of that celebrated expedition which was equipped in the following year. "It is in Egypt," he wrote (in a letter dated the 29th of Thermidor, year V—August 16th, 1797) "that we must attack England."

To attain these ends, he had caused Admiral Brueys to be sent into the Adriatic, with six sail of the line and some frigates and cutters. He had, moreover, devised means for getting possession of the Venetian navy. According to the treaty concluded, he was to be paid three millions in naval stores. Upon this pretext, he took all the hemp, iron, and other materials, which constituted the sole wealth of the Venetian arsenal. After seizing these stores on account of the three millions, Bonaparte took possession of the ships, upon pretext of sending them to occupy the islands on behalf of democratic Venice. He ordered those which were building to be finished, and thus succeeded in fitting out six sail of the line, six frigates, and several cutters. These he joined to the squadron which Admiral Brueys had brought from Toulon. He replaced the million which the treasury had stopped, furnished Brueys with funds for enrolling excellent seamen in Albania and on the coasts of Greece, and thus created a naval force capable of awing the whole Mediterranean. He fixed its principal station at Corfu, for excellent reasons, and which were approved by the government. From Corfu, this squadron could sail up the Adriatic, and act in concert with the army of Italy, in case of new hostilities; it could go to Malta, where it would overawe the court of Naples; and it would be easy for it, if it were wanted in the ocean to concur in any project, to fly to the Straits more speedily than from Toulon. Lastly, at Corfu the squadron might be trained and learn to manœuvre better than at Toulon, where it generally lay motionless. "You will never have seamen," wrote Bonaparte, "while you leave them in your ports."

Such was the way in which Bonaparte employed his time during the wilful delays to which Austria subjected him. He thought also of his military position in regard to that power. She had made immense preparations since the signature of the preliminaries of Leoben. She had transferred the greater part of her forces to Carinthia, in order to protect Vienna and to secure it against the impetuosity of Bonaparte. She had ordered a levy *en masse* in Hungary. Eighteen thousand Hungarian horse had been training for three months past on the banks of the Danube. Thus she possessed the means of supporting the negotiations of Udine. Bonaparte had scarcely more than seventy thousand troops, a very small portion of which was cavalry. He applied to the Directory for reinforcements, that

ne might be able to face the enemy, and he particularly urged the ratification of the treaty of alliance with Piedmont, in order to obtain ten thousand of those Piedmontese soldiers, of whom he had so high an opinion. But the Directory would not send him reinforcements, because the removal of troops would have occasioned numerous desertions. It deemed it better, by accelerating the march of the army of Germany, to extricate the army of Italy than to reinforce it; and it still hesitated to sign the alliance with Piedmont, because it would not guarantee a throne, the natural fall of which it hoped and wished for. It had merely sent a few dismounted cavalry. In Italy there were abundant means of mounting and equipping them.

Deprived of the resources on which he had reckoned, Bonaparte saw himself exposed to a storm from the quarter of the Julian Alps. He had endeavoured to supply himself in all possible ways with the means that were refused him. He had armed and fortified Palma Nova with extraordinary activity, and had made it a fortress of the first order, which would of itself require a long siege. This circumstance alone produced a material change in his position. He had caused bridges to be thrown over the Isonzo, and *têtes de pont* constructed, in order to be ready to cross with his accustomed promptness. If the rupture should take place before snow fell, he hoped to surprise the Austrians, to throw them into disorder, and, in spite of the superiority of their forces, to be very soon at the gates of Vienna. But, if the rupture should not happen till after the fall of snow, he should not be able to anticipate the Austrians, but be obliged to receive them in the plains of Italy, where the weather allowed them to debouch in all seasons, and then the disadvantage of number would no longer be balanced by that of the offensive. In this case he considered himself as being in danger.

Bonaparte was therefore desirous that the negotiations should be brought speedily to a close.* After the ridiculous note of the 18th of July, in which the plenipotentiaries had anew insisted on a congress at Berne, and remonstrated against what had been done at Venice, Bonaparte had replied in a vigorous manner, which proved to Austria that he was ready to dash again upon Vienna. Messrs. de Gallo, de Meerveldt, and a third negotiator, M. de Degelmann, had returned with fresh powers, and with authority to negotiate at Udine. They arrived there on the 31st of August (14th of Fructidor), and the conferences had immediately begun. But the object evidently was to gain time; for, while accepting a separate negotiation at Udine, they still reserved to themselves the right to revert to a general congress at Berne. They intimated that the congress of Rastadt, for peace with the Empire, was about to open immediately; that the negotiations would be carried on there at the same time as those at Udine, which

* "Napoleon's resolution to sign the treaty was accelerated from his having observed, when he looked out from his windows, the summits of the Alps covered with snow; a symptom which too plainly told him that the season for active operations that year was drawing to a close, and he had no confidence in the ability of France to resume the contest the ensuing spring. He then shut himself up in his cabinet, and, after reviewing his forces, said, 'Here are eighty thousand effective men; but I shall not have above sixty thousand in the field. Even if I gain the victory, I shall have twenty thousand killed and wounded; and how, with forty thousand, can I withstand the whole forces of the Austrian monarchy, who will advance to the relief of Vienna? The armies of the Rhine could not advance to my succour before the middle of November, and before that time arrives the Alps will be impassable from snow. It is all over; I will sign the peace, let the government and the lawyers say what they choose.'"—*Bourrienne*. E.

could not fail to complicate interests exceedingly, and to give rise to as many difficulties as a general congress at Berne. Bonaparte observed that peace with the Empire was not to be negotiated till after the peace with the emperor; he declared that, if the congress were opened, France would not send envoys to it; and he added that, if on the 1st of October peace were not concluded with the emperor, the preliminaries of Leoben should be considered as null.

Things were at this point, when the 18th of Fructidor (September 4) dispelled all the false hopes of Austria. M. de Cobentzel immediately hastened from Vienna to Udine. Bonaparte repaired to Passeriano, a very beautiful country-seat at some distance from Udine, and everything indicated a sincere desire to treat. The conferences took place alternately at M. de Cobentzel's, at Udine, and at Passeriano, the residence of Bonaparte. M. de Cobentzel* was a man of a shrewd, fertile, but not logical mind. He was haughty and morose. The other three negotiators kept silence. Bonaparte was the only representative of France since the dismissal of Clarke. He had sufficient arrogance, and sufficient fluency and keenness of language, to reply to the Austrian negotiator. Though it was evident that M. de Cobentzel really intended to treat, he nevertheless made a parade of the most extravagant pretensions. He said that if Austria ceded the Netherlands to us, that was all we had to expect; that she would not undertake to secure to us the limit of the Rhine; and that it was for the Empire to make this concession. As an indemnification for the rich and populous provinces of the Netherlands, Austria required possessions not in Germany but in Italy. The preliminaries of Leoben had given her the Venetian states as far as the Oglio, that is to say, Dalmatia, Istria, the Friule, the Bresciano, the Bergamasco, and the Mantuan, with the fortress of Mantua; but these provinces would not half indemnify her for what she lost in ceding the Netherlands and Lombardy. It would not be too much, said M. de Cobentzel, to leave her Lombardy as well as to give her Venice and the legations, and to reinstate the Duke of Modena in his duchy.

To all the eloquence of M. de Cobentzel, Bonaparte replied only by unbroken silence, and to his extravagant pretensions by pretensions equally extravagant, uttered in a firm and decisive tone. He demanded the line of the Rhine, including Mayence, for France, and the line of the Isonzo for Italy. Between these opposite pretensions it was requisite to take a middle course. Bonaparte, as we have already observed, had reason to believe that, by ceding Venice to Austria—a concession not included in the preliminaries of Leoben, because he had then no thought of destroying that republic—he could induce the emperor to remove his boundary from the Oglio to the Adige, so that the Mantuan, the Bergamasco, and the

* "Count Cobentzel was a native of Brussels; a very agreeable man in company, and distinguished by studied politeness; but positive and intractable in business. There was a want of propriety and precision in his mode of expressing himself, of which he was sensible; and he endeavoured to compensate for this by talking loud and using imperious gestures."—*Montholon*. E.

"Count Cobentzel was middle-aged, very ugly, and is truly reported to have resembled Mirabeau. He had the same fallow face, and his eyes were equally small. He had also the same enormous head of hair. Though really agreeable, he was much less so than he would have been, had he permitted his own good sense and information to direct his manners instead of servilely copying those of Prince Kaunitz and Prince Potemkin, to both of whom he affected to bear a personal resemblance, and whose frivolity and morality he assumed, together with an exclusive predilection for the great world. This world was the court, beyond the luminous circle of which all to him was chaos."—*Duchess d'Abrantes*. E.

Bresciano, might be given to the Cisalpine, which would thus have the frontier of the Adige and Mantua; to guarantee to France the boundary of the Rhine and the possession of Mayence; and, lastly, to consent to leave her the Ionian islands. Bonaparte resolved to treat on these conditions. He saw in this arrangement many advantages, and all those which France could obtain at the moment. The emperor, in accepting Venice, would compromise himself in the opinion of Europe, for it was for him that Venice had betrayed France. By relinquishing the Adige and Mantua, the emperor would give great consistence to the new republic: by leaving us the Ionian islands, he would pave the way for us to the empire of the Mediterranean; by guaranteeing to us the boundary of the Rhine, he would put it out of the power of the Empire to refuse it; by delivering Mayence to us, he would virtually put us in possession of that boundary, and would again compromise himself with the Empire in the most serious manner, by giving up to us a fortress belonging to one of the Germanic princes. It is true that, in another campaign, France would be sure either to overturn the Austrian monarchy, or to compel it to renounce Italy. But Bonaparte had more than one personal reason for avoiding a new campaign. It was now the month of October, and too late to penetrate into Austria. The army of Germany, commanded by Augereau, must have all the advantage, for there was nothing to oppose it. The army of Italy would have all the Austrian forces upon its hands; it would be reduced to the defensive; and it could no longer act the brilliant part and be first at Vienna. Lastly, Bonaparte was fatigued. He wished to enjoy for a while his immense glory. One battle more would add nothing to the marvels of his two campaigns, and, in signing the peace, he should crown himself with a double glory. To that of the warrior he should add that of the negotiator, and he would be the only general of the republic who had combined both, for none of them had yet signed treaties. He should satisfy one of the most ardent wishes of France, and return to her bosom with all sorts of distinction. It is true that he would be guilty of formal disobedience in signing a treaty on those bases, for the Directory required the entire emancipation of Italy; but Bonaparte felt confident that the Directory would not refuse to ratify the treaty, as it would then be setting itself in opposition to the public opinion in France. The Directory had shocked it already by breaking off the negotiations at Lille; he should shock it much more by breaking off those at Udine; and he should justify himself against the reproaches of the royalist faction, which accused him of wishing for everlasting war. Bonaparte, therefore, felt that, in signing the treaty, he should oblige the Directory to ratify it.

He boldly delivered his ultimatum to M. de Cobentzel. It gave Venice to Austria, but the Adige and Mantua to the Cisalpine, the Rhine and Mayence to France, with the Ionian islands into the bargain. On the 16th the last conference was held at M. de Cobentzel's, at Udine. The negotiators on both sides declared themselves ready to break off: M. de Cobentzel intimated that his carriages were ready. They were seated at an oblong square table; the four Austrian negotiators being on one side, Bonaparte by himself on the other. M. de Cobentzel recapitulated all that he had said, insisted that the emperor, in giving up the keys of Mayence, ought to receive those of Mantua; that he could not do otherwise without disgracing himself; that, moreover, France had never made a more glorious treaty, and certainly she could not desire one more advantageous; that she wished above all things for peace and would severely judge the conduct

of the negotiator who should sacrifice the interest and the repose of his country to his military ambition. Bonaparte, cool and collected during this insulting apostrophe, suffered M. de Cobentzel to finish speaking; then stepping up to a sideboard upon which stood a porcelain tea-service, a present from the great Catherine to M. de Cobentzel,* and displayed as an article of peculiar value, he took it up and dashed it upon the floor with these words: "War is declared, but remember that, in less than three months, I will demolish your monarchy as I dash in pieces this porcelain." This act and these words struck the Austrian negotiators with astonishment. He bowed to them, withdrew, and getting immediately into his carriage, ordered an officer to go and acquaint the Archduke Charles that hostilities would recommence in twenty-four hours. M. de Cobentzel, alarmed, instantly sent the ultimatum signed to Passeriano. One of the conditions of the treaty was the release of M. de Lafayette, who had for five years heroically endured his imprisonment at Olmütz.

Next day, October the 17th (26th of Vendémiaire), the treaty was signed at Passeriano. It was dated from a small village situated between the two armies, to which, however, the negotiators did not repair, because there was no place in it fit for their reception. This village was Campo Formio. It gave its name to this celebrated treaty, the first concluded between the emperor and the French republic.

It was agreed that the emperor, as sovereign of the Netherlands, and as a member of the Empire, should guarantee to France the boundary of the Rhine; that he should deliver Mayence to our troops; and that the Ionian islands should remain in our possession. It was further agreed that the Cisalpine republic should have Romagna, the legations, the duchy of Modena, Lombardy, the Valteline, the Bergamasco, the Bresciano, and the Mantuan, with the Adige and Mantua for its boundary. The emperor subscribed, moreover, to various conditions resulting from this treaty and from anterior treaties by which the republic was bound. In the first place, he engaged to give the Brisgau to the Duke of Modena, as a compensation for his duchy. He also engaged to use his influence for the purpose of

* The following characteristic anecdote of Count Cobentzel is extracted from the entertaining *Memoirs of the Duchess d'Abrantes*: "M. de Cobentzel had been for a long time Austrian ambassador at the court of Catherine II., and retained an enthusiastic admiration of that sovereign, who kept a theatre, played herself, and carried her condescension so far as to write comedies for the amusement of her court. Count Cobentzel had had a little theatre constructed in the Austrian ambassador's palace at St. Petersburg, principally with the object of acting himself. One day he was to play the part of the Countess d'Escarbagnas. The empress had promised to be present, and the count-countess was dressed early to be in readiness for appearing on the stage the moment the czarina had taken her seat. She arrived, the ambassador was sought for, but neither he nor the countess could be found. At length, after a tiresome search, he was discovered in his cabinet, in male attire indeed, but with his hair puffed, in high-heeled shoes, and so suffocated with passion, that he could scarcely articulate the words, 'Hang that villain for me!' pointing to a man who was praying to all the saints in heaven to defend him from that madman. This was a courier from Vienna, arrived in haste with important despatches, and specially ordered to deliver them into the ambassador's own hands. He arrived at seven in the evening, just as the count, having finished his toilet, as the Countess d'Escarbagnas, was complacently surveying in a looking-glass a figure which has, perhaps, never since been paralleled, and repeating the most striking passages of his part. The young courier, on observing this grotesque figure, was persuaded of his insanity, and refused to deliver the despatches, till the ambassador was growing seriously angry, when, to complete his fury, the empress's arrival was announced to him. The secretary to the embassy explained this strange scene to the courier, and persuaded him at length to give his despatches into the hands of Count Cobentzel." E

obtaining for the stadtholder a compensation in Germany for the loss of Holland, and for the King of Prussia a compensation for the loss of the little territory which he had ceded to us on the left bank of the Rhine. In virtue of these engagements, the voice of the emperor was insured at the congress of Rastadt for the solution of all questions that specially interested France. The emperor received, in return for all that he had granted, the Friule, Istria, Dalmatia, and the mouths of the Cattaro.

France had never made, since she existed, so glorious a peace. She had, at length, obtained her natural limits, and obtained them with the consent of the continent. A great revolution had taken place in Upper Italy. There an ancient state had been destroyed and a new state founded. But the state destroyed was a despotic aristocracy, an irreconcilable enemy of liberty. The state founded was a republic liberally constituted, and which might possibly communicate liberty to all Italy. It was to be regretted, it is true, that the Austrians had not been driven beyond the Isonzo, that all Upper Italy and the city of Venice itself had not been united with the Cisalpine: with another campaign that result would have been obtained. Particular considerations had prevented the young warrior from making that campaign. Personal interest began to affect the calculations of the great man, and to attach a stain to the first and perhaps the brightest act of his life.

Bonaparte could scarcely doubt the ratification of the treaty; yet he was not without anxiety, for this treaty was a formal contravention of the instructions of the Directory. He selected Berthier, the faithful and com-
plaisant chief of his staff, whom he was very fond of, and whom he had not yet sent to France to enjoy the applauses of the Parisians, to be the bearer of it. With his usual tact, he gave the military officer a scientific man for his companion. This was Monge, who had been upon the commission appointed to select the objects of art in Italy, and who, notwithstanding his geometrical and rank demagogue spirit, had been won, like many others, by genius, grace, and glory.

Monge and Berthier reached Paris in a few days. They arrived there in the middle of the night, and roused Lareveillère-Lepeaux, president of the Directory, from his bed. Though the bearers of a treaty of peace, the two messengers were far from feeling the joy and confidence usual under such circumstances; they were embarrassed, like men who have to commence with a painful confession; they were obliged, in fact, to say that the government had been disobeyed. They employed the greatest rhetorical precautions to intimate the tenor of the treaty, and to excuse the general. Lareveillère treated them with all the attention which two such distinguished persons, and one of them an illustrious man of science, deserved; but he said nothing more concerning the treaty than that the Directory would decide upon it. He laid it in the morning before the Directory. The news of the peace had already spread throughout Paris; joy was at its height; people were not acquainted with the conditions, but, whatever they were, they made sure that they were brilliant. They extolled Bonaparte and his double glory. As he had foreseen, they were delighted to find in him the pacificator and the warrior; and a peace which he had signed from selfishness was vaunted as an act of military disinterestedness. The young general, it was said, has refused the glory of a new campaign for the sake of giving peace to his country.

The burst of joy was so prompt, that it would have been very difficult for the Directory to check it by rejecting the treaty of Campo Formio. This

treaty was the result of a formal disobedience; the Directory, therefore, had excellent reasons for refusing its ratification; and it would have been very important to give a severe lesson to the audacious negotiator who had violated its express orders. But how disappoint the general expectation! How venture to refuse peace a second time, after having refused it at Lille! It would thus justify all the reproaches of the victims of Fructidor, and give great dissatisfaction to the public. There would be another danger equally formidable to encounter in rejecting the treaty. Bonaparte would resign his command, and reverses must inevitably follow the resumption of hostilities in Italy. What a responsibility would not the government take upon itself in this case! Besides, the treaty was attended with immense advantages. It opened splendid prospects, it gave Mayence and Mantua in addition to the cessions of Leoben; lastly, it left all the forces of France at liberty to fall upon England.

The Directory, therefore, approved of the treaty. The general joy now became the more lively and the more profound. The Directory skilfully sought to avail itself of this event for turning the public opinion against England. The hero of Italy and his invincible companions were to fly from one enemy to another, and the very day on which the treaty was published, an ordinance appointed Bonaparte commander-in-chief of the army of England.

Bonaparte prepared to leave Italy, in order to obtain a few moments' rest, and to enjoy a glory the highest known among the moderns. He was appointed plenipotentiary at Rastadt, with Bonnier and Treilhard, to treat for peace with the Empire. It was also agreed that he should meet M. de Cobentzel at Rastadt, and exchange with him the ratifications of the treaty of Campo Formio. At the same time, he was to superintend the execution of the conditions relative to the occupation of Mayence. With his usual foresight, he had taken care to stipulate that the Austrian troops should not enter Palma Nova till he should have entered Mayence.

Before he set out for Rastadt, he resolved to put a finishing hand to the affairs of Italy. He nominated to the last appointments which yet remained to be filled in the Cisalpine; he arranged the conditions of the continuation of the French troops in Italy, and their relations with the new republic. These troops were to be commanded by Berthier, and to form a corps of thirty thousand men, to be maintained at the expense of the Cisalpine. They were to remain there till a general peace in Europe. He withdrew the corps which he had at Venice, and delivered up that city to an Austrian corps. The Venetian patriots, on finding themselves transferred to Austria, were indignant. Bonaparte had caused an asylum to be secured for them in the Cisalpine, and had stipulated with the Austrian government that they should be at liberty to sell their possessions. They were not grateful for these attentions, and poured forth vehement and very natural imprecations against the conqueror by whom they were sacrificed. Villetard, who seemed to have entered into an engagement with them in the name of the French government, wrote to Bonaparte, and was treated by him with extraordinary harshness. But it was not the patriots alone who manifested profound grief on this occasion. The nobles and the populace, who so lately preferred Austria to France, because they liked the principles of the one and abhorred those of the other, felt all their natural sentiments rekindled within them, and showed an attachment to their ancient country, which rendered them worthy of an interest that they had not yet excited. The despair became general. A noble lady poisoned herself; and the old

doge fell motionless at the feet of the Austrian officer to whom he was taking the oath of allegiance.*

Bonaparte addressed a proclamation to the Italians, in which he took leave of them and gave them his parting advice. It breathed that noble, firm, and somewhat rhetorical tone, which he had the art of giving to his public language. "We have given you liberty," said he to the Cisalpines; "take care to preserve it. To be worthy of your destiny, make only discreet and moderate laws; cause them to be executed with energy. Favour the diffusion of knowledge, and respect religion. Compose your battalions not of disreputable men, but of citizens imbued with the principles of the republic and closely linked to its prosperity. You have in general need to impress yourselves with the feeling of your strength, and with the dignity which befits the free man. Divided and bowed down for ages by tyranny, you would not have conquered your liberty; but, in a few years, were you to be left to yourselves, no power on earth will be strong enough to wrest it from you. Till then the great nation will protect you against the attacks of your neighbours; its political system will be united with yours. I shall leave you in a few days. The orders of my government and an imminent danger to the Cisalpine republic will alone bring me back among you."

This last sentence was a reply to those who asserted that he aimed at making himself King of Lombardy. There was nothing that he preferred to the title and the character of first general of the French republic. One of the Austrian negotiators had offered him, in the name of the emperor, a state in Germany. He replied that he was determined to owe his fortune to the gratitude of the French people alone. Had he a glimpse of what was to happen? Assuredly not; but had he been only the first citizen of the republic, it is easy to conceive that he would have preferred it. The regret of the Italians accompanied him, and they watched with pain the disappearance of this bright apparition. Bonaparte travelled rapidly through Piedmont, intending to proceed by way of Switzerland to Rastadt. Magnificent entertainments, and presents for himself and his wife, awaited him on his route. Princes and people were anxious to see that celebrated warrior, that arbiter of so many destinies. At Turin the king had caused presents to be prepared, in token of his gratitude for the support which he had given him with the Directory. In Switzerland the enthusiasm of the Vaudois for the liberator of the Valteline was extreme. Young damsels, in dresses of the three colours, presented him with crowns. Everywhere this maxim so dear to the Vaudois was inscribed; *One people cannot be the subject of another people*. At Murten, Bonaparte desired to see the bone-house; he found there a multitude of inquisitive persons, who followed wherever he went. The cannon fired in the towns through which he passed. The government of Berne, which observed with vexation the enthusiasm excited by the liberator of the Valteline, forbade its officers to fire the guns. It was not obeyed. On reaching Rastadt, he found all the German princes impatient to see him. He immediately made the French negotiators assume the attitude befitting their mission and their character. He refused to receive M. de Fersen, whom Sweden had sent to represent her at the congress of the Empire, and who, from his connexion with the former court of France, was not a proper person to treat with the French

* "The most remarkable incident of the final transfer of Venice to the Austrians was, that the aged doge, Marini, dropped down senseless as he was about to take the oath of allegiance to the Imperial commissioner, and died shortly after."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E.

republic. This refusal produced a strong sensation, and proved Bonaparte's constant solicitude to keep up the dignity of the *great nation*, as he called it in all his harangues. Having exchanged the ratifications of the treaty of Campo Formio, and made the necessary arrangements for the delivery of Mayence, he resolved to set out for Paris. He foresaw nothing of importance to be discussed at Rastadt, and above all he foresaw interminable delays, before all these petty German princes could be brought to agree. Such a part was not to his liking. Besides, he was fatigued, and some impatience to reach Paris and to ascend to the Capitol of modern Rome was very natural.

He left Rastadt, travelled incognito through France, and arrived in Paris on the evening of the 15th of Frimaire, year VI (December 5th, 1797). He went to conceal himself in a very modest house, which he had desired to be bought for him in the Rue Chantereine. This man, whose pride was unbounded, had all the address of a female in hiding himself. On the surrender of Mantua, he had hastened away from the honour of seeing Wurmser and the garrison file off; and in Paris he determined to bury himself in the most obscure abode. In his language, in his dress, and in all his habits, he affected a simplicity which surprised the imagination of men, and impressed it the more deeply from the effect of the contrast. All Paris, apprized of his arrival, was impatient to see him. This was only natural, especially in Frenchmen.* M. de Talleyrand, the minister for foreign affairs, for whom, while at a distance, he had conceived a strong partiality, meant to call upon him the same evening. Bonaparte apologized for not being able to see him, and went to the minister on the following morning. The saloon of the hotel of foreign affairs was full of distinguished persons, anxious to see the hero.† Reserved towards everybody, he perceived Bougainville,‡ and went

* "In a metropolis where all is welcome that can vary the tedium of human life, the arrival of any remarkable person is a species of holiday; but such an eminent character as Bonaparte—the conqueror—the sage—the politician—the undaunted braver of every difficulty—the invincible victor in every battle—who had carried the banners of the republic from Genoa till their approach scared the pontiff at Rome, and the emperor in Vienna, was no every-day wonder. His youth too added to the marvel. Napoleon's general manner in society during this part of his life, has been described by an observer of first-rate power; according to whom he was one for whom the admiration, which could not be refused to him, was always mingled with a portion of fear. He was different in his manner from other men, and neither pleased nor angry, kind nor severe after the common fashion of humanity. He estimated his fellow-mortals no otherwise than as they could be useful to his views; and, with a precision of intelligence which seemed initiative from its rapidity, he penetrated the sentiments of those whom it was worth his while to study. Bonaparte did not then possess the ordinary tone of light conversation in society; and there was a stiffness and reserve in his manner, which was, perhaps, adopted for the purpose of keeping people at a distance. His look had the same character. When he thought himself closely observed, he had the power of discharging from his countenance all expression, save that of a vague and indefinite smile, and presenting to the curious investigator the fixed eyes and rigid features of a bust of marble."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E.

† "The leaders of all parties were anxious to see the hero—all called upon him; but he refused to listen to them. The streets and squares through which he was expected to pass, were constantly crowded, but Napoleon never showed himself. He had no habitual visitors, except a few men of science."—*Montholon*. E.

‡ "Louis Antoine de Bougainville, Count of the Empire, senator, and member of the Institute in 1796, was born in 1729, and died in 1811. He was remarkable for energy of character, and fought bravely under Montcalm in Canada. He afterwards entered the navy, and became one of the greatest naval officers in France. He made a voyage round the world, and enriched geography by many new discoveries. After the year 1790, he devoted himself exclusively to science. He was a man of engaging manners, and worthy of the greatest esteem."—*Encyclopædia Americana*. E.

straight up to him, and addressed him in terms which, falling from his lips, could not fail to produce profound impressions. He already affected the attention of a sovereign to the useful and celebrated man. M. de Talleyrand introduced him to the Directory. Though there were many reasons for dissatisfaction between the general and the directors, yet the interview was full of apparent cordiality. It suited the Directory to affect satisfaction, and the general to show deference. Besides, his services were so important, his glory so resplendent, that dissatisfaction was forced to give way to enthusiasm. The Directory prepared a triumphal festival for the delivery of the treaty of Campo Formio. It was not held in the grand audience chamber of the Directory, but in the great court of the Luxembourg. Every arrangement was made for rendering this solemnity one of the most imposing of the Revolution. The directors were seated on a raised platform at the farther end of the court, at the foot of the altar of the country, and habited in the Roman costume. Around them, the ministers, the ambassadors, the members of the two Councils, the magistrates, the chiefs of the administrations, were placed on seats, ranged amphitheatrically. Magnificent trophies, composed of numberless colours taken from the enemy, rose at a little distance from one another all round the court; beautiful tricoloured hangings adorned the walls. The galleries were filled with the best company of the capital; bands of musicians were placed in the area; and a numerous artillery was drawn up around the palace, to add its thunders to the sound of the music and the din of acclamations. Chenier composed one of his finest hymns for this occasion.*

It was the 20th of Frimaire, year VI (December 10th, 1797). The Directory, the public functionaries, and the spectators, having taken their places, waited with impatience for the illustrious man whom few of them had ever seen. He appeared, accompanied by M. de Talleyrand, who was commissioned to introduce him, for it was the negotiator who was congratulated at the moment. All who were present, struck by that slender figure, that pale Roman visage, that piercing eye, still talk to this day of the effect which he produced, and of the indescribable impression of genius and authority which he left upon the imagination. The sensation was extreme. Unanimous acclamations burst forth at the sight of so simple a person surrounded by such renown. Shouts of *The Republic for ever! Bonaparte for ever!* arose on all sides. M. de Talleyrand then addressed the assembly, and, in a neat and concise speech, strove to refer the glory of the general, not to himself, but to the Revolution, to the armies, and to the *great nation*. He seemed desirous to spare the modesty of Bonaparte, and with his accustomed intelligence, to divine how the hero would like to be spoken of before his face. M. de Talleyrand then adverted to what might, he said, be called his ambition; but, in alluding to his antique love of simplicity, to his fondness for the abstract sciences, to his favourite books, to that sublime Ossian with whom he learned to detach himself from the earth, M. de Talleyrand observed that it would perhaps be necessary to solicit him to tear himself some day from his studious retirement.† What

* "All the authorities gave Napoleon magnificent entertainments. The Directory, in particular, exhibited itself in all its burlesque pomp of mantles and hats with feathers, which rendered the meeting of the five members of the supreme power sufficiently ridiculous. But in other respects the fêtes were fine, and they had the special charm attached to things which are supposed to be lost, and are recovered. Money circulated, and the result of all this was, that everybody was pleased."—*Duchess d'Abrantes*. E.

† "Bonaparte arrived, dressed very simply, followed by his aides-de-camp, all taller than himself, but nearly bent by the respect which they paid him. M. de Talleyrand,

M. de Talleyrand had said was upon all lips, and was repeated in all the speeches delivered at this great solemnity. Everybody declared, over and over again, that the young general was without ambition, so afraid were they that he had it. When M. de Talleyrand had finished, Bonaparte spoke, and delivered, in a firm tone, the following broken sentences :

"Citizens,

"The French people, in order to be free, had kings to combat.

"To obtain a constitution founded on reason, it had the prejudices of eighteen centuries to overcome.

"The constitution of the year III and you have triumphed over all obstacles.

"Religion, feudalism, royalty, have successively, for twenty centuries past, governed Europe; but from the peace which you have just concluded dates the era of representative governments.

"You have succeeded in organizing the great nation, whose vast territory is circumscribed only because Nature herself has fixed its limits.

"You have done more. The two finest countries in Europe, formerly so renowned for the arts, the sciences, and the great men whose cradle they were, see with the greatest hopes genius and freedom issuing from the tomb of their ancestors.

"These are two pedestals on which the destinies are about to place two powerful nations.

"I have the honour to deliver to you the treaty signed at Campo Formio and ratified by his majesty the emperor.

"Peace insures the liberty, the prosperity, and the glory of the republic.

"When the happiness of the French people shall be seated on better organic laws, all Europe will become free."

Fresh acclamations succeeded this speech. Barras, president of the Directory, answered Bonaparte. In a long, rambling, irrelevant address, he highly extolled the modesty and the simplicity of the hero; and he introduced a clever tribute to Hoche, the supposed rival of the conqueror of Italy. "Why is not Hoche here," said the president of the Directory, "to see and to embrace his friend?" Hoche had, in fact, in the preceding year defended Bonaparte with generous warmth. Agreeably to the new direction given to all minds, Barras held forth a prospect of new laurels to the hero, and exhorted him to go and gather them in England.*

After these three speeches, Chenier's hymn was sung in full chorus, accompanied by a magnificent orchestra. Two generals then advanced, attended by the minister at war. These were the brave Joubert, the hero of the Tyrol, and Andreossy,† one of the most distinguished officers of the

in presenting him to the Directory, called him the Liberator of Italy, and assured them that he detested luxury and splendour, the ambition of vulgar souls, and that he loved the poems of Ossian particularly, because they detach us from the earth."—*Madame de Staël*. E.

* "‘Crown,’ said Barras, ‘so illustrious a life by a conquest which the great nation owes to its outraged dignity. Go, and by the punishment of the cabinet of London, strike terror into the hearts of all who would miscalculate the powers of a free people. Let the conquerors of the Po, the Rhine, and the Tiber, march under your banners; the ocean will be proud to bear them; it is a slave still indignant, who blushes for his fetters. Hardly will the tricolour standard wave on the blood-stained shore of the Thames, ere a unanimous cry will bless your arrival, and that generous nation will receive you as its liberator.’"—*Napoleon's Memoirs*. E.

† "General Andreossy served with distinction in Italy during the campaign of 1796. He accompanied Bonaparte to Egypt, and was one of those who returned with him, and supported him on the 18th of Brumaire. On the peace of Amiens, the First Consul

artillery. They came forward, bearing an admirable standard. It was that which the Directory had just given at the conclusion of the campaign to the army of Italy, the new oriflamme of the republic. It was covered with numberless letters in gold, and these letters formed the following inscriptions :

"The army of Italy has taken one hundred and fifty thousand prisoners, it has taken one hundred and seventy pair of colours, five hundred and fifty pieces of siege artillery, six hundred pieces of field artillery, five bridge equipages, nine sail of the line, twelve frigates, twelve cutters, eighteen galleys.—Armistices with the Kings of Sardinia, Naples, the Pope, the Dukes of Parma and Modena.—Preliminaries of Leoben.—Convention of Montebello, with the republic of Genoa.—Treaties of peace of Tolentino and Campo Formio.—Given liberty to the people of Bologna, Ferrara, Modena, Massa-Carrara, La Romagna, Lombardy, Brescia, Bergamo, Mantua, Cremona, part of the Veronese, of Chavenna, of Bormio, and of the Valteline; to the people of Genoa, to the Imperial fiefs, to the people of the departments of Corcyra, the Egean Sea, and Ithaca. Sent to Paris the masterpieces of Michael Angelo, Guercino, Titian, Paul Veronese, Corregio, Albano, the Caracci, Raphael, Leonardo da Vinci, &c.—Triumphed, in eighteen pitched battles, MONTENOTTE, MILLESIMO, MONDOVI, LODI, BORGHETTO, LONATO, CASTIGLIONE, ROVEREDO, BASSANO, ST. GEORGE, FONTANA NIVA, CALDIERO, ARCOLE, RIVOLI, LA FAVORITA, THE TAGLIAMENTO, TARVIS, NEUMARKT.—Fought sixty-seven actions."

Joubert and Andreossy spoke in their turn and received a flattering reply from the president of the Directory. After all these speeches, the generals went to receive the embrace of the president of the Directory. The moment that Bonaparte had received it from Barras, the other four directors threw themselves, as if by an involuntary impulse, into the arms of the general. Unanimous acclamations rent the air: the people who thronged the streets joined their shouts, and the cannon their thunders. All heads were overcome with the intoxication. Thus it was that France threw herself into the arms of an extraordinary man. Let us not censure the weakness of our fathers. That glory reaches us only through the clouds of time and adversity, and yet it transports us! Let us say with *Æschylus*: "How would it have been had we seen the monster himself!"

appointed him minister of France at the court of St James's. In 1804 he was appointed grand officer of the Legion of Honour, and accompanied the Emperor on his German campaign in 1805. Andreossy has written several memoirs relative to Egypt."—*Biographie Moderne*. E.

THE DIRECTORY

GENERAL BONAPARTE IN PARIS; HIS RELATIONS WITH THE DIRECTORY—PLAN OF AN INVASION OF ENGLAND—POLITICAL RELATIONS OF FRANCE WITH THE CONTINENT—CONGRESS OF RASTADT—REVOLUTIONS AT ROME AND IN SWITZERLAND—INTERNAL STATE OF FRANCE, ELECTIONS OF THE YEAR VI; ELECTORAL SCHISMS—EXPEDITION TO EGYPT SUBSTITUTED BY BONAPARTE FOR THE PROJECTED INVASION; PREPARATIONS FOR THAT EXPEDITION.

THE triumphal reception which the Directory had prepared for Bonaparte was followed by splendid entertainments given to him individually by the directors, the members of the Councils, and the ministers. Each strove to surpass the other in magnificence. The hero of these festivities was struck with the taste displayed on his account by the minister for foreign affairs, and felt a strong liking for ancient French elegance. Amidst this pomp, he appeared simple, affable, but severe, almost insensible to pleasure, seeking among the crowd the useful and celebrated man, in order to converse with him on the art or science in which he had signalized himself.* Men of the highest renown felt honoured at having been distinguished by General Bonaparte.

The acquirements of the young general were but those of an officer who had recently quitted the military schools. But, owing to the instinct of genius, he could converse on subjects the most foreign to his profession, and throw out some of those bold, but original ideas, which, in general, are but the impertinences of ignorance, but which, coming from superior men, and expressed in their style, produce illusion, and captivate even those who have made a special study of the subjects to which they relate. That facility of treating all subjects was remarked with surprise. The newspapers, which gave the most trifling particulars respecting the person of General Bonaparte, which reported with what personage he had dined, how he had looked, whether he was cheerful or sad, stated that, in dining with François de Neufchâteau, he had talked of mathematics with Lagrange and Laplace, of metaphysics with Sieyès, of poetry with Chenier, and of legislation and political economy with Daunou. In general, people durst not question him much when they were in his company, but they were particularly desirous to lead him to talk of his campaigns. Whenever he did advert to them, he never spoke of himself, but of his army, of his

* " 'Mankind,' said Napoleon, 'are, in the end, always governed by superiority of intellectual qualities, and none are more sensible of this than the military profession. When, on my return to Paris from Italy, I assumed the dress of the Institute, and associated with men of science, I knew what I was doing; I was sure of not being misunderstood by the lowest drummer of the army.' "—*Thibaudeau*. E.

soldiers, and of republican bravery; he described the bustle, the din, of battles; he drew a lively picture of the decisive moment, showed in what manner it was requisite that it should be seized, and transported all who heard him by his clear, striking, and dramatic recitals. If his exploits had proclaimed a great commander, his conversations revealed a mind original and fertile, by turns comprehensive and precise, and always persuasive when he chose to display it.* He had conquered the multitude by his glory; by his conversation he began to conquer, one by one, the most distinguished men in France. The infatuation, already great, became still greater when they had seen him. There was nothing about him, not even the traces of a foreign extraction, which time had not effaced, but contributed to the effect. Singularity always adds to the spell of genius, especially in France, where, with the greatest uniformity of manners, people are passionately fond of eccentricity. Bonaparte affected to shun the crowd, and to conceal himself from observation. Sometimes he even manifested displeasure at too strong demonstrations of enthusiasm. Madame de Staël, who was, and who had a right to be, fond of greatness, genius, and glory, was impatient to see Bonaparte, and to pay him the tribute of her admiration. Like an imperious man, who wishes every body to keep his place, he was angry with her for sometimes leaving hers; he thought her too clever, too enthusiastic; he had even a presentiment of her independence amidst all her admiration; he was cold, harsh, and unjust. She asked him one day, with too little address, who was, in his estimation, the first of women. "She who has borne most children," he replied, drily. From this moment commenced that reciprocal antipathy which brought upon her such unmerited persecutions, and which led him to commit acts of petty and brutal tyranny. He went abroad but little; lived in his humble dwelling in the Rue Chantierine, which had changed its name, and which the department of Paris had ordered to be called Rue de Victoire. He admitted only a few men of science, Monge, Lagrange, Laplace, Berthollet; a few generals, Desaix, Kleber, Caffarelli; a few artists, and especially the celebrated actor, Talma, for whom he already manifested an extraordinary partiality. When he went abroad, it was generally in a very simple carriage; at the theatre, he was always in a private box; and he seemed not to participate at all in his wife's fondness for dissipation. For her he showed extreme affection. He was enthralled by that peculiar grace which, either in private life or upon the throne, never forsook Madame Beauharnais, and which in her made amends for beauty.

A place having become vacant in the Institute by the banishment of Carnot, it was immediately offered to Bonaparte. He eagerly accepted it. At the meeting held for his reception, he took his seat between Lagrange and Laplace, and thenceforth, in his public ceremonies, he assumed the dress of a member of the Institute, affecting thus to conceal the warrior under the habit of the man of science.†

* "When he talked with the purpose of pleasing, Bonaparte often told anecdotes of his life in a very pleasing manner; when silent, he had something disdainful in the expression of his face; when disposed to be quite at ease, he was, in Madame de Staël's opinion, rather vulgar. His natural tone of feeling seemed to be a sense of internal superiority, and of secret contempt for the world in which he lived, the men with whom he acted, and even the very objects which he pursued. His character and manners were, upon the whole, strongly calculated to attract the attention of the French nation, and to excite a perpetual interest even from the very mystery which attached to him, as well as from the splendour of his triumphs."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E.

† On this occasion Napoleon addressed the following note to Camus: "The suffrage of the distinguished men who compose the Institute, honours me I feel sensibly that,

So much glory could not fail to give umbrage to the heads of the government, who, having on their side neither antiquity of rank nor personal greatness, were wholly eclipsed by the warrior peacemaker. They, nevertheless, paid him the highest respect, to which he replied by demonstrations of deference. The sentiment that most engrosses, is the one that is least talked of. The Directory was far from expressing any of its fears. It received numerous reports from its spies, who went to the barracks and to the public places to listen to the language used concerning Bonaparte. Bonaparte, it was said, would soon put himself at the head of affairs, overthrow an enfeebled government, and thus save France both from the royalists and the Jacobins. The Directory, with a feigned frankness, showed him these reports, and affected to treat them with contempt, as if it had deemed the general incapable of ambition. The general, an equally clever dissembler, was thankful for these testimonies, and declared that he was worthy of the confidence reposed in him. But on either side there was extreme distrust. If the spies of the police talked to the Directory of plans of usurpation, the officers who surrounded the general talked to him of plans for poisoning. The death of Hoche had given rise to absurd suspicions; the general, who, though exempt from puerile apprehensions, was, nevertheless, prudent, was extremely cautious when he dined with a certain director; he ate little, and only of such dishes as he had seen the director himself eat of, and drank no wine of which he had not seen him drink.

Barras was fond of encouraging a belief that he was the author of Bonaparte's fortune, and that, being no longer his protector, he had continued to be his friend. He paid him extraordinary personal attentions, strove, with his usual suppleness, to convince him of his attachment, took every opportunity of blaming the conduct of his colleagues to him, and affected to keep himself apart from them. Bonaparte received, without cordiality, the testimonies of this director, which he held of no account, and did not repay his servility with any sort of confidence.

Bonaparte was frequently consulted on certain questions. A minister was sent to call him to the Directory; he would go, take his seat beside the directors, and give his opinions with that superiority of tact which distinguished him in matters of administration and government as well as those of war. He affected in politics a direction of ideas depending upon the position which he had assumed. Immediately after the 18th of Fructidor, we have seen him, when the impulse was once given and the fall of the royalist faction assured, stop short all at once, with the resolution of lending the government no more than the support absolutely necessary for preventing the restoration of monarchy. This point obtained, he wished not to appear to attach himself to the Directory. He chose to show all parties that he kept aloof from them, neither connected nor embroiled with any. The attitude of a censor was the position which suited his ambition. This part is an easy one in regard to a government assailed in contrary directions by factions, and always liable to be overthrown. It is advantageous, because it soon rallies around you all the discontented, that is, all the parties that soon become universally disgusted with the government that

before I can become their equal, I must long be their pupil. The only true conquests those which awaken no regret, are those we obtain over ignorance. The most honourable, as the most useful pursuit of nations, is that which contributes to the extension of human intellect. The real greatness of the French republic ought, henceforth, to consist in not permitting the existence of one new idea which has not been added to the national stock." E.

attempts to repress, without having strength sufficient to crush them. The proclamations of Bonaparte to the Cisalpines and the Genoese, relative to the laws which they had proposed to pass against the nobles, had sufficed to indicate the present direction of his sentiments. It was perceived, and his language rendered it obvious enough, that he censured the conduct pursued by the government subsequently to the 18th of Fructidor. It was natural that the patriots should have regained somewhat of their old ascendancy since that occurrence. The Directory was not controlled, but slightly impelled by them. This was evident in its appointments, in its measures, and in its spirit. Bonaparte, though keeping up considerable reserve, manifested disapprobation of the direction which the government was pursuing. He appeared to consider it as feeble, incapable, suffering itself to be beaten by one faction after having been beaten by another. It was obvious, in short, that he would not hold the same sentiments with it. He even conducted himself in such a manner, as to prove that, though determined to oppose the return of royalty, he would not undertake equally to answer for the safety of the Revolution and its acts. The anniversary of the 21st of January was at hand; it was necessary to negotiate, to prevail on him to appear at the festival, which was about to be celebrated for the fifth time. He had arrived in Paris in December, 1797. The year 1798 was commencing. He refused to attend the ceremony, as if he disapproved of the act that was celebrated, or as though he wished to do something for those whom his proclamations of the 18th of Fructidor, and the slaughter of the 13th of Vendémiaire, had alienated from him. It was intended that he should figure at it under all his titles. Lately, commander-in-chief of the army of Italy, and plenipotentiary of France at Campo Formio, he was now one of the plenipotentiaries of the congress of Rastadt, and general of the army of England; he ought, therefore, to be present at the solemnities of his government. He said that those were not qualities which obliged him to attend, and that, therefore, his presence being voluntary, would have the appearance of an assent which he would not give. A compromise took place. The Institute was to attend the ceremony in a body. He mingled in its ranks, and seemed to perform a duty imposed on him as a member. Among all the qualities already heaped upon him, that of member of the Institute was certainly the most convenient, and he contrived to make a well-timed use of it.

Rising power is soon divined. A number of officious persons and sycophants already surrounded Bonaparte. They asked him if he was going to be content for ever with the command of armies, and if he would not, at length, take that part in the government of affairs, which his ascendancy and his political genius insured to him. On observing the influence of Pichegru in the Five Hundred, and that of Barras in the Directory, he was authorized to believe, that he might play an important political part; but, at the moment, he had none to perform. He was too young to be a director; for that office the age of forty years was required, and he was not thirty.* People certainly talked of a dispensation in regard to age, but this was a concession which would alarm the republicans, make them raise a great outcry, and certainly not compensate for the annoyances that it would bring upon him. In order to be associated, as a fifth member, in the government, to have but his voice in the Directory, to wear himself out in struggles with the Councils

* "Napoleon made an effort to obtain a dispensation of the law which required the age of forty for one of the Directory; but, failing in that attempt, his whole thoughts and passions centred in the East—the original theatre of his visions of glory."
Alison. E

which were still independent, it would not be worth while to violate the law in his favour. France had yet a powerful enemy to combat—England; and, though Bonaparte was covered with glory, it was better for him to go and gather fresh laurels, and to leave the government to spend itself still more in its arduous struggle with the various parties.

We have seen that, on the very day that the signature of the treaty of Campo Formio was known in Paris, the Directory, with a view to turn the public mind against England, immediately created an army, called the army of England, and gave the command of it to General Bonaparte. The government thought frankly and sincerely of taking the shortest way for attacking England, and purposed to land an army in that country. The boldness of opinions, at this period, caused such an enterprise to be considered as extremely practicable. The expedition already attempted against Ireland proved that it was possible to cross over under favour of a fog or of a gale of wind. It was conceived that the English nation, which had not yet created for itself an army, would not, with all its patriotism, be able to withstand the admirable soldiers of Italy, and of the Rhine, and, above all, the genius of the conqueror of Castiglione, Arcole, and Rivoli. The government purposed to leave only twenty-five thousand men in Italy, and to bring back all the rest into the interior. As for the grand army of Germany, composed of the two armies of the Rhine and of the Sambre and Meuse, it meant to reduce that to the force necessary for overawing the Empire during the congress of Rastadt, and to march off the rest towards the sea-coasts. The same direction was given to all the disposable troops. The generals of engineers inspected the coasts to select the best points for embarking: orders were given to collect considerable flotillas in the ports; and extreme activity prevailed in the naval department. It was hoped that a gale would at length drive off the English squadron, which was blockading the harbour of Cadiz, and that then the Spanish fleet would be able to come out and join that of France. As for the Dutch fleet, which the French government had flattered itself with the prospect of uniting with its own, it had just sustained a severe check within sight of the Texel, and its wrecks only had returned to the ports of Holland. But the Spanish and French fleet would be sufficient to cover the passage of a flotilla, and to insure the transport of sixty or eighty thousand men to England. To second all these preparations, care had been taken to provide new means of finance. The budget, fixed, as we have seen, at 616 millions for the year VI, was inadequate to an extraordinary armament. The government, in order to gain the concurrence of commercial men in an enterprise most favourable to their interests, proposed a voluntary loan of eighty millions. It was to be secured upon the state. Part of the profits of the expedition were to be changed into prizes, for which lots were to be drawn by the lenders. At the instigation of the Directory, the principal merchants applied to it to open this loan. The plan of it was submitted to the legislative body, and it appeared to obtain immediate favour. Subscriptions to the amount of fifteen or twenty millions were received. The Directory exerted not only all its efforts, but all its severity, against England. A law prohibited the introduction of English goods: it obtained authority to have recourse to domiciliary visits to discover them, and caused them to be carried into effect throughout all France on the same day, and at the same hour.

Bonaparte seemed to approve and to second this great movement, but at heart he disliked the plan. To land sixty thousand men in England, to march to London, and to enter that capital, did not appear to him the most

difficult part of the business. He was aware that it would be impossible to conquer the country, and to establish himself there; that he could at most ravage it, despoil it of part of its wealth, throw it back, annul it, for half a century; but that he must sacrifice the army which he had brought over, and return almost alone after a sort of barbarian incursion. At a later period, with a more extensive power, with greater experience of his means, with a wholly personal irritation against England, he thought seriously of engaging her hand to hand, and staking his fortune against hers. But at this time he had different ideas and different plans. One reason, in particular, decided him. The preparations that were making would take several months; the fine season was approaching, and it would be necessary to wait for the fogs and the storms of the ensuing winter, in order to attempt a landing. Now, he was not disposed to remain a year idle in Paris, adding nothing to his exploits, and sinking in public opinion precisely because he was not rising in it.* He meditated, therefore, a plan of a different kind, a plan quite as gigantic as the invasion, but more singular, more vast in its consequences, more conformable with his imagination, and, above all, more speedy. We have seen that in Italy he turned his particular attention to the Mediterranean; that he had created a sort of navy there; that, in the partition of the Venetian states, he had reserved the Greek islands for France; that he had set on foot intrigues in Malta, in the hope of wresting that island from the knights and from the English; that, finally, he had frequently extended his views to Egypt, as the intermediate point which France ought to occupy between Europe and Asia, to secure either the commerce of the Levant or that of India. This idea had taken possession of his imagination and wholly engrossed it. In the office of the minister for foreign affairs, there were some valuable documents concerning Egypt, and its colonial, maritime, and military importance. These were, at his request, sent to him by M. de Talleyrand, and he set about devouring them. Obligated to make a tour of the sea-coasts, on account of the execution of the project against England, he filled his carriage with travels in, and memoirs concerning, Egypt.† Thus, while apparently obeying the commands of the Directory, he was planning another enterprise. He was in person on the strand and beneath the sky of ancient Batavia, while his imagination was wandering on the shores of the East. He had a confused glimpse of an immense future. To penetrate into those countries of light and glory, where Alexander and Mahomet had conquered and founded empires, to make them ring with his name, and to send it back to France, repeated by the echoes of Asia—this was to him an intoxicating prospect.

He set about, therefore, his inspection of the coasts, during the months of Pluviose and Ventose (January and February), giving an excellent

* "‘If I remain long unemployed in Paris,’ said Napoleon, ‘I am undone. The renown of one in this great Babylon speedily supplants that of another. If I am seen three times at the Opera, I shall no longer be an object of curiosity. You need not talk of the desire of the citizens to see me; crowds at least as great would go to see me led out to the scaffold. I am determined not to remain in Paris. There is nothing to be done here. Everything here passes away. My glory is already declining. I must go to the East. All the great men of the world have there acquired their celebrity.’—*Bourrienne*. E.

† ‘So completely had the idea of Egypt taken possession of Napoleon’s mind, that all the books brought from the Ambrosian library to Paris, after the peace of Campo Formio, which related to Egypt, were submitted to his examination, and many bore extensive marginal notes in his own handwriting, indicating the powerful grasp and indefatigable activity of his mind.’—*Alison*. E

direction to the preparations for invasion, but engrossed by other thoughts and other projects.

While the republic was turning all her forces against England, she had other important interests to attend to on the continent. Her political task there was immense. She had to treat with the Empire at Rastadt, that is, with feudalism itself; she had to direct into the new track three republics, her offspring, the Batavian, the Cisalpine, and the Ligurian republics. Placed at the head of the democratic system, and in presence of the feudal system, she had to prevent collisions between these systems, that she might not have to recommence the struggle which she had just finished so gloriously, but which had cost her such arduous efforts. Such was the task, and it was not less difficult than that of attacking and ruining England.

The congress of Rastadt had been sitting for two months. Bonnier, a very intelligent man, and Treilhard, who was upright but coarse, were the representatives of France. Bonaparte, in the few days which he had passed at the congress, had secretly settled with Austria the arrangements necessary for the occupation of Mayence and the *tête de pont* of Mannheim. It had been agreed that the Austrian troops should retire on the approach of the French troops, and leave the troops of the Empire to themselves. The French were then to take possession of Mayence, and the *tête de pont* of Mannheim, either by intimidating the troops of the Empire, when left to themselves, or by making a sudden assault. This was accordingly done. The troops of the elector, finding themselves abandoned by those of Austria, surrendered Mayence. Those which were at the *tête de pont* of Mannheim attempted to resist, but were obliged to yield. Several hundred men, however, were sacrificed. It was evident from these two circumstances that Austria had, by the secret articles of the treaty of Campo Formio, insured to the republic the line of the Rhine, since she consented to put into her hands its two most important points. It was agreed, moreover, that, during the negotiations, the French army should quit the right bank of the Rhine, and return to the left bank, from Basle to Mayence; that from this point it might continue to occupy the right bank, but must confine itself to the boundary of the Mayn. The French army, bordering the Rhine and the Mayn, and blockading Ehrenbreitstein, would hold the Empire in its grasp. As for the Austrian armies, they were to retire beyond the Danube, and as far as the Lech, and to evacuate the fortresses of Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philipsburg. Their position with respect to the Empire would be nearly the same as that of the French armies. The deputation of the Empire would thus have to deliberate between a double line of soldiers. Austria did not honestly execute the secret articles, for, under favour of a deception, she left garrisons in Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt. France winked at this infraction of the treaty, in order not to disturb the good understanding. It was then proposed that ambassadors should be mutually sent. Austria replied, that for the moment the two powers might content themselves with corresponding through the ministers whom they had at the congress of Rastadt. This was not showing any great eagerness to commence amicable relations with France; but, after her defeats and humiliations, it was easy to account for and to forgive this lurking relic of spleen on the part of Austria.

The first explanations between the deputation of the Empire and the ministers of Austria were warm. The states of the Empire complained, in fact, that Austria aided in despoiling them, by granting the line of the Rhine to the republic, and giving up in a perfidious manner Mayence and the

tête de pont of Mannheim. They complained, also, that Austria, after drawing the Empire into the quarrel, deserted it, and was delivering up its provinces in order to obtain possessions in Italy in exchange.* The ministers of the emperor replied that he had been involved in the war on account of the interests of the Empire, and for the defence of the princes who had possessions in Alsace; that, after taking up arms for their interest, he had made extraordinary efforts for six consecutive years; that he had found himself abandoned successively by all the states of the confederation; that he had almost singly sustained the whole burden of the war; that he had lost in this conflict part of his dominions, and especially the rich provinces of Belgium and Lombardy; that, after such efforts, attended with such bitter fruit, he had a right to expect gratitude, and not to be assailed with complaints. The truth was, that the emperor had assumed the interests of the princes having possessions in Alsace as a pretext for making war; that he had carried it on for the gratification of his sole ambition; that he had hurried the Germanic confederation into it against its inclination; and that now he was betraying it in order to indemnify himself at its expense. After sharp altercations, which led to nothing, the envoys were obliged to proceed to the discussions of the basis of the negotiations. The French wanted the left bank of the Rhine, and proposed the expedient of secularizations, in order to indemnify the princes dispossessed of their dominions. Austria, who, not content with having acquired the greater part of the Venetian territory, wished to obtain a few bishoprics to boot, and who, moreover, had secret conventions with France; Prussia, who had agreed with France to indemnify herself on the right bank for the duchy of Cleves, which she had lost on the left bank; the dispossessed princes, who desired rather to acquire states on the right bank, out of the neighbourhood of the French, than to recover their old principalities—Austria, Prussia, the dispossessed princes, all voted alike for ceding the line of the Rhine, and for recurring to secularizations as the means of indemnity. The Empire, of course, could scarcely defend itself against such a concurrence of determinations. As, however, the powers given to the deputation made the integrity of the Germanic Empire an express condition, the French plenipotentiaries declared these powers insufficient, and required others. The deputation obtained fresh powers from the diet. Though it had then the privilege of conceding the line of the Rhine and renouncing the left bank, it nevertheless persisted in claiming the latter. It alleged many reasons, for reasons are always plentiful. The Germanic Empire, said the deputation, had not been the first to declare war. Long before the diet of Ratisbon had issued the declaration, Custine had surprised Mayence and overrun Franconia. It had, therefore, merely defended itself. The deprivation of part of its territory would overthrow its constitution and compromise its existence, which was of importance to all Europe. The provinces on the left bank, which it was proposed to take away, were of very little consequence to a state which had become so extensive as the French republic. Some other military line, the Moselle, for instance, might be substituted for the line of the Rhine. Lastly, the republic was renouncing, for very paltry advantages

* "Great was the consternation in Germany, when, at length, it could no longer be concealed that the line of the Rhine had been abandoned. It was the more difficult for the Austrian plenipotentiaries at Rastadt to reconcile the dispossessed proprietors to this step, as the emperor had previously announced in the Diet, that an armistice had been concluded for the empire, on the basis of the integrity of the Germanic body." — *Blissom*. E.

the glory which was so brilliant, so pure, and so useful for her, of political moderation. In consequence, the deputation proposed to cede all that the Empire had possessed beyond the Moselle, and to take that river for the boundary. France had excellent reasons to oppose to these. She had taken the offensive, it was true, and begun the war *de facto*; but the real war, the war of intention, of machinations, and of preparations, had been begun by the Empire. It was at Treves and at Coblenz that the emigrants had been collected and organized; it was from those places that the legions commissioned to humble, to brutalize, to dismember France were to start. France, instead of being vanquished, was victorious; she availed herself of her position, not to do all the injury that others had meant to do to her, but to indemnify herself for the war which had been made upon her, by requiring her true natural boundary—the line of the Rhine.

They disputed, therefore, for even when concessions are inevitable, people will still contest them. But it was evident that the deputation was about to cede the left bank, and that it made this resistance merely to obtain better conditions on other disputed points. Such was the state of the negotiations at Rastadt in the month of Pluviose, year VI (February, 1798).

Augereau, to whom the Directory had given the command of the army of Germany, in order to get rid of him, had surrounded himself with the most violent Jacobins. He could not fail to give umbrage to the Empire, which particularly dreaded the contagion of the new principles, and complained of the inflammatory publications circulated in Germany. So many heads in Europe were in a state of excitement, that there was no necessity for supposing French interference in order to account for the circulation of revolutionary publications. But it was of consequence to the Directory to obviate all complaints; besides, it was dissatisfied with the turbulent conduct of Augereau; it deprived him of his command, and sent him to Perpignan, upon pretext of collecting there an army destined, so it said, to act against Portugal. That court had, at the instigation of Pitt, declined to ratify the treaty concluded with the republic, and France threatened to strike in her an ally of England. In reality this was but an empty demonstration, and the commission given to Augereau was a disguised disgrace.

France, in addition to the direct relations which she began to renew with the powers of Europe, had, as we have observed, to direct the new republics. They were naturally agitated by contrary parties. It was the duty of France to spare them the convulsions by which she had herself been torn. Besides, it was for this purpose that she was called in and paid. She had armies in Holland, in the Cisalpine, and in Liguria, maintained at the expense of those republics. If, in order to avoid the appearance of interfering with their independence, she were to leave them to themselves, either a counter-revolution or an outburst of Jacobinism would be likely to ensue. In the one case, there would be danger for the republican system; in the other, for the universal repose and for the maintenance of the general peace. The Jacobins, if they gained the ascendancy in Holland, might indispose Prussia and Germany; if they made themselves masters in Liguria and the Cisalpine, they might convulse Italy, and call Austria back into the lists. It was requisite, therefore, to moderate the march of these republics, but, in so doing, the government exposed itself to another inconvenience. Europe complained that France, so far from having allies in the Dutch, the Cisalpines, and the Genoese, had subjects, and reproached her with aiming at universal dominion. It was expedient, therefore, to choose agents who had precisely the shade of opinion adapted to the country

in which they were to reside, and who had tact enough to make the hand of France felt without suffering it to be perceived. There were, as we see, difficulties of all sorts to overcome, in order to keep in presence, and to keep so without collision, the two systems which had of late been arrayed against one another in Europe. We have seen them warring for six years. We are about to see them during a year of negotiation, and that year will prove, more than war itself, their natural incompatibility.

We have already described the different parties that divided Holland. The moderate and prudent party, which desired a uniform and temperate constitution, had to combat the Orangists, the creatures of the stadtholder; the federalists, the partisans of the old provincial divisions, aspiring to authority in their provinces, and willing to suffer only a feeble federal bond; lastly, the democrats, or Jacobins, wishing for pure unity and democracy. The Directory, of course, deemed it right to support the first party in opposition to the other three; because it was solicitous, without any of the contrary extremes, to reconcile the old federative system with a sufficient concentration of the government. The Directory has been frequently accused of wishing to establish everywhere the republic *one and indivisible*, and people in general have argued very unfairly concerning its system in this particular. The republic *one and indivisible*, conceived in 1793, would have been a profound idea, if it had not been the offspring of a mighty instinct. A state so homogeneous, so solidly founded, as France, cannot admit the federal system. A state so threatened as France would have been undone by admitting that system. It was not adapted either to its geographical configuration, or to its political situation. To have attempted to introduce unity and indivisibility everywhere in the same degree as in France would certainly have been absurd; but the Directory, placed at the head of a new system, obliged to create powerful allies for itself, would naturally seek to give strength and consistence to its new allies, and there is no strength or consistence without a certain degree of concentration and unity. Such was the idea, or more correctly speaking, the instinct, which governed and could not help governing, almost unknown to themselves, the heads of the French republic.

Holland, with its former federative system, would have been reduced to complete impotence. Its national assembly had not yet been able to give it a constitution. It was still cramped by all the regulations of the ancient states of Holland; federalism ruled there; the partisans of unity and of a moderate constitution demanded the abolition of these regulations, and the speedy establishment of a constitution. Noël, the envoy, was accused of favouring the federalists. France could no longer delay siding with one party. She sent Joubert, who had been one of Bonaparte's lieutenants in Italy, celebrated for his march into the Tyrol, modest, disinterested, brave, and a warm patriot, to command the army of Holland. She superseded Noël by Delacroix, formerly minister for foreign affairs. She might have made a better choice. The Directory was unfortunately in want of persons qualified for the diplomatic career. Among the members of the past or present assemblies, there were certainly many enlightened and clever men, but they were not habituated to diplomatic forms. They were dogmatic and supercilious, and it was difficult to find among them persons combining firmness of principles with suppleness of manners, which it was nevertheless requisite that our envoys to foreign countries should possess, in order to be capable of at once commanding respect for our doctrines, and of sparing the prejudices of old Europe. Delacroix, on his arrival in Holland,

attended a dinner given by the diplomatic committee. All the foreign ministers were invited to it. After he had held in their presence the most violent language, Delacroix, glass in hand, exclaimed, "Why is there not a Batavian daring enough to stab the regulations on the altar of his country?" It is easy to conceive what an effect such sallies must produce on foreigners. It was not long, in fact, before the regulations were *stabbed*.* Forty-three deputies had already protested against the operations of the National Assembly. They met on the 3d of Pluviose (January 22d, 1798), at the hotel of Haarlem, and there, supported by our troops, they followed the example set them four months before, on the 18th of Fructidor. They excluded from the national assembly a certain number of suspected deputies, put some of them into confinement, abolished the regulations, and organized the assembly into a kind of convention. In a few days, a constitution closely resembling that of France was framed and put in force. In imitation of the Convention, the new leaders composed the government of the members of the existing assembly, and constituted themselves into a directory and legislative body. Those who come forward to effect movements of this kind are always the most vehement of their party. It was to be feared that the new Batavian government would be strongly imbued with democracy, and that, under the influence of an ambassador like Delacroix, it would overstep the line which the Directory would fain have traced for it. This kind of 18th of Fructidor did not fail to cause European diplomatists, and those of Prussia in particular, to remark that France governed Holland, and extended in fact to the Texel.

The Ligurian republic was in a very good train, though secretly excited like all new states, by two equally intemperate parties. As for the Cisalpine, it was a prey to the most vehement passions. The spirit of locality divided the Cisalpines, who belonged to old states dismembered by Bonaparte. Besides this spirit of locality, the agents of Austria, the nobles, the priests, and the furious democrats, violently agitated the new republic. But the democrats were the most dangerous, because they had a powerful support in the army of Italy, composed, as we have seen, of the most fiery patriots in France. The Directory had as much trouble to direct the spirit of these armies in foreign countries as that of its ministers, and in this particular it had as many difficulties to surmount as in every other. It had not yet appointed any minister to the new republic. Berthier, in quality of commander-in-chief, still represented the French government. It was requisite to fix by a treaty of alliance the relations of the new republic with the mother state. This was drawn up in Paris, and sent for the ratification of the Councils. The two republics formed an alliance offensive and defensive for all cases; and, till the Cisalpine should have a military establishment, France was to grant the succour of twenty-five thousand men on the following conditions. The Cisalpine was to furnish buildings for barracks, hospitals, and magazines, and ten millions per annum for the subsistence of the twenty-five thousand men. In case of war, she was to furnish an extraordinary subsidy. France gave up to the Cisalpine great part of the

* "At a public dinner Delacroix exclaimed, 'Is there no Batavian who will plunge a poniard into the Constitution, on the altar of his country?' Amid the fumes of wine and the riot of intoxication, the plan for its assassination was soon adopted; on the night of the 22d of January, the barriers were closed, the French troops were called out, and, early the next day, the Assembly, under the dictation of French bayonets, introduced a form of government on the model of that already established in France."
Gibbon. E.

artillery taken from the enemy for the purpose of arming her fortresses. These conditions were not exorbitant; yet many of the Cisalpine deputies in the Council of the Ancients, who were unfavourably disposed towards the republican system and France, pretended that this treaty was too burdensome, that advantage was taken of the dependence in which the new state was placed, and they rejected the treaty. In this there was evident malice. Bonaparte, being obliged to select the persons composing the councils and the government, had not been able to ascertain the sentiments of them all, and it became necessary to make some changes. The existing councils, nominated according to martial law by Bonaparte, were modified in a similar manner by Berthier. The latter removed some of the most obstinate members, and then submitted the treaty, which was immediately accepted. It was unlucky that France was again obliged to suffer her hand to be seen; for Austria instantly asserted that, notwithstanding all the promises made at Campo Formio, the Cisalpine was not an independent republic, but evidently a French province. She raised difficulties concerning the admission of Marescalchi, the minister accredited to her by the Cisalpine.

The territory formed by France and the new republics dovetailed with yet feudal Europe in a most dangerous manner for the peace of both systems. Switzerland, still wholly feudal, though republican, was encircled by France, Savoy which had become a French province, and the Cisalpine. Piedmont, with which France had contracted an alliance, was enclosed by France, Savoy, the Cisalpine, and Liguria. The Cisalpine and Liguria enveloped the Parmesan and Tuscany, and might communicate their fever to Rome and Naples. The Directory had recommended the greatest reserve to its agents, and had forbidden them to hold out any hopes to the democrats. Guingéné in Piedmont, Cacault in Tuscany, Joseph Bonaparte* at Rome, Trouvé at Naples, had express orders to testify the most amicable dispositions towards the princes in whose capitals they resided. They were to assure them that the Directory had no intention whatever to propagate revolutionary principles; that it would content itself with maintaining the republican system where it was already established, but that it would take no steps to extend it to powers who behaved honourably to France. The intentions of the Directory were sincere and discreet. Its wishes, it is true, were favourable to the progress of the Revolution, but it meant no

* "Joseph Bonaparte, the eldest brother of Napoleon, was born at Ajaccio, in 1768. He was designed for his law, but the invasion of Corsica by the English in 1793, compelled him, with the rest of his family, to seek refuge in France. When his brother seized the imperial sceptre, Joseph was laden with honours both civil and military, raised to the throne of Naples and afterwards, in 1808, to that of Spain. He was, however, compelled to fly from the kingdom, in consequence of the decisive overthrow he met with at Vittoria. In 1814, after his brother's abdication, he retired to Switzerland, where he bought a valuable estate. In the following year, he returned to Paris, but after the battle of Waterloo, escaped to the United States, and established himself in the vicinity of Philadelphia, under the name of Count Survilliers."—*Court and Camp of Bonaparte*.—After the overthrow of Charles X., Joseph returned to Europe, and is still, we believe, residing on the continent. E.

"You would seldom see a better countenance than that of Joseph Bonaparte. With masculine strength and expression, it combines a mild, intelligent smile. Joseph is well read, not only in our literature, but in that of Italy and England. He loves poetry and the belles lettres, and takes pleasure in surrounding himself with learned and scientific men. It has been said that his character is weak and false. He has goodness of heart, gentleness, clemency, and accuracy of judgment. His conduct, during his unfortunate reign in Spain, was, on the whole, admirable. He left France with great regret, and entreated his brother not to force a crown on him."—*Duchess d'Abrantes*. E.

longer to propagate it by arms. It was desirous, if revolution should break out in fresh states, to afford no occasion to reproach France with an active participation. Besides, Italy was full of princes, relatives or allies of the great powers, whom it was impossible to injure without running the risk of new hostilities. Austria would not fail to interfere in behalf of Tuscany, of Naples, and, perhaps, of Piedmont; Spain would certainly interfere on account of the Prince of Parma. It was requisite, therefore, to make a point, if new events should break out, of not having the responsibility of them.

Such were the instructions of the Directory; but the passions are not to be governed, and especially the passion for liberty. Could France prevent the French, Ligurian, and Cisalpine democrats from corresponding with the Piedmontese, Tuscan, Roman and Neapolitan democrats, and from communicating to them the warmth of their opinions, their encouragement, and their hopes? They told them that policy forbade the French government to interfere ostensibly in the revolutions which were everywhere preparing, but that it would protect them when once effected; that they must have the courage to attempt them, and succours would immediately arrive.

Agitation pervaded all the Italian states. Arrests were multiplied there, and the accredited ministers of France confined themselves to the duty of claiming, occasionally, the persons unjustly confined. In Piedmont, the apprehensions were numerous, but the intercession of France was frequently successful. In Tuscany, great moderation prevailed. At Naples, there was a class of men who shared the new opinions; but the court, equally malicious and senseless, combated those opinions by chains and punishments. Trouvé, our ambassador, was overwhelmed with humiliations. He was sequestered, like one infected with the plague. The Neapolitans were forbidden to visit him. He had even found great difficulty in procuring a physician for himself. Those who have accused of having had communication with the French legation, and who wore their hair cropped, and without powder, were thrown into prison. The letters of the French ambassador were seized, unsealed, and kept by the Neapolitan police for ten or twelve days. Frenchmen had been assassinated. Even when Bonaparte was in Italy, he had great difficulty in restraining the fury of the court of Naples, and now that he was no longer there, it is easy to conceive what it must have been capable of. The French government was strong enough to punish it severely for its faults; but to avoid disturbing the general peace, it had directed Trouvé, its minister, to observe the utmost moderation, to confine himself to remonstrances, and to strive to bring it back to reason.

The government that was nearest to its ruin was the Papal Government. This was not for want of defending itself; it ordered arrests also; but an aged Pope, whose pride was humbled, and aged, incapable cardinals, could scarcely uphold a state tottering on all sides. Already, at the suggestion of the Cisalpines, the March of Ancona had revolted, and formed itself into the Anconitan republic. Thence the democrats excited rebellion throughout the whole of the Roman states. They had, indeed, no great number of partisans there, but they were strongly seconded by the public discontent. The papal government had lost that splendour which dazzled the eyes of the people, since the contributions imposed at Tolentino had obliged it to give up even the valuable moveables and the precious stones belonging to the Holy See. The new taxes, the creation of paper-money, which are fallen more than two-thirds of its value, and the aliena-

tion of one-fifth of the property of the clergy, had dissatisfied all classes, and even the ecclesiastics themselves. The grandees of Rome, who had acquired some of the knowledge diffused throughout Europe during the eighteenth century, loudly murmured against a feeble, silly government, and said that it was high time the temporal rule of the Roman states should be transferred from the hands of ignorant, incapable monks, unacquainted with secular affairs, to those of real citizens, experienced in the business of life and possessing a knowledge of the world. Thus the dispositions of the Roman people were by no means favourable to the Pope. The democrats, however, were far from numerous. They inspired prejudices on the score of religion, to which they were supposed to be enemies. The French artists at Rome excited them much; but Joseph Bonaparte strove to repress them, saying that they were not strong enough to attempt a decisive movement; that they would ruin themselves and compromise France to no purpose; that, besides, she would not support them, but leave them exposed to the consequences of their imprudence.

On the 6th of Nivose (December 26, 1797), they came to apprise him that there would be a movement. He sent them away, exhorting them to keep quiet, but they paid no attention to the French minister. The system of all the dabblers in revolutions was that they ought to be daring, and to involve France even against her will. They assembled accordingly, on the 8th of Nivose (December 28), to attempt a movement. Dispersed by the Pope's dragoons, they sought refuge in the jurisdiction of the French ambassador, and under the piazza of the Corsini palace where he resided. Joseph hastened thither with some French military men, and among them General Duphot, a very distinguished young officer of the army of Italy. His intention was to interpose between the papal troops and the insurgents, in order to prevent a massacre. But the papal troops, regardless of the ambassador, fired and killed the unfortunate Duphot by his side.* This young man was on the point of marriage with a sister-in-law of Joseph. His death produced an extraordinary commotion. Several foreign ambassadors, particularly the Spanish minister, d'Azara, hastened to Joseph's residence. The Roman government alone waited fourteen hours without sending to the minister of France, though he had written to it repeatedly during the day. Joseph indignantly demanded passports. They were given to him, and he set out immediately for Tuscany.

This event produced a strong sensation. It was evident that the Roman government might have prevented this commotion, which was foreseen at Rome two days before, but that it purposely suffered it to break out, in order that it might inflict a severe chastisement on the democrats; and that in the tumult it had not been careful to take such precautions as to prevent a violation of the law of nations and an assault upon the French legation. In the Cisalpine, and among all the Italian patriots, great indignation was immediately manifested against the Roman government. The army of Italy loudly insisted on marching for Rome.

The Directory was extremely embarrassed. It regarded the Pope as the

* "General Duphot, indignant at being restrained by the pontifical troops within the palace of the French ambassador, drew his sword, rushed down the staircase, and put himself at the head of one hundred and fifty armed Roman democrats, who were contending with the dragoons in the courtyard of the palace; he was immediately killed by a discharge ordered by a sergeant commanding the patrol of the papal troops; and the ambassador himself, who had followed to appease the tumult, narrowly escaped the same fate."—*Alison*. E.

spiritual head of the party inimical to the Revolution. It was strongly tempted to destroy the pontiff of that ancient and tyrannical Christian religion, in spite of the danger of offending the powers and provoking their interference. But, how great soever might be the inconveniences of a hostile determination, the revolutionary passions triumphed on this occasion, and the Directory ordered General Berthier, who commanded in Italy, to march upon Rome. It hoped that, as the Pope was neither the kinsman nor the ally of any court, his fall would not provoke any powerful interference.

Great was the joy of all the republicans and partisans of the new French philosophy. On the 22d of Pluviose (February 10, 1798), Berthier came in sight of the ancient capital of the world, which the republican armies had not yet visited. Our soldiers paused for a moment to survey the old and magnificent city. The Spanish minister, d'Azara, the usual mediator of the Italian powers with France, hastened to the head-quarters to negotiate a convention. The Castle of St. Angelo was delivered up to the French on the natural condition between civilized nations, to respect religion, the public establishments, persons, and property. The Pope was left in the Vatican, and Berthier, introduced at the Porta di Popolo, was conducted to the Capitol, like the Roman generals of old in their triumphs. The democrats, at the summit of their wishes, assembled in the Campo Vaccino, in sight of the remains of the ancient Forum, and, surrounded by a senseless rabble, ready to applaud all new events, proclaimed the Roman republic. A notary drew up an act by which the populace, calling itself the Roman people, declared that it resumed its sovereignty and constituted itself a republic. The Pope had been left alone in the Vatican. Messengers were sent to demand the abdication of his temporal sovereignty, for there was no intention of meddling with his spiritual authority. He replied with dignity that he could not divest himself of a property which was not his, but which had devolved on him from the apostles, and was only a deposit in his hands. This logic had little effect upon our republican generals. The Pope, treated with the respect due to his age, was removed in the night from the Vatican and conveyed into Tuscany, where he received asylum in a convent. The Roman people seemed to feel little regret for this sovereign, who had nevertheless reigned more than twenty years.

Unfortunately, outrages, not against persons but against property, sullied the entry of the French into the ancient capital of the world. There was no longer at the head of the army that severe and inflexible commander, who, not so much from virtue as from a horror of disorder, had so severely punished plunderers. Bonaparte alone could have curbed rapacity in so wealthy a country. Berthier had set out for Paris. Massena had succeeded him. This hero, to whom France will owe everlasting gratitude for having saved her at Zurich from apparently inevitable ruin, was accused of having set the first example. It was soon followed. The French proceeded to plunder the palaces, the convents, and the rich collections. Jews in the train of the army purchased at a low price the magnificent objects placed in their hands by the depredators. The pillage was revolting. It is right to observe that it was neither the subaltern officers nor the soldiers who were guilty of these disorders, but the superior officers. All the articles which they took away, and which were ours by right of conquest, ought to have been collected in a *dépôt* and sold for the benefit of the army, which had not received pay for five months. It had come from

the Cisalpine, the defective financial organization of which had hitherto prevented it from paying the subsidy agreed upon by our treaty. The soldiers and the inferior officers were in the most deplorable state of destitution; they were indignant at seeing their chief gorged with spoils, and compromising the glory of the French name, without any advantage to the army. A mutiny broke out against Massena. The officers assembled in a church, and declared that they would serve under him no longer.* Part of the population, unfavourably disposed towards the French, prepared to seize the moment of this misunderstanding to attempt a movement. Massena withdrew the army from Rome, leaving a garrison in the Castle of St. Angelo. The danger put an end to the mutiny, but the officers persisted in continuing united, and in demanding the punishment of the plunderers, and the recall of Massena †

We thus see that to the difficulty of moderating the march of the new republics, and of choosing and directing our agents, was added that of curbing the armies, and all this at immense distances for the administrative communications. The Directory recalled Massena, and sent to Rome a commission composed of four upright and enlightened men, to organize the new republic. These were Daunou, Monge, Florent, and Faypoult. The latter, an able and honest administrator, was charged with every thing connected with the finances. The army of Italy was divided into two; that which had just dethroned the Pope, was called the army of Rome.

The next point was to justify the new revolution to the foreign powers. Spain, whose piety might have afforded cause for apprehension, but who was under French influence, said nothing. But self-interest is more intractable than religious zeal. Hence the two most discontented courts were those of Vienna and Naples. That of Vienna saw with pain the influence of France spreading in Italy. In order not to aggravate her grievances, it was resolved not to incorporate the new republic with the Cisalpine. It was, therefore, constituted separately. To have united the two would have too rudely awakened the idea of Italian unity, and afforded ground for believing in the plan for democratising all Italy. Though the emperor had not yet sent a minister to Paris, Bernadotte was despatched to give him explanations, and to reside in Vienna. As for the court of Naples, its rage was extreme on beholding the revolution at its doors. It demanded nothing less than two or three Roman provinces to pacify it. It coveted, in particular, the duchy of Benevento and the territory of Ponte Corvo, which

* "The third cause of the general discontent, said the army, at a meeting of the officers held at the Pantheon, is the arrival of General Massena. The soldiers have not forgotten the extortions and robberies he has committed wherever he has been invested with the command. The Venetian territory, and above all, Padua, are a district teeming with proofs of his immorality."—*Prince Hardenberg's Memoirs*. E.

† "To such a height did the disorders rise, that they excited the indignation of the army itself; for while the agents of the Directory were enriching themselves, and still lying the name of France by unheard-of spoliations, the inferior officers and soldiers were suffering the greatest privations. For several months they had been without pay, their clothes were worn out, their feet bare, their knapsacks empty. Indignant at the painful contrast which their condition offered to that of the civil agents, and comparing their penury with the luxurious condition of the corps stationed in the Cisalpine republic, the officers and soldiers in and round Rome, broke out into open and unmeasured terms of vituperation. The discontents were so alarming an aspect that Massena, who had assumed the command, ordered all the troops, excepting three thousand, to leave the capital. But they refused to obey, and he was compelled to abandon the command"—*Massena*. E.

lay very conveniently for it. Garat was sent to arrange matters with that court; and Trouvé was destined for the Cisalpine.

The revolution was thus making inevitable and much more rapid progress than the Directory could have wished. We have already mentioned a country into which it threatened to introduce itself, namely, Switzerland. It would seem as if Switzerland, that ancient abode of liberty and of simple and pastoral manners, had nothing to receive from France, and as if it alone had no revolution to undergo; yet, though the thirteen cantons were governed with republican forms, it did not thence follow that equity prevailed in the mutual relations of these petty republics, and especially in their relations with their subjects. Feudalism, which is but the military hierarchy, existed among these republics, and there were people dependent on other people, as a vassal upon his liege lord, and groaning under an iron yoke. The Aargau and the canton of Vaud were dependent on the aristocracy of Berne; the Lower Valais on the Upper Valais; the Italian bailiwicks, that is, the valleys sloping towards Italy, on various cantons. There were, moreover, great numbers of communes dependent on certain towns. The canton of St. Gall was governed feudally by a convent. All the subject countries had become so only in virtue of conditions contained in charters consigned to oblivion, and which it was forbidden to bring forth to the light. The country was almost everywhere dependent on the towns, and subject to the most vexatious monopolies; and nowhere was the tyranny of trade-guilds so oppressive. In all the governments, the aristocracy had gradually possessed itself of the whole power. In Berne, the principal of these petty states, a few families had seized the supreme authority, and excluded all others from it for ever; they had their golden book, in which all the ruling families were inscribed. Manners frequently mitigate the laws. That was not the case here. There aristocracies revenged themselves with a keenness of spite peculiar to petty states. Berne, Zurich, Geneva, had frequently, and very recently, too, exhibited the spectacle of executions. Throughout Europe there were Swiss, who were either forcibly banished, or who had withdrawn themselves by voluntary exile from aristocratic vengeance. Finally, ill united, imperfectly bound to one another, the thirteen cantons had now no strength; they were rendered incapable of defending their liberty. From that feeling of bad brotherhood so common in federative states, almost all of them had recourse in their quarrels to the neighbouring powers, and had particular treaties, some with Austria, others with Piedmont, and others again with France. Switzerland, therefore, was but a glorious recollection and an admirable soil. Politically, it exhibited only a chain of petty and humiliating tyrannies.

The reader may now conceive what effect the example of the French Revolution must have produced in its bosom. Zurich, Basle, and Geneva, were agitated. In this latter city, in particular, the disturbances had been attended with bloodshed. Throughout the whole French part, and especially in the Pays de Vaud, revolutionary sentiments had made great progress. The Swiss aristocrats, on their part, had omitted nothing that could do disservice to France, and had studied to displease her as much as they could without provoking her omnipotence. The gentlemen of Berne had welcomed the emigrants, and rendered them all the services that lay in their power. It was in Switzerland that all the plots hatched against the republic were devised. It will be recollected that it was at Basle that Wickham, the English agent, guided all the threads of the counter-revolution. The Directory had a right, then, to be dissatisfied. It had one very

easy way of revenging itself on Switzerland. The Vaudois, persecuted by the gentry of Berne, invoked the interference of France. When the Duke of Savoy ceded them to Berne, France had undertaken to guarantee their rights by a treaty, dated 1565; that treaty had several times been appealed to and executed by France. There was nothing extraordinary, therefore, in the interference of the Directory, claimed on this occasion by the Vaudois. Besides, several of those petty dependent districts had foreign protectors.

We have seen with what enthusiasm the Vaudois received the liberator of the Valteline, when passing through Switzerland, on his way from Milan to Rastadt. The Vaudois, full of hope, had sent deputies to Paris, and earnestly solicited the protection of France.* Their countryman, the brave and unfortunate Laharpe, had died for us in Italy, at the head of one of our divisions. They were cruelly oppressed, and, without any political reason, mere humanity would suffice to induce France to interfere. It was not to be conceived that France, with her new principles, would refuse to enforce treaties conservative of the liberty of a neighbouring people, and executed even by the ancient monarchy. Policy alone would have prevented her, for it was giving a new alarm to Europe, especially at the very moment when the pontifical throne at Rome was crumbling to pieces. But France, which was desirous of conciliating Germany, Piedmont, Parma, Tuscany, and Naples, thought that she did not owe the same forbearance to Switzerland; and was anxious, in particular, to establish a government similar to her own in a country which was considered as the military key to all Europe. In this case, as in regard to Rome, the Directory was drawn beyond the line of its watching policy by a more important interest. To place the Alps in friendly hands was a motive as powerful as that of overthrowing the papacy.

In consequence, on the 8th of Nivose (December 28, 1797), it declared that it took the Vaudois under its protection, and that the members of the governments of Berne and Friburg should be answerable for the safety of their persons and property. General Menard, at the head of the division that was lately Massena's, immediately recrossed the Alps, and encamped at Carouge, in sight of the Lake of Geneva. General Schauburg ascended the Rhine with a division of the army of Germany, and took post at Erguel, in the environs of Basle. At this signal there was a burst of joy in the Pays de Vaud, in the bishopric of Basle, and in the country of Zurich. The Vaudois immediately demanded their ancient states. Berne replied that it would receive individual petitions, but that there should be no assemblies of states, and required the renewal of the oath of allegiance. This was the signal for insurrection to the Vaudois. The bailiffs, whose tyranny was odious, were expelled, but without being otherwise ill-treated; trees of liberty were everywhere planted, and in a few days the Pays de Vaud constituted itself into the Lemanic republic. The Directory recognised it, and ordered General Menard to occupy it, signifying at the same time to the canton of Berne that its independence was guaranteed by

* * The revolutionary deputies of the Pays de Vaud presented the following address to Napoleon:—"The deputies of the Pays de Vaud, whom the generous protection of the Directory has so powerfully aided, desire to lay their homage at your feet. They owe it the more, because it was your passage through their country which electrified the inhabitants, and was the precursor of the thunderbolt which has overwhelmed the oligarchy. The Helvetians swore, when they beheld the Liberator of Italy, to recover their rights."—*Napoleon's Confidential Correspondence*. E.

France. Meanwhile, a revolution was taking place at Basle. Ochs, the tribune, a clever man, a stanch partisan of the Revolution, and in close connexion with the French government, was the principal mover in it. The people of the country had been admitted with the citizens to form a kind of national convention, for the purpose of framing a constitution. Ochs was its author: it was a copy of that of France, which then served as the model for all republican Europe. It was translated into the three languages, French, German, and Italian, and circulated in all the cantons, to excite their zeal. Mengaud, who was the French agent to the cantons, and who resided at Basle, contributed to give the impulse. In Zurich, the people of the country had revolted, and insisted on being reinstated in their rights.

Meanwhile, the gentry of Berne had collected an army, and convoked a general diet at Aarau, to consider of the state of Switzerland, and to demand the federal contingent from each canton. They circulated among their German subjects a report that the French part of Switzerland wished to separate from the confederation and to unite itself with France; that religion was threatened; and that the atheists of Paris aimed at destroying it. By these representations they drew from the mountains of the Oberland a simple, ignorant, fanatic population, persuaded that their ancient religion was about to be attacked. They collected nearly twenty thousand men, divided into three corps, which were stationed at Friburg, Murten, Buren, and Solothurn, guarding the line of the Aar, and watching the French. In the meantime, that is to say in Pluviose (February, 1798), the diet assembled at Aarau was embarrassed and knew not what course to pursue. Its presence did not prevent the inhabitants of Aarau from rising, planting the tree of liberty, and declaring themselves free. The Bernese troops entered Aarau, cut down the tree of liberty, and committed some excesses there. Mengaud, the agent, declared the people of Aarau under the protection of France.

The parties were thus arrayed against each other without being yet at open war. France, called upon by the people whose guarantee she was, covered them with her troops, and threatened to employ force, in case the least violence was committed against them. The Bernese aristocracy, on its part, claimed the rights of sovereignty, and declared that it wished to live at peace with France, but to be reinstated in its possessions. Unfortunately for it, all the old governments round about were falling either voluntarily or by violence. Basle emancipated, as far as it was concerned, the Italian bailiwicks; the Upper Valais emancipated the Lower Valais. Friburg, Solothurn, and St. Gall were in revolution. The Bernese aristocracy, finding itself pressed on all sides, made up its mind to some concessions, and admitted fifty persons from the country to share the prerogatives hitherto reserved for the ruling families; but it deferred all modification of the constitution for a year. This was but an empty concession, which could not make any amends. A French flag of truce had been sent to the Bernese troops posted on the frontiers of the Pays de Vaud, to give them notice that they would be attacked if they advanced. The bearer was assaulted, and two horsemen belonging to his escort were murdered. This circumstance decided for war. Brune, appointed to the command, had some conferences at Payerne, but they were fruitless, and on the 12th of Ventose (March 2d), the French troops broke up. General Schaumburg, with the division which had come from the Rhine and which was stationed in the territory of Basle, made himself master of Solothurn and of the course of

the Aar. Brune, with the division from Italy, took possession of Friburg. General Erlach, who commanded the Bernese troops, retired into the positions of Fraubrunnen, Guminen, Laupen, and Neueneck. These positions cover Berne on every side, whether the enemy debouches from Solothurn or from Friburg. This retreat produced among the Bernese troops the usual effect of such a movement upon fanatic and undisciplined bands. They cried out that they were betrayed, and murdered their officers. Part of them dispersed. Erlach, however, had still about him some of those battalions, distinguished in all the armies of Europe by their discipline and their bravery, and a certain number of resolute peasants. On the 15th of Ventose (March 5th), Brune, who was on the Friburg road, and Schaumburg on that of Solothurn, attacked simultaneously the positions of the Swiss army. General Pigeon, who formed Brune's advanced guard, attacked the position of Neueneck. The Swiss made an heroic resistance, and, favoured by the advantage of the ground, barred the way to our veteran bands of Italy. But, at the same moment, Schaumburg, who had come from Solothurn, took from Erlach the position of Fraubrunnen, and the city of Berne was thus uncovered on one side. The Swiss were forced to retreat, and they fell back in disorder upon Berne. The French found before the city a multitude of fanatic and desperate mountaineers. Women and old men came and threw themselves upon their bayonets. They were compelled to sacrifice with regret these unfortunate wretches, who sought in this manner a useless death. They entered Berne. The people of the mountains upheld their ancient reputation for valour, but they proved themselves as blind and as ferocious as the rabble of Spain. They again murdered their officers, and among them the unfortunate Erlach.* Steiger, the celebrated *avoyer* of Berne, the chief of the Bernese aristocracy, had a narrow escape from the fury of the fanatics, and fled across the mountains of the Oberland to the little cantons, and from them into Bavaria.

The taking of Berne decided the submission of all the great Swiss cantons. Brune, called, as our generals have so often been, to be the founder of a republic, thought of composing with the French part of Switzerland, the Lake of Geneva, the Pays de Vaud, part of the canton of Berne, and the Valais, a republic to be called the Rhodanic. But the Swiss patriots had wished for a revolution in their country merely in the hope of two great advantages: the abolition of all the dependencies of people upon people, and the Helvetic unity. They desired the overthrow of all internal tyrannies, and the formation of a common force, by the establishment of a central government. In compliance with their wishes, it was resolved that the whole of Switzerland should be formed into a single republic. A meeting was convoked at Aarau, for the purpose of proposing the constitution framed at Basle. The Directory sent Lecarlier, the ex-conventionalist, to meet the views of the Swiss, and to arrange with them the establishment of a constitution which should be satisfactory. Attempts at resistance were preparing in the small mountain cantons of Uri, Glarus, Schwytz, and Zug. The priests and the beaten aristocrats persuaded these unfortunate moun-

* "Deplorable excesses followed the dissolution of the Swiss army. The brave D'Erlach was massacred by the deluded soldiers at Munzingen, as he was endeavouring to reach the small cantons. Steiger, after undergoing incredible hardships, escaped by the mountains of Oberland into Bavaria. Numbers of the bravest officers fell victims to the fury of the troops; and the democratic party, by spreading the belief that they had been betrayed by their leaders, occasioned the destruction of the few men who could have sustained the sinking fortunes of their country."—*Alison*. E.

taineers that the French were coming to overthrow their religion and their independence. Among other absurd reports, they asserted that, as France was in want of soldiers to fight the English, she meant to seize the robust youths of Switzerland, to embark them, and to throw them on the British coasts.

The French, on entering Berne, seized the coffers of the government, which is the usual and the least disputed consequence of the right of war. All the public property of the vanquished government belongs to the victorious government. All these petty, economical, and avaricious states, possessed old savings. Berne had a little hoard, which has furnished all the enemies of France with an ample subject for calumny. It has been estimated at thirty millions; it was really about eight. It has been asserted that France made war merely to possess herself of it, and to devote it to the Egyptian expedition, as if she could have supposed that the authorities of Berne would be so improvident as not to remove it, and as if it were possible that she should plunge into a war and defy the consequences of such an invasion, in order to gain eight millions. These absurdities will not bear the slightest examination.* A contribution was imposed on the members of the old aristocracies of Berne, Friburg, Solothurn, and Zurich, to supply the troops with pay and subsistence.

It was now nearly the end of the winter of 1798 (year VI). Five months had scarcely elapsed since the treaty of Campo Formio, and the situation of Europe was already strangely altered; the republican system was daily becoming more encroaching; to the three republics previously founded by France were now to be added two new ones, created within two months. Europe everywhere rang with the names of Batavian republic, Helvetic republic, Cisalpine republic, Ligurian republic, Roman republic. Instead of three states, France had now five to direct. She was involved in a new complication of business, and had fresh explanations to give to the foreign powers. The Directory found itself thus insensibly carried away. There is nothing more ambitious than a system. It conquers almost always of itself, and frequently even against the will of its authors.

While it was obliged to attend to external affairs, the Directory had also to concern itself about the elections. Ever since the 18th of Fructidor, there had remained in the Councils only such deputies as the Directory had voluntarily left in them, and as it could rely upon. They consisted of all those who had either favoured or suffered the stroke of policy. Six months of tolerable quiet between the executive power and the Councils had elapsed, and the Directory had employed them, as we have seen, in negotiations, in maritime projects, and in the creation of new states. Though great tranquillity had prevailed, it cannot be said that the union was perfect. Two powers having opposite parts to perform, cannot remain in perfect harmony for so long a time.

A new opposition, composed not of royalists but of patriots, was forming. The reader must have already observed that, after a party had been conquered, the government was obliged to enter into a conflict with that which had assisted it to conquer, because the latter became too exacting, and began to revolt in its turn. Since the 9th of Thermidor, the epoch at which the factions, having become equal in strength, had begun to have the alternative of defeats and victories, the patriots had reacted in Germinal and Prairial, and immediately after them the royalists in Vendé-

We find them repeated by Madame de Staël and a great number of writers

maire. Since Vendémiaire and the institution of the Directory, the patriots had had their turn, and had been the most audacious till the rash attempt on the camp at Grenelle. From that day the royalists had regained the ascendancy. They had lost it on the 18th of Fructidor, and it was now the patriots' turn to raise their heads. To characterize this state of things, a word was devised which we have seen revived at a later period, that of see-saw. That policy which consists in alternately raising either party, was called a see-saw system. The Directory was reproached with employing it, and thus being by turns the slave of the faction by which it was assisted. This reproach is unjust; for no government, unless it arrives with a victorious sword at the head of affairs, can immolate all the parties at once, and govern without, and in spite of them. At every change of system, one is obliged to make changes of administration, and naturally to call to it those who have manifested opinions conformable with the system which has triumphed. All the members of the victorious party press forward in a body, beset the government, and are ready to attack it if it does not comply with their wishes. All the patriots are stirring, and obtaining the support of the deputies who had voted with the Directory in the Councils. The Directory had resisted many importunities, but had been obliged to comply with some. It had appointed many patriots to be commissioners in the departments (prefects). A great number of others were preparing to seize the opportunity of the elections to get into the legislative body. The authorities recently nominated were a real advantage to them.

Besides, the new opposition, composed of all the patriots who were bent on abusing the 18th of Fructidor, there was another, that which had entitled itself constitutional. It appeared anew; it pretended not to lean either to the royalists or to the patriots; it affected independence, moderation, and attachment to the written law; it comprehended men who, without being carried along by any party, had personal causes for discontent. Some had not been able to obtain an embassy, promotion, a contract for a relative; others had lost the place vacant in the Directory by a few votes. Nothing is more common than this sort of discontent under a new government not long established, composed of men who were but lately in the ranks of mere citizens. It is said that heirship is a curb to ambition, and so it is if it be restricted to certain functions. Nothing can equal the importunity used towards men who were yesterday your equals. You have contributed to appoint them, or perhaps you feel that they are above you merely by the accident of a few votes. It seems as if you had a right to demand and to obtain everything of them. The Directory, without intending it, had made a great number of malcontents among the deputies who were formerly called directorialists, and whom the aid afforded in Fructidor had rendered it extremely difficult to satisfy. One of Bonaparte's brothers, Lucien,* deputed

* "Lucien Bonaparte, in the year 1797, was about twenty-two years of age; he was tall, ill-shaped, having limbs like those of the field-spider, and a small head, which, with his tall stature, would have made him unlike his brothers, had not his physiognomy attested their common parentage. He was very near-sighted, which made him half-shut his eyes and stoop his head. This defect would, therefore, have given him an unpleasing air, if his smile, always in harmony with his features, had not imparted something agreeable to his countenance. Thus, though he was rather plain, he pleased generally. He had very remarkable success with women who were themselves very remarkable, and that long before his brother arrived at power. With respect to understanding and talent, Lucien always displayed abundance of both. In early youth, when he met with a subject he liked, he identified himself with it. He lived at that time in an ideal world. Thus at eighteen, the perusal of Plutarch carried him into the Forum

by Corsica to the Five Hundred, had ranged himself in this constitutional opposition, not that he had any reason for personal discontent, but because he imitated his brother, and assumed the part of censor of the government. It was the attitude which befitted a family that aimed at making for itself a place apart. Lucien was clever, and endowed with a remarkable talent for public speaking. In the tribune, he produced great effect, especially surrounded as he was by his brother's glory. Joseph, on leaving Rome, had returned to Paris, where he kept house in high style, receiving a great number of generals, deputies, and eminent persons. The two brothers, Joseph and Lucien, could thus do many things which etiquette and his great reserve forbade the general to do.

If, however, public opinion, which for six months past had been nearly unanimous, now began to assume various shades, no striking difference was yet perceptible. Moderation, politeness, pervaded the Councils, and an immense majority approved of all the propositions of the Directory.

Everything indicated that the elections of the year VI would be favourable to the patriots. It was their turn. They had the ascendancy in France and in all the new republics. The Directory had determined to employ all legal means to avoid being overthrown by them. Its commissioners issued moderate circulars, which contained exhortations but no threats. It had not, however, at its disposal, any of the influences or the infamous tricks devised in our days, for directing elections according to the pleasure of power. In the elections of the year V, some assemblies were divided, and, to avoid violence, a portion of the electors had gone and voted apart. This example was proposed in the electoral assemblies of this year; almost everywhere schisms took place; almost everywhere the electors in the minority alleged some infraction of the law, or some violence exercised towards them, as a pretext for assembling apart, and making their particular election. It is right to observe that in many departments the patriots behaved with their accustomed turbulence, and justified the secession of their adversaries. In some of the assemblies, it was the patriots who were in a minority and who seceded; but almost everywhere they had a majority, because the mass of the population, which was adverse to them, and which had thronged to the elections of the years V and VI, now intimidated by the 18th of Fructidor, had withdrawn, as it were, from public affairs, and durst not take any part in them. In Paris, the agitation was very great. There were two assemblies, one at the Oratoire, composed entirely of patriots, and comprehending, at least, six hundred electors; the other at the Institute, composed of moderate republicans, and amounting to no more than two hundred and twenty-eight electors. The choice made by the latter was excellent.

The elections, in general, had been double. Already the malcontents, the lovers of novelty, those who, from all sorts of motives, wished to modify the existing order of things, cried, "This will never do; after making an 18th of Fructidor against the royalists, we are liable to have to make another against the patriots." Already they circulated reports that the constitution was about to be changed; a proposition to that effect was even made to the Directory, by which it was peremptorily rejected.

There were different courses to take with respect to the elections. If

and the Pyrræus. He was a Greek with Demosthenes, a Roman with Cicero; he espoused all the ancient glories, but he was intoxicated with those of our own time. Those, who, because they had no conception of this enthusiasm, alleged that he was jealous of his brother, have asserted a wilful falsehood, if they have not fallen into a most egregious error. — *Duchess d'Abrantes*. E.

they were to act upon rigorous principles, the Councils must sanction the elections made by the majorities; otherwise, the consequence would be that the minorities, by separating themselves, would have the faculty of prevailing and carrying the nominations. Violence, illegal proceedings, might be a reason for annulling the choice made by the majorities, but not for adopting the choice of the minorities. The patriots in the Councils insisted strongly on this opinion, because, their party having been much more numerous in almost all the assemblies, they would then have gained the cause. But the mass of the two Councils was anxious to prevent them from gaining their cause, and two expedients were proposed; either to choose between the nominations made by the schismatic assemblies, or to make a new 18th of Fructidor. The latter was inadmissible; the former was much milder and much more natural. It was adopted. Almost everywhere the elections of the patriots were annulled, and those of their adversaries confirmed. The elections made in Paris, in the assembly at the Institute, though it contained only two hundred and twenty-eight electors, while that at the Oratoire comprehended six hundred, were approved of. In spite of this system, however, the new third brought a real reinforcement to the patriotic party in the two Councils. That party was highly incensed at the expedient adopted for excluding the men of its choice, and became somewhat more animated against the Directory.

It became necessary to choose a new director. The lot designated François de Neufchâteau as the member who was to retire. He was succeeded by Treilhard, one of our plenipotentiaries at Rastadt. Treilhard had precisely the same opinions as Lareveillère, Rewbel, and Merlin. He produced no change in the spirit of the Directory. He was an honest man, with considerable experience in business. Thus there were in the government four sincere republicans, voting absolutely alike, and combining intelligence with integrity. Treilhard was succeeded at Rastadt by Jean Debry, formerly a member of the legislature and of the National Convention.

Since the parties had been obliged, by the establishment of the constitution of the year III, to combat within the narrow space of a constitution, the scenes in the interior had been less violent. Since the 18th of Fructidor, in particular, the tribune had lost much of its importance. All eyes were turned abroad. The great influence of the republic in Europe, her singular and multiplied relations with foreign powers, her train of republics, the revolutions which she was everywhere effecting, her designs against England, engrossed the whole attention. How would France set about attacking her rival, and contrive to inflict upon her blows as severe as she had already struck Austria?—Such was the question that people asked themselves. They were accustomed to such boldness and such prodigies, that they saw nothing surprising in the crossing of the Channel. The friends and enemies of England alike conceived her to be in great danger. She herself believed that she was seriously threatened, and made extraordinary efforts for defending herself. The whole world had its eyes fixed on the Strait of Calais.

Bonaparte, who was thinking of Egypt as he had thought two years previously of Italy, as he thought of everything, that is, with irresistible violence,* had submitted his plan to the Directory, which was at that

* "Napoleon had for some time been influenced by an ardent desire to effect a revolution in the East; he was literally haunted by the idea of the glory which had been

moment discussing it. The great geniuses who have considered the map of the world have all thought of Egypt. We may mention three, Albuquerque, Leibnitz, and Bonaparte. Albuquerque had conceived that the Portuguese, who had just opened a way to India by the Cape of Good Hope, might be deprived of that important trade, if any other nation should make use of the Nile and the Red Sea. He formed, therefore, the gigantic idea of diverting the course of the Nile and throwing it into the Red Sea, in order to render that way utterly impracticable, and to secure for ever to the Portuguese the commerce of India. Vain foresight of genius, which strives to render all things eternal in a changing and shifting world! Had Albuquerque's plan been carried into effect, it was for the Dutch, and subsequently for the English, that he would have laboured. Under Louis XIV. the great Leibnitz, whose mind embraced all things, addressed a memorial to the French Monarch, which is one of the most splendid monuments of political reasoning and eloquence. Louis XIV. had resolved, for the sake of a few medals, to invade Holland. "Sire," said Leibnitz, "it is not at home that you will be able to conquer those republicans; you will not cross their dikes, and you will range all Europe on their side. It is in Egypt that you must strike them. There you will find the real track of the commerce of India; you will wrest that commerce from the Dutch, you will secure for ever the dominion of France in the Levant, you will rejoice all Christendom, you will fill the world with astonishment and admiration: Europe will applaud instead of leaguering against you."

It was these vast conceptions, neglected by Louis XIV., that filled the head of the young republican general.

Egypt had very recently been again thought of. M. de Choiseul had entertained the idea of occupying it when all the American colonies were in danger. It once more became an object of attention, when Joseph II. and Catherine threatened the Ottoman empire. Still more recently, M. Magallon, the French consul at Cairo, a man of superior abilities and thoroughly acquainted with the state of Egypt and the East, had sent memorials to the government, either to complain of the extortions practised by the Mamelukes upon French commerce, or to explain the advantages that would accrue from taking vengeance upon them. Bonaparte had surrounded himself with all these documents, and had formed his plan from the contents of them. Egypt was, in his opinion, the real stepping-stone between Europe and India; it was there that France ought to establish herself in order to ruin England; thence she would for ever command the Mediterranean, make it, to use one of his own expressions, *a French lake*, and insure the existence of the Turkish empire, or to be at hand to seize the best portion of the spoil. Once established in Egypt, she would have it in her power to do two things—either to create a navy in the Red Sea, and proceed to destroy the settlements of the English in the great Indian peninsula; or make Egypt a colony and an entrepôt. The commerce of India could not fail soon to flow into that channel, and to forsake the Cape of Good Hope. All the caravans of Syria, Arabia, and Africa, already met at Cairo. The trade of those countries alone might become immense. Egypt was the most fertile country in the world. Besides a great abundance of the different sorts of grain, it was capable

there acquired, and was firmly convinced that the power of England could never be effectually humbled except by a blow at its Indian possessions. The Persians, said he, 'have blocked up the route of Tamerlane; I will discover another.'—*Bourrienne*. E.

of furnishing all the productions of America, and of superseding them entirely. Thus, whether Egypt were made a point of departure for the purpose of attacking the English settlements or a mere entrepôt, the occupation of that country would be certain to bring back commerce on a large scale into its true channels, and to make those channels lead to France.

In the next place, this daring enterprise would, in the estimation of Bonaparte, have the advantage of being well-timed. According to the luminous reports of Magallon, the consul, this was the very moment for an expedition to Egypt. By hastening the preparations and the voyage, it might arrive there very early in the summer. It would then find the harvest finished and got in, and the wind favourable for ascending the Nile. Bonaparte maintained that it would be impossible to land before winter in England; that, besides, she was too well forewarned; that the expedition to Egypt, being totally unexpected, would meet with no obstacles; that a few months would suffice for the French to establish themselves; and that he would himself return in the autumn to carry into execution the landing in England; that the season would then be favourable; that England would by that time have sent part of her naval force to India, so that there would be fewer obstacles to encounter in order to reach her shores. Besides all these motives, Bonaparte had others of a personal nature. An idle life in Paris was insupportable to him; he saw nothing to be attempted in politics; he was afraid of wearing himself out, and anxious to aggrandize his renown. "Great names," he had observed, "are to be gained only in the East."

The Directory, which has been accused of having desired to get rid of Bonaparte by sending him to Egypt, raised, on the contrary, strong objections to the project. Lareveillère-Lepeaux, in particular, was one of its most obstinate antagonists. He said that the government would be exposing thirty or forty thousand of the best soldiers of France, consigning them to the risk of a naval engagement, and depriving itself of its best general, of the one whom Austria most dreaded, at a moment when the continent was in an unsettled state, and when the creation of the new republics had excited violent resentments; that, moreover, it would probably urge the Porte to take arms by invading one of its provinces. Bonaparte found an answer to every objection. He said that nothing was easier than to give the English the slip by keeping them in ignorance of the project; that France, with three or four hundred thousand soldiers, would not miss thirty or forty thousand; that, as for himself, he should soon return; that the Porte had long ago lost Egypt through the usurpation of the Mamelukes; that she would feel pleasure in seeing France chastise them; that arrangements might be made with her; and that the continent would not so soon break out, and so forth. He also adverted to Malta, which he should take by the way from the Knights, and secure to France. The discussions were extremely warm, and produced a scene which has always been incorrectly described. Bonaparte, in a paroxysm of impatience, dropped the word resignation. "I am far from wishing you to give it," said Lareveillère with firmness; "but, if you offer it, I am of opinion that it ought to be accepted."* From that moment Bonaparte never said a word about resigning.

* This reply has been ascribed by turns to Rewbel and Barras; and a very different cause from the real one has been attributed to this discussion: It was on the subject of the expedition to Egypt and by Lareveillère that this rejoinder was made.

Overcome at last by the importunities and the arguments of Bonaparte, the Directory assented to the proposed expedition. It was seduced by the grandeur of the enterprise, by its commercial advantages, by the promise which Bonaparte gave to return by the winter, and then to attempt a landing in England. It was agreed to observe secrecy, and, that it might be the better kept, the pens of the secretaries were not employed. Merlin, president of the Directory, wrote the order with his own hand, and the order itself did not state the nature of the enterprise. It was agreed that Bonaparte should be empowered to take with him thirty-six thousand men of the old army of Italy, a certain number of officers and generals of his own selection, men of science, engineers, geographers, artisans of all kinds, and the squadron of Brueys, reinforced by some of the ships which had been left at Toulon. Orders were given to the treasury to pay him a million and a half every decade. He was allowed to take three out of the eight millions found in the coffers of Berne. It has been asserted that Switzerland was invaded in order to obtain the means of invading Egypt. The reader is now capable of judging what truth there was in that conjecture.

Bonaparte immediately formed a commission, which was directed to repair to the ports of the Mediterranean, and to prepare there all the means of transport. This commission was entitled, the commission for arming the coasts of the Mediterranean. It knew no more than other people the object of the armament. The secret was confined to Bonaparte and the five directors. As great preparations were making in all the ports at once, it was supposed that the armament in the Mediterranean was connected with that going forward in the ports of the Atlantic. The army assembling on the coast of the Mediterranean was called the left wing of the army of England.

Bonaparte now fell to work with that extraordinary activity which he displayed in the execution of all his plans. Running by turns to the ministers of war, of the marine, and of the finances, and from the ministers to the treasury, seeing with his own eyes to the execution of the orders, using his ascendancy to hasten their despatch, corresponding with all the ports, with Switzerland, with Italy, he caused every preparation to be made with incredible rapidity.* He fixed upon four points for the assemblage of convoys and of troops. The principal convoy was to sail from Toulon, the second from Genna, the third from Ajaccio, the fourth from Civita Vecchia. He ordered the detachments of the army of Italy, which were returning to France, to march towards Toulon and Genoa, and one of the divisions, which had been to Rome, to proceed to Civita Vecchia. He caused contracts to be made both in France and Italy with captains of merchantmen, and thus procured four hundred vessels in the ports which were to serve as points of departure. He collected a numerous artillery; he picked out two thousand five hundred of the best cavalry and had them put on board

* "Bonaparte exerted himself night and day in the execution of his projects. I never saw him so active. He made himself acquainted with the abilities of the respective generals, and the force of all the army corps. Orders and instructions succeeded each other with extraordinary rapidity. If he wanted an order of the Directory, he ran to the Luxembourg to get it signed by one of the directors. Napoleon it was who organized the army of the East, raised money, and collected ships; and it was he who conceived the idea of joining to the expedition men distinguished in science and art, and whose labours have made known, in its present and past state, a country, the very name of which is never pronounced without exciting grand recollections."—*Bourrienne*. E

without horses, because he intended to mount them at the expense of the Arabs. He resolved to take with him nothing but saddles and harness. He ordered only three hundred horses to be embarked, that on his arrival he might have a few mounted cavalry and harnessed guns. He collected artisans of all kinds. He brought from Rome the Greek and Arabic printing types of the Propaganda, and a company of printers; he formed a complete collection of philosophical and mathematical instruments. The men of science, the artists, the engineers, the draughtsmen, the geographers, whom he took with him, amounted to about one hundred persons. The names of the most illustrious were associated with his enterprise; Monge, Berthollet, Fourier, and Dolomieu, accompanied the expedition, so did also Desgenettes, Larrey, and Dubois. Every one was eager to attach himself to the fortune of the young general. They knew not to what quarter they were bound, but were all ready to accompany him no matter whither. Desaix had gone, during the negotiations at Udine, to visit the fields of battle which had become so celebrated in Italy. From that time he had contracted a friendship with Bonaparte, and he wished to go with him. Kleber was at Chaillot, grumbling, as usual, at the government, and resolved not to solicit any appointment. He frequently called to see the great master of the art of which he was passionately fond. Bonaparte asked him to accompany him. Kleber assented with joy. "But," said he, "how will the *lawyers* like it?" meaning the directors. Bonaparte undertook to remove all obstacles. "Well," said Kleber, who supposed that they were bound for England, "if you throw a fireship into the Thames, put Kleber on board her, and you shall see what he will do." To these two first-rate generals, Bonaparte added Reynier, Dugua, Vaubois, Bon, Menou,* Baraguay-d'Hilliers, Lannes, Murat, Belliard, and Dommartin, who had already so ably seconded him in Italy. The brave and accomplished Caffarelli-Dufalga, who had lost a leg on the Rhine, commanded the engineers. The weak but convenient Berthier was to be the chief of the staff. Detained by a violent passion, he had nearly forsaken the general who had made his fortune. Ashamed of himself, he excused his conduct, and hastened to embark at Toulon. Brueys commanded the squadron, and under him the Rear-admirals, Villeneuve, Blanquet-Duchayla, and Decrès. Gantheaume was the chief of the naval staff. Thus all the most illustrious men in war, in science, and in the arts, that France could produce, hastened, with implicit confidence in the young general, to embark for an unknown destination.

France and Europe rang with rumours of the preparations making in the Mediterranean. Conjectures of all kinds were formed. "Whither is Bonaparte bound?" was the universal question. "Whither are those brave officers, those scientific men, that army, going?"—"They are going," said some, "to the Black Sea, to restore the Crimea to the Porte."—"They are going to India, to assist Tippoo Saib," replied others. Some, coming near the mark, maintained that they were going to cut a canal across the Isthmus of Suez, or to land on the shore of the isthmus, and to embark again in the Red Sea for India. Others, hitting the mark itself, said that they were going to Egypt. A memoir read in the preceding year to the Institute, furnished a ground for this conjecture. Lastly, the most sagacious supposed a much more profound combination. In their opinion

* "Menou, anxious to justify his conduct at Paris on the 13th of Vendémiaire entreated to be allowed to join the army of the East."—*Thibaudeau*. E.

all these preparations, which seemed to indicate a plan of colonization were only a feint. Bonaparte intended merely to pass with the Mediterranean squadron through the Strait of Gibraltar, to attack Lord St. Vincent, who was blockading Cadiz, to drive him off, to release the Spanish squadron, and to take it to Brest, where the so much desired junction of all the navies of the continent would be effected. It was for this reason that the Mediterranean expedition was called the left wing of the army of England.

This last conjecture was the very one which predominated in the mind of the English cabinet. It had been for six months past in a state of alarm, and knew not on which side the storm that had been so long gathering, would break. In this anxiety, the opposition had, for a moment, joined the ministry, and made common cause with it. Sheridan had directed his eloquence against the ambition, the encroaching turbulence, of the French people, and acceded on all points, excepting the suspension of the Habeas Corpus, to the proposals of the minister. Pitt had immediately ordered a second squadron to be equipped. Extraordinary efforts were made to send it to sea, and it was reinforced with ten sail of the line from Lord St. Vincent's fleet, to enable it to close the Strait, for which Bonaparte was expected to steer. Nelson* was detached with three sail by Lord St. Vincent, to cruise in the Mediterranean, and to watch the course of the French.

Everything was ready for embarkation. Bonaparte was on the point of setting out for Toulon, when a scene occurred at Vienna, and the dispositions manifested by several cabinets had well-nigh detained him in Europe. The foundation of two new republics had excited the utmost apprehension of revolutionary contagion. England, with a view to foment this fear, had filled all the courts with her emissaries. She urged the new King of Prussia to relinquish his neutrality, and to preserve Germany from the inundation; she endeavoured to work upon the wrong-headed and violent Emperor Paul; she strove to alarm Austria on account of the occupation of the chain of the Alps by the French, and offered him subsidies if he would renew the war; she excited the silly passions of the Queen of Naples and Acton. The last mentioned court was more exasperated than ever. It insisted that France should evacuate Rome, or cede to it part of the Roman provinces. Garat, the new ambassador, had displayed to no purpose the greatest moderation. He could no longer endure the ill-treatment of the Neapolitan cabinet. Thus the state of the continent was such as to produce well-grounded apprehensions, and these were further aggravated

* "Horatio Nelson was born in the year 1758, at Burnham Thorpe, in Norfolk, of which parish his father was rector. At the age of twelve he entered the navy as a midshipman, and in 1773, accompanied Commodore Phipps in an expedition to the North Pole. At the commencement of the war with the French republic, he was made commander of the *Agamemnon*. At the siege of Calvi he lost an eye. At the battle off Cape St. Vincent, he displayed great gallantry, for which he was made a Knight of the Bath, Rear-admiral of the Blue, and appointed to the command of the inner squadron at the blockade of Cadiz. In an unsuccessful attack on the town of Santa Cruz, he lost his right arm. His next achievement was the victory of the Nile, which gained him a peerage and a pension of two thousand pounds. His next service was the restoration of the King of Naples, which was accompanied with circumstances of cruelty, attributable to the influence of Lady Hamilton, with whom Nelson was then intimately connected. In 1801, he was employed on the expedition to Copenhagen, and on his return was created a viscount. His last victory was the decisive one off Cape Trafalgar, where he lost his life. His remains were carried to England, and he was magnificently interred in St. Paul's cathedral. Having left no issue by his wife, an earldom was bestowed on his brother, and a sum of money voted by parliament for the purchase of an hereditary estate."—*Encyclopædia Americana*. E.

by an unforeseen circumstance. Bernadotte had been sent to Vienna, to give explanations to the Austrian cabinet and to reside there, though no ambassador had yet been sent by it to Paris. That general, of a restless and susceptible disposition, was an unfit person for the post which he was destined to fill.

On the 14th of April (23d of Germinal), an entertainment was to be given at Vienna in celebration of the equipment of the Vienna volunteers. The reader will recollect the zeal which these volunteers had manifested in the preceding year, and what fate had befallen them at Rivoli and La Favorita. Bernadotte was indiscreet enough to attempt to oppose this entertainment, alleging that it was an insult to France. The emperor very justly replied, that he was sovereign in his own dominions, that France was at liberty to celebrate her victories, but that he too had a right to celebrate the devotedness of his subjects. Bernadotte determined to reply to one festivity by another; he gave, therefore, an entertainment in his hotel, in celebration of one of the victories of the army of Italy, the anniversary of which it was, and hoisted before his door the tricoloured flag, inscribed with the words, *Liberty, Equality*. The populace of Vienna, excited, it is said, by emissaries of the English ambassador, thronged to the hotel of the French ambassador, broke the windows, and committed other disorders. The Austrian ministry hastened to send protection to Bernadotte, and behaved towards him in a very different manner from what the Roman government had done towards Joseph Bonaparte. Bernadotte, whose imprudence had provoked this event, quitted Vienna and proceeded to Rastadt.

The cabinet of Vienna was extremely sorry for this event. It was clear that this cabinet, even supposing it to be inclined to resume arms, would not have begun by insulting our ambassador and provoking hostilities for which it was not prepared. It is certain, on the contrary, that, though highly dissatisfied with France and her recent encroachments, and foreseeing that it should some day have to renew the conflict with her, it was not yet disposed, and deemed its subjects too much exhausted and its means too feeble, to attack anew the republican colossus. It immediately published a disapprobation of the proceeding, and wrote to Bernadotte for the purpose of appeasing him.

The Directory was inclined to view the event at Vienna in the light of a rupture. It immediately sent counter-orders to Bonaparte, and even wished him to set out for Rastadt, to overawe the emperor, and to force him either to give satisfaction or to decide upon war. Bonaparte, annoyed by the stoppage of his plans, would not go to Rastadt, and, judging of the matter more correctly than the Directory, he declared that the circumstance was not so important as it was conceived to be. Austria, in fact, wrote immediately, that she was at length about to send a minister to Paris, in the person of M. de Degelmann; she appeared to dismiss the directing minister Thugut; she intimated that M. de Cobentzel would repair to any place fixed by the Directory, to enter into explanations with an envoy of France concerning the affair of Vienna, and the changes which had taken place in Europe since the treaty of Campo Formio. The storm, therefore, seemed, to have blown over. Besides, the negotiations at Rastadt had made an important advance. After disputing the left bank foot by foot, after insisting on retaining the tract comprised between the Moselle and the Rhine, and afterwards a small territory between the Roer and the Rhine, the deputation of the Empire had at last conceded the whole of the left bank. The line of the Rhine was at length acknowledged as our natural boundary

Another principle, of not less importance, had been admitted—that of indemnifying the dispossessed princes by means of secularizations. But points not less difficult yet remained to be settled—the appropriation of the islands in the Rhine, the conservation of the fortified posts, bridges, and *têtes de pont*, the fate of the monasteries, and of the immediate nobility on the left bank, the payment of the debts of the countries ceded to France, the manner of enforcing the laws of emigration in them, and so forth. These were questions which it was difficult to resolve, especially with German dilatoriness.

Such was the state of the continent. The horizon seemed somewhat clearer, and Bonaparte at length obtained permission to set out for Toulon. It was agreed that M. de Talleyrand should start immediately afterwards for Constantinople, in order to gain the assent of the Porte to the expedition to Egypt.

THE DIRECTORY.

EXPEDITION TO EGYPT—DEPARTURE FROM TOULON; ARRIVAL OFF MALTA; CONQUEST OF THAT ISLAND—DEPARTURE FOR EGYPT; LANDING AT ALEXANDRIA; CAPTURE OF THAT PLACE—MARCH FOR CAIRO; BATTLE OF CHEBREISS; BATTLE OF THE PYRAMIDS; OCCUPATION OF CAIRO—ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS OF BONAPARTE IN EGYPT; ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEW COLONY—NAVAL ENGAGEMENT OF ABOUKIR; DESTRUCTION OF THE FRENCH FLEET.

BONAPARTE arrived at Toulon on the 20th of Floreal, year VI (May 9, 1798). His presence rejoiced the army, which began to murmur and to fear that he would not be at the head of the expedition. It was the old army of Italy. It was rich, covered with glory, and one might say of it that *its fortune was made*. Hence it had much less zeal for making war, and it required all the enthusiasm with which the general inspired it, to induce it to embark and proceed to an unknown destination. Nevertheless, on seeing him at Toulon, it was inflamed with ardour. It was eight months since it had seen him. Bonaparte, without acquainting it with its destination, addressed to it the following proclamation :

“Soldiers !

“You are one of the wings of the army of England; you have waged war in mountains, in plains, at sieges; you have still to wage maritime war

“The Roman legions, which you have sometimes imitated, but not yet equalled, combated Carthage by turns on the sea and on the plains of Zama. Victory never forsook them, because they were constantly brave, patient in enduring fatigue, well disciplined, and united together.

“Soldiers, the eyes of Europe are upon you! You have great destinies to fulfil, battles to fight, dangers and hardships to surmount; you will do more than you have yet done for the prosperity of your country, the happiness of mankind, and your own glory.

“Soldiers, seamen, infantry, artillery, cavalry, be united: recollect that on the day of battle you have need of one another.

“Soldiers, seamen, you have hitherto been neglected; now the greatest solicitude of the republic is for you. You will be worthy of the army of which you form a part.

“The genius of liberty, which had made the republic from her birth the arbitress of Europe, decrees that she shall be so to the most remote seas and nations.”

It was impossible to proclaim an important enterprise in a more worthy manner, and still leave it in the mystery in which it was intended to be enveloped.

The squadron of Admiral Brueys consisted of thirteen sail of the line,

one of which was of 120 guns (L'Orient, which was to carry the admiral and the general), two of 80, and ten of 74. There were, besides, two Venetian ships of 64 guns, six Venetian and eight French frigates, seventy-two brigs, cutters, avisos, gun-boats, and small vessels of all sorts. The transports assembled at Toulon, Genoa, Ajaccio, and Civita Vecchia, amounted to four hundred. They formed thus five hundred sail, which were to float at once upon the Mediterranean. Never had such an armament put to sea. The fleet carried about forty thousand men of all arms, and ten thousand seamen. It had water for one month and provisions for two.

It sailed on the 30th of Floreal (May 19), amid the thunders of the cannon and the cheers of the whole army.* Violent gales did some damage to a frigate on leaving the port. Nelson, who was cruising with three sail of the line, suffered so severely from the same gales that he was obliged to bear up for the island of St. Pierre to refit. He was thus kept at a distance from the French fleet, and did not see it pass. It steered first towards Genoa to join the convoy collected in that port, under the command of General Baraguay d'Hilliers. It then sailed for Corsica, to call for the convoy at Ajaccio, commanded by Vaubois, and afterwards proceeded into the sea of Sicily to join the division of Civita Vecchia, under the command of Desaix. Bonaparte's intention was to stop at Malta, and there to make by the way a bold attempt, the success of which he had long since prepared by secret intrigues. He meant to take possession of that island, which, commanding the navigation of the Mediterranean, became important to Egypt, and could not fail soon to fall into the hands of the English, unless they were anticipated.

The order of the Knights of Malta was like all the institutions of the middle ages. It had lost its object, and with that its dignity and its strength. It was now nothing but an abuse, profitable only to those who were partners in it. The Knights possessed considerable estates in Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, and Germany, conferred on them by pious Catholics to enable them to protect Christians going on pilgrimage to the holy places. Now that there had ceased to be pilgrimages of this kind, the duty of the knights was to protect the Christian nations against the Barbary states, and to destroy the infamous pirates who infested the Mediterranean. The property of the order was sufficient to maintain a considerable naval force; but the knights took no pains to form one: they had but two or three old frigates and a few galleys, which went to give and receive entertainments in the ports of Italy. The bailiffs and the commanders, spread over all Christendom, consumed in luxury and indolence the revenues of the order. There was not a knight who had ever been engaged with the Barbary corsairs. Hence the order excited no interest whatever. In France, its possessions had been taken from it, and Bonaparte had caused them to be seized in Italy, and no remonstrance had been made in its behalf. We have seen that Bonaparte had already taken care to form secret connexions in Malta. He had gained some of the knights, and he purposed to intimi-

* "One of the last acts of Napoleon before embarking was to issue a humane proclamation to the military commissioners of the ninth division, in which Toulon was situated, in which he severely censured the cruel application of one of the harsh laws of the 19th of Fructidor to old women above seventy years of age, children in infancy, and women with child, who had been seized and shot for violating that tyrannical edict. This interposition gave universal satisfaction, and added another laurel of a purer colour to those which already encircled the brows of the general."—*Alison*. E.

date them by a bold stroke, and to oblige them to surrender, for he had neither time nor means for a regular attack against a fortress reputed to be impregnable. The order, which had for some time foreboded its danger, on seeing the French squadrons predominant in the Mediterranean, had placed itself under the protection of the Emperor Paul.

Bonaparte made great efforts to join the division from Civita Vecchia; but this he could not accomplish till he was off Malta. The five hundred French sail came in sight of the island on the 21st of Prairial (June 9), twenty-two days after leaving Toulon. This sight filled the city of Malta with consternation. Bonaparte, in order to have a pretext for stopping, and to give rise to a cause of contention, applied to the grand-master for leave to take in water. The grand-master, Ferdinand de Hompesch, replied by a peremptory refusal, alleging that the rules of the order forbade the entry of more than two ships belonging to belligerent powers. The English had been received in a different manner when they appeared. Bonaparte declared that this was a proof of the most decided malice, and immediately ordered a landing. On the following day, the 22d of Prairial (June 10), the French troops landed on the island, and completely invested La Valetta, which contains a population of nearly thirty thousand souls, and is one of the strongest fortresses in Europe. Bonaparte ordered artillery to be landed, for the purpose of cannonading the forts. The knights returned his fire, but very feebly. They resolved to make a sortie, but a great number of them were taken. Disorder then ensued in the place. Several knights of the French tongue declared that they could not fight against their countrymen. Some of them were thrown into dungeons. All were dismayed. The inhabitants clamoured for surrender. The grand-master, who possessed little energy, and recollected the generosity of the conqueror of Rivoli at Mantua, hoping to save his interest from shipwreck, released one of the French knights whom he had thrown into prison, and sent him to Bonaparte to negotiate. The treaty was soon concluded. The knights gave up to France the sovereignty of Malta and the dependent islands: in return, France promised her interference at the congress at Rastadt to obtain for the grand-master a principality in Germany, in default of which, she promised him a life annuity of 300,000 francs, and an indemnity of 600,000 francs in ready money. She granted to each knight of the French tongue a pension of 700 francs, and 1000 if they were sixty years of age; she promised her mediation, with a view that those of the other tongues might be put in possession of the estates belonging to the order in their respective countries. Such were the conditions by means of which France gained possession of the best harbour in the Mediterranean, and one of the strongest in the world.* It required the ascendancy of Bonaparte to obtain it without fighting; it required his daring to venture to lose some days there, with the English in pursuit of him. Caffarelli-Dufalga, as witty as he was brave, when going over the place and admiring the fortifications, used this expression: "We are extremely lucky that there was somebody in the place to open the gates for us."

* "Napoleon said to one of the companions of his exile at St. Helena, 'Malta certainly possesses immense physical, but no moral means of resistance. The knights did nothing disgraceful. They could not hold out against impossibility.' No, but they yielded themselves. The successful capture of Malta was assured before the fleet quitted Toulon."—*Bourrienne*. E.

"The grand-master, on quitting the island which he had not had the courage to defend, disgraced himself by kissing the hand of the conqueror who had despoiled him of his dominions."—*Thibaudeau*. E.

Bonaparte left Vaubois at Malta with a garrison of three thousand men. He placed Regnault de St. Jean-d'Angely, there in quality of civil commissioner. He made all the administrative regulations that were necessary for the establishment of the municipal system in the island, and set sail immediately for the coast of Egypt.

He weighed anchor on the 1st of Messidor (June 19), after a stay of ten days. The essential point now was, not to fall in with the English. Nelson, having refitted at the islands of St. Pierre, had received from Lord St Vincent a reinforcement of ten sail of the line and several frigates, which composed a squadron of thirteen sail of the line and some vessels of an inferior class. He had returned on the 13th of Prairial (June 1) off Toulon, but the French squadron had been gone twelve days. He had run from Toulon to the roads of Tagliamon, and from the roads of Tagliamon to Naples, where he had arrived on the 2d of Messidor (June 20), at the very moment when Bonaparte was leaving Malta. Learning that the French had been seen off Malta, he followed, determined to attack them, if he could overtake them.

The French, on board the whole squadron, were ready for battle. The possibility of falling in with the English was present to every mind, but excited no apprehension. Bonaparte had put on board each ship of the line five hundred picked men, who were daily exercised in working the guns, and at the head of whom was one of those generals so accustomed to stand fire under his command. He had made it a principle in maritime tactics that each ship was to have but one aim, that of closing with another, fighting, and boarding her. Orders were issued in consequence, and he reckoned upon the bravery of the picked troops distributed among the ships. These precautions taken, he calmly steered for Egypt. This man, who, according to absurd detractors, was afraid of the hazards of the sea, resigned himself with composure to fortune amidst the English squadrons, and had had the hardihood to tarry some days at Malta to conquer that island. Mirth prevailed on board the fleet. They knew not precisely whither they were bound, but the secret began to transpire, and they waited with impatience to get sight of the shores which they were going to conquer. In the evening, the men of science and the general officers on board L'Orient assembled in the cabin of the general-in-chief, and there commenced the ingenious and learned discussions of the Institute of Egypt.* At one moment, the English squadron was only a few leagues

* "During the whole voyage, Napoleon passed the greatest part of his time below in the cabin, reclining upon a couch which, by a ball and socket joint at each foot, rendered the ship's pitching less perceptible, and consequently relieved the sickness from which he was scarcely ever free. His remarkable saying to the pupils of a school which he one day visited, 'Young people, every hour of time is a chance of misfortune for future life,' may be considered in some measure as forming the rule of his own conduct. Perhaps no man ever better understood the value of time. If the activity of his mind found not wherewithal to exercise itself in reality, he supplied the defect by giving free scope to imagination, or in listening to the conversation of the learned men attached to the expedition. He delighted in discoursing with Monge and Berthollet, when the conversation mostly ran upon chemistry, mathematics, and religion, as also with Caffarelli, whose conversation, rich in facts, was at the same time lively and intellectual. At other times he conversed with the admiral, when the subject always related to naval manœuvres, of which he showed great desire to obtain knowledge, and nothing more astonished Brueys than the sagacity of his questions. I was almost always with him in his cabin, where I read to him some of his favourite works which he had selected for his camp library. He seldom rose before ten o'clock in the morning. The Orient had the appearance of a populous town from which women had been excluded: and this floating

distant from the immense French convoy, and neither party was aware of it. Nelson began to suppose that the French were bound for Egypt, made sail for Alexandria, and arrived there before them;* but, not finding them, he flew to the Dardanelles to seek them there. By singular good luck, it was not till two days afterwards that the French expedition came in sight of Alexandria, on the 13th of Messidor (July 1). It was very nearly six weeks since it sailed from Toulon.

Bonaparte immediately sent on shore for the French consul. He learned that the English had made their appearance two days before, and, supposing them to be not far off, he resolved that very moment to attempt a landing. It was impossible to enter the harbour of Alexandria, for the place appeared disposed to defend itself: it became necessary, therefore, to land at some distance on the neighbouring coast, at a creek called the Creek of the Marabou. The wind blew violently and the sea broke with fury over the reefs on the shore. It was near the close of day. Bonaparte gave the signal, and resolved to go on shore immediately. He was the first to get into the long boat. The soldiers loudly insisted on accompanying him to land. The boats began to be hoisted out, but the sea ran so high that they were in danger of being dashed every moment against one another. At length, after great dangers, they reached the shore. At that moment a sail appeared on the horizon. It was supposed to be an English ship. "O

city was inhabited by two thousand individuals, amongst whom were a great number of distinguished men, several of whom Napoleon invited every day to dine with him. When the weather was fine he went up to the quarter-deck, which, from its extent, formed a grand promenade. I recollect that when walking the quarter-deck with him while we were in the sea of Sicily, I thought I could see the summits of the Alps lighted by the setting sun. Bonaparte laughed much, and joked me about it. He called Brueys, who took his telescope, and soon confirmed my conjecture. The Alps! At the mention of that word by the admiral, I think I can see Bonaparte still. He stood for a long time motionless, and then bursting from his trance, exclaimed, 'No! I cannot behold the land of Italy without emotion. Those mountains command the plains where I have so often led the French to victory. With them, we will conquer again.' One of Napoleon's greatest pleasures during the voyage was, after dinner, to fix upon three or four persons to support a proposition, and as many to oppose it. He always gave out the subjects to be discussed, which most frequently turned upon questions of religion, the different kinds of argument, and the art of war. No country came under Bonaparte's observation without recalling historical recollections to his mind. On passing the island of Candia his imagination was excited, and he spoke with enthusiasm of ancient Crete and the Colossus, whose fabulous renown has surpassed all human glories. The ingenious fables of mythology likewise occurred to his mind, and imparted to his language something of a poetical, and I may say, of an inspired character. The sight of the kingdom of Minos led him to reason on the laws best calculated for the government of nations, and the birthplace of Jupiter suggested to him the necessity of a religion for the mass of mankind. The musicians on board the Orient sometimes played matins; but only between decks, for Napoleon was not yet sufficiently fond of music to have it in his cabin. It is scarcely possible that some accidents should not occur during a long voyage. On these occasions nothing was more remarkable than the humanity of the man who has since been so prodigal of the blood of his fellow-creatures on the field of battle. When any individual fell into the sea, the general-in-chief was in a state of agitation till he was saved. He ordered me to reward those who ventured their lives in this service."—*Bourrienne*. E.

* "The first news of the enemy's armament was, that it had surprised Malta. Nelson formed a plan for attacking it while at anchor at Gozo, but intelligence reached him that the French had left that island the day after their arrival. It was clear that their destination was eastward—he thought for Egypt—and for Egypt, therefore, he made all sail. When he arrived off Alexandria, the enemy were not there, neither was there any account of them. Nelson then shaped his course to the northward for Caramania, and steered from thence along the southern side of Candia, carrying a press of sail, both night and day, with a contrary wind. It would have been his delight, he said, to have tried Bonaparte on a wind."—*Southey's Life of Nelson*. E.

Fortune," exclaimed Bonaparte, "dost thou desert me! What! not five days only!" Fortune did not desert him, for it was a French frigate which was rejoining the fleet. With great difficulty, four or five thousand men were landed in the course of the evening and the night. Bonaparte resolved to march forthwith for Alexandria, in order to surprise the place, and not to allow the Turks time to make preparations for defence. The troops instantly commenced their march. Not a horse was yet landed; the staff, Bonaparte, and Caffarelli himself, notwithstanding his wooden leg, had to walk four or five leagues over the sands, and came at daybreak within sight of Alexandria.

That ancient city, the creation of Alexander, no longer possessed its magnificent edifices, its innumerable houses, and its immense population. Three-fourths of it were in ruins. The Turks, the wealthy Egyptians, the European merchants, dwelt in the modern town, which was the only part preserved. A few Arabs lived among the ruins of the ancient city: an old wall, flanked by towers, enclosed the new and the old town, and all around extended those sands which in Egypt are sure to advance wherever civilization recedes.

The four thousand French led by Bonaparte arrived there at daybreak. Upon this sandy beach they met with a few Arabs only, who, after firing a few musket-shot, fled to the desert. Bonaparte divided his men into three columns. Bon, with the first, marched on the right towards the Rosetta gate; Kleber, with the second, marched in the centre towards the gate of the Pillar; Menou, with the third, advanced on the left towards the gate of the Catacombs. The Arabs and the Turks, excellent soldiers behind a wall, kept up a steady fire, but the French mounted with ladders and got over the old wall. Kleber was the first who fell, struck by a ball on the forehead. The Arabs were driven from ruin to ruin, as far as the new town. The combat seemed likely to be continued from street to street, and to become sanguinary,* when a Turkish captain served as a mediator for negotiating an arrangement. Bonaparte declared that he had not come to ravage the country or to wrest it from the Grand Signor, but merely to deliver it from the domination of the Mamelukes, and to revenge the outrages which they had committed against France. He promised that the authorities of the country should be upheld, that the ceremonies of religion should continue to be performed as before, that property should be respected, and so forth. On these conditions, the resistance ceased. On that same day the French were masters of Alexandria. Meanwhile, the rest of the army had landed. The next points that demanded attention were to place the squadron in safety, either in the harbour or in one of the neighbouring roads; to form at Alexandria an administration adapted to the manners of the country; and to lay down a plan of invasion for gaining possession of Egypt. For the moment, the dangers of the sea and of a meeting with the English were over; the greatest obstacles were surmounted with that success which seems always to attend the youth of a great man.

Egypt, in which we had just landed, is the most singular country, the best situated, and one of the most fertile in the world. Its position is well known. Africa is united to Asia only by an isthmus a few leagues across,

* "Repulsed on every side, the Turks betake themselves to God and their Prophet, and fill their mosques. Men, women, old and young, children at the breast—all are massacred. At the end of four hours the fury of our troops ceases."—*General Boyer's Correspondence*. E.

called the Isthmus of Suez, and which, if cut through, would give access from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, and relieve navigators from the necessity of traversing immense distances and doubling amidst storms the Cape of Good Hope. Egypt lies parallel to the Red Sea and the Isthmus of Suez. She is mistress of that isthmus. It was this country which, in the time of the ancients and in the middle ages, during the prosperity of the Venetians, was the channel of the commerce of India. Such is its situation between the East and the West. Its physical constitution and form are not less extraordinary. The Nile, one of the largest rivers in the world, has its source in the mountains of Abyssinia, runs six hundred leagues through the deserts of Africa, then enters, or rather tumbles into Egypt, throwing itself down the cataracts of Syene, and, after a course of two hundred leagues more, falls into the sea. Its banks constitute the whole of Egypt. It is a valley two hundred leagues in length and five or six in breadth. On either side it is bordered by an ocean of sand. Several chains of hills, low, dry, and rugged, hardly break the dull uniformity of these sands, and scarcely throw a shadow over their immensity. Some separate the Nile from the Red Sea, others form the great desert, in which they are lost. On the left bank of the Nile, at a certain distance in the desert, wind two stripes of land capable of cultivation, which form an exception to the sands, and are covered with some verdure. These are islands of vegetation amidst an ocean of sand. They are called *Oases*. There are two, the great and the little. An effort of man, by diverting thither a branch of the Nile, would transform them into fertile provinces. Fifty leagues from the sea, the Nile divides into two branches, which fall, at the distance of sixty leagues asunder, under the Mediterranean, the one at Rosetta, the other at Damietta. The Nile was formerly known to have seven mouths. They may still be perceived, but only two of them are now navigable. The triangle formed by its two great branches and the sea measures sixty leagues at its base and fifty on the sides. It is called the Delta. It is the most fertile part of Egypt, because it is the best watered and most intersected by canals. The country is divided into three parts, the Delta or Lower Egypt, which is called Bahireh; Middle Egypt, called Westanieh; and Upper Egypt, called the Saïd.

The Etesian winds, blowing in a constant manner from north to south, during the months of May, June, and July, drive before them all the clouds formed at the mouth of the Nile, suffer not one to hover over that ever serene country, and carry them towards the mountains of Abyssinia. There these clouds gather, descend in rain, during the months of July, August, and September, and produce the celebrated phenomenon of the inundation of the Nile. Thus this land receives from the overflowing of the river that water which does not descend upon it from the heavens. It never rains; and the marshes of the Delta, which would be pestilential beneath the sky of Europe, produce in Egypt not a single fever. The Nile, after its inundation, leaves a fertile mud, which is the only soil susceptible of cultivation on its banks, and produces those abundant harvests which of old were appropriated to the subsistence of Rome. The farther the inundation extends, the greater is the area of the soil fit for cultivation. The owners of this soil, levelled every year by the waters, divide it among them every year by measurement. Hence land-surveying is an important art in Egypt. The inundation might be extended by means of canals, which would also have the advantage of diminishing the rapidity of the waters, of making them stay a longer time, and of spreading fertility at the

expense of the desert. Nowhere would the labour of man be productive of more salutary effects; nowhere would civilization be more desirable. The Nile and the desert dispute Egypt between them, and it is civilization that would furnish the Nile with the means of conquering the desert, and confining it within narrower bounds. It is believed that Egypt formerly supported twenty millions of inhabitants, exclusively of the Romans.* When the French arrived there, it was scarcely capable of subsisting three millions.

The inundation ends some time in September. The agricultural operations then commence. In October, November, December, January, and February, the country in Egypt exhibits a delicious spectacle of fertility and luxuriance. It is then covered with the richest crops, enamelled with flowers, and studded with immense herds and flocks. In March, the hot season commences; deep clefts open in the ground, so that it is sometimes dangerous to ride over it on horseback. The rural labours are then over. The Egyptians have harvested all the productions of the year. Besides corn, Egypt produces the best rice, the finest vegetables, sugar, indigo, senna, cassia, natron, flax, hemp, cotton, and all these in marvellous abundance. It has no oil, but this it obtains on the opposite coasts of Greece: neither does it grow tobacco or coffee, but these it finds by its side in Syria and Arabia. It is also destitute of wood, for the larger vegetables have not a sufficient depth of soil in the annual mud deposited by the Nile upon a sub-soil of gravel. Sycamores and palms are the only trees of Egypt. For want of fuel, the inhabitants burn cow-dung. Egypt rears immense herds. Poultry of all sorts swarms there. It produces those admirable horses, so celebrated all over the world for their beauty, their spirit, their familiarity with their masters; and the useful camel, capable of living without food or drink for several days, whose foot sinks without fatigue in the moving sands, and which serves like a living ship for crossing the sandy sea.

Every year prodigious caravans come to Cairo, meeting like the fleets of both sides of the desert. Some come from Syria and Arabia, others from Africa and the coasts of Barbary. They bring every production peculiar to the countries of the sun, gold, ivory, feathers, inimitable shawls, perfumes, gums, spices of all kinds, coffee, tobacco, wood, and slaves. Cairo becomes a magnificent mart of the most exquisite productions of the globe, of those which the mighty genius of the people of the West will never be able to imitate, because it is the sun which bestows them, and which their delicate taste will always make them covet. Thus the commerce of India is the only one to which the progress of nations will never put an end. There would, therefore, be no need to make Egypt a military post, in order to set about destroying by violence the commerce of the English. It would be sufficient to establish a mart there, with safety, laws, and European commodities, to draw thither the wealth of the world.

The population of Egypt is, like the towns that cover it, a mixture of the wrecks of several nations. Copts, the ancient inhabitants of Egypt, Arabs, who conquered Egypt from the Copts and Turks, the conquerors of the Arabs—such are the races whose remains lead a wretched life in a

* "In ancient times Egypt and Libya were the granary of Rome; and the masters of the world depended for their subsistence on the floods of the Nile. Even at the time of the conquests of the Mahometans, the former is said to have contained twenty millions of souls, including those who dwelt in the adjoining oasis of the desert."—*Alison* E.

land of which they are unworthy. On the arrival of the French, the Copts amounted at most to two hundred thousand. Poor, despised, brutalized, they had devoted themselves, like all the proscribed classes, to the most ignoble occupations. The Arabs formed almost the entire mass of the population. They were descendants of the companions of the Prophet. Their condition was infinitely varied. Some, of high birth, carrying back their pedigree to Mahomet himself, great landed proprietors, possessing some traces of Arabian knowledge, combining with nobility the functions of the priesthood and the magistracy, were, by the title of sheiks, the real grandees of Egypt. In the divans, they represented the country, when its tyrants wished to address themselves to it. In the mosques, they formed a sort of universities, in which they taught the religion and the morality of the Koran, and a little philosophy and jurisprudence. The great mosque of Jemil-Azar was the first learned and religious body in the East. Next to these grandees came the smaller landholders, composing the second and more numerous class of the Arabs; then the great mass of the inhabitants, who had sunk into the state of absolute Helots. These last were hired peasants, cultivating the land by the name of fellahs, and living in abject poverty. There was a fourth class of Arabs, namely, the Bedouins or rovers; these would never attach themselves to the soil; they were the children of the desert. Mounted on horses or camels, driving before them numerous herds of cattle, they wandered about seeking pastures in the Oases, or coming annually to show the stripes of land susceptible of cultivation, situated on the borders of Egypt. Their trade was to escort caravans, or to lend their camels for the purposes of transport. But, faithless robbers, they frequently plundered the merchants whom they escorted, or to whom they lent their camels. Sometimes, even, violating the hospitality granted to them on the margin of the land capable of cultivation, they fell upon the valley of the Nile, which, five leagues in breadth, was easy of access, plundered the villages, and, remounting their horses, carried off their booty in the heart of the desert. Turkish negligence left their ravages almost always unpunished, and made as little opposition to the robbers of the desert as to its sands. These wandering Arabs, divided into tribes on both sides of the valley, amounted to one hundred or one hundred and twenty thousand, and could furnish from twenty to twenty-five thousand horse, brave, but fit only to harass an enemy, not to fight him.

The third and last race was that of the Turks; but it was not more numerous than the Copts; that is to say, it amounted to about two hundred thousand souls at most. It was divided into Turks and Mamelukes. The Turks, who had come since the last conquest of the sultans of Constantinople, were almost all enrolled in the list of the janizaries; but it is well known that in general they got their names inscribed in those lists merely that they might enjoy the privileges of janizaries, and that a very small number of them were really in the service. Very few of them composed the military force of the pacha. This pacha, sent from Constantinople, was the sultan's representative in Egypt; but, escorted only by a few janizaries, he found his authority invalidated by the very precautions which Sultan Selim had formerly taken to preserve it. That sultan, judging that Egypt was likely from its remoteness to throw off the dominion of Constantinople, and that a clever and ambitious pacha might create there an independent empire, devised a counterpoise and instituted a Mameluke soldiery. But, as it is impossible to conquer the physical conditions which render a country dependent or independent of another, instead of the pacha

it was the Mamelukes who had rendered themselves independent of Constantinople and masters of Egypt. The Mamelukes were slaves purchased in Circassia. Selected from among the handsomest boys of the Caucasus, carried young to Egypt, bred in ignorance of their origin, and in the practice of, and a fondness for, arms, they became the bravest and most agile horsemen in the world.* They held it an honour to be without origin, to have been bought at a high price, and to be handsome and brave. They had twenty-four beys, who were their owners and their chiefs. Each of these beys had five or six hundred Mamelukes. It was a herd which they took care to feed, and which they bequeathed sometimes to a son, but more frequently to a favourite Mameluke, who became bey in his turn. Every Mameluke had two fellahs to wait upon him. The entire body consisted of nearly twelve thousand horse, with twenty-four thousand Helots as attendants. They were the real masters and tyrants of the country. They lived either on the produce of the lands belonging to the beys, or on the revenue arising from the numerous taxes imposed in every possible form. The Copts, whom we have already described as engaged in the most ignoble occupations, were their tax-gatherers, their spies, their men of business; for the demoralized are always at the service of the strongest. The twenty-four beys, equal by right, were not so in fact. They made war upon one another, and the strongest, subduing the rest, enjoyed a sovereignty for life. He was wholly independent of the pacha representing the sultan of Constantinople, allowed him at most a sort of nullity at Cairo, and frequently refused him the *miri*, or land-tax, which, representing the right of conquest, belonged to the Porte.

Egypt was, therefore, an absolute feudality, like that of Europe in the middle ages. It exhibited at once a conquered people, a conquering soldiery, in rebellion against its sovereign; and, lastly, an ancient brutalized class, at the service and in the pay of the strongest.

Two beys, superior to the rest, ruled Egypt at this moment. The one, Ibrahim Bey, wealthy, crafty, and powerful; the other, Mourad Bey, intrepid, valiant, and full of ardour. They had agreed upon a sort of division of authority, by which Ibrahim Bey had the civil, and Mourad Bey the military power. It was the business of the latter to fight; he excelled in it, and he possessed the affection of the Mamelukes, who were all eager to follow him.

* "The Mamelukes are an invincible race, inhabiting a burning desert, mounted on the fleetest horses in the world, and full of courage. They live with their wives and children in flying camps, which are never pitched two nights together in the same place. They are horrible savages, and yet they have some notion of gold and silver; a small quantity of it serves to excite their admiration."—*Louis Bonaparte*. E.

"The Mamelukes are admirable horsemen, and the bits in their horses' mouths are so powerful that the most fiery steeds are speedily checked, even at full career, by an ordinary hand. Their stirrups are extremely short, and give the rider great power both in commanding his horse and striking with his sabre; and the pommel and back part of the saddle are so high, that the horseman, though wounded, can scarcely lose his balance; he can even sleep without falling, as he would do in an arm-chair. The horse is burdened by no baggage or provisions, all of which are carried by the rider's servants; while the Mameluke himself, covered with shawls and turbans, is protected from the strokes of a sabre. They are all splendidly armed; in their girdle are always to be seen a pair of pistols and a poniard; from the saddle are suspended another pair of pistols and a hatchet; on one side is a sabre, on the other a blunderbuss, and the servant on foot carries a carbine. They seldom parry with the sword, as their fine blades would break in the collision, but avoid the strokes of their adversary by skill in wheeling their horse, while they trust to his impetus to sever his head from his body, without either cut or thrust."—*Miot*. E.

Bonaparte, who with the genius of the captain united the tact and the address of the founder, and who had, moreover, administered conquered countries enough to have made a particular art of it for himself, immediately perceived the line of policy which he had to pursue in Egypt. He must, in the first place, wrest that country from its real masters, the Mamelukes. It was they whom he had to fight and to destroy by arms and by policy. Besides, he had strong reasons to urge against them, for they had never ceased to ill-treat the French. As for the Porte, it was requisite that he should not appear to attack its sovereignty, but affect, on the contrary, to respect it. In the state to which it was reduced, that sovereignty was not to be dreaded. He could treat with the Porte, either for the cession of Egypt, by granting it certain advantages elsewhere, or for a partition of authority, in which there would be nothing detrimental; for the French, in leaving the pacha at Cairo and transferring to themselves the power of the Mamelukes, would not afford much cause for regret. As for the inhabitants, in order to make sure of their attachment, it would be requisite to gain the real population, namely, that of the Arabs. By respecting the sheiks, by flattering their old pride, by increasing their power, by encouraging a secret desire, which was found in them, as it had been found in Italy, and as it is found everywhere, that of the re-establishment of their ancient country, the Arab country, Bonaparte reckoned upon ruling the land and entirely attaching it to him. By afterwards sparing persons and property, among a people accustomed to consider conquest as conferring a right to murder, pillage, and devastation, he should produce a surprise that would be most advantageous to the French army. If, besides, the French were to respect women and the Prophet, the conquest of hearts would be as firmly secured as that of the soil.

Bonaparte conducted himself agreeably to these conclusions, which were equally just and profound. Endowed with an entirely eastern imagination, it was easy for him to assume the solemn and imposing style which was suited to the Arab race. He drew up proclamations, which were translated into Arabic and circulated in the country. To the pacha he wrote, "The French republic has resolved to send a powerful army to Egypt to put an end to the plunder of the beys, as it has been obliged to do several times during this century against the beys of Tunis and Algiers. Thou, who oughtest to be the ruler of the beys, and whom they, nevertheless, hold at Cairo without authority and without power, thou must view my arrival with pleasure. Thou art, doubtless, already apprized that I am not come to do anything against the Koran or the sultan. Thou knowest that the French nation is the only ally that the sultan has in Europe. Come then to meet me, and curse with me the impious race of the beys." Addressing the Egyptians, Bonaparte made use of these words: "People of Egypt, you will be told that I am come to overthrow your religion. Believe it not. Reply that I am come to restore your rights to you, to punish the usurpers, and that I have a much higher respect than the Mamelukes for God, his Prophet, and the Koran."* Adverting to the tyranny of the Mamelukes, he

* "You will laugh outright, you witlings of Paris, at the Mahometan proclamation of the commander-in-chief. He is proof, however, against all your railery, and the thing itself will certainly produce a most surprising effect."—*Journet's Correspondence*. E.

"Our proclamation to the Egyptians has produced an effect altogether astonishing. The Bedouins, enemies of the Mamelukes, and who, properly speaking, are neither more nor less than intrepid robbers, sent us back, as soon as they had read it, thirty of

said, "Is there a fine estate?—it belongs to the Mamelukes. Is there a beautiful slave, a fine horse, a good house?—all belong to the Mamelukes. If Egypt is their farm, let them produce the lease which God has granted them of it. But God is just and merciful to the people, and he hath ordained that the empire of the Mamelukes shall be put an end to." Referring to the sentiments of the French, he added, "We, too, are true Mussulmans. Was it not we that destroyed the Pope, who said that war must be made upon the Mussulmans? Was it not we who destroyed the Knights of Malta, because those idiots believed that God had decreed that they should make war upon the Mussulmans? Thrice happy those who shall side with us. They shall prosper in their fortune and their rank. Happy they who shall be neuter! They will have time to become acquainted with us, and they will range themselves on our side. But wo, threefold wo, to those who shall arm for the Mamelukes and fight against us! For them there will be no hope; they shall perish."

To his soldiers Bonaparte said, "You are going to undertake a conquest, the effects of which on the civilization and the commerce of the world are incalculable. You will give the surest and the severest blow to England, until you shall have it in your power to strike her death-blow."

"The people with whom we are going to live are Mahometans. The first article of their faith is this: 'There is no God but God, and Mahomet is his prophet.' Do not contradict them. Act towards them as you have acted towards the Jews, towards the Italians. Pay respect to their muftis and to their imams, as you have done to the rabbis and to the bishops. Show the same toleration for the ceremonies prescribed by the Koran and for the mosques, as you have done for the convents, for the synagogues, for the religion of Moses, and for that of Jesus Christ.* The Roman legions protected all religions. You will here find customs differing from those of Europe: you must habituate yourselves to them. The people among whom we are come treat women differently from us. Recollect that in every country he who violates is a coward."

"The first city that we shall come to was built by Alexander. We shall meet at every step with glorious recollections, worthy to excite the emulation of Frenchmen."

Bonaparte immediately made his dispositions for establishing the French authority at Alexandria, and for quitting the Delta and gaining possession of Cairo, the capital of Egypt. It was the month of July; the Nile was about to inundate the country. He was anxious to reach Cairo before the inundation, and to employ the time during which it should last in establishing himself there. He ordered everything at Alexandria to be left in the same state as it was; that the religious exercises should be continued; and that justice should be administered as before by the cadis. His intention was merely to possess himself of the rights of the Mamelukes, and to appoint a commissioner to levy the accustomed imposts. He caused a divan, or municipal council, composed of the sheiks and principal persons of Alexandria, to be formed, in order to consult them on all the measures

our people whom they had made prisoners, with an offer of their services against the Mamelukes."—*Louis Bonaparte*. E.

* "The French army, since the Revolution, had practised no sort of worship. In Italy even they never went to church. We took advantage of that circumstance to present the army to the Mussulmans as disposed to embrace their faith. This produced the very best effect, and the people ceased to regard them as idolaters."—*Moo-tolen*. E.

which the French authority would have to take. He left three thousand men in garrison at Alexandria, and gave the command of it to Kléber, whose wound was likely to keep him in a state of inactivity for a month or two. He directed a young officer of extraordinary merit, and who gave promise to France of becoming a great engineer, to put Alexandria in a state of defence, and to construct there all the necessary works. This was Colonel Cretin, who, in a short time, and at a small expense, executed superb works at Alexandria. Bonaparte then ordered the fleet to be put into a place of security. It was a question whether the large ships could enter the port of Alexandria. A commission of naval officers was appointed to sound the harbour and to make a report. Meanwhile, the fleet was anchored in the road of Aboukir. Bonaparte ordered Brueys to see to it, that this question should be speedily decided, and to proceed to Corfu if it should be ascertained that the ships could not enter the harbour of Alexandria.

After he had attended to these points, he made preparations for marching. A considerable flotilla, laden with provisions, artillery, ammunition, and baggage, was to run along the coast to the Rosetta mouth, enter the Nile, and ascend the river at the same time as the French army. He then set out with the main body of the army, which, after leaving the two garrisons in Malta and Alexandria, was about thirty thousand strong. He had ordered his flotilla to proceed as high as Ramanieh, on the banks of the Nile. There he purposed to join it, and to proceed up the Nile parallel with it, in order to quit the Delta and to reach Upper Egypt, or Bahireh. There were two roads from Alexandria to Ramanieh; one through an inhabited country, along the sea-coast and the Nile, the other shorter and as the bird flies, but across the desert of Damanhour. Bonaparte, without hesitation, chose the shorter. It was of consequence that he should reach Cairo as speedily as possible. Desaix marched with the advanced guard. The main body followed at the distance of a few leagues. They broke up on the 18th of Messidor (July 6). When the soldiers found themselves amidst this boundless plain, with a shifting sand beneath their feet, a scorching sun over their head, no water, no shade, with nothing for the eye to rest upon but rare clumps of palm-trees, seeing no living creatures but small troops of Arab horsemen, who appeared and disappeared at the horizon, and sometimes concealed themselves behind sandhills to murder the laggards, they were profoundly dejected.* They had already conceived a liking for

* "As the Hebrews wandering in the wilderness complained, and angrily asked Moses for the onions and fleshpots of Egypt, the French soldiers constantly regretted the luxuries of Italy. In vain were they assured that the country was the most fertile in the world, that it was even superior to Lombardy. How were they to be persuaded of this when they could get neither bread nor wine? We encamped on immense quantities of wheat, but there was neither mill nor oven in the country. The apprehensions of the soldiers increased daily, and rose to such a pitch that a great number of them said there was no great city of Cairo, and that the place bearing that name was a vast assemblage of mere huts, destitute of every thing that could render life comfortable. To such a melancholy state of mind had they brought themselves, that two dragons threw themselves, completely clothed, into the Nile, where they were drowned. The officers complained more loudly than the soldiers, because the comparison was proportionately more disadvantageous to them. In Egypt they found neither the quarters, the good table, nor the luxuries of Italy. The commander-in-chief, wishing to set an example, used to bivouac in the midst of the army, and in the least commodious spots. No one had either tent or provisions. The dinner of Napoleon and his staff consisted of a dish of lentils. The soldiers passed the evening in political conversations, arguments, and complaints. Many of them having observed that wherever there were vestiges of

rest, after the long and obstinate campaigns in Italy. They had accompanied their general to a distant country, because their faith in him was implicit, because he had held forth to them the prospect of a land of promise, from which they should return rich enough to purchase each of them a field of six acres. But when they beheld this desert, their feelings were mingled with disappointment, which was aggravated to despair. They found all the wells, which at intervals border the road through the desert destroyed by the Arabs. There were left only a few drops of brackish water, wholly insufficient for quenching their thirst. They had been informed that they should find refreshments at Damanhour: they met with nothing there but miserable huts, and could not procure either bread or wine, but only lentils in great abundance, and a little water. They were obliged to proceed again into the desert. Bonaparte saw the brave Lannes and Murat themselves, take off their hats, dash them on the sand, and trample them under foot. He, however, overawed all.* His presence imposed silence, and sometimes restored cheerfulness. The soldiers would not impute their sufferings to him; they were angry with those who took pleasure in observing the country. On seeing the men of science stop to examine the slightest ruins, they said that they should not have been there but for them, and revenged themselves with witticisms after their fashion. Caffarelli, in particular, brave as a grenadier, and inquisitive as a scholar, was considered by them as the man who had deceived the general and drawn him into this distant country. As he had lost a leg on the Rhine, they said, "He, for his part, laughs at all this: he has one foot in France." However, after severe hardships, endured at first with impatience, and afterwards with gaiety and fortitude, they reached the Nile on the 22d of Messidor (July 10), after a march of four days. At sight of the Nile and of the water so much longed for, the soldiers flung themselves into it, and bathing in its waves, forgot their fatigues. Desaix's division, which from the advanced guard had become the rear guard, saw two or three hundred Mamelukes galloping before it, whom it dispersed by a few volleys of grape. These were the first that had been seen. They warned the French that they would speedily fall in with the hostile army. The brave Mourad Bey, having received intelligence of the arrival of Bonaparte, was actually collecting his forces around Cairo. Until they should have assembled, he was hovering with a thousand horse about our army, in order to watch its march.

The army waited at Ramanieh for the arrival of the flotilla. It rested till the 25th of Messidor (July 13), and set out on the same day for Chebreiss. Mourad Bey was awaiting us there with his Mamelukes. The flotilla which had set out first and preceded the army, found itself engaged before it could be supported. Mourad Bey had one also; and from the shore he joined his fire to that of his djerms—light Egyptian vessels. The French flotilla had to sustain a very severe combat. Perrée, a naval officer, who commanded it, displayed extraordinary courage; he was supported by the cavalry who had come dismounted to Egypt, and who, until they could

antiquity they were carefully searched, vented their spite in invectives against the scientific men. Whenever they met with an ass, they called him a *ssent*."—*Napoleon's Memoirs*. E.

* "One day Napoleon rushed among a group of discontented generals, and, addressing himself to the tallest, 'You have held mutinous language,' said he, with vehemence, 'and it is not your being six feet high that should save you from being shot in a couple of hours'."—*Las Cases*. E.

equip themselves at the expense of the Mamelukes, had taken their passage by water. Two gun-boats were retaken from the enemy, and he was repulsed. At that moment the army came up; it was composed of five divisions. It had not yet been in action with its singular enemies. To swiftness and the charge of horse, and to sabre-cuts, it would be necessary to oppose the immobility of the foot-soldier, his long bayonet, and masses presenting a front on every side. Bonaparte formed his five divisions into five squares, in the centre of which were placed the baggage and the staff. The artillery was at the angles. The five divisions flanked one another. Mourad Bey flung upon these living citadels a thousand or twelve hundred intrepid horse; who, bearing down with loud shouts and at full gallop, discharging their pistols, and then drawing their formidable sabres, threw themselves upon the front of the squares. Encountering everywhere a hedge of bayonets and a tremendous fire, they hovered about the French ranks, fell before them, or scampered off in the plain at the utmost speed of their horses. Mourad, after losing two or three hundred of his bravest men, retired for the purpose of proceeding to the point of the Delta, and awaiting us near Cairo at the head of all his forces.

This action was sufficient to familiarize the army with this new kind of enemy, and to suggest to Bonaparte the sort of tactics which he ought to employ with them. He pursued his march for Cairo. The flotilla ascended the Nile abreast of the army. It marched without intermission during the following days. The soldiers had fresh hardships to endure, but they kept close to the Nile, and could bathe every night in its waters. The sight of the enemy had revived all their ardour. Those soldiers, already disgusted with fatigue, as is always the case when men have gained glory enough, I found, says Bonaparte, always admirable under fire. During the marches, they frequently relapsed into ill humour, and ill humour was succeeded by pleasantries. The men of science began to command respect by the courage which they displayed. Mongé and Berthollet had shown heroic intrepidity at Chebreiss. The soldiers, though cracking their jokes,* paid them the highest respect. As they could yet see nothing of the capital of Cairo, so highly extolled as one of the wonders of the East, they declared that there was no such place, or that they should find it, like Damanhour, a collection of wretched huts. They said also that the poor general had been imposed upon; and that he had suffered himself to be transported *like a good boy*—himself and his companions in glory. In the evening, when they rested, the soldiers, who had read the tales of the Thousand and One Nights, or heard them related, repeated them to their comrades, and they promised themselves gorgeous palaces glittering with gold. They were still without bread, not from the want of corn, but because there was neither mill nor oven. They ate lentils, pigeons, and an exquisite water-melon, known in southern regions by the name of *pastèque*. The soldiers called it *St. Pastèque*.

The army approached Cairo, and there the decisive battle was to be fought. Mourad Bey had collected the greatest part of his Mamelukes, nearly ten thousand in number. They were attended by double the num-

* "The savans, or scientific men, had been supplied with asses, the beasts of burden easiest attained in Egypt, to transport their persons and philosophical apparatus; and loud shouts of laughter used to burst from the ranks while forming to receive the Mamelukes, when the general of division called out with military precision, 'Let the asses and the savans enter within the square.' The soldiers also amused themselves by calling the asses *demisavans*."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E.

ber of fellahs, to whom arms were given, and who were obliged to fight behind the intrenchments. He had also assembled some thousands of janizaries or spahis, dependent on the pacha, who, notwithstanding Bonaparte's letter, had suffered himself to be persuaded to join his oppressors. Mourad Bey had made preparations of defence on the banks of the Nile. The great capital, Cairo, is seated on the right bank of that river. It was on the opposite bank that Mourad Bey had pitched his camp, in a long plain extending from the river to the pyramids of Giseh, the highest in Egypt. His dispositions were as follows: a large village, called Embabeh, lay with its back towards the river. Mourad Bey had ordered some works there, conceived and executed with all the ignorance of the Turks. They consisted of a mere trench, which encompassed the village with immoveable batteries, the guns of which, having no carriages, could not be displaced. Such was Mourad's intrenched camp. He had there posted his twenty-four thousand fellahs and janizaries, intending to fight there with the accustomed obstinacy of the Turks behind walls. This village, intrenched and supported upon the river, formed his right. His Mamelukes, to the number of ten thousand horse, extended over the plain between the river and the pyramids. Some thousand Arab horse, who came as auxiliaries to the Mamelukes, merely for the sake of plundering and slaughtering in case of victory, filled the space between the Mamelukes and the pyramids. Mourad Bey's colleague, Ibrahim, less warlike and less brave than he, kept on the other side of the Nile, with about a thousand Mamelukes, and with his women, his slaves, and his wealth, ready to quit Cairo and to flee to Syria, if the French should prove victorious. A considerable number of djerms covered the Nile, and were laden with the valuable effects of the Mamelukes. Such was the order in which the two beys awaited Bonaparte.

On the 3d of Thermidor (July 21), the French army set itself in march before daybreak. It knew that it should soon come in sight of Cairo and encounter the enemy. At dawn of day, it at last discovered on its left and on the other side of the river, the lofty minarets of that great capital, and on its right, in the desert, the gigantic pyramids gilded by the sun. At sight of these monuments, it halted, as if seized with curiosity and admiration. The face of Bonaparte beamed with enthusiasm. He began to gallop before the ranks of the soldiers, and pointing to the pyramids, "Consider," he exclaimed, "that from the summits of those pyramids, forty centuries have their eyes fixed upon you!" They advanced at a quick step. They saw, as they approached, the minarets of Cairo shooting up, they saw the pyramids increase in height, they saw the swarming multitude which guarded Embabeh, they saw the glistening arms of the ten thousand horsemen resplendent with gold and steel, and forming an immense line. Bonaparte immediately made his dispositions. The army, as at Chebreiss, was divided into five divisions. Those of Desaix and Regnier formed the right, towards the desert; Dugua's division formed the centre; and Menou's and Bon's formed the left, along the Nile. Bonaparte, who, since the battle at Chebreiss, was capable of judging of the ground and the enemy, made his dispositions accordingly. Each division, as at Chebreiss, formed a square; each square was composed of six ranks. Behind were the grenadier companies in platoons, ready to reinforce the points of attack. The artillery was at the angles. The baggage and the generals were in the centre. These squares were moving. When they were in march, two sides marched upon the flank. When they were charged, they were to halt, in order to front on all sides. Again, when they

were to carry a position, the first ranks were to detach themselves and to form columns of attack, and the others were to remain in rear, still forming the square, but only three deep and ready to rally the columns of attack. Such were the dispositions ordered by Bonaparte. He was afraid lest his impetuous soldiers of Italy, accustomed to advance at the charge step, would find it difficult to resign themselves to that cold and impassable immobility of walls. He had taken pains to prepare them for it. Orders were issued, in particular, not to be in a hurry to fire, to wait coolly for the enemy, and not to fire till he was at the muzzle of the guns.

The army advanced almost within cannon-shot. Bonaparte, who was in the centre square, formed by Dugua's division, examined with a telescope the state of the camp of Embabeh. He saw that the artillery of the camp, not being mounted on carriages, could not be moved into the plain, and that the enemy would not quit the intrenchments. On this circumstance he based his movements. He resolved to bear with his divisions upon the right, that is, upon the corps of the Mamelukes, moving on out of the range of the cannon of Embabeh. His intention was to separate the Mamelukes from the intrenched camp, to surround them, to drive them into the Nile, and not to attack Embabeh till he had got rid of them. After he had destroyed the Mamelukes, it would not be difficult for him to settle matters with the multitude which thronged that camp.

He immediately gave the signal. Desaix, who formed the extreme right, first set himself in march. Next to him came Regnier's square, and then Dugua's, in which was Bonaparte. The two others moved round Embabeh, beyond the range of the cannon. Mourad Bey, who, though uninstructed, was endowed with great natural abilities and extraordinary sagacity, immediately guessed the intention of his adversary, and resolved to charge during this decisive movement. He left two thousand Mamelukes to support Embabeh, and then rushed with the rest on the two squares upon the right. That of Desaix, having got among some palm-trees, was not yet formed when the first horsemen came up to it. But it formed instantaneously, and was ready to receive the charge. It is an enormous mass that is composed of eight thousand horse, galloping all at once in a plain. They bore down with extraordinary impetuosity upon Desaix's division.* Our brave soldiers, who had become as cool as they had formerly been fiery, waited for them calmly, and received them at the muzzle of their guns with a tremendous fire of musketry and grape. Checked by this fire, these innumerable horsemen hovered along the ranks, and galloped around the blazing citadel. Some of the bravest threw themselves on the bayonets, then, turning their horses, and backing them upon our infantry, they succeeded in making a breach, and thirty or forty penetrated to the very centre of the square, where they expired at the feet of Desaix. The

* "It was a terrible sight, capable of daunting the bravest troops, when the immense body of Mameluke cavalry approached at full gallop the squares of infantry. The horse men, admirably mounted and magnificently dressed, rent the air with their cries. The glitter of spears and scimitars dazzled the sight, while the earth groaned under the repeated and increasing thunder of their feet."—*Alison*. E.

"Nothing in war was ever seen more desperate than the charge of the Mameluke cavalry. Failing to force their horses through the French squares, individuals were seen to wheel them round, and rein them back on the ranks, that they might disorder them by kicking. As they became frantic with despair, they hurled at the phalanxes which they could not break, their pistols, their poniards, and their carabines. Those who fell wounded to the ground dragged themselves on, to cut at the legs of the French with their crooked sabres. But their efforts were all vain."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E

mass, facing about, quitted Desaix's square, and fell upon Regnier's, which came next. Being received with the same fire, it returned to the point from which it had started; but it found in its rear Dugua's division, which Bona parte had moved towards the Nile, and was put completely to the route. The enemy then fled in disorder; one part of the fugitives ran off on our right towards the pyramids, another, passing under Dugua's fire, threw itself into Embabeh, carrying confusion along with it. From that moment disorder commenced in the intrenched camp. Bonaparte, perceiving it, ordered his two divisions on the left to approach Embabeh for the purpose of taking it. Bon and Menou advanced under the fire of the intrenchments, and on arriving within a certain distance, they halted. The squares divided; the foremost ranks formed columns of attack, while the others remained in squares resembling real citadels. But, at the same moment, the Mamelukes, as well those whom Mourad had left at Embabeh as those who had fled thither, attempted to anticipate us. They rushed upon our columns of attack while yet in march. But the latter halting immediately, and forming into square with wonderful rapidity, received them with firmness, and killed a great number. Some threw themselves into Embabeh, where the disorder became extreme; others fled to the plain between the Nile and our right, and were shot or driven into the river. The columns made a brisk attack on Embabeh, took it, and threw the multitude of janizaries and fellahs into the Nile. Many were drowned, but, as the Egyptians are excellent swimmers, the greater number contrived to escape. The battle was at an end.* The Arabs who were near the pyramids, and in expectation of a victory, darted off into the desert. Mourad, with the wrecks of his cavalry and his face covered with blood, retired towards Upper Egypt. Ibrahim, who, from the opposite bank, witnessed this disaster, proceeded towards Belbeys, with the intention of retiring to Syria. The Mamelukes immediately set fire to the djerms laden with their valuables. This prize escaped us, and our soldiers saw, during the whole night, the flames consuming a rich booty.

Bonaparte established his head-quarters at Giseh, on the banks of the Nile, where Mourad Bey had a superb residence.† Considerable stores of provisions were found as well at Giseh as at Embabeh; and our soldiers could make themselves amends for their long privations. They found vines laden with magnificent grapes in the gardens of Giseh, and these they had soon gathered. But they made a booty of a different kind on the field of battle—this consisted of splendid shawls, beautiful weapons, horses, and purses, containing as many as two or three hundred pieces of gold; for the Mamelukes carried about them all their wealth. They passed the evening,

* "The battle of the Pyramids struck terror far into Asia and Africa. The caravans which came to Mecca from the interior of those vast regions, carried back the most dazzling accounts of the victory of the invincible legions of Europe. The destruction of the cavalry which had so long tyrannized over Egypt, excited the strongest sentiments of wonder and admiration; and the orientals whose imaginations were strongly impressed by the flaming citadels which had dissipated their terrible squadrons, named Napoleon Sultan Kebir, or the Sultan of Fire."—*Alison*. E.

† "About nine in the evening, Napoleon entered the country-house of Murad Bey, at Giseh. We found it difficult to make it serve for our lodging and to understand the distribution of the different apartments. But what most struck the officers was a great quantity of cushions and divans, covered with the finest damasks and silks of Lyons, and ornamented with gold fringe. The gardens were full of magnificent trees, but without allys. The soldiers were particularly delighted with the great arbours of vines which were covered with the finest grapes in the world. The vintage was soon over." *Gourgaud* E.

the night, and the next day, in collecting those spoils. Five or six hundred Mamelukes had been slain, and more than a thousand were drowned in the Nile. The soldiers set about fishing them up out of the river, and spent several more days in this kind of search.

The battle had cost us scarcely a hundred killed and wounded; for if defeat is terrible for broken squares, the loss is insignificant for victorious squares. The Mamelukes had lost their best horsemen by the fire or by the water. Their forces were dispersed, and the possession of Cairo was secured to us. This capital was in extraordinary agitation. It contains more than three hundred thousand inhabitants, and is full of a ferocious and brutal populace, which was indulging in all sorts of excesses, and intending to profit by the tumult to pillage the rich palaces of the beys. Unluckily, the French flotilla had not yet ascended the Nile, and we had no means of crossing to take possession of Cairo. Some French traders who happened to be there, were sent to Bonaparte by the sheiks to arrange concerning the occupation of the city. He procured a few djerms, sent across a detachment which restored tranquillity, and secured persons and property from the fury of the populace. On the next day but one, he entered Cairo, and took possession of the palace of Mourad Bey.

No sooner was he settled in Cairo, than he hastened to pursue the same policy which he had already adopted at Alexandria, and by which he hoped to gain the country. He visited the principal sheiks, flattered them, gave them hopes of the re-establishment of the Arab dominion, promised protection to their religion and customs, and completely succeeded in winning them by a mixture of clever flattery and lofty expressions bearing the stamp of eastern greatness. The essential point was to obtain from the sheiks of the mosque of Jemil-Azar a declaration in favour of the French. It was like a papal brief among Christians. On this occasion, Bonaparte exerted his utmost address, and was completely successful. The great sheiks issued the desired declaration, and exhorted the Egyptians to submit to the envoy of God, who revered the Prophet, and who had come to deliver his children from the tyranny of the Mamelukes. Bonaparte established a divan at Cairo, as he had done at Alexandria, composed of the principal sheiks and the most distinguished inhabitants. This divan, or municipal council, was intended to serve him in gaining the minds of the Egyptians, by consulting it, and learning from it all the details of the internal administration. It was agreed that similar assemblies should be established in all the provinces, and that these subordinate divans should send deputies to the divan of Cairo, which would thus be the great national divan.

Bonaparte resolved to leave the administration of justice to the cadis. In execution of his scheme of succeeding to the rights of the Mamelukes, he seized their property, and caused the taxes previously imposed to continue to be levied for the benefit of the French army. For this purpose, it was requisite that he should have the Copts at his disposal. He omitted nothing to attach them to him, holding out hopes to them of an amelioration of their condition. He sent back generals with detachments down the Nile to complete the occupation of the Delta, which the army had merely reversed. He sent others towards the Upper Nile, to take possession of Middle Egypt.* Desaix was placed with a division at the entrance of Up

* "Bonaparte directed his particular attention to the civil and military organization of the country. Only those who saw him in the vigour of his youth, can form an idea of his extraordinary intelligence and activity. Nothing escaped his observation. The mosques, the civil and religious institutions the harems, the women, the laws and

per Egypt, which he was to conquer from Mourad Bey, as soon as the waters of the Nile should subside with the autumn. Each of the generals, furnished with detailed instructions, was to repeat in the country what had been done at Alexandria and at Cairo. They were to court the sheiks, to win the Copts, and to establish the levy of the taxes, in order to supply the wants of the army.

Bonaparte then turned his attention to the welfare and health of his soldiers. They began to like Egypt. They found there rest, abundance, and a pure and wholesome climate. They became accustomed to the singular manners of the country, and made them an incessant subject of jokes. But, guessing, with their accustomed sagacity, the intention of the general, they affected also a profound reverence for the Prophet, and laughed with him at the part which policy obliged them to play. Bonaparte ordered ovens to be built, that they might have bread. He lodged them in the excellent houses of the Mamelukes, and exhorted them, above all things, to respect the women. They had found in Egypt superb asses, in great numbers. It was a great pleasure to ride about in the environs, and to gallop over the country upon these animals. Their vivacity caused some accidents among the grave inhabitants of Cairo. It became necessary to forbid them to pass too swiftly through the streets. The cavalry was mounted on the finest horses in the world, namely, on the Arabian horses taken from the Mamelukes.

Bonaparte was also attentive to keep up the relations with the neighbouring countries, in order to uphold and to appropriate to himself the rich commerce of Egypt. He appointed the Emir Hadgi. This is an officer annually chosen at Cairo, to protect the great caravan from Mecca. He wrote to all the French consuls on the coast of Barbary, to inform the beys that the Emir Hadgi was appointed, and that the caravans might set out. At his desire, the sheiks wrote to the sherif of Mecca, to acquaint him that the pilgrims would be protected, and that the caravans would find safety and protection. The pacha of Cairo had followed Ibrahim Bey to Belbeys. Bonaparte wrote to him, as well as to the several pachas of St. Jean d'Acre and Damascus, to assure them of the good dispositions of the French towards the Sublime Porte. These last precautions were unfortunately useless; for the officers of the Porte were not to be persuaded that the French, who came to invade one of the richest provinces belonging to their sovereign, were really his friends.

The Arabs were struck by the character of the young conqueror. They could not comprehend how it was that a mortal who wielded the thunderbolt should be so merciful. They called him the worthy son of the Prophet, the favourite of the great Allah. They sang in the great mosque the following litany :

"The great Allah is no longer wroth with us. He hath forgotten our faults; they have been sufficiently punished by the long oppression of the Mamelukes. Let us sing the mercies of the great Allah !

"Who is he that hath saved the Favourite of Victory from the dangers of the sea and the rage of his enemies? Who is he that hath led the brave men of the West safe and unharmed to the banks of the Nile ?

customs of the country—all were scrupulously respected. A few days after they entered Cairo, the French were freely admitted into the shops, and were seen sociably smoking their pipes with the inhabitants, assisting them in their occupations, and playing with their children."—*Bourrienne*. E.

"It is the great Allah, the great Allah, who hath ceased to be wroth with us. Let us sing the mercies of the great Allah !

"The Mameluke beys had put their trust in their horses ; the Mameluke beys had drawn forth their infantry in battle array.

"But the Favourite of Victory, at the head of the brave men of the West, hath destroyed the footmen and the horsemen of the Mamelukes.

"As the vapours which rise in the morning from the Nile are scattered by the rays of the sun, so hath the army of the Mamelukes been scattered by the brave men of the West, because the great Allah is now wroth with the Mamelukes, because the brave men of the West are as the apple of the right eye of the great Allah."

Bonaparte, in order to make himself better acquainted with the manners of the Arabs, resolved to attend all their festivals. He was present at that of the Nile, which is one of the greatest in Egypt. That river is the benefactor of the country. It is, in consequence, held in great veneration by the inhabitants, and is the object of a sort of worship. During the inundation, its water is introduced into Cairo by a great canal ; a dike prevents it from entering the canal until it has attained a certain height ; the dike is then cut, and the day fixed for this operation is a day of rejoicing. The height to which the river has risen is publicly proclaimed, and when there are hopes of a great inundation, general joy prevails, for it is an omen of abundance. It is on the 18th of August (1st of Fructidor) that this festival is held. Bonaparte had ordered the whole army to be under arms, and had drawn it up on the banks of the canal. An immense concourse of people had assembled, and beheld with joy the brave men of the West attending their festivals. Bonaparte, at the head of his staff, accompanied the principal authorities of the country. A sheik first proclaimed the height to which the Nile had risen. It was twenty-five feet, which occasioned great joy. Men then fell to work to cut the dike. The whole of the French artillery was fired at once, at the moment when the water of the river poured in. According to custom, a great number of boats hastened to the canal, in order to obtain the prize destined to that which should first enter it. Bonaparte delivered the prize himself. A multitude of men and boys plunged into the waters of the Nile, from a notion that bathing in them at this moment is attended with beneficial effects. Women threw into them hair and pieces of stuff. Bonaparte then ordered the city to be illuminated, and the day concluded with entertainments. The festival of the Prophet was celebrated with not less pomp. Bonaparte went to the great mosque, seated himself on cushions, cross-legged like the sheiks, and repeated with them the litanies of the Prophet, rocking the upper part of his body to and fro, and shaking his head. All the members of the holy college were edified by his piety.*

* "I never," said Napoleon, "followed any of the tenets of the Mahometan religion. I never prayed in the mosques. I never abstained from wine, nor was circumcised, neither did I ever profess it. I said merely that we were the friends of the Mussulmans, and that I respected their Prophet, which was true ; I respect him now. I told them we were all friends of Mahomet, which they really believed, as the French soldiers never went to church, and had no priests with them, for you must know that, during the Revolution, there was no religion whatever in the army. Menou really turned Mahometan, which was the reason I left him behind."—*A Voice from St. Helena*. E.

"On one occasion Bonaparte had a Turkish dress made, which he once put on, merely in joke. One day he desired me to go to breakfast without waiting for him, and that he would follow me. In about a quarter of an hour he made his appearance in his new costume. As soon as he was recognised, he was received with a loud burst of

He then attended the dinner given by the grand sheik elected in the course of the day.*

It was by such means that the young general, as profound a politician as he was a great captain, contrived to ingratiate himself with the people. While he flattered their prejudices for the moment, he laboured to diffuse among them some day the light of science by the creation of the celebrated Institute of Egypt. He collected the men of science and the artists whom he had brought with him, and, associating with them some of the best educated of his officers, composed that Institute to which he appropriated revenues and one of the most spacious palaces in Cairo.† Some were to occupy themselves in preparing an accurate description and a map of the country, comprehending the most minute details; others were to explore its ruins, and to furnish history with new lights: others, again, were to study the productions, to make observations useful to natural philosophy, natural history, and astronomy; while others were to employ themselves in inquiries concerning the ameliorations that might be made in the condition of the inhabitants, by machines, canals, works upon the Nile, and processes adapted to a soil so singular and so different from that of Europe. If Fortune did subsequently wrest from us that beautiful country, at any rate she could not deprive us of the conquests which science was about to make in it. A monument was preparing which was destined to reflect not less honour on the genius and the perseverance of our men of science, than the expedition on the heroism of our soldiers.

Monge was the first who obtained the presidency. Bonaparte was only the second. He proposed the following subjects: To inquire the best construction of wind and water mills; to find a substitute for the hop, which does not grow in Egypt, for the making of beer; to determine the sites adapted to the cultivation of the vine; to seek the best means of procuring water for the citadel of Cairo; to dig wells in different spots in the desert; to inquire the means of clarifying and cooling the water of the Nile; to devise some useful application of the rubbish with which the city of Cairo, as well as all the ancient towns of Egypt, was encumbered; and to find out materials requisite for the manufacture of gunpowder in Egypt. From these questions, the reader may judge of the bent of the general's mind. The engineers, the draughtsmen, and the men of science, immediately dispersed themselves throughout all the provinces, to commence the

laughter. He sat down very coolly; but he found himself so ill at ease in his turban and oriental robe, that he speedily threw them off, and was never after tempted to resume the disguise."—*Bourrienne*. E.

* "At this grand dinner, guests sat on carpets, with their legs across. There were twenty tables, and five or six people at each table. That of the general-in-chief and the sheik was in the middle; a little slab of a precious kind of wood, ornamented with mosaic work, was placed eighteen inches above the floor, and covered with a great number of dishes in succession. They were pilaus of rice, a particular kind of roast, and pastry—all very highly spiced. The sheiks picked everything with their fingers. Accordingly, water was brought to wash the hands three times during dinner. Gooseberry-water, lemonade, and other sorts of sherbets, were served to drink, and abundance of preserves and confectionary with the dessert. In the evening the whole city was illuminated."—*Memoirs of Napoleon*. E.

† "The Institute of Egypt was composed of members of the French Institute, and of the men of science and artists of the commission who did not belong to that body. They added to their number several officers of the artillery and staff. The Institute was established in one of the palaces of the beys; the garden became a botanical garden; a chemical laboratory was formed at head-quarters; and Berthollet performed experiments there every week, at which Napoleon and a great number of officers attended."—*Memoirs of Napoleon*. E.

description and the map of the country. Such were the first proceedings of this infant colony, and the manner in which its founder directed the operations.

The conquest of the provinces of Lower and Middle Egypt had been effected without difficulty, and had cost only a few skirmishes with the Arabs. A forced march upon Belbeys had been sufficient to drive Ibrahim Bey into Syria. Dessaix awaited the autumn for wresting Upper Egypt from Mourad Bey, who had retired thither with the wreck of his army.

Fortune was, meanwhile, preparing for Bonaparte the most terrible of all reverses. On leaving Alexandria, he had earnestly recommended to Admiral Brueys to secure his squadron from the English, either by taking it into the harbour of Alexandria, or by proceeding with it to Corfu; and he had particularly enjoined him not to leave it in the road of Aboukir, for it was much better to fall in with an enemy when under sail, than to receive him at anchor. A warm discussion had arisen on the question whether ships of 80 or 120 guns could be carried into the harbour of Alexandria. As to the others, there was no doubt; but the two 80 gun ships and that of 120 would require lightening so much as to enable them to draw three feet less water. For this purpose it would be necessary to take out their guns, or to construct floats. On such conditions Admiral Brueys resolved not to take his squadron into the harbour. He conceived that, if he were obliged to adopt such precautions for his three largest ships, he never should be able to get out of the harbour in presence of the enemy, and that he might thus be blockaded by a squadron of very inferior force: he determined, therefore, to proceed to Corfu. But being strongly attached to General Bonaparte, he would not sail before he had received intelligence of his entry into Cairo and his establishment in Egypt. The time which he spent, either in sounding the channels to the harbour, or in waiting for news from Cairo, caused his own destruction, and occasioned one of the most fatal events of the Revolution, and one of those which, at that epoch, had the greatest influence on the destinies of the world.*

Admiral Brueys was moored in the road of Aboukir. That road is a very regular semicircle. Our thirteen ships formed a semicircle parallel to the shore. The admiral, in order to secure his line, had supported it at one extremity upon a small island, called the islet of Aboukir. He conceived that no ship could pass between that islet and his line to take him in the rear, and in that belief he had contented himself with placing there a battery of twelve-pounders, merely to prevent the enemy from landing there. So unassailable did he consider himself on this side, that he had placed his worst ships there. He was under more apprehension concerning the other extremity of his semicircle. On this side he deemed it possible that the enemy might pass between the shore and his line; but there he had placed his largest and best officered ships. An important circumstance contributed to produce a feeling of security: this extremity being to the south, and the wind blowing from the north, an enemy attempting to attack on this side would have the wind in his teeth, and would scarcely persist in fighting under such a disadvantage.

In this situation, protected on his left by an islet, which he deemed

* "The catastrophe of Aboukir came like a thunderbolt on the general-in-chief. In spite of all his energy and fortitude, he was deeply distressed by the disasters which now assailed him. He measured the fatal consequences of the event at a single glance. The total loss of his fleet put an end to all his most romantic visions—one of which was dating an order of the day from the ruins of Memphis."—*Bourriens*. E.

sufficient for barring the road, and on his right by his best ships and by the wind, he awaited in security the intelligence that was to decide his departure.

Nelson, after visiting the Archipelago, and returning to the Adriatic Naples, and Sicily, had at length obtained the certainty of the landing of the French at Alexandria. He immediately steered in that direction, in order to seek and to fight their squadron. He sent a frigate to look out for it, and to reconnoitre its position. This frigate having found it in the road of Aboukir, had the opportunity of examining our line at her leisure. Had the admiral, who had a great number of frigates and light vessels in the harbour of Alexandria, taken the precaution to have a few of them under sail, he might have kept the English aloof, prevented them from observing his line, and been apprized of their approach. Unfortunately, he did nothing of the kind. The English frigate, having made her observations, rejoined Nelson, who, being informed of all the particulars of our position, immediately stood in for Aboukir. He arrived there on the 14th of Thermidor (August 1, 1798), about six in the evening. Admiral Brueys was at dinner. He immediately ordered the signal for battle to be given. But so unprepared was the squadron to receive the enemy, that the hammocks were not stowed away on board any of the ships, and part of the crews were on shore. The admiral despatched officers to send the seamen on board, and to demand part of those who were in the transports. He had no notion that Nelson would dare to attack him the same evening, and conceived that he should have time to receive the reinforcements for which he had applied.

Nelson resolved to attack immediately, and to try a daring manœuvre, which would, he hoped, decide the victory. He resolved to attack our line on the left, that is, the extremity of our line next to the islet of Aboukir, to pass between that islet and our squadron, in spite of the danger of shoals, and thus place himself between the shore and our line. This manœuvre was perilous, but the intrepid Englishman did not hesitate. The number of ships was equal on both sides, namely, thirteen sail of the line. Nelson attacked about eight in the evening. His manœuvre was not at first successful. The Culloden, in attempting to pass between Aboukir islet and our line, grounded on a shoal. The Goliath, which followed her, was more fortunate, and passed; but, owing to the wind, she drifted past our first ship, and could not bring-to till opposite to the third. The Zealous, the Audacious, the Theseus, and the Orion followed the movement, and succeeded in placing themselves between our line and the shore. They advanced as far as the Tonnant, which was our eighth, and thus engaged the whole of our left and centre. Their other ships advanced outside the line, and placed it between two fires. As an attack of this sort was wholly unexpected on board the French squadron, the guns on the side next to the shore were not yet cleared, and our first two ships could fire on one side only: hence one of them was disabled and the other dismantled. But in the centre, where L'Orient, the admiral's ship, was, the firing was tremendous. The Bellerophon, one of Nelson's best ships, had her masts and rigging shot away, and was obliged to fall out of the line. Other English ships dreadfully crippled, were also compelled to quit the battle. Admiral Brueys had received only part of his seamen; he, nevertheless, maintained the fight with advantage; he even hoped, in spite of the success of Nelson's manœuvre, to gain the victory, if the orders which he gave at this moment to his right were executed. The English had engaged only the left and the

centre; our right, composed of our five best ships, had no enemy before it. Admiral Brueys gave it the signal to make sail, and to place itself outside the line of battle. The English ships attacking us from that side would then have been between two fires. The signals were not perceived. In such a case, a lieutenant ought not to hesitate to plunge into danger and to fly to the succour of his commander. Rear-admiral Villeneuve, brave but irresolute, continued motionless, waiting for orders. Our left and our centre remained, therefore, between two fires. The admiral and his captains, nevertheless, performed prodigies of valour, and gloriously sustained the honour of the flag. We had lost two ships; the English also had lost two, one of which was aground and the other dismasted; our fire was superior. The unfortunate Brueys was wounded; he would not leave the deck. "An admiral," said he, "ought to die giving orders." A cannon-ball killed him on his quarter-deck.* About eleven o'clock a fire broke out on board the magnificent ship *L'Orient*. She blew up. This tremendous explosion suspended for a short time this obstinate conflict.† Our five ships engaged, the *Franklin*, the *Tonnant*, the *Peuple Souverain*, the *Spartiate*, and the *Aquilon*, undaunted by the catastrophe, kept up their fire the whole night. There would still have been time for the right to weigh anchor and to come to their assistance. Nelson feared lest this manœuvre should be executed: he was so crippled that he could not have sustained the attack. At length Villeneuve made sail, but to stand out to sea and to save his wing, which he did not think could be risked with advantage against Nelson. Three of his ships threw themselves upon the coast; he escaped with the other two, and two frigates, and sailed for Malta. The engagement had lasted upwards of fifteen hours. All the crews attacked had performed prodigies of valour.‡ The brave captain Du Petit-Thouars

* Napoleon, a short time after the battle, addressed the following interesting letter to Madame Brueys on her husband's death:

"Your husband has been killed by a cannon-ball, while combating on his quarter-deck. He died without suffering—the death the most easy and envied by the brave. I feel warmly for your grief. The moment which separates us from the object we love, is terrible; we feel isolated on earth; we almost experience the convulsions of the last agony; the faculties of the soul are annihilated; its connexion with the earth is preserved only across a veil which distorts everything. We feel in such a situation that there is nothing which still binds us to life; that it were far better to die; but when, after such first and unavoidable throes, we press our children to our hearts, tears and more tender sentiments arise; and life becomes bearable for their sakes. Yes, madam, they will open the fountains of your heart; you will watch their childhood; educate their youth; you will speak to them of their father; of your present grief; and of the loss which they and the republic have sustained in his death. After having resumed your interest in life by the chord of maternal love, you will perhaps feel some consolation from the friendship and warm interest which I shall ever take in the widow of my friend."—*Napoleon's Confidential Correspondence*. E.

† "At ten o'clock *L'Orient* blew up, with an explosion so tremendous, that nothing in ancient or modern war was ever equal to it. Every ship in the hostile fleets was shaken to its centre. The firing, by universal consent, ceased on both sides, and the awful explosion was followed by a silence still more awful. After a pause, however, of ten minutes, the firing recommenced."—*Alison*. E.

"*L'Orient* blew up about eleven o'clock in the evening. The whole horizon seemed on fire; the earth shook; and the smoke which proceeded from the vessel ascended heavily in a mass, like an immense black balloon. It then brightened up, and exhibited the objects of all descriptions which had been precipitated on the scene of conflict. What a terrible moment of fear and desolation for the French who witnessed this awful catastrophe!"—*Louis Bonaparte*. E.

‡ "The crews of the French fleet all fought with the enthusiastic courage which is characteristic of their nation. *Casa Bianca*, captain of *L'Orient*, fell mortally wounded, when the flames were devouring that splendid vessel; his son, a boy ten years of age

had two of his limbs shot off. He ordered snuff to be brought him, remained on his quarter-deck, and, like Brueys, waited till a cannon-ball despatched him. Our whole squadron, excepting the two ships and two frigates, carried off by Villeneuve, was destroyed. Nelson had suffered so severely that he could not pursue the fugitives.

Such was the famous battle of Aboukir, the most disastrous that the French had yet sustained, and the one the military consequences of which were destined to prove the most prejudicial. The fleet which had carried the French to Egypt, which might have served to succour or to recruit them, which was to second their movements on the coast of Syria, had there been any to execute, which was to overawe the Porte, to force it to put up with false reasoning, and to oblige it to wink at the invasion of Egypt, which finally, in case of reverse, was to convey the French back to their country—that fleet was destroyed.* The French ships were burned, but they had not been burned by themselves, a circumstance which made a vast difference in regard to the moral effect resulting from it. The news of this disaster spread rapidly in Egypt, and for a moment filled the army with despair. Bonaparte received the tidings with imperturbable composure. "Well," said he, "we must die in this country, or get out of it as great as the ancients." He wrote to Kleber, "This will oblige us to do greater things than we intended. We must hold ourselves in readiness." The great soul of Kleber was worthy of this language: "Yes," replied Kleber, "we must do great things. I am preparing my faculties." The courage of these great men supported the army and restored its confidence. Bonaparte strove to divert the thoughts of the soldiers by various expeditions, and soon made them forget this disaster. On the festival of the foundation of the republic, celebrated on the 1st of Vendémiaire, he strove to give a new stimulus to their imagination: he had engraved on Pompey's Pillar the names of the first forty soldiers slain in Egypt. They were the forty who had fallen in the attack of Alexandria. These forty names of men, sprung from the villages of France, were thus associated with the immortality of Pompey and Alexander. He issued this grand and extraordinary address to his army, in which was recorded his own wonderful history:

"Soldiers,

"We celebrate the first day of the year VII of the republic.

"Five years ago the independence of the French people was threatened; but you took Toulon; this was an omen of the destruction of your enemies.

"A year afterwards you beat the Austrians at Dego.

"The following year you were on the summits of the Alps.

"Two years ago you were engaged against Mantua, and you gained the famous victory of St. George.

"Last year you were at the sources of the Drave and the Isonzo, on your return from Germany.

was combating by his side when he was struck, and embracing his father, resolutely refused to quit the ship, though a gun-boat came alongside to take him off. He contrived to bind his dying parent to the mast which had fallen into the sea, and floated off with the precious charge; he was seen after the explosion by some of the British squadron, who made the utmost efforts to save his life; but, in the agitation of the waves following that dreadful event, both were swallowed up, and seen no more."—*Alison*. E.

* "Of thirteen ships of the line, nine were taken and two burned; of four frigates, one was sunk and one burned. The British loss was eight hundred and ninety-five in killed and wounded. Of the French, five thousand two hundred and twenty-five perished, and three thousand one hundred and five were taken and sent on shore including the wounded."—*James's Naval History*. E.

"Who would then have said that you would be to-day on the banks of the Nile, in the centre of the old world ?

"From the Englishman, celebrated in the arts and commerce, to the hideous and ferocious Bedouin, all nations have their eyes fixed upon you.

"Soldiers, yours is a glorious destiny, because you are worthy of what you have done and of the opinion that is entertained of you. You will die with honour, like the brave men whose names are inscribed on this pyramid, or you will return to your country covered with laurels and with the admiration of all nations.

"During the five months that we have been far away from Europe, we have been the object of the perpetual solicitude of our countrymen. On this day, forty millions of citizens are celebrating the era of representative governments: forty millions of citizens are thinking of you. All of them are saying, 'To their labours, to their blood, we are indebted for the general peace, for repose, for the prosperity of commerce, and for the blessings of civil liberty.'

VOL. IV.—37

THE DIRECTORY.

EFFECT OF THE EXPEDITION TO EGYPT IN EUROPE; PREJUDICIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE NAVAL BATTLE OF ABOUKIR; DECLARATION OF WAR BY THE PORTE; EFFORTS OF ENGLAND TO FORM A NEW COALITION—CONFERENCES WITH AUSTRIA AT SELZ—PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS OF RASTADT—FRESH COMMOTIONS IN HOLLAND, SWITZERLAND, AND THE ITALIAN REPUBLICS; CHANGE IN THE CISALPINE CONSTITUTION—GENERAL DISPOSITION TO WAR—LAW RELATIVE TO THE CONSCRIPTION—FINANCES OF THE YEAR VII.

THE expedition to Egypt continued to be a secret in Europe long after the departure of our fleet. The taking of Malta began to fix conjectures. This place, reputed impregnable, and taken in passing, threw extraordinary glory around the French Argonauts. The landing in Egypt, the occupation of Alexandria, the battle of the Pyramids, struck all imaginations in France and in Europe. The name of Bonaparte, which had appeared so great when it came from the Alps, produced a still more singular and astonishing effect when coming from distant countries of the East. Bonaparte and Egypt were the topic of conversation everywhere. The plans already executed were considered as nothing; others far more gigantic were inferred. Bonaparte was going, it was said, to traverse Syria and Arabia, and to fall upon Constantinople or India.

The unfortunate battle of Aboukir came, not to destroy the spell of the enterprise, but to revive all the hopes of the enemies of France, and to hasten the success of their plots. England, which was extremely alarmed for her commercial power, and was only waiting for a favourable moment to turn new enemies against us, had filled Constantinople with her intrigues. The Grand Seigneur was not sorry to see the Mamelukes punished, but he was not willing to lose Egypt. M. de Talleyrand, who was to have gone to offer explanations to the divan, had not set out. The agents of England had a clear field. They persuaded the Porte that the ambition of France was insatiable; that, after disturbing Europe, she aimed at convulsing the East, and that in despite of an ancient alliance, she had invaded the richest province of the Turkish empire. These suggestions, and money distributed in the divan, would not have sufficed to decide it if the fine fleet of Brueys could have come to cannonade the Dardanelles; but the battle of Aboukir deprived the French of all their ascendancy in the Levant, and gave to England a decided preponderance. The Porte solemnly declared war against France, and, for the sake of a province which she had long lost, she quarrelled with her natural friend, and connected herself with her most formidable enemies, Russia and England. The sultan ordered an army to be assembled for the purpose of reconquering Egypt. This circumstance

rendered the position of the French extremely precarious. Separated from France, and deprived of all succours by the victorious fleets of England, they were liable, besides, to be beset by all the hordes of the East. There were about thirty thousand of them to encounter so many dangers.

Nelson, after his victory, proceeded to Naples to refit his shattered squadron and to receive triumphal honours. In spite of the treaties which bound the court of Naples to France, and which forbade her to give any succour to our enemies, all the ports and dockyards of Sicily were open to Nelson. He was himself received with extraordinary honours. The king and queen went to the entrance of the port to meet him, and called him the saviour of Italy. People began to say that the triumph of Nelson ought to be the signal for a general rising; that the powers ought to take advantage of the moment when the most formidable army of France and her greatest captain were locked up for ever in Egypt, to march against her, and to drive back into her bosom her soldiers and her principles. Suggestions of this kind were assiduously presented to all the courts. Letters were written to those of Tuscany and Piedmont to rouse their hitherto disguised hatred. This was the moment, it was said, to second the court of Naples, to unite against the common enemy, to rise all at once on the rear of the French, and to slaughter them from one end of the peninsula to the other. Austria was told that she ought to seize the moment when the Italian powers should fall upon the French in the rear, to attack them in front, and to wrest Italy from them. The matter would be easy, for Bonaparte and his terrible army were no longer on the Adige. Applications were made to the Empire, stripped of part of its states, and compelled to cede the left bank of the Rhine; efforts were made to draw Prussia from her neutrality; lastly, such means were used with the Emperor Paul as were calculated to act upon his morbid mind, and to decide him to furnish the succours so long and so vainly promised by Catherine.

These suggestions could not fail to be well received at all the courts; but all were not in a condition to comply with them. Those which were nearest to France were most exasperated and most disposed to drive back the revolution into the bosom from which it had sprung; but, for the very reason that they were nearest to the republican colossus, it behoved them to use greater reserve and caution before they entered upon a struggle with it. Russia, the farthest from France, the least exposed to her vengeance, as well on account of her distance as of the moral state of her subjects, was the most easily decided. Catherine, whose subtle policy had always tended to perplex the situation of the West, either that she might have a pretext for interfering with it, or that she might gain time to do what she wished in Poland, had not carried her policy along with her. This policy is innate in the Russian cabinet; it arises from her very position: it may change its mode of proceeding or its means, according as the sovereign is crafty or violent; but it always tends, by an irresistible impulse, to the same point. The cunning Catherine had contented herself with giving hopes and succour to the emigrants. She had preached up the crusade without sending a soldier.* Her successor was about to pursue the same end, but in a way suited to his character. That prince, violent

* "Catherine's latest project was the formation of a powerful confederacy for the defence of Europe against the French republic, and she had given orders for a levy of a hundred and fifty thousand men, destined to take part in the German campaigns—a design which, if carried into effect by her firm and intrepid hand, might have accelerated, by nearly twenty years, the catastrophe which closed the war."—*Alison*. E.

and almost insane, but at the same time very generous, had at first appeared to swerve from Catherine's policy, and refused to execute the treaty of alliance concluded with England and Austria; but, after this momentary deviation, he had soon returned to the policy of his cabinet. He afforded asylum to the pretender, and took emigrants into his pay after the treaty of Campo Formio. He was persuaded that he ought to make himself the chief of the European nobility threatened by the demagogues. The step taken by the order of Malta, in selecting him for its protector, contributed to inflame his imagination, and he embraced the idea held out to him with all the susceptibility and ardour of the Russian princes. He tendered his protection to the Empire, and offered himself as guarantee for its integrity. The capture of Malta filled him with indignation, and he offered the co-operation of his armies against France. England triumphed, therefore, at St. Petersburg as at Constantinople, and made enemies till then irreconcilable go hand in hand.

The like zeal did not prevail everywhere. Prussia found herself too much benefited by her neutrality and by the exhaustion of Austria, to have any desire to interfere in the struggle of the two systems. She merely watched her frontiers towards Holland and France, in order to keep out the revolutionary contagion. She had placed her armies in such a manner as to form a sanitary cordon. The Empire, which had learned to its cost to appreciate the power of France, and which was still liable to become the theatre of war, wished for peace. Even the dispossessed princes wished for it too, because they were sure of obtaining indemnities on the right bank. The ecclesiastical princes alone, threatened with secularization, demanded war. The Italian powers of Piedmont and Tuscany desired nothing better than an occasion, but they trembled under the iron grasp of the French republic. They waited for Naples or Austria to give them the signal. With respect to Austria, though the best disposed of the courts forming the monarchical coalition, she yet hesitated with her usual tardiness to adopt any resolution, and she was particularly concerned for her subjects, already much exhausted by the war. France had created two new republics, Switzerland and Rome, one on her flank, the other in Italy, which had greatly exasperated and thoroughly disposed her to renew the contest; but she would have winked at these fresh encroachments of the republican coalition, if she had been indemnified by some acquisitions. It was with this view that she had proposed conferences at Selz. These conferences were to take place in the summer of 1798, not far from Rastadt, and at the same time with the congress at that place. On their result would depend the determination of Austria, and the success of the efforts made to form a new coalition.

François de Neufchâteau was the envoy selected by France. It was on his account that the little town of Selz had been fixed upon. It was situated on the bank of the Rhine not far from Rastadt, but on the left bank.

This last condition was necessary, because the constitution forbade a director, on relinquishing office, to leave France before the expiration of a certain time. M. de Cobentzel had been sent by Austria. From the first moment the dispositions of that power might be perceived. She wished to be indemnified by an extension of territory for the conquests which the republican system had made in Switzerland and Italy. France desired in the first place to come to an arrangement respecting the occurrence at Vienna, and to obtain satisfaction for the insult offered to Bernadotte. But Austria evaded all explanation on that point, and always deferred that part

of the negotiation. The French envoy reverted to it incessantly. For the rest, he had orders to be content with the slightest satisfaction. France would have wished that Thugut, the minister, disgraced in appearance, should be so in reality, and that some excuse, the most insignificant in the world, should be made to Bernadotte in reparation of the insult which he had received. M. de Cobentzel merely said that his court disapproved what had passed at Vienna, but he offered no satisfaction whatever, and continued to insist on the extension of territory which he claimed. It was evident that the satisfactions of self-love would not be granted till those of ambition had been obtained. Austria alleged that the institution of the two republics, the Roman and the Helvetic, and the manifest empire exercised over the Cisalpine, Ligurian, and Batavian republics, were violations of the treaty of Campo Formio, and a dangerous alteration of the state of Europe: she desired that France should be obliged to grant compensations, if she wished her recent usurpations to be forgiven. By way of compensation, the Austrian negotiator demanded new provinces in Italy. He insisted that the line of the Adige should be carried farther, and that the Austrian possessions should extend to the Adda and the Po, which would give the emperor a good half of the Cisalpine republic. M. de Cobentzel proposed to indemnify the Cisalpine republic with part of Piedmont: he proposed also that the remainder of that kingdom should be given to the Grand-duke of Tuscany; and that the King of Sardinia should receive in compensation the States of the Church. Thus, at the price of an aggrandizement for himself in Lombardy, and for his family in Tuscany, the emperor would have sanctioned the institution of the Helvetic republic, the overthrow of the Pope, and the dismemberment of the Sardinian monarchy. France could not assent to these proposals for many reasons. In the first place, she could not dismember the Cisalpine as soon as formed, and replace under the Austrian yoke provinces which she had emancipated, to which she had promised liberty, and which she had made pay for that liberty; lastly, she had, in the preceding year, concluded a treaty with the King of Sardinia, by which she guaranteed to him his dominions. This guarantee was stipulated against Austria in particular. France, of course, could not sacrifice Piedmont; consequently François de Neufchâteau could not assent to M. de Cobentzel's proposals. They parted without coming to any conclusion. No satisfaction was given for the occurrence at Vienna. M. de Degelmann, who was to have been sent as ambassador to Paris, did not arrive, and it was notified that the two cabinets would continue to correspond through their ministers at the congress of Rastadt. This separation was generally considered as a kind of rupture.

The determination of Austria was evidently taken from that moment; but, before she recommenced hostilities, she wished to insure the concurrence of the principal powers of Europe. M. de Cobentzel set out for Berlin, and was to proceed from Berlin to St. Petersburg. The object of these journeys was to co-operate with England in forming a new coalition. The Emperor of Russia had sent to Berlin one of the most distinguished personages in Russia, Prince Repnin. M. de Cobentzel was to unite his efforts with those of Prince Repnin and the English legation to gain the young king.

France had sent to Berlin one of her most illustrious citizens, Sieyes. The reputation of Sieyes had been immense before the reign of the Convention. It had vanished under the level of the committee of public welfare. It had suddenly sprung up again when men could resume their

natural career ; and the name of Sieyes had again become the most celebrated name in France next to that of Bonaparte ; for in France, a reputation for profundity is what produces the greatest effect next to a high military renown. Sieyes was therefore one of the two great personages of the time. Always pouting and grumbling at the government, not like Bonaparte, from ambition, but from spleen against the constitution which he had not framed, he could not fail to be an annoyance. The government, therefore, conceived the idea of giving him an embassy. This would be an occasion for removing him to a distance, for making him useful, and above all, for furnishing him with the means of existence. The Revolution had deprived him of them all by abolishing ecclesiastical benefices. A high embassy would permit them to be restored to him. The highest was that of Berlin, for no ambassador had yet been sent to Austria, Russia, or England. Berlin was the theatre of all intrigues, and Sieyes, though not the fittest person for the management of affairs, was, nevertheless, a keen and a sure observer. Besides, his high reputation peculiarly qualified him to represent France, especially in Germany, for which he was better suited than for any other country.

The king was not pleased to see so celebrated a revolutionist as Sieyes arrive in his capital ; he durst not, however, refuse him. Sieyes conducted himself with temper and dignity ; he was received in the same manner, but left entirely to himself. Like all our envoys abroad, he was closely watched, and as it were sequestered. The Germans were very curious to see him, but dared not call upon him. His influence on the court of Berlin was absolutely null. It was a sense of his interest that alone defended the King of Prussia against the solicitations of England, Austria, and Russia.

While these efforts were making in Germany to decide the King of Prussia, the court of Naples, full of joy and temerity since Nelson's victory,* made immense preparations for war, and redoubled its solicitations to the sovereigns of Tuscany and Piedmont. France, out of a kind of complaisance, had suffered it to occupy the duchy of Benevento ; but it was not pacified by this concession. It flattered itself that in the approaching war it should gain half of the papal dominions.

The negotiations at Rastadt proceeded successfully for France. Treillard, who had become director, and Bonaparte, who had gone to Egypt, had been succeeded by Jean Debry and Roberjot. After obtaining the line of the Rhine, a multitude of military, commercial, and political questions yet remained to be settled. The French deputation had become extremely extortionate, and demanded much more than it had a right to obtain. It insisted, in the first place, on having all the islands in the Rhine, which was an important article, especially in a military point of view. It then insisted on keeping Kehl and its territory, opposite to Strasburg, and Cassel and its territory, opposite to Mayence. It insisted that the commercial bridge between the two Breisachs should be re-established ; that

* "The enthusiasm of the court of Naples was already very great, when the arrival of Nelson with his victorious fleet, raised it to the highest possible pitch. The remonstrances of the French ambassador were unable to restrain the universal joy ; the presence of the British admiral was deemed a security against every danger ; a signal for the resurrection of the world against its oppressors. In vain the more prudent counsellors of the king represented the extreme peril of attacking, with their inexperienced forces, the veterans of France, before the Austrians were ready to support them on the Adige ; the war party, at the head of which were the queen and Lady Hamilton, the wife of the English ambassador, succeeded in producing a determination for the commencement of immediate hostilities."—*Alison*. E.

fifty acres of land facing the old bridge of Huningen should be granted to us, and that the important fortress of Ehrenbreitstein should be demolished. It next demanded that the navigation of the Rhine, and of all the German rivers falling into the Rhine, should be free; that all the tolls should be abolished; that goods should be subject to the same custom-house duty on both banks; that the towing-paths should be kept up by the states bordering upon the river. It demanded a last and highly important condition, namely, that the debts of the countries on the left bank ceded to France should be transferred to the countries on the right bank destined to be given as indemnities.

The deputation of the Empire replied with justice that the line of the Rhine ought to present an equal security to both nations; that it was the reason of an equal security which had been more particularly alleged in order to cause this line to be granted to France; but that this security would cease to exist for Germany, if France were to keep all the offensive points, as well by reserving for herself the islands, as by appropriating Cassel, Kehl, and fifty acres of land opposite to Huningen. The deputation of the Empire refused, therefore, to admit the demands of France, and proposed as the real boundary line the *Thalweg*, that is, the middle of the principal navigable arm. All the islands on the right of that line should belong to Germany, all on the left to France. In this manner, there would be placed between the two nations the real obstacle which makes a river a military line, namely, the principal navigable arm. As a consequence of this principle, the deputation demanded the demolition of Cassel and Kehl, and refused the fifty acres opposite to Huningen. It was not willing that France should retain any offensive point, while Germany was to lose them all. It refused with less reason the demolition of Ehrenbreitstein, which was incompatible with the safety of the city of Coblenz. It granted the free navigation of the Rhine, but demanded it throughout its whole course, and wished France to oblige the Batavian republic to recognise this liberty. As for the free navigation of the rivers of the interior of Germany, that article, it alleged, was beyond the sphere of its competence, and concerned each state individually. It granted the towing-paths. It proposed that everything relative to tolls and their abolition should be referred to a treaty of commerce. Lastly, it proposed, with respect to the countries on the left bank ceded to France, that they should continue to bear the charge of their own debts, on the principle that the debt accompanies its pledge, and that the estates of the immediate nobility should be considered as private property and acknowledged by that title. The deputation demanded accesssoryly that the French troops should evacuate the right bank, and raise the blockade of Ehrenbreitstein, because it reduced the inhabitants to famine.

These contrary pretensions gave rise to a series of notes and counter-notes during the whole summer. At length, in the month of Vendémiaire, year VI (August and September, 1798), the *Thalweg* was admitted by the French deputation. The principal navigable arm was taken for the boundary between France and Germany, and the islands were consequently to be divided upon this principle. France consented to the demolition of Cassel and Kehl, but she demanded the island of Petersau, situated in the Rhine, nearly opposite to Mayence, and of great importance for that place. The Germanic empire consented on its side to the demolition of Ehrenbreitstein. The free navigation of the Rhine and the abolition of tolls were conceded. There still remained to be settled the questions concerning the commercial bridges, the possessions of the immediate nobility, the application of the

laws of emigration in the ceded countries, and the debts of those countries. The secular princes had declared that every concession compatible with the honour and the security of the Empire ought to be made, to obtain the peace which was so necessary to Germany. It was evident that most of those princes wished to treat. Prussia exhorted them to do so. But Austria began to manifest the very contrary dispositions, and to excite the resentment of the ecclesiastical princes against the course of the negotiations. The deputies of the Empire, though decidedly in favour of peace, were extremely cautious on account of the fear which they felt of Austria, and wavered between that power and Russia. As for the French ministers, their behaviour was extremely stiff. They lived apart and in a sort of seclusion, like all our ministers in Europe. Such was the state of the congress at the conclusion of the summer of the year VI (1798).

During the occurrence of these events in the East and in Europe, France, still charged with the direction of the five republics instituted around her, had been involved in endless anxieties. Continual difficulties were encountered in regard to the direction of the public mind and the maintenance of our troops there, in keeping up a good understanding between our ambassadors and our generals, and in preserving harmony with the neighbouring states.

It had been necessary almost everywhere to do what had been done in France, that is, after striking one party very soon to strike the other. In Holland, on the 3d of Pluviose (January 22d), a sort of 18th of Fructidor had been executed, to remove the Federalists, to abolish the old regulations, and to give a unitary constitution nearly similar to that of France. But this revolution had turned too much in favour of the democrats. These had possessed themselves of all the power. After excluding from the national assembly all the deputies who were suspected by them, they had constituted themselves into a directory and two councils, without recurring to new elections. In this proceeding they meant to imitate the National Convention of France, and its notorious decrees of the 13th and 15th of Fructidor. They had since possessed themselves of the entire direction of affairs, and they went beyond the line to which the French Directory wished all the republics under its care to keep. General Daendels, one of the most distinguished men of the moderate party, came to Paris, arranged matters with our directors, and returned to Holland, to inflict on the democrats there a blow similar to that which they had recently received in Paris, in being excluded from the legislative body by means of the schisms. Thus, whatever was done in France, it was necessary to repeat immediately afterwards in the states dependent on her. Joubert was ordered to support Daendels. The latter joined the ministers, and, with the aid of the Batavian and French troops, dispersed the Directory and the councils, formed a provisory government, and caused directions to be issued for new elections. Delacroix, the French minister, who had supported the democrats, was recalled. These scenes produced their customary effect. People did not fail to assert that the republican constitutions could not go alone, that the lever of bayonets was every moment required, and that the new states were in the most complete dependence on France.

In Switzerland, the establishment of the republic, *one and indivisible*, could not take place without fighting. The small cantons of Schwytz, Zug, and Glarus, excited by the priests and the Swiss aristocrats, had sworn to oppose the adoption of the new system. General Schaumburg, without attempting to reduce them by force, had forbidden all communication of

the other cantons with them. The refractory petty cantons had immediately taken up arms and invaded Lucerne, where they had pillaged and devastated. Schaumburg had marched against them, and, after some obstinate combats, had forced them to sue for peace. The pledge of that peace had been the acceptance of the new constitution. It had been found necessary also to have recourse to the sword, and even to fire, to quell the peasants of the Upper Valais, who had made an incursion into the Lower Valais, for the purpose of re-establishing their dominion there. Notwithstanding these obstacles, the constitution was everywhere in force in Prairial (May, 1798). The Helvetic government had assembled at Aarau. Composed of a directory and two councils, it began to try its skill in the administration of the country. The new French commissioner was Rapinat,* Rewbel's brother-in-law. The Helvetic government was to arrange with Rapinat respecting the administration of affairs. Circumstances rendered this administration a difficult task. The priests and the aristocrats, nestled in the mountains, were watching for a favourable moment to raise the population afresh. It was requisite for the government to be on its guard against them, to maintain and to satisfy the French army which it had to oppose to them, to organize the administration, and to enable itself to exist soon in an independent manner. This task was not less difficult for the Helvetic government, than for the French commissioner sent to it.

It was natural that France should seize the funds belonging to the ancient aristocratic cantons, for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the war. The money contained in the coffers, and the stores in the magazines formed by the late cantons, were indispensably necessary for the support of her army. It was the most ordinary exercise of the right of conquest. She might, it is true, have renounced this right, but necessity compelled her to avail herself of it at the moment. Rapinat was, therefore, ordered to put seals on all the coffers. Many Swiss, even among those who had wished for the revolution, deemed it very wrong to seize the hoards and the stores of the old governments. The Swiss are, like all mountaineers, prudent and brave, but extremely avaricious. They were glad to have liberty brought to them, and to be rid of their oligarchs, but they disliked paying the expenses of the war. While Holland and Italy had supported, almost without complaint, the enormous burden of the longest and most devastating campaigns, the Swiss patriots loudly cried out about a few millions that were taken from them. The Helvetic directory, on its part, caused fresh seals to be put over those which had just been placed by Rapinat, and thus protested against the disposal of the funds in favour of France. Rapinat immediately ordered the seals of the Helvetic directory to be removed, and declared to that directory that it was limited to administrative functions, that it could not do anything contrary to the authority of France, and that, in future, its laws and decrees should not have any force, unless they contained nothing contrary to ordinances of the commissioner and of the French general. The enemies of the Revolution—and more than one

* "The rapacity of the French commissioners who followed in the rear of the armies, soon made the Swiss regret even the spoliations of Brune and their first conquerors. Lecarlier, after levying immense sums at Berne and elsewhere, as the public treasure was exhausted, took in payment the effects of three hundred of the richest families, and sent the principal senators as prisoners to the citadel of Besançon till the contribution was paid. He was succeeded by Rapinat, whose exactions were still more intolerable."
—*Prince Hardenberg's Memoirs*. E.

had alunk into the Helvetic councils—triumphed at this squabble, and complained of tyranny. They declared that their independence was violated, and that the French republic, which had pretended to bring them liberty, had in reality brought them nothing but subjection and poverty. It was not in the councils only that the opposition manifested itself. It existed also in the directory and in the local authorities. At Lucerne and at Berne, old aristocrats occupied the administrations; they raised obstacles of all sorts against the levy of fifteen millions, assessed upon the ancient aristocratic families for the wants of the army. Rapinat took upon himself to purify the Helvetic government and administrations. By a letter of the 28th of Prairial (June 16), he demanded of the Helvetic government the dismissal of two directors, named Bay and Pfeiffer, and that of the minister for foreign affairs, and the renewal of the administrative chambers of Lucerne and Berne. This demand, made with the tone of an order, could not be refused. The dismissals were immediately given, but the rudeness with which Rapinat conducted himself, caused fresh outcries to be raised and all the blame to be laid on his side. He compromised his government, in fact, by openly violating forms, in order to effect changes which it would have been easy to obtain by other means. The French Directory immediately wrote to the Helvetic Directory, to express its disapprobation of Rapinat's conduct, and to give satisfaction for this violation of all forms. Rapinat was recalled; the dismissed members continued, nevertheless, to be excluded. The Helvetic councils nominated, as successors to the two displaced directors, Ochs, the author of the constitution, and Colone Laharpe, brother of the general who had fallen in Italy, one of the authors of the revolution in the canton de Vaud, and one of the most upright and best-intentioned citizens of his country.

An alliance, offensive and defensive, was concluded between the Helvetic and French republics on the 2d of Fructidor (August 19). According to this treaty, either of the two powers, being at war, had a right to require the intervention of the other, and to apply to it for succour, the amount of which was to be determined by circumstances. The requiring power was to pay the troops that should be furnished by the other. The free navigation of all the rivers of France and Switzerland was reciprocally agreed upon. Two routes were to be opened, the one from France to the Cisalpine, across the Valais and the Simplon; the other from France into Suabia, running along the Rhine, and then following the eastern shore of the Lake of Constance. In this system of united republics, France thus secured two military high-roads, to enable her to reach the states of her allies, and to debouch rapidly in Italy or in Germany. It has been observed that those two roads transferred the theatre of war to the allied states. It was not the roads, but the alliance of France which rendered these states liable to become the theatre of war. The roads were only a medium for hastening up with the more despatch, and being in time to protect them, by taking the offensive in Germany or in Italy.

The city of Geneva was incorporated with France, as well as the town of Mûhlhausen. The Italian bailiwicks, which had long hesitated between the Cisalpine and the Helvetic republics, declared for the latter, and voted for their incorporation. The Grison leagues, which the Directory would have united with Switzerland, were divided between two rival factions, and wavered between Austrian and Helvetic domination. The

monks and the foreign agents produced a new disaster in Unterwalden. They excited the peasants of that valley to rise against the French troops. A most obstinate action took place at Stanz, and it was found necessary to set fire to that unfortunate village before it could be cleared of the fanatics who had there established themselves.*

The same difficulties were encountered on the other side of the Alps. A sort of anarchy prevailed between the subjects of the new states and their governments, between those governments and our armies, between our ambassadors and our generals. The confusion was tremendous. The little Ligurian republic was inveterate against Piedmont, and determined to introduce the revolution into it at any rate. A great number of Piedmontese democrats had sought refuge in its bosom, and issued from it armed and organized, to make incursions into their country, and to attempt to overthrow the royal government. Another band had set out from the Cisalpine, and had advanced by Domo d'Ossola. But these attempts had been repulsed, and a great number of victims had been uselessly sacrificed. The Ligurian republic had not on that account desisted from harassing the government of Piedmont. It collected and armed more refugees, and purposed to make war itself. Sotin, our minister at Genoa, had the greatest difficulty to restrain it. Guingené, our minister at Turin, had on his part not less trouble to reply to the continual complaints of Piedmont, and to moderate the vengeance which it wanted to wreak on the patriots.

The Cisalpine was in frightful disorder. Bonaparte, in constituting it, had not had leisure to calculate precisely the proportions which ought to have been observed in the divisions of the territory and in the number of the functionaries; he had not had time to organize the municipal and the financial systems. This little state alone had two hundred and forty representatives. The departments were too numerous; it was eaten up by a multitude of functionaries; it had no regular and uniform system of taxation. With considerable wealth, it had no finances, and it could scarcely find means to pay the subsidy agreed upon for the support of our armies. The confusion in every other department was at its height. Since the exclusion of some members of the council, decreed by Berthier, to enforce the acceptance of the treaty of alliance with France, the revolutionists had retained the ascendancy, and the language of the Jacobins predominated in the councils and the clubs. Our army seconded this movement and supported all its extravagances. Brune, after completing the subjection of Switzerland, had returned to Italy, where he had been invested with the general command of all the French troops, since the departure of Berthier for Egypt. He was at the head of the most vehement patriots. Lahoz, the commandant of the Lombard troops, whose organization had been commenced under Bonaparte, was swayed by the same ideas and the same sentiments. There existed other causes of disorder in the misconduct of our officers. They behaved in the Cisalpine as though it had been a conquered country. They maltreated the inhabitants, required lodgings to which, agreeably to the treaties, they were not entitled, devastated the places which they inhabited, frequently levied requisitions as in time of

* "The French columns forced their way through the valley, the flames of the houses marking their steps. The village of Stanz, which was wholly built of wood, was speedily consumed; and not fewer than seventy peasants, with their pastor at their head, perished in the flames of the church. A small band of auxiliaries, arriving too late to prevent the massacre, rushed into the very thick of the battle, and after destroying twice their own number of the enemy, were cut off to the last man."—*Lacretelle*. E

war, extorted money from the local administrations, and helped themselves out of the coffers of the towns, without alleging any kind of pretext but their will and pleasure. The commandants of fortresses, in particular, committed intolerable extortions. The commandant of Mantua, for instance, had gone so far as to farm out for his own advantage the fishery of the lake. The generals proportioned their exactions to their rank, and, independently of all that they extorted, they made scandalous profits with the companies. That which contracted for the supply of the army of Italy allowed a bonus of forty per cent. to the staffs. We may conceive what must have been its gains in order to enable it to make such an allowance to its patrons. In consequence of desertions, there were not in the ranks half the men inserted in the lists, so that the republic was paying double what it ought to have done. Notwithstanding all these malversations, the soldiers were ill paid, and almost all of them several months in arrear. Thus the country which we occupied was terribly drained, while our soldiers fared none the better for that. The Cisalpine patriots tolerated all these disorders without complaining, because the staff lent them its support.

At Rome, things went on better. There, a commission, composed of Daunou, Florent, and Faypoult, governed the emancipated country with wisdom and integrity. These three men had framed a constitution, which had been adopted, and which, excepting a few differences, and the denominations, which were not the same, was an exact copy of the French constitution. The directors were termed consuls; the council of the ancients was called the senate; and the second council, the tribunate. But it was not enough to give a constitution; it was requisite to put it in force. It was not, as it may easily be imagined, the fanaticism of the Romans that opposed its establishment, but their indolence. There were no opposers but a few peasants of the Apennines, instigated by the monks, who were soon quelled by the presence of our soldiers. But in the inhabitants of Rome, who had been called to compose the consulate, the senate, and the tribunate, there prevailed an extreme carelessness and inaptitude for business. It had required great trouble to induce them to sit every other day, and they absolutely insisted on summer vacations. To this indolence must be added an absolute inexperience and incapacity in matters of administration. There was more zeal in the Cisalpines, but it was zeal without skill and without moderation, which rendered it quite as mischievous as carelessness. It was to be apprehended that, on the departure of the French commission, the Roman government would fall into dissolution, from the sloth or the retirement of its members. And yet people were very fond of places at Rome; they set a high value on them, as is usual in states destitute of industry.

The commission had put an end to all the malversations practised at the first moment of our entry into Rome. It had taken into its own hands the management of the finances, and directed them with integrity and ability. Faypoult, who was an upright and clever functionary, had established a very judicious system of taxation for the whole Roman state. He had thus contrived to provide for the wants of our army; he had cleared off all the arrears of pay due not only to the army of Rome, but also to the division which had embarked at Civita Vecchia. If the finances had been as well managed in the Cisalpine, the country would not have been drained, and our soldiers would have lived in abundance. At Rome, the military authority was completely subject to the commission. General St. Cyr, who

had succeeded Massena, was distinguished by strict probity; but, sharing that fondness for authority which was becoming general among his comrades, he appeared dissatisfied at being subordinate to the commission. At Milan, in particular, people were extremely discontented at all that was doing at Rome. The Italian democrats were angry to see the Roman democrats mere ciphers and curbed by the commission. The French staff at the head of the divisions stationed at Rome was mortified to see a rich portion of the conquered countries slip through its fingers, and sighed for the moment when the commission should relinquish its functions.

It would be wrong to charge to the account of the French Directory the disorder that prevailed in the allied countries. No will, how strong soever it might be, could have prevented the explosion of the passions which disturbed them; and, as for extortions, the will of Napoleon himself proved not strong enough to prevent them in the conquered provinces. What a single individual, full of genius and vigour, could not effect, a government composed of five members, and placed at an immense distance, was still less capable of accomplishing. There were, nevertheless, in the majority of our Directory, the greatest zeal for insuring the welfare of the new republics, and the warmest indignation against the insolence and exactions of the generals, and the manifest robbery of the companies. Excepting Barras, who took half of all the profits of the companies, and who was the hope of all the firebrands of Milan, the other four directors denounced with the greatest energy what was doing in Italy. Lareveillère, in particular, whose strict integrity revolted at such excesses, submitted to the Directory a plan which was approved. He wished that a commission should continue to direct the Roman government, and to bridle the military authority; that an ambassador should be sent to Milan, to represent the government, and to deprive the staff of all influence there; that this ambassador should be authorized to make in the Cisalpine constitution the changes that it required — such as reducing the number of the local divisions, of the public functionaries, and of the members of the councils; that, lastly, this ambassador should have for his assistant an administrator capable of creating a system of taxation and accountability. This plan was adopted. Trouvé, late minister of France at Naples, and Faypoult, one of the members of the commission at Rome, were sent to Milan, to carry into execution the measures proposed by Lareveillère.

Trouvé, as soon as he should reach Milan, was to call around him the most enlightened men of the Cisalpine, and to concert with them the changes that it would be necessary to make, either in the constitution or in the officers of the government. When all these changes were determined upon, he was then to get them proposed in the councils of the Cisalpine by deputies under his influence, and, in case of need, to support them with the authority of France. At the same time, he was to conceal his hand as much as possible.

Trouvé, having proceeded from Naples to Milan, did there what he had been directed. But the secret of his mission was a difficult one to keep. It was soon known that he had come to change the constitution, and especially to reduce the number of the places of all kinds. The patriots, well aware, from the conduct of the ambassador, that the reductions would be levelled at them, were furious. They looked for support to the staff of the army, which was extremely indisposed towards the new authority, to which it was obliged to submit; and a scandalous struggle ensued between the French legation and the French staff, surrounded by Italian patriots.

Trouvé and the men by whom he was visited, were denounced with extreme violence in the Cisalpine councils. It was alleged that the French minister had come to violate the constitution, and to add another to those acts of oppression which the Directory had exercised upon all the allied republics.* Trouvé had unpleasant things of every kind to encounter, on the part of the Italian patriots and of our officers. The latter conducted themselves with the utmost indecency at a ball which he gave, and caused the greatest scandal. These scenes were deplorable, especially on account of the effect which they produced upon the foreign ministers. Not only did the actors in them exhibit to those ministers a spectacle of the most mischievous divisions, but they insulted them at the diplomatic dinners by drinking, before their faces, to the extermination of all kings. The most vehement Jacobinism reigned at Milan. Brune and Lahoz set out for Paris, in order to obtain the support of Barras. But the Directory, forewarned, was not to be shaken in its resolutions. Lahoz was ordered to leave Paris at the very moment of his arrival. As for Brune, he was directed to return to Milan, and to concur in the changes which Trouvé was to bring about there.

After making the various modifications required by the constitution, Trouvé submitted them to the most discreet of the deputies, whom he assembled at his residence. They approved of them, but the irritation was so great that they durst not undertake themselves to propose them to the two councils. Trouvé was therefore obliged to display French authority, and to exercise ostensibly a power which he would fain have concealed. At bottom, however, the mode employed was of little consequence. It would have been absurd in France, who had created these new republics, and who enabled them to exist by her support, not to avail herself of her strength for the establishment there of the order which she deemed the best. It was much to be regretted that she had not made it the best possible on the very first day, and at once, that she might not be obliged to repeat these acts of her omnipotence. On the 30th of August (13th of Fructidor), Trouvé called together the directory and the two councils of the Cisalpine. He submitted to them the new constitution and all the administrative and financial laws which Faypoult had prepared. The councils were reduced from two hundred and forty to one hundred and twenty members. The persons to be retained in the councils and the government were designated. A regular system of taxation was established. There were personal and indirect taxes, which at the moment they were striving to introduce in France, and which gave great offence to the patriots. All these changes were approved of and adopted. Brune had been obliged to furnish the aid of the French troops. Of course, the rage of the Cisalpine patriots was impotent; the revolution was effected without obstacle. It was decided, moreover, that a convocation of the primary assemblies should speedily take place, for the purpose of approving of the alterations made in the constitution.

Trouvé's task was accomplished; but the French government, seeing the commotion which that minister had excited, thought that it would not be possible to leave him at Milan, that it ought to give him some other embassy,

* " 'The innovations in the Cisalpine republic,' said Lucien Bonaparte at Milan, 'tending, as they do, to abridge popular freedom by the excessive power which they confer upon the Directory, especially the exclusive right of proposing laws, are worthy of eternal condemnation. Nations disgusted with France, who gives them constitutions one day only to take them away the next, will finally conceive a detestation of the republic, and prefer their former submission to a sovereign.' "—*Botta. E*

and to send to Milan a man who was a stranger to the late squabbles. Unfortunately, the Directory suffered a *ci-devant* member of the Jacobins, who had become a base and supple courtier of Barras, who had been made a partner by him in the traffic of the companies, and put into the way of honours, to be imposed upon it. This was Fouché, whose appointment Barras obtained unawares from his colleagues. Fouché set out to succeed Trouvé, and the latter was to proceed to Stuttgart. But Brune, seizing the opportunity of Trouvé's departure, took upon himself, with an audacity not to be accounted for, unless by the military licentiousness which then prevailed, to make the most important alterations in the work of the minister of France. He required the resignation of three of the directors nominated by Trouvé; he changed several of the ministers; he made various modifications in the constitution. Sopranzi, one of the three directors, whose resignation he had demanded, having courageously refused to give it, he ordered his soldiers to seize him and drag him by force from the palace of the government. He then lost no time in convoking the primary assemblies, in order to obtain their approbation of Trouvé's work, modified as it had just been by himself. Fouché, who arrived at this juncture, ought to have opposed this convention, and not have permitted the alterations which the general had no authority for making to be sanctioned. But he allowed Brune to act as he pleased. Trouvé's modifications, and the more recent modifications of Brune, were approved of by the primary assemblies, submissive at once to the military power and to the violence of the patriots.

When the French Directory was informed of these transactions, it did not flinch. It annulled all that Brune had done, removed him from his command, and sent Joubert to restore matters to the state in which Trouvé had left them. Fouché raised objections; he alleged that, the new constitution having been approved of with the alterations which Brune had made, it would have a bad effect to change it again. He was right, and he even gained over Joubert to his opinion. But it did not become the Directory to wink at such daring acts of its generals, and, above all, it did not become it to permit them to exercise such a power in the allied states. It recalled Fouché himself, who thus passed only a few days in the Cisalpine, and it enjoined the integral re-establishment of the constitution, as given by Trouvé in the name of France. As for the individuals from whom Brune had forced their resignation, they were prevailed upon to renew it, in order to avoid fresh changes.

Thus the Cisalpine remained constituted as the Directory had wished it to be, excepting the few persons changed by Brune. But these continual changes, these skirmishes, these disputes between our civil and military agents, produced the most deplorable effect, disheartened the recently emancipated people, lowered the consideration of the mother republic, and proved the difficulty of keeping all these bodies in their proper orbit.

The events in the Cisalpine were made a subject of severe reproach against the Directory; for it is customary to turn everything into a grievance against a government which one is attacking, and to make crimes of the very obstacles which it encounters in its course. The double opposition, which began again to appear in the Councils, attacked in different ways the operations executed in Italy. The theme was quite simple for the patriot opposition. An outrage had been perpetrated, it alleged, against the independence of an allied republic, nay, an infraction of the French laws had been committed, for the Cisalpine constitution, which had just been altered, was guaranteed by a treaty of alliance, and that treaty, approved of

by the Councils, could not be infringed by the Directory. As for the constitutional, or moderate, opposition, it was natural to expect its approbation rather than its reproaches, because the changes made in the Cisalpine were directed against the exclusive patriots. But in this part of the opposition was Lucien Bonaparte. He was seeking causes of quarrel with the government, and, besides, he deemed it his duty to defend the work of his brother, which was attacked by the Directory. He cried out like the patriots, that the independence of the allies was attacked, that the treaties were violated, &c.

The two oppositions spoke out more and more boldly every day. They began to contest with the Directory certain prerogatives, with which it was invested by the law of the 19th of Fructidor, and which it had occasionally exercised. Thus this law gave it a right to shut up clubs, or to suppress journals, the tendency of which appeared to be dangerous. The Directory had closed some clubs which had become too violent, and suppressed some journals which had circulated false intelligence, evidently invented with a malicious intention. There was one journal, among the rest, which alleged that the Directory was going to incorporate the Pays de Vaud with France; the Directory suppressed it. The patriots inveighed against this arbitrary power, and demanded the repeal of several of the clauses of the law of the 19th of Fructidor. The Councils decided that these clauses should remain in force, till the enactment of a law relative to the press: a report was ordered preliminary to the preparation of that law.

The Directory encountered strong opposition in financial matters. It was time to close the budget of the year VI (1797-1798), and to submit that of the year VII (1798-1799). That of the year VI had been fixed at 616 millions, but in these 616 millions there had been a deficit of 62 millions, and, besides this deficit, a considerable arrear in the receipts. The creditors, notwithstanding the solemn promise to discharge the consolidated third, had not been integrally paid. It was decided that *bons* receivable in payment of taxes should be given to them in discharge of the arrear. It was requisite to settle immediately the budget of the year VII, which was about to commence. The expenditure was fixed at 600 millions, in the supposition of no new continental war. It was found necessary to reduce the land-tax and the personal-tax, which were much too high, and to raise the duties on stamps and registration, the customs, &c. Additional centimes were decreed for the local expenses, and tolls at the gates of towns for the maintenance of the hospitals and other institutions. Notwithstanding these augmentations, Ramel, the minister, asserted that the taxes would not produce more at the utmost than three-fourths, to judge from past years, and that it was a gross exaggeration to estimate the effective receipts at 450 or 500 millions. He therefore demanded fresh resources to cover in reality the expenditure of 600 millions. He proposed a tax on doors and windows, and a tax on salt. Violent discussions ensued. The tax on doors and windows was decreed, and a report on the salt-tax was prepared.

In these contradictions there was nothing mischievous, but they were the symptoms of a secret animosity, which needed nothing but public disasters to break forth. The Directory, perfectly aware of the state of Europe, clearly saw that new dangers were preparing, and that war was about to be rekindled on the continent. On this point the movements of the different cabinets left not the least doubt. Cobentzel and Repnin had not succeeded in their efforts to induce Prussia to relinquish her neutrality, and had left in high dudgeon. But Paul I., completely won, had stipulated a treaty of

alliance with Austria, and it was said that his troops had marched. Austria was arming with activity. The court of Naples had ordered the enrolment of the whole population.* It would have been the height of imprudence not to make preparations, on observing such movements from the banks of the Vistula to those of the Volturno. Our armies were greatly diminished by desertion. The Directory resolved to provide for their replenishment by a grand institution, which was yet to be created. The Convention had twice drawn upon the population of France, but in an extraordinary manner, without enacting a permanent law for the annual levy of soldiers. In March, 1793, it had ordered a levy of three hundred thousand men; in August, in the same year, it had adopted the grand and glorious resolution of the levy *en masse*, by generations. The republic had since upheld itself by this measure alone, by forcing those who had taken arms at that epoch to remain under its banners. But war and disease had cut off a great number, and peace had brought back another great number to their homes. Only twelve thousand furloughs had been granted, but there had been ten times as many desertions; and it was difficult to be severe towards men, who had for six years defended their country, and made her triumphant over Europe at the expense of their blood. The skeletons remained, and they were excellent. It was necessary to fill them up by new levies, and to take, not an extraordinary and temporary measure, but a general and permanent measure; to enact, in short, a law which should become, in some measure, an inherent part of the constitution. The conscription was devised.

General Jourdan was the reporter of this grand and salutary law, which has been made a bad use of, like everything else in this world, but which nevertheless saved France and raised her glory to its utmost height. By this law every Frenchman was declared to be a soldier by right, during a certain period of his life. This period was from the age of twenty to twenty-five. The young men of that age were to be divided into five classes, year by year. The government, according to its wants, was to call out these men, beginning with the first class, comprehending those of twenty, and with the youngest of each class. It could then call out the five classes successively, in proportion to the wants of the state. In time of peace, the conscripts were to be obliged to serve till they were twenty-five years old. In time of war, the duration of service was to be unlimited. The government was to be empowered to grant furloughs, when it conceived that this might be done without inconvenience. There was to be no exemption of any kind, except in favour of those who had married before the enactment of the law, or who had already paid their debt in the preceding wars. This law was thus destined to provide for ordinary cases; but in extraordinary cases, when the country should be declared in danger, the government was to have a right, as in 1793, to the entire population. Recourse was to be again had to the levy *en masse*.

This law was adopted without opposition, and considered as one of the most important creations of the Revolution. The Directory immediately applied for authority to enforce it, and claimed a right to levy two hundred thousand conscripts, to complete the armies and to put them on a respecta-

* "The infantry of Naples consisted of thirty thousand regular soldiers, and fifteen thousand militia; forty thousand men were ordered to be added to the army to carry it to the war establishment, and the militia to be quadrupled. But these energetic measures were never carried into full execution, and the effective forces of the monarchy never exceeded sixty thousand men, of which one-third were required to garrison the fortresses on the frontier."—*Jomini*. E.

ble footing. This demand was granted by acclamation on the 2d of Vendémiaire, year VI (September 23, 1798). Though the two oppositions frequently counteracted the Directory, out of spleen or jealousy, still they wished the republic to retain its ascendancy in presence of the powers of Europe. A levy of men requires a levy of money. The Directory demanded, over and above the budget, 125 millions; 90 for the equipment of the two hundred thousand conscripts, and 35 to repair the recent naval disaster. The question was, from what source that sum was to be taken. Ramel, the minister, proved that the *bons* for the payment of two-thirds of the debt had almost wholly come back, and that there were yet left national domains to the amount of 400 millions, which were consequently free, and might be devoted to the new wants of the republic. The sale of 125 millions worth of national domains was in consequence decreed. One twelfth was to be paid in ready money, the remainder in obligations of the purchasers, negotiable at pleasure, and payable successively in eighteen months. They were to bear interest at five per cent. This paper would answer the purposes of ready money, from the facility of paying it away to the companies. The domains were to be sold at eight times their annual produce. No more opposition was made to this resource, than to the law for recruiting, of which it was the consequence.

The Directory thus placed itself in a condition to reply to the menaces of Europe, and to uphold the dignity of the republic. Two events of inferior importance had occurred, the one in Ireland, the other at Ostend. Ireland had rebelled,* and the Directory had sent thither General Humbert, with fifteen hundred men. A remittance of money which the treasury was to have made having been unfortunately delayed, a second division of six thousand men, under the command of General Sarrazin, had been prevented from sailing, and Humbert had been left unsupported. He had maintained his ground for a considerable time, and with such success as to prove that the arrival of the expected reinforcement would have entirely changed the aspect of things.† But, after a series of honourable combats, he had been

* "The rebellion assumed a particularly formidable aspect in the counties of Wexford and Wicklow. Almost the whole county of Kildare was also in open insurrection. The insurgents took, and retained possession of, the town of Wexford for three weeks; kept the government in a state of constant anxiety and alarm, defeating the King's troops on several occasions; but were put down at Vinegar Hill by a royalist force consisting of about 13,000 effective men with a formidable train of artillery. The greatest cruelties were committed on both sides. In this rebellion, according to the most probable accounts, the loss of the army amounted to 19,700 men; that of the rebels and fugitives exceeded 50,000."—*Plowden's History of Ireland*. E.

† The landing of the French troops was announced by two proclamations, one from General Humbert, the other from Napper Tandy to his countrymen. The first bore, "United Irish! The soldiers of the great nation have landed on your shores, to aid you in breaking your fetters and recovering your liberties. Napper Tandy is at their head. He has sworn to break your fetters, or perish in the attempt. To arms, freemen, to arms! The trumpet calls you. Do not let your brethren perish unrevenged; if it be their destiny to fall, may their blood cement the glorious fabric of freedom!" Napper Tandy's proclamation was still more energetic. "What do I hear? The British government talks of concessions; will you accept them? They hold out in one hand the olive branch; look well to the other, you will see in it the hidden dagger. No; Irishmen! you will not be the dupe of base intrigues. Barbarous crimes have been committed in your country; your friends have fallen victims to their devotion to your cause; their shades surround you; they cry aloud for vengeance. It is your duty to avenge their death. It is your duty to strike the assassins of your friends on their bloody thrones. Irishmen, declare a war of extermination against your oppressors—the eternal war of liberty against tyranny." E.

"Never did England run greater danger than in the year 1798, when one expedition

obliged to lay down his arms, with his whole corps.* A check of the like nature, sustained by England, had balanced this loss. The English came from time to time and threw a few bombs into our seaports. They effected a landing at Ostend, for the purpose of destroying the sluices; but vigorously pursued, and cut off from their ships, they were taken to the number of two thousand men.

directed against the East, threatened her Indian empire, and another against the West, under the command of General Humbert, was destined to carry into Ireland the principles of the French Revolution, and sever that important island from the British empire."—*Prince Hardenberg's Memoirs*. E.

* "At length General Humbert's little corps was surrounded, and compelled to surrender, after a brave resistance, by Lord Cornwallis."—*Annual Register*. E.

THE DIRECTORY

RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES—INVASION OF THE ROMAN STATES BY THE NEAPOLITAN ARMY; CONQUEST OF THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES BY GENERAL CHAMPIONNET—ABDICATION OF THE KING OF SARDINIA—DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST AUSTRIA—MILITARY MEANS AND PLANS OF THE DIRECTORY—CAMPAIGN OF 1799; INVASION OF THE GRISONS; BATTLE OF STOKACH; RETREAT OF JOURDAN—BATTLE OF MAGNANO IN ITALY; RETREAT OF SCHERER—MURDER OF THE PLENIPOTENTIARIES AT RAS TADT.

THOUGH Austria had concluded an alliance with Russia and England, and could reckon upon a Russian army and an English subsidy, still she hesitated to involve herself in a fresh struggle with the French republic Spain, who beheld with pain the flame rekindled on the continent, and who equally dreaded the progress of the republican system and its ruin (for in the one case she was liable to be revolutionized, and, in the other, punished on account of her alliance with France), had interposed anew to pacify the exasperated adversaries. Her mediation, provoking discussions, gave rise to some possibility of arrangement, and caused fresh hesitations at Vienna, or at least fresh delays. At Naples, so furious was the frenzy of the court that it was indignant at any delay, and determined to find some way of commencing hostilities, in order to force Austria to draw the sword. The folly of this petty court was unparalleled. It was the lot of the Bourbons, at this period, to be led by their wives into all their faults. In this same predicament had been seen at one time, Louis XVI., Charles IV., and Ferdinand. The fate of the unfortunate Louis XVI. is known. Charles IV. and Ferdinand were hurried, though in different ways, by the same influence, into inevitable ruin. The people of Naples had been obliged to wear the English cockade. Nelson was treated as a tutelary divinity. Orders had been issued for the levy of one-fifth of the population—a sort of extravagance; for one-fiftieth, well armed, would have sufficed to give Naples rank among the powers. Each convent was to furnish a horse-soldier fully equipped; part of the possessions of the clergy had been sold; all the taxes had been doubled; lastly, that framer of unfortunate projects, all whose military plans had been so unsuccessful, and whom Fate reserved for reverses of so extraordinary a kind—Mack, had solicited to be placed at the head of the Neapolitan army.* Triumph had been decreed him before victory. The title of liberator of Italy, the same that

* "Nelson's falcon eye measured Mack's worth at once. 'General Mack,' said he, cannot move without five carriages. I have formed my own opinion of the man—I heartily pray I may be mistaken."—*Southey's Life of Nelson*. E.

Bonaparte had borne, was conferred on him. To all these grand means were added nones to all the saints, prayers to St. Januarius, and persecutions against those who were suspected of participating in French opinions.

The petty court of Naples continued its intrigues in Piedmont and Tuscany. It wanted the Piedmontese to rise in the rear of the army that occupied the Cisalpine, and the Tuscans in the rear of that which held possession of Rome. The Neapolitans would have availed themselves of the opportunity to attack the army of Rome in front; the Austrians were also to profit by it to attack that of the Cisalpine in front; and from all these combinations it was augured that not a Frenchman would escape. The King of Sardinia, a religious prince, felt some scruples on account of the treaty of alliance which bound him to France; but he was told that faith promised to oppressors was not binding, and that the Piedmontese had a right to murder the French to the very last man. Moreover, scruples were a less obstacle in this instance than the strict vigilance of the Directory. As for the Archduke of Tuscany, he was entirely destitute of means. Naples, in order to decide him, promised to send him an army in Nelson's squadron.

The Directory was on its guard and was taking its precautions. The Ligurian republic, still exasperated against the King of Sardinia, had at length declared war. To a hatred of principles was added a hatred arising from neighbourhood, and those two petty states were determined at any rate to come to blows. The Directory interfered in the quarrel, signified to the Ligurian republic that it must lay down its arms, and declared to the King of Sardinia that it would take upon itself to maintain tranquillity in his dominions, but that, to this end, it must occupy an important post there. It demanded, in consequence, permission to occupy by its troops the citadel of Turin. Such a pretension was not justifiable unless by the fears which the court of Piedmont excited. There was incompatibility between the old and the new states, and they could not trust one another. The King of Sardinia loudly remonstrated; but he had not the means of resisting the demands of the Directory. The French occupied the citadel, and immediately set about arming it. The Directory had separated the army of Rome from that of the Cisalpine, and had appointed General Championnet, who had distinguished himself on the Rhine, to the command of it. The army was dispersed over the whole of the Roman states; there were in the March of Ancona four or five thousand men, commanded by General Casa Bianca; General Lemoine was, with two or three thousand men, on the opposite slope of the Apennines, towards Terni. Macdonald, with the left nearly five thousand strong, was spread out upon the Tiber. There was a small reserve at Rome. The so-called army of Rome amounted, therefore, to fifteen or sixteen thousand men at most. The necessity for watching the country, and the difficulty of subsisting in it, had required the dispersion of our troops, and, if an active and well-seconded enemy had known how to seize the opportunity, he might have made the French repent their separation.

Great stress was laid on this circumstance at Naples. The court flattered itself with the idea of surprising the French, and destroying them in detail. What glory to take the initiative, to gain the first success, and at last to force Austria to enter upon the career, after opening it for her! Such were the reasons that induced the court of Naples to commence hostilities. It hoped that the French would be easily beaten, and that Austria could not

longer hesitate, when once the sword should be drawn. M. de Gallo and Prince Belmonte-Pignatelli, who were rather better acquainted with Europe and with political affairs, were opposed to these ideas. But their prudent counsels were disregarded. In order to decide the poor king and to draw him from his innocent pursuits, a letter, as if from the emperor, was forged, it is said, and this provoked the commencement of hostilities. Orders for marching at the end of November were forthwith issued. The whole Neapolitan army was set in motion. The king himself set out, with great parade, to be present at the operations. There was no declaration of war, but a summons was sent to the French to evacuate the Roman states. They replied to this summons by preparing to fight, notwithstanding the disproportion of number.

In the respective situation of the two armies nothing would have been easier than to overwhelm the French dispersed in the Roman provinces, on the right and left of the Apennines. To this end, the Neapolitans should have marched straight upon their centre, and directed the mass of their own forces between Rome and Terni. The left of the French, placed beyond the Apennines to guard the Marches, would have been cut off from their right, placed on the other side to guard the banks of the Tiber. They would thus have been prevented from joining, and driven back in disorder to Upper Italy. The Peninsula, at least, would have been delivered; Tuscany, the Roman states, and the Marches, would have fallen under the dominion of Naples. The number of the Neapolitan troops would have rendered this plan easier and more certain, but it was impossible for Mack to employ so simple a manœuvre. As in all his former plans, he proposed to surround the enemy by a multitude of detached corps. He had nearly sixty thousand men, forty thousand of whom formed the active army, and twenty thousand the garrisons. Instead of directing this mass of forces upon the essential point of Terni, he divided it into six columns. The first, acting on the back of the Apennines, along the Adriatic, was to proceed by the Ascoli road to the Marches. The second and third, acting on the other side of the Apennines, and keeping themselves in communication with the first, were to march, the one upon Terni, the other upon Magliano. The fourth, constituting the main body, was to move upon Frascati and Rome. A fifth, proceeding along the coast of the Mediterranean, was to traverse the Pontine marshes, and to rejoin the main body on the Via Appiana. The sixth and last, put on board Nelson's squadron, was bound for Leghorn, to excite Tuscany to rise and to cut off the retreat of the French. Thus every preparation was made for enveloping and taking them all, though nothing was done for beating them first.

It was in this order that Mack marched with his forty thousand men. The quantity of his baggage, the want of discipline in his troops, and the bad state of the roads, rendered his movements extremely slow. The Neapolitan army formed a long train, without order and without unity. Championnet, apprized in time of the danger, detached two corps to watch the march of the enemy, and to protect the separate corps as they fell back. Conceiving that he should not be able to retain Rome, he resolved to take a position in rear of the city, on the banks of the Tiber, between Civita Castellana and Civita Ducale, and to concentrate his forces in order to resume the offensive.

While Championnet was prudently retiring and evacuating Rome, leaving eight hundred men in the castle of St. Angelo, Mack was proudly advancing upon all the roads, and apparently expecting to meet with no

resistance. He arrived at the gates of Rome on the 9th of Frimaire, year VII (November 29, 1798), and entered without obstacle. A triumphal reception was prepared for the king.* That weak prince, treated as conqueror and liberator, was intoxicated with the kind of military glory which was awarded him. He had been advised to make a noble use of his victory, and he invited the Pope to come and resume possession of his dominions. His army, however, less generous than himself, committed atrocious pillage. The Roman populace, with its usual fickleness, attacked the houses of those whom he accused of being revolutionists, and destroyed them. The mortal remains of the unfortunate Duphot were exhumed and treated with the grossest indignity.

While the Neapolitans were thus wasting time at Rome, Championnet was executing with extraordinary activity the skilful determination which he had taken. Aware that the essential point was at the centre, on the Upper Tiber, he directed Macdonald to take a strong position at Civita Castellana, and reinforced him with all the troops that he could spare. He transferred part of the forces that he had in the Marches to the other side of the Apennines, and left General Casa Bianca no more than were absolutely necessary to retard the march of the enemy in that quarter. He hastened in person to Ancona, to accelerate the arrival of his artillery and ammunition. Concerning himself no more than he could help respecting what was doing in his rear in Tuscany, he sent an officer with a small detachment to observe what was passing on that side.

The Neapolitans at length fell in with the French on the different roads by which they were advancing. They were thrice as numerous, but they had to deal with the famous soldiers of Italy, and they found the task a hard one. In the Marches, the column advancing by Ascoli was driven back to a great distance by Casca Bianca. On the Terni road, a Neapolitan colonel was taken, with his whole corps, by General Lemoine. This first experience of war with the French was not calculated to encourage the Neapolitans. Mack, nevertheless, made his dispositions for carrying the position which he felt to be the most important, that of Civita Castellana, where Macdonald was with the main body of our troops. Civita Castellana is the ancient Veji. It is seated on a ravine, in a very strong position. The French held several distant posts, which covered the approaches to it. On the 14th of Frimaire (December 4), Mack caused Borghetto, Nepi, and Rignano to be attacked by a considerable force. He sent an accessory column along the opposite bank of the Tiber, to take possession of Rignano. None of these attacks proved successful. One of the columns, put to flight, lost all its artillery. A second, being enveloped, lost three thousand prisoners. The others, disheartened, confined themselves to mere demonstrations. In no instance could the Neapolitan troops withstand the attack of the French. Mack, somewhat disconcerted, renounced the attempt to take the central position of Civita Castellana, and began to discover that it was not on this point that he ought to have endeavoured to force the enemy's line. It was at Terni, a point much nearer to the Apennines, and much less defended by the French, that he ought to have struck the principal blow. He then began to think how to remove his troops and to make them fall back from Civita Castellana upon Terni. But i

* "When the King of Naples made his triumphant entry into Rome, such was the state of discipline of his troops, that they fell into confusion merely from the fatigues of the march and the severity of the rains, and arrived in as great disorder at the termination of a few days' advance, as if they had sustained a disastrous retreat."—*Alison*. E

would have required that rapidity of execution which was impossible with undisciplined troops, to conceal that movement. It took several days to make the main body of the army recross the Tiber; and Mack delayed still more by his own fault an operation already too slow. Macdonald, whom he hoped to detain by demonstrations at Civita Castellana, had already quitted that place and crossed the Tiber. Lemoine had been reinforced at Terni. Thus the Neapolitans had been forestalled on all the points which they purposed to surprise. The first movement of General Metsch, from Calvi on Otricoli, was productive only of disaster. On the 19th of Frimaire (December 9), driven back from Otricoli upon Calvi, that general was surrounded and obliged to lay down his arms, with four thousand men, before a corps of three thousand five hundred. From that moment, Mack thought only of returning to Rome, and falling back from Rome to the foot of the mountains of Frascati and Albano, with a view to rally his army there and to reinforce it with fresh battalions. This was but a sorry resource, for it was not the quantity of his soldiers that it behoved him to augment, but their quality that he ought to have changed; and it was not by retiring a few leagues from the field of battle that he could gain time to give them discipline and bravery.*

The King of Naples, when apprized of these disastrous events, stole away from Rome, which he had entered a few days before in triumph. The Neapolitans evacuated it in disorder, to the great satisfaction of the Romans, who were already much more annoyed by their presence than they had been by that of the French. Championnet re-entered Rome seventeen days after he had quitted it. He had truly deserved the honours of a triumph. Skilfully concentrating himself with fifteen or sixteen thousand men, he had contrived to take the offensive against forty thousand, and driven them in disorder before him. Championnet would not confine himself to the mere defence of the Roman states. He conceived the daring plan of conquering the kingdom of Naples with his little army. The enterprise was difficult, not so much on account of the force of the Neapolitan army, as the disposition of the inhabitants, who might involve us in a long and very dangerous partisan warfare. Championnet nevertheless persisted in advancing. He left Rome to pursue Mack in his retreat. He took from him by the way a great number of prisoners, and put completely to the rout the column which had landed in Tuscany, and only three thousand men of which escaped.

Mack, in complete disorder, retreated rapidly into the kingdom of Naples, and did not stop till he was before Capua, on the line of the Volturno. He selected his best troops, placed them in front of Capua, and along the whole line of the river, which is very deep, and forms a barrier that it is difficult to surmount. Meanwhile the king had reached Naples, and his sudden return had produced consternation there. The populace, enraged at the checks sustained by the army, cried treason, demanded arms, and threatened to murder the generals, the ministers, and all those to whom they attributed the disasters of the war. That odious court did not hesitate to give arms to the lazzaroni, though it was easy to foresee the use that they would make of them. No sooner had these little better than barbarians received the spoils of the arsenals, than they rose and made

* "The Neapolitan soldiers did not lose much honour," said Nelson, "for God knows they had little to lose, but they lost what they had. —*Southey's Life of Nelson* E.

themselves masters of Naples. Still shouting treason, they seized a king's messenger and put him to death. Acton, the favourite, to whom the public calamities began to be attributed, the queen, the king, the whole court, were filled with dismay. Naples appeared to be no longer a safe abode. The idea of seeking refuge in Sicily was immediately conceived and adopted. On the 11th of Nivose (December 31), the most valuable moveables of the crown, all the treasures of the palaces of Caserta and Naples, and twenty millions in money, were put on board Nelson's squadron, which sailed for Sicily. Acton, the author of all the public calamities, would not run the risk of staying at Naples, and embarked with the queen. All that could not be carried away was burned. It was amidst a storm, and by the light of the flames of the blazing dock-yard, that this cowardly and criminal court abandoned the kingdom which it had compromised to its dangers. It left orders, it is said, to put to death all the upper class of citizens accused of a revolutionary spirit. All were to be sacrificed down to the rank of notary. Prince Pignatelli remained at Naples, invested with the powers of viceroy.

Championnet was, meanwhile, advancing towards Naples. He had, in his turn, committed the same fault as Mack. He had divided his force into several columns, which were to rejoin one another before Capua. Their junction, after traversing a difficult country, amidst a fanatic population, excited everywhere against the pretended enemies of God and St. Januarius, was extremely uncertain.

Championnet, having arrived with his main body on the banks of the Volturno, resolved to make an attempt on Capua. Repulsed by a numerous artillery, he was obliged to relinquish the idea of a *coup-de-main*, to withdraw his troops, and to wait for the arrival of the other columns. This attempt took place on the 14th of Nivose (January 3, 1799). The Neapolitan peasantry, who had everywhere risen, intercepted our couriers and our convoys. Championnet received no intelligence concerning his other columns, and his position might be considered as extremely critical. Mack availed himself of this occasion to make amicable overtures. Championnet, reckoning upon the fortune of the French, peremptorily rejected Mack's proposals. Fortunately, he was rejoined by his columns, and an armistice was then concluded on the following conditions: Mack was to abandon the line of the Volturno, to give up the city of Capua to the French, to retire behind the line of the Regi Lagni on the Mediterranean side, and of the Ofanto on the Adriatic side, and thus to cede a great portion of the kingdom of Naples. Besides these concessions of territory, a contribution of eight millions in money was stipulated. The armistice was signed on the 22d of Nivose (January 11).

When the tidings of the armistice reached Naples, the fury of the populace was unbounded. They cried out more vehemently than ever that they were betrayed by the officers of the crown. The appearance of the commissioner appointed to receive the contribution of eight millions excited the rabble to the utmost. It rebelled and prevented the execution of the armistice. The tumult was carried to such a height that Prince Pignatelli was terrified and quitted Naples. That fine capital was now left at the mercy of the lazzaroni. There was no longer any recognized authority, and the city was threatened with a terrible convulsion. At length, after a tumult of three days, a chief was chosen, who possessed the confidence of the lazzaroni, and who had some means of restraining their fury. This

was the Prince of Moliterno. Meanwhile, the like fury burst forth in Mack's army. His soldiers, instead of charging their misfortunes to their own cowardice, were incensed against their general on account of them, and would have murdered him. The so-called liberator of Italy, who a month before had received the honours of triumph, had no other asylum than the very camp of the French. He solicited permission of Championnet to take refuge with him. The generous republican, overlooking the indecorous language of Mack in his correspondence, afforded him an asylum, gave him a place at his table, and allowed him to retain his sword.

Championnet, authorized by the refusal given at Naples to execute the conditions of the armistice, advanced upon that capital, with a view to gain possession of it. The thing was difficult, for an immense population, which, in the open field, a few squadrons of cavalry would have swept away, became extremely formidable behind the walls of a city. He was obliged to fight several battles before he could approach the place, and the lazzaroni displayed there more courage than the Neapolitan army.* The imminence of the danger had redoubled their fury. The Prince of Moliterno, who strove to soothe them, had soon incurred their dislike, and they had chosen for leaders two of their number, called Paggio and Mad Michael. From that moment they gave a loose to the utmost excesses, and committed all sorts of outrages against the citizens and nobles accused of Jacobinism. To such a length were these excesses carried, that all the classes interested in the maintenance of order wished for the entry of the French. The inhabitants sent word to Mack that they would join him for the purpose of delivering up Naples. The Prince of Moliterno himself promised to seize Fort St. Elmo, and to give it up to the French. On the 4th of Pluviose (January 23d) Championnet made the assault. The lazzaroni defended themselves courageously; but the citizens, having gained possession of Fort St. Elmo and different posts of the city, gave admittance to the French. The lazzaroni, intrenched, nevertheless, in the houses, would have defended themselves, retiring from street to street, and perhaps have set fire to the city, had not one of their chiefs been taken prisoner. The French paid him particular attention, promised to respect St. Januarius, and at length induced him to prevail upon all his followers to lay down their arms.

From that moment Championnet found himself master of Naples and of the whole kingdom. He lost no time in restoring order, and disarming the lazzaroni. Agreeably to the intentions of the French government, he proclaimed the new republic. An ancient name was given to it, that of Parthenopean republic. Such was the result of the follies and malignity of the court of Naples. Twenty thousand French and two months were sufficient to foil its vast designs, and to convert its dominions into a repub-

* "The naked rabble, called lazzaroni, showed the most desperate courage; and notwithstanding a murderous defeat, they held out Naples two days with their irregular musketry only, against regular forces amply supplied with artillery. What can we say of a country where the rabble are courageous and the soldiers cowards? What, unless that the higher classes, from whom the officers are chosen, must be the parties to be censured."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E.

† "General Championnet once more brought back victory to our standards by defeating Mack and taking Naples; but the Directory determined to sacrifice the glory of one of her sons on the altar of his country; and Championnet was deprived of his command, arrested, tried by a court-martial, and was on the point of being shot. All this was because he resisted the designs of certain base and avaricious proconsuls." *Duchess d'Abrantes*. E.

lic. This short campaign of Championnet immediately procured him a brilliant reputation. The army of Rome thenceforth assumed the title of army of Naples, and was separated from the army of Italy. Championnet became independent of Joubert.

During the occurrence of these events in the Peninsula, the fall of the kingdom of Piedmont was at length consummated. From a precaution which circumstances sufficiently authorized, Joubert had already taken possession of the citadel of Turin, and armed it with artillery taken from the Piedmontese arsenals. But this precaution was wholly inadequate in the present state of affairs. Disturbances still prevailed in Piedmont. The republicans were incessantly making new efforts, and they had even just sustained a loss of six hundred men in an attempt to surprise Alexandria. A masquerade, sallying forth from the citadel of Turin, in which the whole court was represented, and which was the joint work of Piedmontese and of French officers, whom the generals could not always restrain, had well nigh provoked a sanguinary combat in Turin itself. The court of Turin could not be a friend to France, and the correspondence of the Neapolitan minister with M. de Priocca, directing minister of Piedmont, afforded sufficient evidence of this. Under such circumstances, France, exposed to a new war, could not leave upon her communications with the Alps two parties at open war with one another, and a hostile government. It possessed, in regard to the court of Piedmont, the same right that the defenders of a fortress have over all the buildings which cramp it or obstruct its defence. It was decided that the king should be compelled to abdicate. The republicans were supported, and they were assisted to gain possession of Novara, Alexandria, Susa, and Chivasso.* The king was then told that he could not live any longer in a country which was in a state of rebellion, and which was likely to become soon the theatre of war. He was required to abdicate the sovereignty of Piedmont, retaining that of Sardinia. The abdication was signed on the 19th of Frimaire (December 9, 1798). Thus the two most powerful princes of Italy, those of Naples and Piedmont, had no part of their dominions left but two islands. Under the circumstances that were preparing, the French government would not be at the trouble of creating a new republic, and it was decided that, until the conclusion of the war, Piedmont should be provisorily administered by France. There was nothing left to seize in Italy but Tuscany. A mere notification would have sufficed for taking possession of it, but this notification was deferred till Austria should openly declare her intentions.

War, however, was no longer doubtful. The intercepted correspondence, the lifting of the sword by the court of Naples, which would not have commenced without the certainty of a powerful intervention, the immense preparations of Austria, lastly, the arrival of a Russian corps, in Moravia, left no doubt whatever. It was now Nivose (January, 1799), and it was evident that hostilities would commence before the expiration of two months. Thus the incompatibility of the two great systems which the Revolution had arrayed against each other, was demonstrated by facts. France had begun the year 1798 with three republics by her side, the Batavian, the Cisalpine, and the Ligurian, and by the end of that year there

* "When too late for any useful purpose, the Piedmontese government issued a manifesto, in which, among other things, they complained that the French had treacherously taken possession of the towns of Novara, Alexandria, Chivasso, and Susa. Grouchy, the French general, forced the king to suppress this proclamation, threatening, in case of refusal, to bombard him in his own palace."—*Prince Hardenberg's Memoirs*. E

existed six, in consequence of the creation of the Helvetic, the Roman and the Parthenopean republics. This extension had not been so much the result of the spirit of conquest, as of the spirit of system. The French had been obliged to assist the oppressed Vaudois : they had been provoked at Rome to avenge the death of the unfortunate Duphot, sacrificed while endeavouring to separate the two parties : at Naples they had done no more than repel an aggression. Thus they had been absolutely forced to renew the struggle. It is certain that the Directory, though it had unbounded confidence in French power, was nevertheless desirous of peace for political and financial reasons ; it is certain, too, that the emperor, though desirous of war, wished to defer it for some time longer. Both had, nevertheless, conducted themselves as though anxious to renew the conflict immediately, so great had been the incompatibility of the two systems.

The revolution had imparted to the French government extraordinary confidence and hardihood. The recent event in Naples, though inconsiderable in itself, had confirmed it in the persuasion that everything must give way before French bayonets. Such, indeed, was the opinion of all Europe. It required nothing short of the immense means combined against France, to impart the courage to engage her. But this confidence of the French government in its strength was exaggerated, and concealed from it part of the difficulties of its position. The sequel has proved that its resources were immense, but that at the moment these resources were not sufficiently prepared to insure victory. Besides France, the Directory had to administer Holland, Switzerland, the whole of Italy, divided into so many republics. To administer them through the medium of their own government, was, as we have seen, a more difficult task than if it had taken the immediate command of them into its own hands. Owing to defective organization, it could derive from them scarcely any resource, either in money or men. It was nevertheless obliged to defend them, and consequently to fight upon a line extending without interruption from the Texel to the Adriatic—a line which, attacked in front by Russia and Austria, was assailed in rear by the English fleets, either in Holland or at Naples.

The forces which such a military situation required, it was obliged to draw from France alone. Now, the armies were most materially weakened. Forty thousand soldiers, our very best, were in Egypt, under our great captain. The armies left in France were reduced one-half by desertions, which peace always brings along with it. The government paid for the same number of soldiers, but it had not perhaps one hundred thousand effective men. The administrations and the staffs made a profit of the pay, and it was a useless surcharge for the finances. These one hundred and fifty thousand effective men formed excellent skeletons, which might be filled up by the new levy of conscripts ; but this would require time, and there had not been sufficient since the establishment of the conscription. Lastly, the finances were still in the same disorder as ever, owing to the vicious system of collection. There had been voted a budget of 600 millions, and an extraordinary resource of 125 millions out of the 400 millions' worth of national domains remaining on hand ; but the tardiness of the receipts, and the error in the estimate of certain products, left a considerable deficit. Lastly, subordination, most necessary in so vast a machine, began to disappear. It became extremely difficult to curb the military. This state of perpetual war caused them to feel that they were necessary, and they grew imperious and importunate. Placed in wealthy countries, they determined

to profit by the circumstance, and they were accomplices in all speculations. They strove also to gain a triumph for their opinions wherever they resided, and scarcely heeded the directions of the civil agents. We have seen an instance of this in the quarrel between Brune and Trouvé. Lastly, in the interior, the opposition, which we have seen rearing its head again since the 18th of Fructidor, and assuming two characters, was daily becoming bolder. The patriots, put down at the last elections, were preparing to triumph in the new elections. The moderate party criticised coolly, but keenly, all the measures of the government, and, according to the custom of all oppositions, reproached it even with the difficulties which it had to encounter, and which were most frequently insurmountable. The government is power itself: it ought to triumph; the worse for it if it does not. Nobody listens to its excuses when it explains why it has not succeeded.

Such was the situation of the Directory at the moment when war again began with Europe. It made mighty efforts to restore order in this vast machine. Confusion still prevailed in Italy. The resources of that fine country were squandered and uselessly wasted for the army. A few plunderers monopolized all the benefit from them. The commission appointed to institute and to administer the Roman republic had just resigned its functions, and the influence of the staffs had immediately manifested itself. The consuls who were deemed too moderate had been changed. The advantageous contracts made for the supply of the army had been broken. The commission, in which Faypoult had the direction of the finances, had contracted for the subsistence and the payment of the troops stationed in Rome, and for the carriage of all the works of art sent to France. It had assigned in payment national domains taken from the clergy. The bargain, besides being moderate in regard to price, had the advantage of furnishing an occasion for disposing of the national domains. It was cancelled, in order to give the contract to Baudin and Company, who were devouring Italy. They were supported by the staffs, to which they allowed a profit of one per cent. Piedmont, which had just been occupied, presented a new prey to pounce upon; and the probity of Joubert, the commander-in-chief of the army of Italy, was not a guarantee against the rapacity of the staffs and of the companies. Naples, in particular, was marked out for pillage. There were in the Directory four upright men, Rewbel, Lareveillère, Merlin, and Treilhard, who were indignant at all disorders. Lareveillère especially, the strictest of all, and the most intimately acquainted with facts (from his particular relations with Trouvé, the ambassador, and with the members of the commission of Rome), recommended the display of the greatest energy. He proposed and obtained the adoption of a very judicious plan, namely, to institute in all the countries dependent on France, or in which our armies resided, commissions to superintend the civil and financial departments, and wholly independent of the staffs. At Milan, Turin, Rome, and Naples, civil commissions were to receive the contributions stipulated with the countries allied with France, to make contracts and all the financial arrangements, to supply, in short, the wants of the armies, but not to leave the management of any funds to the military chiefs. The commissioners were, nevertheless, ordered to furnish the generals with such funds as they should require; they were not to be obliged to specify for what purpose they were wanted, and were to be accountable for them to the government alone. Here again great deference was shown to the military authority. The four directors procured the

adoption of the measure, and orders were given to Scherer* to carry it into immediate execution with the utmost rigour. As he manifested some indulgence for his comrades, it was notified to him that he should be held responsible for all the disorders that were not repressed.

This measure, however just it might be, could not fail to give great offence to the staffs. In Italy, especially, they appeared ready to mutiny. They alleged that the government dishonoured the military by the precautions which it was taking in regard to them, that it was absolutely tying the hands of the generals and depriving them of all authority. Championnet, at Naples, had already set up for legislator, and appointed commissions for administering the conquered country. Faypoult was sent to Naples, to take the management of the whole financial department. He issued the ordinances necessary for placing the administration in his hands, and revoked certain very injudicious measures adopted by Championnet. The latter, with all the pride of men of his profession, especially when they are victorious, deemed himself insulted. He had the hardihood to issue an ordinance by which he enjoined Faypoult and the other commissioners to quit Naples within twenty-four hours. Such conduct was not to be endured. To disobey the orders of the Directory, and to drive from Naples the envoys invested with its powers, was an act which deserved the severest reprehension, unless it meant to abdicate the supreme authority and to transfer it to the generals. The Directory did not flinch; and, owing to the energy of the upright members who were determined to put an end to speculations, it exerted in this instance all its authority. It took the command from Championnet, and ordered him to be tried by a court martial. Unfortunately, the insubordination did not stop there. The gallant Joubert suffered himself to be persuaded that military honour was stained by the ordinances of the Directory. He would not retain the command on the new conditions prescribed to the generals, and tendered his resignation. The Directory accepted it. Bernadotte refused to succeed Joubert from the same motives. The Directory, nevertheless, would not give way, and persisted in its ordinances.

The Directory then turned its attention to the levy of the conscripts, which was proceeding slowly. As the first two classes could not furnish the two hundred thousand men, it procured authority to take them out of all the classes, till the number required should be complete. In order to gain time, it was decided that the communes should take upon themselves the equipment of the new recruits, and that this expense should be deducted from the amount of the land-tax. These new conscripts, scarcely equipped, were to repair to the frontiers, to be there formed into garrison battalions, to replace the old troops in the fortresses and the camps of reserve; and, when they should be sufficiently trained, to march and join the active armies.

The deficit was another subject that engaged the attention of the Directory. Ramel, the minister, who had managed our finances with intelligence and probity ever since the establishment of the Directory, after he had verified the produce of the taxes, ascertained that the deficit would amount to 65 millions at least, without reckoning all the arrear arising from the delay in the receipts. A violent dispute took place respecting the amount

* "General Scherer is a man of honourable deportment. To great facility in expressing himself, he unites an extent of general and military knowledge which may probably induce you to deem his services useful in some important station."—*Napoleon's Letters to the Directory*. E.

of the deficit. The adversaries of the Directory estimated it at no more than 15 millions. Ramel proved that it would be at least 65, and perhaps even 75. The tax on doors and windows had been devised, but it was insufficient. The tax on salt was brought under discussion. A great outcry was raised: the people, it was alleged, were oppressed; the public burdens were made to bear upon a single class; the *gabelles* were renewed. It was Lucien Bonaparte who urged these complaints with the greatest vehemence.* The partisans of the government replied by asserting the necessity of the case. The tax was rejected by the Council of the Ancients. In order to make amends, the tax on doors and windows was doubled, and that on carriage entrances was even increased tenfold. The possessions of the Protestant clergy were put up for sale, and it was decreed that salaries should be paid to those ministers by way of compensation. The sums recoverable from purchasers of domains who still remained indebted to the state were placed at the disposal of the government.

Unfortunately all these resources were not sufficiently prompt. Besides the difficulty of raising the produce of the taxes to 600 millions, there was another inconvenience in the tardiness of the receipts. It was found necessary in this, as in the preceding years, to give orders to the contractors on the produce not yet received. Even the annuitants, to whom, since the paying off of the two-thirds, the utmost punctuality had been promised, were paid with *bons* receivable for the taxes. Thus the government was again obliged to have recourse to expedients.

It was not enough to have collected soldiers and funds for their support; it was requisite to distribute them in a suitable manner, and to select generals for them. It was necessary, as we have observed, to guard Holland, the line of the Rhine, Switzerland, and all Italy, that is, to operate from the Gulf of Tarento to the Texel. Holland was covered on one side by the neutrality of Prussia, which appeared certain; but an Anglo-Russian fleet was to attempt a landing there, and it was urgent to protect her from that danger. The line of the Rhine was protected by the two fortresses, Mayence and Strasburg; and though it was not probable that Austria would endeavour to cross it, still it was but prudent to cover it by a corps of observation. Whether the French took the offensive or waited for it, it was on the banks of the Upper Danube, towards the Lake of Constance or in Switzerland, that they would have to encounter the Austrian armies. It was requisite to have an active army, which, starting from Alsace or Switzerland, should advance into the plains of Bavaria. In the next place, it was requisite to have a corps of observation to cover Switzerland; and lastly, a strong army was required to cover Upper Italy against the Austrians, and Lower Italy against the united Neapolitans and English.

This field of battle was immense, and it was not then known and appreciated as it has since been, in consequence of long wars and glorious campaigns. It was then thought that the key to the plain was in the mountains. Switzerland, situated amidst the immense line upon which the hostile armies would have to fight, appeared to be the key to the whole continent. France, which occupied Switzerland, seemed to have a decided

* "During Napoleon's absence in Egypt, Lucien Bonaparte acted the useful part of a spy on the proceedings of the Directory, powerless in ability, and still more so in public opinion—despised by the bold for their weakness, and by the good for their undisguised rapacity. Lucien saw that the moment was not far off when a daring hand might hurl them from the seat they so ill filled, and seize the supreme authority."—*Court and Camp of Bonaparte*. E.

advantage. In possessing the sources of the Rhine, the Danube, and the Po, she seemed to command the whole course of those rivers. This was a mistake. It is to be conceived that two armies which support one wing immediately upon mountains, as the French did when they fought in the environs of Verona, or in the environs of Rastadt, should attach importance to the possession of those mountains, because one of the two which is master of them can come upon the enemy from the heights. But when they are fighting at the distance of fifty or one hundred leagues from mountains, these cease to have the same influence. While they would be exhausting themselves for the possession of the St. Gothard, armies on the Rhine or on the Lower Po would have time to decide the fate of Europe. But conclusions were drawn from the minor to the major. Because heights are important on a field of battle of a few leagues, it was concluded that the power which was master of the Alps must be master of the continent. Switzerland has but one real advantage, that of opening direct routes to France upon Austria and to Austria upon France. Hence it is obvious, that, for the peace of the two powers and of Europe, the closing of these routes is a benefit. The more you can prevent points of contact and means of invasion, the more good you effect, espec ally between two states which cannot come into collision without shaking the continent. It is in this sense that the neutrality of Switzerland interests all Europe, and that it has always been judicious to make it a principle of general safety.

France, by invading it, had gained the advantage of the direct routes to Austria and Italy; and, in this sense, the possession of Switzerland might be considered as important for her. But if the multiplicity of routes is an advantage for the power which is to take the offensive, and which has the means of doing so, it becomes an inconvenience for the power which is confined to the defensive, owing to the inferiority of its forces. The latter must wish the number of the points of attack to be as limited as possible, in order that it may be able to concentrate its forces with advantage. If it would be advantageous for France, sufficiently prepared for the offensive, to be able to debouch to Bavaria by way of Switzerland, it would be prejudicial to France, when reduced to the defensive, not to be able to rely on the Swiss neutrality; it would be prejudicial to her to have to guard the whole space between Mayence and Genoa, instead of having it in her power, as in 1793, to concentrate her forces between Mayence and Strasburg, on one side, and between Mont Blanc and Genoa, on the other.

Thus the occupation of Switzerland might become dangerous to France, in case of the defensive. But she was far from anticipating such a case. The intention of the government was to take the offensive everywhere, and to proceed, as formerly, by overwhelming strokes. But the distribution of her forces was most unpropitious. One army of observation was placed in Holland, and another army of observation on the Rhine. One active army was to set out from Strasburg, to cross the Black Forest, and to invade Bavaria. Another active army was to fight in Switzerland for the possession of the mountains, and thus to support, on the one hand, that which was to act on the Danube, and on the other, that which was to act in Italy. A large army was to set out from the Adige, to drive the Austrians completely beyond the Isonzo. A last army of observation was to cover Lower Italy and to guard Naples. It was intended that the army of Holland should amount to twenty thousand men, that of the Rhine to forty thousand, that of the Danube to eighty thousand, that of Switzerland to forty thousand,

that of Italy to eighty thousand, and that of Naples to forty thousand, making a total of three hundred thousand men, exclusively of garrisons. With such forces, this distribution would have been less faulty. But if, by the levy of the conscripts, our armies could be increased in time to that number, they were far from reaching it at the moment. It was not possible to leave more than ten thousand men in Holland. On the Rhine scarcely a few thousand could be collected. The troops destined to compose this army of observation, were detained in the interior, either to watch La Vendée, which was still threatened, or to maintain the public tranquillity during the approaching elections. The army destined to act on the Danube, comprised at most forty thousand men, that of Switzerland thirty, that of Italy fifty, that of Naples thirty. Thus we numbered scarcely one hundred and sixty or one hundred and seventy thousand men.* To scatter them from the Texel to the Gulf of Tarento, was the most imprudent course that could be pursued.

Since the Directory, hurried away by revolutionary daring, was determined to take the offensive, it became, in that case, more necessary than ever, to choose the points of attack, to assemble forces in sufficient mass at those points, and not to disperse for the purpose of fighting on all at once. Thus in Italy, instead of scattering its forces from Verona to Naples, it ought, after the example of Bonaparte, to collect the greater part of them on the Adige, and to strike there the hardest blows. It was sufficiently demonstrated that, by beating the Austrians on the Adige, it was possible to keep Rome, Florence, and Naples, in awe. Towards the Danube, instead of throwing away, to no purpose, thousands of brave men at the foot of the St. Gothard, it was requisite to diminish the army of Switzerland and of the Rhine; to augment the active army of the Danube; and to fight with the latter a decisive battle in Bavaria. It was possible even to reduce the points of attack still more, to remain in observation on the Adige, to act offensively on the Danube only, and there strike a more vigorous and a surer blow, by increasing the mass that was to deal it. Napoleon and the Archduke Charles have proved, the first by great examples, the second by profound arguments, that a quarrel between Austria and France ought to be settled on the Danube. That is the shortest route for reaching the goal. A victorious French army in Bavaria, renders null all the successes of a victorious Austrian army in Italy, because it is much nearer to Vienna.

As an excuse for the plans of the Directory, it must be observed that men had not yet learned to embrace such extensive fields of battle, and that the only person then capable of doing so was in Egypt. The one hundred and sixty thousand men, or thereabouts, actually disposable, were therefore scattered upon the immense line which we have described, and they were distributed as we have indicated. Ten thousand were to observe Holland, a few thousand watched the Rhine, forty thousand formed the army of the Danube, thirty thousand that of Switzerland, fifty thousand that of Italy, thirty thousand that of Naples. The conscripts were soon to reinforce

"Five-and-thirty thousand of the best troops were exiled under Napoleon on a distant shore, and though the addition of two hundred thousand conscripts had been ordered, yet the levy proceeded but slowly; the result of the whole was, that for the actual shock of war from the Adige to the Maine, the Directory could only count on a hundred and seventy thousand men; the remainder of their great forces was buried in the Italian peninsula, or too far removed from the theatre of hostilities, to be able to take an active part in the approaching contest."—*Alison*. E.

these masses, and to increase them to the number fixed by the plans of the ministry.

The selection of the generals was not happier than the conception of the plans. It is true that, since the death of Hoche, and the departure of Bonaparte, Desaix, and Kleber, for Egypt, the choice was much more limited. There was left one general whose reputation was high and deserved. This was Moreau. It was possible to be more daring, more enterprising, but not to be firmer or surer. A state defended by such a man could not perish. Disgraced on account of his conduct in Pichegru's affair, he had modestly consented to become a mere inspector of infantry. He was recommended to the Directory for commander in Italy. Ever since Bonaparte had drawn such attention to that fine country, ever since it was the apple of discord, as it were, between Austria and France, that command seemed to be the most important. For this reason Moreau was thought of. Barras opposed his appointment with all his might. He assigned the reasons of a fiery patriot, and represented Moreau as a suspicious person, on account of his conduct on the 18th of Fructidor. His colleagues had the weakness to give way to him. Moreau was set aside, and continued to be a mere general of division in the army which he ought to have commanded in chief. He nobly accepted this sabaltrern rank, which was beneath his talents. Joubert and Bernadotte had refused the command of the army of Italy—it has been already shown from what motives. Scherer, the minister at war, was therefore thought of. This general had gained a high reputation by his successes in Belgium, and by his glorious battle at Loano. He possessed a superior mind, but a body worn out with age and infirmities; he was no longer capable of commanding young men, full of vigour and daring. Besides, he had quarrelled with most of his comrades by endeavouring to introduce some strictness in the repression of military licentiousness. Barras proposed him for general of the army of Italy, it is said, merely to oblige him to give up the ministry at war, in which office he began to be troublesome on account of his severity. However, the military men who were consulted, especially Bernadotte and Joubert, having spoken of his capacity as it was then estimated in the army, that is to say, very highly, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the army of Italy. He strongly objected to accept it, alleging his age, the state of his health, and, above all, his unpopularity, owing to the office which he had held; but the Directory insisted, and he was obliged to comply.

Championnet, sent for trial before a commission, was succeeded in the command of the army of Naples by Macdonald. The command of the army of Helvetia was conferred on Massena. These selections were excellent, and the republic could do no other than applaud them. The important army of the Danube was given to General Jourdan. Notwithstanding his ill success in the campaign of 1798, the services which he had rendered in 1793 and 1794 were not forgotten, and it was hoped that he would not fall short of his first exploits. As the army of the Danube was not given to Moreau, it could not be in better hands. Unfortunately, it was so inferior in point of number, that it would have required the daring of the victor of Arcole and Rivoli to command it with confidence. Bernadotte had the army of the Rhine; Brune* that of Holland.

* "Brune, like all natives of the South, was ardent, active, fond of literature, poetry and the fine arts; he possessed much information, and betook himself to composition. To facilitate the publication of his works, he became a printer; and at this period the

Austria had made preparations far superior to ours. Not confiding, like us, in her successes, she had employed the two years which had elapsed since the armistice of Leoben, in levying, equipping, and training fresh troops. She had provided them with everything that was necessary, and had studied to select the best generals. She could at this moment bring into line two hundred and twenty-five thousand effective men, exclusively of the recruits which were still preparing. Russia was furnishing her with a contingent of sixty thousand men, whose fanatic bravery was extolled throughout all Europe, and who were commanded by the celebrated Suwarrow.* Thus the new coalition was ready to operate on the front of

Revolution opened. Brune was young; his head and heart confessed but one idea—glory and his country. He soon cast away pen, ink, and paper, and took to the sword. None of our marshals have been so falsely represented in public opinion as Brune. He was not in Paris in the autumn of 1792, but at Radmack; so, of course, could have had no share in the September massacres. He advanced rapidly to an elevated rank in the army; distinguished himself in the campaign of Italy; was afterwards named general-in-chief of the army in Helvetia; and from thence was removed to the Texel, to oppose the landing of the Anglo-Russian army under the command of the Duke of York, who was entirely beaten at Bergen. On the establishment of the Consulate, Brune was appointed to the army of Italy, when, with the assistance of Suchet and Davoust, he nearly destroyed the Austrian army. In 1804, he was one of the sixteen marshals whom Bonaparte appointed when he ascended the imperial throne. He was afterwards, for many years, in disgrace; but on Napoleon's return in 1815, he accepted the command of the eighth military division. On the restoration of Louis, Brune went to Toulon, to restore the white flag there; after which he was summoned to Paris. On his way thither, at Avignon, he was warned that much agitation prevailed in the town, particularly directed against him, and was advised not to pass through it; but turning a deaf ear to all remonstrance, he commanded his postilions to drive to the post-house. Here an armed mob, calling themselves royalists, besieged him in a room to which they had driven him for refuge; the mayor and a few gendarmes succeeded in protecting him for some time, while three thousand citizens looked on with apathy. All resistance, however, was at length overpowered, and, under the pretext that Brune had been the murderer of the Princess Lamballe, he was put to death by the mob; his lacerated corpse, after being dragged through the mud, was thrown into the Rhone, and the river refusing to retain it, it lay two days unburied on the strand."—*Duchess d'Abrantes. E.*

* "Alexander Suwarrow Rimmiski, a Russian field-marshal, was born in 1730, of an ancient family. In 1742 he entered the army as a common soldier, and attained the rank of colonel in 1762, after having distinguished himself in the famous Seven Years' War. He displayed equal talents in fighting the confederates of Poland from 1769 to 1772, which brought on the first dismemberment of that state. In 1774 he joined the army which Romanzow commanded against the Turks, and performed prodigies of valour. In 1783 he subdued the Kuban and Budziack Tartars, and was made commander-in-chief. In 1788 he caused the Turks to be attacked by the Russian fleet under the command of Paul Jones and the Prince of Nassau-Siegen, who defeated them twice. In the following year he was employed at the head of a detached body of Potemkin's army, besieged Ismael, took it, and put twenty thousand Turks to the sword, which procured him the name of the Butcher. In 1792 he was appointed to act in Poland; marched to Warsaw, and forced the suburbs of Prague after a bloody assault, which decided the fate of that kingdom. For his conduct on this occasion Catherine created him field-marshal. In 1799 he was sent into Italy against the French, and defeated Moreau at the passage of the Adda. A misunderstanding taking place soon afterwards between the courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna, Suwarrow received orders to separate from the Austrians and march into Switzerland, where Massena had just routed at Zurich the army that he was going to join. After many severe and doubtful conflicts, he arrived in Germany with the shattered remains of his army, which was his last exploit, the Russian troops having been recalled by their sovereign. On his arrival at St. Petersburg he was rather coldly received by Paul, and died at his estate of Polendorf, in Esthonia, at the age of seventy-one. Born with great talent and vivacity, Suwarrow possessed considerable information, and spoke several languages with facility. He was master of great skill and finesse, and knew how to make them instruments of success. Catherine liked whatever was extraordinary; he therefore took care to an

our line with about three hundred thousand men. Two other Russian contingents, combined with English troops, were talked of, the one destined for Holland, the other for Naples.

The plan of campaign formed by the coalition was not more judicious than ours. It was a pedantic conception of the Aulic Council's, strongly disapproved of by the Archduke Charles, but imposed upon him and all the generals, who were not permitted to make any alteration in it. This plan, like that of the French, was grounded on the principle that mountains are the key to the plain. Thus considerable forces were accumulated to guard the Tyrol and the Grisons, and wrest, if possible, the great chain of the Alps from the French. The second object on which the Aulic Council seemed to lay most stress, was Italy. Considerable forces were placed behind the Adige. The most important theatre of war, that of the Danube, did not appear to be the one that received most attention. The most judicious thing that had been done in that quarter was to place the Archduke Charles there. The Austrian forces were distributed as follows: The archduke was in Bavaria with fifty-four thousand infantry and twenty-four thousand cavalry. In the Vorarlberg, all along the Rhine, till it enters the Lake of Constance, General Hotze commanded twenty-four thousand foot and two thousand horse. Bellegarde was in the Tyrol, with forty-six thousand men, two thousand of whom were cavalry. Kray had on the Adige sixty-four thousand infantry and eleven thousand horse, forming a total of seventy-five thousand men. The Russian corps was destined to join Kray, for the purpose of acting in Italy.

It is obvious that Hotze's twenty-six thousand men and Bellegarde's forty-eight thousand were intended to act in the mountains. They were to gain the sources of the rivers, while the armies acting in the plain were to strive to cross their streams. On the part of the French, the like duty was allotted to the army of Helvetia. Thus, on both sides, a multitude of brave men were about to destroy one another to no purpose among inaccessible

nounce his victories to her in a laconic style that delighted her. Having taken the town of Toutoukai, in Bulgaria, he wrote, 'Glory to God! Praise to Catherine! The town is taken, and I am in it.' He announced the capture of Ismael in these terms: 'Madam, the proud Ismael is at your feet!' He frequently put his orders into verse, and sent his reports so to the empress. He never went into battle without kissing a little image of the Virgin or St. Nicholas, which he always carried about him. He used to tell his soldiers that all those who should be killed fighting would go to Paradise; and in the evening, after beat of drum, obliged his officers to recite a prayer before the soldiers. He was strict in service, and banished luxury from his camp. The soldiers adored him, but not so the officers, many of whom were his secret enemies—made so by his severe habits of discipline. He often changed his shirt in the middle of the camp, and wore sheepskin only. His frugal way of life enabled him to support all the fatigues of war. When he laid aside his sheepskin to put on the marshal's uniform, he took care to load himself immediately with all his honours and decorations, so as to be remarkable for the other extreme. He was bold, active, and had the art of attaching the soldiers to his destiny; but he has been reproached with shallow combinations and extreme cruelty.'—*Biographie Moderne*. E.

"Suwarrow is a most extraordinary man.—He dines every morning about nine. He sleeps almost naked; affects a perfect indifference to heat and cold; and quits his chamber, which approaches to suffocation, in order to review his troops, in a thin linen jacket, while the thermometer is at ten degrees below freezing. A great deal of his whimsical manner is affected. He finds that it suits his troops and the people he has to deal with. I dined with him this morning. He cried out to me across the table, 'Tweddell, the French have taken Portsmouth. I have just received a courier from England. The king is in the Tower, and Sheridan is protector!'"—*Tweddell's Remains*. F.

rocks, the possession of which could not have any influence whatever on the issue of the war.*

The French generals had not failed to represent to the Directory the inadequacy of their means of every kind. Jourdan's forces, since he had been obliged to send several battalions to Belgium to quell some commotions, and a demi-brigade to the army of Helvetia to replace another demi-brigade despatched to Italy, amounted to no more than thirty-eight thousand effective men. Such a force was too disproportionate to that of the archduke, to oppose him with advantage. He solicited the prompt formation of Bernadotte's army, which hitherto comprised no more than four or five thousand men, and especially the organization of the new field battalions. He wished to obtain permission to draw to him either the army of the Rhine or the army of Helvetia—and in this he was right. Massena complained that he had neither magazines nor the means of transport indispensably necessary for the supply of his army in a country barren and extremely difficult of access.

To these observations the Directory replied that the conscripts were about to join, and would soon be formed into field battalions; that the army of Helvetia should be immediately increased to forty thousand men, and that of the Danube to sixty thousand; that, as soon as the elections were over, the old battalions, retained in the interior, should be sent off to form the nucleus of the army of the Rhine. Bernadotte and Massena were ordered to concur in Jourdan's operations, and to conform to his views. The Directory, still relying on the effect of the offensive, and feeling the same confidence as ever in its soldiers, wished its generals, in spite of the disproportion of number, to lose no time in making a sudden attack and disconcerting the Austrians by an impetuous charge. Orders were issued accordingly.

The Grisons, divided into two factions, had long hesitated between the Austrian domination and the Swiss domination. They had at last called the Austrians into their valleys. The Directory, considering them as Swiss subjects, ordered Massena to occupy their territory, but previously to send the Austrians a summons to evacuate it. In case of refusal, he was to attack immediately. At the same time, as the Russians continued advancing into Austria, it addressed two notes on this subject, the one to the congress at Rastadt, the other to the emperor, intimating, that if in the space of eight days counter-orders were not issued to the march of the Russians, it should consider war as declared. Jourdan was ordered to cross the Rhine as soon as that time should have expired.

The congress of Rastadt had made great progress in its labours. The questions of the line of the Rhine, the division of the islands, and the construction of bridges, were settled; the question of the debts was now the only one that occupied its attention. Most of the Germanic princes, excepting the ecclesiastical princes, were sincerely desirous of arranging matters so as to avoid war; but, most of them being under the control of Austria, they durst not speak out. The members of the deputation successively quitted the congress, and it appeared likely that it would soon be impossible to deliberate. The congress declared that it could not reply to the note of the Directory, and referred it to the diet of Ratisbon. The note addressed to the emperor was sent to Vienna and remained unan-

* All these assertions are justified by the detailed comments of the Archduke Charles, General Jomini, and Napoleon.

sured War was declared *de facto*. Jourdan was ordered to cross the Rhine, and to advance through the Black Forest to the sources of the Danube. He passed the Rhine on the 11th of Ventose (March 1). The Archduke Charles crossed the Lech on the 13th of Ventose (March 3). Thus the limits which the two powers had prescribed for themselves were passed, and they were about to come once more to blows. At the same time, Jourdan, though making an offensive march, was ordered to let the enemy fire the first shots, till the declaration of war should be approved by the legislative body.

Massena was meanwhile acting in the Grisons. On the 16th of Ventose (March 6), he summoned the Austrians to evacuate them. The Grisons are composed of the upper valley of the Rhine and the upper valley of the Inn, or the Engadine. Massena resolved to cross the Rhine near its entrance into the Lake of Constance, and thus to pick up all the corps dispersed in the upper valleys. Lecourbe, who formed his right wing, and who, from his extraordinary activity and daring, was the most accomplished general for mountain warfare, was to start from the environs of the St. Gothard, cross the Rhine towards its sources, and throw himself in the valley of the Inn. General Dessoles, with a division of the army of Italy, was to second him, by proceeding from the Valteline into the valley of the Upper Adige.

These skillful dispositions were made with great vigour. On the 16th of Ventose (March 6), the Rhine was boldly crossed at all points. The soldiers threw carts into the river, and passed over them as upon a bridge. In two days Massena was master of the whole course of the Rhine, from its sources to its mouth in the Lake of Constance, and had taken fifteen pieces of cannon and five thousand prisoners. Lecourbe, on his part, executed with equal success the orders of his commander-in-chief. He crossed the Upper Rhine, passed from Dissentis to Tüsis in the valley of the Albula, and from this valley he boldly threw himself into that of the Inn, by crossing the loftiest mountains in Europe, still covered with the snows of winter. A compulsory delay having prevented Dessoles from proceeding from the Valteline towards the Upper Adige, Lecourbe found himself exposed to the attack of all the Austrian forces cantoned in the Tyrol. While, in fact, he was boldly advancing into the valley of the Inn, and marching upon Martinsbrück, Laudohn threw himself with the corps upon his rear; but the intrepid Lecourbe, turning back, attacked Laudohn, overthrew him, took a great number of prisoners, and resumed his march for the valley of the Inn.*

This brilliant commencement seemed to induce a belief that the French could everywhere, in the Alps as at Naples, defy an enemy superior in number. It confirmed the Directory in the notion that it was right to persist in the offensive, and to make amends by daring for inferiority of number.

The Directory sent to Jourdan the declaration of war, which it had obtained from the Councils, with orders to attack immediately. Jourdan had debouched by the defiles of the Black Forest into the country between the Danube and the Lake of Constance. The angle formed by the river and the lake opens more and more as it advances into Germany. Jourdan,

* "This glorious victory was achieved with forces scarcely half the number of the vanquished, and by it the French found themselves masters of the upper extremity of the two great valleys of the Tyrol, the Inn, and the Adige."—*Jomini*. E.

who purposed to support his left on the Danube and his right on the Lake of Constance, was therefore obliged, as he proceeded, to keep extended his line, and consequently to weaken it in a dangerous manner, especially in the face of an enemy very superior in number. He had at first advanced as far as Mengen on the one hand, and Markdorf on the other. But, learning that the army of the Rhine would not be organized before the 10th of Germinal (March 30), and fearing lest he should be turned by the valley of the Neckar, he felt some apprehension, and made a retrograde movement. The orders of his government and the success of Massena decided him to march forward again. He chose a good position between the Lake of Constance and the Danube. Two streams, the Ostrach and the Aach, commencing nearly at the same point, and falling, the one into the Danube, and the other into the Lake of Constance, form one and the same right line, behind which Jourdan established himself. St. Cyr, forming his left, was at Mengen; Souham, with the centre, at Pfullendorf; Ferino, with the right, at Bärendorf. D'Hautpoult was placed with the reserve. Lefebvre, with the division of the advanced guard, was at Ostrach. This was the most accessible point of the line. Situated at the origin of the two streams, it presented marshes, which might be crossed by means of a long causeway. It was upon this point that the Archduke Charles, who meant not to suffer himself to be anticipated, resolved to make his principal effort. He directed two columns to the left and right of the French, against St. Cyr and Ferino. But the whole of his main body, nearly fifty thousand strong, was directed upon the point of Ostrach, where there were at most nine thousand French. The battle commenced in the morning of the 2d of Germinal (March 21), and was most obstinate. The French displayed, in this first encounter, a bravery and perseverance which excited the admiration of Prince Charles himself. Jourdan hastened to this point; but the extent of his line and the nature of the country did not allow him by a rapid movement to transfer his forces from his wings to his centre. The passage was forced, and, after an honourable resistance, Jourdan found himself obliged to beat a retreat. He fell back between Singen and Tuttlingen.

A check at the opening of the campaign was disastrous. It destroyed that spell of daring and invincibility by means of which the French had need to make amends for number. At the same time, their inferiority of force had rendered that check almost inevitable. Jourdan, nevertheless, had not relinquished the intention of taking the offensive. Knowing that Massena was advancing on the other side of the Rhine, in full reliance upon the army of the Danube, he deemed it incumbent on him to make a last effort to aid his colleague, and to support him by proceeding towards the Lake of Constance. He had another motive for advancing again; this was to occupy Stockach, where the roads from Switzerland and Swabia meet—a point which he had done wrong to abandon, when retreating between Singen and Tuttlingen. He fixed his movement for the 5th of Germinal (March 25).

The Archduke Charles had not yet decided what direction he ought to give to his movements. He knew not whether he ought to direct his march to Switzerland, so as to separate Jourdan from Massena, or to the sources of the Danube, so as to separate the former from his base of the Rhine. The direction towards Switzerland seemed to him to be more advantageous for the two armies, for the French had as strong an interest in connecting themselves with the army of Helvetia, as the Austrians had

to separate them from it. But he was ignorant of Jourdan's plans, and resolved to make a reconnaissance for the purpose of ascertaining them. He had fixed this reconnaissance for the 5th of Germinal (March 25), the very day on which Jourdan intended to attack him.

The nature of the ground rendered the position of the two armies extremely complicated. The strategic point was that of Stockach, where the roads from Swabia and Switzerland meet. It was this point that Jourdan was anxious to retake, and the archduke to keep. The Stockach, a small stream, runs, making many windings, before the town of the same name, and finishes its sinuous course in the Lake of Constance. On this stream the archduke had taken position. He had placed his left between Nenzingen and Wahlwies, on the heights, and behind one of the windings of the Stockach. His centre was placed on an elevated plateau, called the Nellenberg, in advance of the Stockach. His right was on the prolongation of this plateau, along the causeway which runs from Stockach to Liptingen. It was like the centre, in advance of the Stockach. The extremity of this wing was covered by the thick woods which extend along the road to Liptingen. There were great defects in this position. If the left had the Stockach before it, the centre and the right had it at their backs, and were liable to be driven into it by an effort of the enemy. Besides, all the positions of the army had but one and the same outlet towards the town of Stockach, and, in case of a forced retreat, the left, the centre, and the right, would be crowded one upon another on a single road, and might, by meeting there, produce disastrous confusion. But the archduke, in resolving to cover Stockach, could not take any other position; and necessity was his excuse. He had but two faults to reproach himself with: the one, that of having omitted to throw up some works for the better protection of his centre, and his right; and the other, of having placed too many troops on his left, which was sufficiently protected by the river. It was his extreme solicitude to retain the important point of Stockach which had induced him to distribute his troops in this manner. He had, in other respects, the advantage of an immense numerical superiority.

Jourdan was ignorant of part of the dispositions of the archduke, for nothing is more difficult than reconnaissances, especially in a country of such a nature as that on which the two armies were acting. He still occupied the opening of the angle formed by the Danube and the Lake of Constance, from Tuttlingen to Steusslingen. This line is very extensive, and the nature of the country, which scarcely admitted of a rapid concentration, rendered this inconvenience still more serious. He ordered General Ferino, who commanded his right towards Steusslingen, to march upon Wahlwies; and Souham, who commanded the centre towards Eigeltingen, to march upon Zenzingen. These two generals were to combine their efforts to carry the archduke's left and centre, by crossing the Stockach and climbing the Nellenberg. Jourdan purposed then to make his left, his advanced guard, and his reserve, act upon the point of Liptingen, in order to penetrate through the woods which covered the archduke's right, and to succeed in forcing it. These dispositions had the advantage of directing the greatest mass of forces upon the archduke's right wing, which was most compromised. Unfortunately, all the columns of the army had too distant points of departure. In order to act upon Liptingen, the advanced guard and the reserve started from Emmingen-ob-Ek, and the left from Tuttlingen, at the distance of a day's march. This separation was the

more dangerous, because the French army, nearly thirty-six thousand strong, was inferior by at least one-third to the Austrian army.

On the 5th of Germinal (March 25), in the morning, the two armies met. The French army marched to a battle, that of the Austrians to a reconnaissance. The Austrians, who had broken up a little before us, surprised our advanced guards, but were soon driven in at all points by the mass of our divisions. Ferino on the right, Souham in the centre, arrived at Wahlwies, Orsingen, Nenzingen, on the bank of the Stockach, at the foot of the Nellenberg, drove back the Austrians to the position which they had occupied in the morning, and commenced a serious attack on that position. They had to cross the Stockach and to force the Nellenberg. A long cannonade took place along the whole line.

On our left, the success was more speedy and more complete. The advanced guard, now commanded by Soult,* since Lefebvre had been wounded, repulsed the Austrians, who had advanced to Emmingen-ob-Ek, took Liptingen, put them to the rout in the plain, pursued them with extreme ardour, and succeeded in taking the woods from them. These woods were the same that covered the Austrian right. By following up

* "Jean-de-Dieu Soult was born in the year 1769, and entered the army in his sixteenth year. Under Hoche, and then under Jourdan, he distinguished himself by his skill and bravery; and at the battle of Fleurus, in particular, he exhibited talents of the highest order. In 1794 he was made general of brigade, and, four years afterwards, of division. The First Consul knew Soult by report, and one day inquired of Massena whether he deserved his reputation. 'Both for judgment and courage,' replied the veteran 'I can recommend him as one who, in my opinion, has scarcely a superior.' In consequence of this praise Soult was intrusted with the command of the chasseurs of the consular guard. When the invasion of England was resolved on, he was placed over the army encamped from Boulogne to Calais, where he established the severest discipline. In 1804 he was presented with the marshal's truncheon. When his generals surrounded Napoleon to receive his final instructions at Austerlitz, all that he said to Soult was, 'To you, marshal, I have only to observe—act as you always do.' In the heat of this celebrated battle an aide-de-camp arrived with an order that he should instantly take the heights of Pratzen. 'I will obey the Emperor's commands as soon as I can,' replied the marshal; 'but this is not the proper time.' This kindled the Emperor's rage, who despatched another aide-de-camp with a more peremptory mandate. He arrived just as Soult was putting his column in motion. The manœuvre had been delayed only because the Russians were extending their line to the left, and so weakening their centre, which was in possession of the heights. Complete success attended the marshal's attack. Napoleon from his eminence perceived at once the reason of the delay and the brilliancy of the movement. He rode up to Soult, and, in presence of the whole staff, told him that he accounted him the ablest tactician in the empire. For his behaviour at Eylau he was created Duke of Dalmatia, and soon afterwards sent to Spain, where he was defeated by Sir John Moore at Corunna, to whose memory he erected a statue near the spot where he had fallen. He next invaded Portugal, where he met with no better success. After remaining two years in the Peninsula, defeated in every action he fought with Wellington, Soult was called to Germany, and was present at the battle of Bautzen. While at Dresden, news arrived of the defeat of the French at Vittoria, on which he was again hurried off to Spain to check the advance of Wellington. But he was as unsuccessful as on the former occasion, and received his final defeat under the walls of Toulouse. On the restoration of the Bourbons he received the portfolio of the ministry at war, but on the escape of Napoleon from Elba he sided with him, and fought at Waterloo. In 1816 he was banished from France, but in three years he received permission to return, and in 1821 his marshal's staff was restored to him."— *Court and Camp of Bonaparte*. E.

Soult, by a show of superior piety, had the art to ingratiate himself with Charles X and his priestly advisers. On the downfall of that dynasty in 1830, Louis-Philippe appointed him to a place in the ministry, which he held for some time, and then resigned. The marshal is a shrewd, worldly man, a skilful soldier, and a consummate courtier, and is at this period (July, 1838) officiating as ambassador extraordinary of France to England in honour of the coronation of Queen Victoria. E.

their movement, the French might possibly throw it into the ravine of the Stockach, and place it in great jeopardy. But it was clear that this wing had just been reinforced at the expense of the centre and the left, and that it was requisite to act upon it with a great mass of force. It was necessary, therefore, as in the original plan, to make the advanced guard, the reserve, and the left, converge upon this same point. Unfortunately, General Jourdan, presuming upon the too easy success which he had already won, aimed at attaining too remote an object, and, instead of calling St. Cyr to him, he ordered that general to make a long circuit for the purpose of turning the Austrians and cutting off their retreat. This was hastening to reap the fruits of victory before the victory was achieved. General Jourdan kept at the decisive point only the division of the advanced guard, and the reserve under d'Hautpoul.

Meanwhile the right of the Austrians, seeing the woods which covered them forced by the enemy, faced about, and disputed with extreme obstinacy the causeway from Liptingen to Stockach, which runs through those woods. They were fighting furiously, when the archduke came up in the utmost haste. Forming a correct judgment of the danger, he withdrew the grenadiers and the cuirassiers from the centre and the left, and moved them to his right. Giving himself no concern about the movement of St. Cyr on his rear, he concluded that, if Jourdan were repulsed, St. Cyr would be in so much the greater danger; and he resolved to confine himself to a decisive effort towards the point actually threatened.

The woods were disputed with extraordinary obstinacy. The French, very inferior in number, resisted with a courage which the archduke calls admirable; but the prince charged in person with some battalions on the causeway of Liptingen, and made the French loose their hold. The latter were driven out of the woods, and at length found themselves in the uncovered plain of Liptingen, from which they had started. Jourdan sent to demand succours of St. Cyr; but it was too late. He had his reserve left, and he determined to order a charge of cavalry, with a view to regain the advantages that he had lost. He despatched four regiments of cavalry at once. This charge, probably checked by another charge, made seasonably by the archduke's cuirassiers, was not successful. A terrible confusion ensued in the plain of Liptingen. The French, after performing prodigies of valour, fled. General Jourdan made heroic efforts to stop the fugitives; he was himself hurried along by them. The Austrians, however, exhausted by this long combat, durst not pursue us.

The engagement was now over. Ferino and Souham had maintained their ground, but they had not forced either the centre or the left of the Austrians. St. Cyr was getting upon their rear. It could not be said that the battle was lost: the French, inferior by one-third, had everywhere retained the field of battle, and displayed remarkable intrepidity; but, with their inferiority, and separated as their different corps were, not to have conquered, was to be beaten. It was necessary immediately to call in St. Cyr, who was in a very precarious situation, to rally the advanced guard and the reserve, which had suffered severely, and to bring back the centre and the right. Jourdan forthwith issued orders accordingly, and directed St. Cyr to fall back as speedily as possible. The position of the latter had become extremely perilous, but he effected his retreat with the steadiness which has always distinguished him, and regained the Danube without accident. The loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, had been nearly equal on both sides. It amounted to about four or five thousand men.

After this unfortunate day, the French were unable to keep the field, and it became necessary for them to seek shelter behind some formidable line. Were they to retreat to Switzerland or to the Rhine? It was evident that, in retreating to Switzerland, they might combine their efforts with Massena's army, and be enabled by that junction to resume an imposing attitude. Unluckily, General Jourdan did not deem it right to follow this course. He was apprehensive for the line of the Rhine, on which Bernadotte had not yet collected more than seven or eight thousand men, and he resolved to fall back to the entrance of the defiles of the Black Forest. He there took a position which he conceived to be strong, and leaving the command to Ernoulf, the chief of his staff, he set out for Paris, to complain of the state of inferiority in which his army had been left. The results spoke much more loudly than all the complaints in the world, and it would have been far better to remain with his army than to go to Paris to complain.

Most fortunately, the Aulic Council imposed upon the Archduke Charles a serious fault, which partly balanced ours. If the archduke, following up his advantages, had pursued our vanquished army without intermission, he might have thrown it into complete disorder, and perhaps even destroyed it. He would then have had time to return towards Switzerland, to attack Massena, deprived of all assistance, reduced to his thirty thousand men, and entangled in the upper valleys of the Alps. It would not have been impossible to cut him off from the road to France. But the Aulic Council forbade the archduke to push on for the Rhine, before Switzerland was evacuated. This was a consequence of the principle that the key to the theatre of the war was in the mountains.

During these occurrences in Swabia, the war was proceeding in the Upper Alps. Massena was operating towards the sources of the Rhine, Lecourbe towards those of the Inn, Dessoles towards those of the Adige, with balanced success. There was, on the other side of the Rhine, a little above the point where it falls into the Lake of Constance, a position which it was necessary to carry—that of Feldkirch. Massena had exerted all his energy to accomplish this purpose, but he had lost two thousand men without result. Lecourbe and Dessoles had fought brilliant actions, the former at Taufers, the latter at Nauders, which had put three or four thousand prisoners into the hands of each, and amply compensated the check at Feldkirch. Thus the French, from their spirit and hardihood, maintained the superiority in the Alps.

Operations commenced in Italy the very day after the battle of Stockach. The French had received about thirty thousand conscripts, which increased the mass of their forces in Italy to very nearly one hundred and sixteen thousand men. They were distributed as follows. Thirty thousand old troops, under Macdonald, guarded Rome and Naples. The thirty thousand young soldiers were in the fortresses. There remained fifty-six thousand men under Scherer. Of these fifty-six thousand men, he had detached five thousand under General Gauthier to occupy Tuscany, and five thousand under General Dessoles to act in the Valteline. Thus Scherer had forty-six thousand left to fight upon the Adige, an essential point, to which the whole mass of our forces ought to have been directed. Besides the disadvantage of the small number of men on this decisive point, there was another which was not less fatal to the French. The general inspired no confidence. He was not young enough, as we have observed; he had, besides, rendered himself unpopular during his ministry. He was himself

aware of this, and it was with great reluctance that he had accepted the command. He went about at night to listen to the conversation of the soldiers in their tents, and to collect with his own ears the proofs of his unpopularity. These were most unfavourable circumstances at the outset of a great and difficult campaign.

The Austrians were to be commanded by Melas and Suwarrow. Meanwhile they were under the Baron de Kray, one of the emperor's best generals. They amounted, even before the arrival of the Russians, to eighty-five thousand men in Upper Italy. Very nearly sixty thousand were already on the Adige. In both armies orders had been given to take the offensive. The Austrians were to debouch from Verona, to skirt the foot of the mountains, and to advance on the other side of the river, masking all the fortresses. The object of this movement was to support that of the army of the Tyrol in the mountains.

Scherer had received no other injunction than to cross the Adige. The commission was difficult, and the Austrians had all the advantage of that line, which must be sufficiently known from the events of 1796. Verona and Legnago, which command it, belonged to the Austrians. The attempt to throw a bridge at any point whatever would have been extremely dangerous, for the Austrians, possessing Verona and Legnago, would have had it in their power to debouch on the flank of the army while so engaged. The safest course, if orders had not been received to take the offensive, would have been to allow the enemy to debouch beyond Verona, to attack him on a ground which we should have had time to choose, to give him battle, and to take advantage of the results of the victory to cross the Adige at his heels.

Scherer, being obliged to take the initiative, hesitated as to what course he should pursue, but at length decided upon an attack towards his left. The reader recollects, no doubt, the position of Rivoli in the mountains, at the entrance of the Tyrol, and very far above Verona. The Austrians had intrenched all the approaches to it and formed a camp at Pastrengo. Scherer resolved, in the first place, to take this camp from them, and to throw them back on this side beyond the Adige. The three divisions of Serrurier, Delmas, and Grenier, were destined for this service. Moreau, who had become merely a general of division under Scherer, was, with Hatry's and Victor's divisions, to alarm Verona. General Montrichard, with one division, was to make a demonstration upon Legnago. This distribution of force indicated the hesitation and uncertainty of the commander-in-chief.

The attack took place on the 6th of Germinal (March 26), the day after the battle of Stockach. The three divisions directed to attack the camp of Pastrengo on several points, took it with an intrepidity worthy of the old army of Italy, and made themselves masters of Rivoli. They took fifteen hundred prisoners and a great number of cannon from the Austrians. The latter recrossed the Adige in haste, by a bridge which they had thrown across at Polo, and which they had time to destroy. At the centre, under Verona, there was fighting for the villages situated in advance of that city. Kaim displayed a useless obstinacy in defending and recovering them. That of San Massimo was seven times taken and retaken. Moreau, not less obstinate than his antagonist, did not allow him to acquire any advantage, and cooped him up in Verona. Montrichard, in making a useless demonstration on Legnago, incurred real danger. Kray, deceived by false intelligence, had imagined that the French would direct their principal

effort upon the Lower Adige. He had despatched thither great part of his forces, and in debouching from Legnago he placed Montrichard in the most imminent peril. The latter fortunately covered himself by the accidents of the ground, and prudently fell back upon Moreau.

The action had been bloody and entirely to the advantage of the French on the left and at the centre. Their loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, might be estimated at four thousand, and that of the Austrians at eight thousand at least.* In spite, however, of the advantage acquired by the French, they had obtained but very unimportant results. At Verona, they had only shut up the Austrians; above Verona, they had driven them across the Adige, and they had gained the means of passing it after them by repairing the bridge of Polo. It should be recollected that the road which runs outside of that river passes through Verona, and that there is no other outlet for debouching into the plain. It was not enough, then, to cross the Adige at Polo; after crossing it, our troops found themselves facing Verona, in the same position as Moreau at the centre, and it was necessary to take the place. If, on the same day, advantage had been taken of the disorder into which the attack on the camp of Pastrengo had thrown the Austrians, and if no time had been lost in re-establishing the bridge of Polo, perhaps the French might have entered the place at the heels of the fugitives, especially by favour of the obstinate battle which Moreau was fighting on the other side of the Adige with General Kaim.

Unfortunately, not one of these plans was adopted. This fault, however, might have been repaired on the following day by operating briskly, and by moving the bulk of the forces before and above Verona towards the point of Polo. But Scherer took three successive days to consider what course he should pursue. He directed a road to be sought on the other side of the Adige, which would allow him to avoid Verona. The army was indignant at this hesitation, and loudly complained that the advantages gained in the action of the 6th (March 26), were not followed up. At length, on the 9th of Germinal (March 29), a council of war was held, and Scherer decided to act. He formed the singular plan of throwing Serrurier's division across the Adige by the bridge of Polo, and of directing the mass of his army between Verona and Legnago, for the purpose of attempting the passage of the river there. To effect the removal of his forces, he sent two divisions of his left to his right, made them pass behind his centre, and exposed them to useless fatigues, upon wretched roads, utterly ruined by the rains.

On the 10th of Germinal (March 30), the new plan was put in execution. Serrurier, with his division, six thousand strong, crossed the Adige alone at Polo, while the bulk of the army was moving lower down between Verona and Legnago. It was easy to foresee what must be the fate of Serrurier's division. Proceeding, after crossing the Adige, along a road which was closed by Verona, and which thus formed a kind of *cul-de-sac*, he incurred great risks. Kray, having a correct notion of its situation, despatched against it a mass of forces three times its number, and drove it

* "The loss of the French in this battle amounted to four thousand men, while that of the Imperialists was nearly seven thousand; but, nevertheless, as the success on the left and centre was in some degree balanced by the disaster on the right, they were unable to derive any decisive advantage from this large difference in their favour. Already the courage of the Austrians was elevated by the balanced success which they had obtained; and, from the hesitation of the enemy in following up his advantage at Pastrengo, they perceived with pleasure, that the genius of Napoleon had not been inherited by his successor."—*Alison*. E.

oriskly back upon the bridge of Polo. Confusion ensued in the ranks. The river was recrossed, but this was effected in disorder. Detachments were obliged to cut their way through, and fifteen hundred prisoners remained in the hands of the Austrians. Scherer, when apprized of this check, which was inevitable, contented himself with picking up the beaten division, and bringing it nearer to the Lower Adige, where he had now concentrated the greater part of his forces.

Several more days were passed by both parties in feeling their way. At length Kray took a determination, and resolved, while Scherer was proceeding to the Lower Adige, to debouch *en masse* from Verona, to march upon Scherer's flank, and to drive him between the Lower Adige and the sea. The disposition was good; but, fortunately, an intercepted order made Moreau acquainted with Kray's plan; he immediately communicated it to the general-in-chief, and urged him to direct his divisions to ascend the river again, in order to make head towards Verona, by which place the enemy was about to debouch.

It was while executing this movement that the two armies met on the 16th of Germinal (April 5), in the environs of Magnano. Victor's and Grenier's divisions, forming the right, towards the Adige, were ascending the river by San Giovanni and Tomba, with the intention of proceeding to Verona. They overthrew Mercantin's division, which was opposed to them, and completely destroyed Wartensleben's regiment. Thus these two divisions arrived nearly opposite to Verona, and were enabled to accomplish their object, which was to cut off from that city all the troops that Kray might have sent out of it. Delmas's division, which was to move to the centre, towards Butta Preda and Magnano, was delayed, and afforded the Austrian division of Kaim occasion to advance as far as Butta Preda, and thus to form a salient point about the middle of our line. But Moreau, on the left, with Serrurier's, Hatry's, and Montrichard's divisions, victoriously advanced. He had ordered Montrichard's division to change front, in order to face Butta Preda, about the spot where the enemy had formed a point, and was marching with his two other divisions towards Dazano. Delmas, having at length arrived at Butta Preda, covered our centre; and at this moment fortune seemed to declare in our favour, for our right, completely victorious on the side next to the Adige, was preparing to intercept the retreat of the Austrians to Verona.

But Kray, judging that the essential point was on our right, and that he ought to renounce success on all the other points for the purpose of securing it on that, directed thither the greatest mass of his forces. He had one advantage over Scherer, namely, the proximity of his divisions, which permitted him to displace them with greater facility. The French divisions, on the contrary, were at a great distance from one another, and fought on ground intersected by numerous inclosures. Kray fell unawares, with his whole reserve, upon Grenier's division. Victor was proceeding to the succour of the latter, when he was himself charged by the Nadasty and Reisky regiments. Kray was not content with this first advantage. He had caused Mercantin's division, beaten in the morning, to be rallied in the rear; he despatched it afresh against Grenier's and Victor's divisions, and thus decided their defeat. Those two divisions, in spite of a warm resistance, were obliged to abandon the field of battle. The right being put to the rout, our centre found itself threatened. Kray did not fail to proceed against it; but Moreau was there, and he prevented Kray from following up his advantage.

The battle was evidently lost, and it was necessary to think of retreating.* The loss had been great on both sides. The Austrians had three thousand killed and wounded, and two thousand of them were prisoners. The French had an equal number killed and wounded, but they had lost four thousand prisoners. It was there that General Pigeon, who, during the first campaign in Italy, had displayed such talent and daring in the advanced guards, was mortally wounded.

Moreau advised that the army should sleep on the field of battle, to avoid the confusion of a nocturnal retreat, but Scherer resolved to fall back the same evening. Next day, he retired behind the Molinella, and on the day following, the 18th of Germinal (April 7), to the Mincio. Supported upon Peschiera on the one hand, and Mantua on the other, he would be enabled to oppose a vigorous resistance, to recall Macdonald from the further extremity of the Peninsula, and by this concentration of his forces to recover the superiority which he had lost by the battle of Magnano. But the unfortunate Scherer had entirely lost his self-possession. His soldiers were worse disposed than ever. Masters for three years of Italy, they were indignant at seeing it wrested from them, and they imputed their reverses to the unskilfulness of their general. It is certain that, for their parts, they had done their duty as well as in the days of their brightest glory. The reproaches of his army had shocked Scherer as much as his defeat. Conceiving that he could not maintain his ground on the Mincio, he retired to the Oglio, and then to the Adda, which he reached on the 12th of April. No one could tell where this retrograde movement would end.

The campaign had been opened scarcely six weeks, and we were already retreating at all points. Ernoulf, chief of the staff, whom Jourdan had left with the army of the Danube at the entrance of the defiles of the Black Forest, had taken fright on being informed of an incursion of a few light troops on his flanks, and retired in disorder towards the Rhine. Thus, both in Germany and in Italy, our armies, as brave as ever, nevertheless lost their conquests, and retreated beaten towards the frontier. It was in Switzerland only that we had retained the advantage. There Massena kept his ground with all the tenacity of his character; and, excepting the fruitless attempt on Feldkirch, had uniformly come off conqueror. But, established on the projecting point formed by Switzerland between Germany and Italy, he was placed between two victorious armies, and it became indispensably necessary for him to retreat. He accordingly gave orders to that effect to Lecourbe, and fell back into the interior of Switzerland, but in good order, and preserving the most imposing attitude.

Our arms were humbled, and our ministers abroad were destined to be the victims of the most disgraceful and atrocious outrage. War being declared against the emperor, and not against the Germanic empire, the congress of Rastadt had continued assembled. The parties had very nearly arranged matters as to the last difficulty, that of the debts; but two-thirds of the states had already recalled their deputies. This was an effect of the influence of Austria, which did not wish peace to be concluded. Some only of the deputies of Germany still remained, and, the retreat of the army

* "Before night, Scherer drew off his shattered forces behind the Tararo, carrying with them two thousand prisoners and several pieces of cannon—a poor compensation for the loss of four thousand killed and wounded, four thousand prisoners, seven standards, eight pieces of cannon, and forty caissons, which had fallen into the hands of the Imperialists. This victory, one of the most signal in the Austrian annals, decided the fate of Italy."—*Jomini*. E

of the Danube having opened the country, the deliberations were held amidst Austrian troops. The cabinet of Vienna then conceived an infamous plan, which reflected long dishonour on its policy. It had loudly complained of the haughtiness and energy which our ministers had displayed at Rastadt. It imputed to them a disclosure which had deeply compromised it in the estimation of the Germanic body. It was that of the secret articles arranged with Bonaparte for the occupation of Mayence. These secret articles proved that, in order to obtain Palma Nova in the Friule, the Austrian cabinet had ceded Mayence, and unworthily betrayed the interests of the Empire. That cabinet was highly incensed, and resolved to take vengeance on our ministers. It wished, moreover, to seize their papers, to ascertain which of the German princes were at the moment treating individually with the French republic. It therefore conceived the criminal idea of securing the persons of our ministers on their return to France, of robbing, ill-using, and perhaps even murdering them. It was never known, however, whether the order for murdering them had been given in a positive manner.

Our ministers already felt some distrust, and, without apprehending any attack on their persons, they had some fears for their correspondence. It was, in fact, interrupted on the 30th of Germinal by the removal of the pontoniers who conveyed it across. Our ministers remonstrated; the deputation of the Empire remonstrated too, and asked if the congress could consider itself safe. The Austrian officer to whom it addressed itself, did not return a satisfactory answer. Our ministers then declared that they would set out in three days, that is to say, on the 9th of Floreal (April 29), for Strasburg, adding that they should stay in that city, ready to renew the negotiations as soon as any wish to that effect should be expressed. On the 7th of Floreal, a courier of the legation was seized. Fresh remonstrances were made by the whole congress, and it was expressly asked whether the French ministers were safe. The Austrian colonel commanding the Szekler hussars, cantoned near Rastadt, replied that the French ministers had but to set out within twenty-four hours. He was applied to for an escort for them, but refused it, and declared that their persons would be respected. Our three ministers, Jean Debry, Bonnier, and Roberjeot, set out at nine in the evening of the 9th of Floreal (April 28). They occupied three carriages with their families. They were followed by the Ligurian legation and the secretaries of embassy. At first an objection was made to permit them to leave Rastadt; but at length all obstacles were removed, and they departed. They were scarcely fifty paces from Rastadt, when a troop of Szekler hussars rushed upon them with drawn swords, and stopped the carriages. That of Jean Debry was the first. The hussars violently opened the door, and asked, in a semi-barbarous jargon, if he was Jean Debry. On his reply in the affirmative, they seized him by the throat, dragged him out of the carriage, and in presence of his wife and children fell upon him with their sabres. Believing him to be dead, they went to the other carriages and murdered Roberjeot and Bonnier, in the arms of their families. The members of the Ligurian legation and the secretaries of embassy had time to escape. The ruffians charged with this execution then plundered the carriages, and carried off all the papers.

Jean Debry had not received any mortal wound. The coolness of the night restored to him the use of his senses, and he crawled, covered with blood, to Rastadt. When this outrage was known, it excited the indig-

nation of the inhabitants and of the members of the congress. German honour was shocked at a violation of the law of nations unheard-of among civilized people, and which was only conceivable of a semi-barbarian cabinet. The members of the deputation left at the congress paid all possible attention to Jean Debry and to the families of the murdered ministers. They afterwards assembled, and drew up a declaration, in which they denounced to the world the outrage that had just been committed, and repelled all suspicion of connivance with Austria. This crime, known immediately throughout all Europe, excited universal indignation.* The Archduke Charles wrote a letter to Massena, intimating that he should direct proceedings to be instituted against the colonel of the Szekler hussars; but this cold and formal letter, which proved the embarrassment of the prince, was not worthy of him and of his character. Austria did not, and could not, make any reply to the accusations directed against her.

Thus the war between the two systems that divided the world was implacable. The republican ministers, ill-received at first, then insulted during a year of peace, were at last murdered in a most unworthy manner, and with a ferocity characteristic of savages alone. The law of nations, observed between the most inveterate enemies, was violated only in regard to them.

* "About this time our plenipotentiaries were massacred at Rastadt by the Shekler hussars, and notwithstanding the indignation expressed by all Frenchmen at that atrocious act, vengeance was still very tardy in overtaking the assassins. The two Councils were the first to render a melancholy tribute of honour to the victims. Who that saw that ceremony can ever forget its solemnity? Who can recollect without emotion the religious silence which reigned throughout the hall and tribunes, when the vote was put? The president turned towards the curule chair of the victim, on which lay the official costume of the assassinated representative covered with black crape, bent over it, and pronouncing the names of Robertjot and Bonnier, added in a voice, the tone of which was always thrilling, 'Assassinated at the congress of Rastadt!' Immediately all the representatives responded, 'May their blood be upon the heads of their murderers!' This crime was long attributed to the court of Austria; but I have positive evidence that the Queen of Naples and the colonel of the Shekler regiment were the sole authors of the murder. I do not now recollect at what battle it was that the Shekler hussars were in such a situation as obliged them to capitulate. Their consciences told them, however, that they ought not to expect quarter. 'Will you make us prisoners?' demanded the commander of the corps. He received for answer an exclamation of rage and indignation—'Defend yourselves, wretches!' The whole regiment was exterminated."—*Duchess d'Abrantes*. E.

VOL. IV.—43

THE DIRECTORY.

EFFECT OF OUR FIRST REVERSES; MULTIPLIED ACCUSATIONS AGAINST THE DIRECTORY—ELECTIONS OF THE YEAR VII; SIEYES NOMINATED DIRECTOR IN THE PLACE OF REWBEL—CONTINUATION OF THE CAMPAIGN—MASSENA IS INVESTED WITH THE JOINT COMMAND OF THE ARMIES OF HELVETIA AND THE DANUBE, AND OCCUPIES THE LINE OF THE LIMMAT—ARRIVAL OF SUWARROW IN ITALY; SCHERER TRANSFERS THE COMMAND TO MOREAU; BATTLE OF CASSANO; RETREAT OF MOREAU BEYOND THE PO AND THE APENNINES—ATTEMPT TO FORM A JUNCTION WITH THE ARMY OF NAPLES; BATTLE OF THE TREBBIA—COALITION OF ALL THE PARTIES AGAINST THE DIRECTORY; REVOLUTION OF THE THIRTIETH OF PRAIRIAL; TREILHARD, LAREVEILLERE, AND MERLIN, RESIGN THE DIRECTORSHIP.

THE unexpected reverses which marked the opening of the campaign, and the outrage at Rastadt, produced an impression most prejudicial to the Directory. From the very moment of the declaration of war, the two parties in opposition began to be violent, and they kept no bounds when they saw our armies beaten and our ministers murdered. The patriots excluded by the schisms, the military men whose licentiousness the government had attempted to repress, the royalists, concealing themselves behind the discontented of different classes, all made at once a handle of the late events for accusing the Directory. They preferred the most unjust and the most multiplied charges against it. The armies, they alleged, had been entirely neglected. The Directory had suffered their ranks to be thinned by desertion, and had not used any activity in replenishing them by means of the new conscription. It had retained in the interior a great number of old battalions, which, instead of being sent to the frontiers, were employed in cramping the freedom of the elections. The armies, thus reduced to a force so disproportionate to that of the enemy, had not been supplied by the Directory with magazines, or with provisions, or with accoutrements, or with means of transport, or with horses for remounts. It had abandoned them to the rapacity of the administrations, which had consumed to no purpose a revenue of six hundred millions. Lastly, it had made the very worst choice of generals to command them. Championnet, the conqueror of Naples, was in confinement for having endeavoured to repress the rapacity of the agents of the government. Moreau was reduced to the part of a mere general of division. Joubert, the conqueror of the Tyrol, Augereau, one of the heroes of Italy, were without command. Scherer, on the contrary, who had paved the way to all our defeats by his administration, had the command of the army of Italy, because he was a countryman and friend of Rewbel. But they did not stop here. There

were other names which they repeated with acrimony. The illustrious Bonaparte, his illustrious lieutenants, Kleber and Desaix, and their forty thousand companions in arms, the conquerors of Austria, where were they? In Egypt, in a distant land, where they were likely to perish from the imprudence of the government, perhaps from its malignity. It now began to be asserted that this enterprise, lately so admired, had been contrived by the Directory to get rid of a celebrated warrior of whom it was jealous.

They went back still farther. They reproached the government on account of the war itself. They insisted that it had provoked it by its imprudent conduct towards the powers. It had invaded Switzerland, overthrown the Pope and the court of Naples, and thus urged Austria to extremities, and all without being prepared to enter upon the conflict. By invading Egypt, it had decided the Porte to a rupture. In deciding the Porte, it had relieved Russia from all apprehension for her rear, and permitted her to send sixty thousand men into Germany. Lastly, such was their fury, that they went so far as to say the Directory was the secret author of the murders at Rastadt. It was, they alleged, an expedient for inflaming the public mind against the enemies of France, and demanding fresh resources from the legislative body.

These reproaches were repeated everywhere, in the tribune, in the newspapers, in the public places. Jourdan had hastened to Paris, to complain of the government and to impute to it all his reverses. Those generals who had not come had written to state their grievances. It was a universal attack, which would be incomprehensible, if we were not acquainted with the violence, and especially the contradictions, of the parties.

With ever so slight a recollection of facts, we shall be able to reply to all these reproaches. The Directory had not suffered the ranks of the armies to be thinned, for it had granted only twelve thousand furloughs; but it could not possibly prevent desertions in time of peace. There is not a government in the world that could have prevented them. The Directory would even have exposed itself to the charge of tyranny, by taking measures to oblige many soldiers to rejoin the armies. There would, in fact, have been some harshness in forcing men who had been spilling their blood for the last six years to return to their colours. It was but five months since the conscription was decreed; and it had not had the means, in so short a time, to organize that system of recruiting, and above all to equip and to train the conscripts, to form them into field battalions, and to send them to Holland, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. It had retained some old battalions, because they were indispensable for maintaining tranquillity during the elections, and because this duty could not be committed to young soldiers, whose sentiments were not formed, and whose attachment to the republic was not sufficiently decided. Another important reason had justified this precaution, namely, La Vendée again excited by foreign emissaries,* and Holland threatened by the Anglo-Russian fleets.

As for the disorder of the administration, the charges brought against the Directory were not better founded. There had been dilapidations, indeed, but almost all to the advantage of the very persons who complained

* "The disturbances in the western provinces had again risen to a formidable height. The Vendéans and Chouans had yielded only a temporary submission to General Hoche; and with the arrival of less skilful leaders of the republican forces and the increasing weakness of government, their activity had again led them to insurrection."
--*Lacretelle* E.

of them, and in spite of the utmost efforts of the Directory. There had been dilapidations in three ways: by the plunder of the conquered countries, by charging to the state the pay of the soldiers who had deserted, and lastly, by making disadvantageous contracts with the companies. Now, it was the generals and the staffs, who had committed and profited by all these dilapidations. It was they who had plundered the conquered countries, made a profit upon the pay, and shared that of the companies. We have seen that the latter sometimes relinquished so much as forty per cent. of their profits, in order to obtain the patronage of the staffs. Scherer, towards the end of his ministry, had embroiled himself with his brother officers by the resistance which he had opposed to all these disorders. The Directory had endeavoured to put a stop to them by appointing commissions independent of the staffs; and we have seen how Championnet treated them at Naples. The disadvantageous bargains made with the companies arose from another cause—the state of the finances. Promises only were given to the contractors, and these, therefore, indemnified themselves by the price for the uncertainty of the payment. The credits opened this year amounted to 600 millions of ordinary and to 125 millions of extraordinary. Out of this sum, the minister had already assigned 400 millions for expenses incurred. Not 210 millions had yet been received; orders had been delivered for the other 190.

Thus nothing could be imputed to the Directory on the score of dilapidations. Neither could it be reproached for its choice of generals excepting in one instance. Championnet, after his conduct towards the commissioners sent to Naples, could not be allowed to retain the command. Macdonald was at least equal to him, and was known to be a man of strict integrity. Joubert and Bernadotte had refused the command of the army of Italy. They had recommended Scherer. Moreau, who ought by right to have been appointed, had been rejected by Barras alone, who had insisted on Scherer's nomination. As for Augereau, his democratic turbulence was a just reason for refusing him a command; and besides, notwithstanding his undeniable qualities, he was inadequate to a command in chief. With respect to the expedition to Egypt, we have seen whether the Directory was chargeable with that, and whether it is true that it was anxious to get rid of Bonaparte, Kleber, Desaix, and their forty thousand companions in arms. Lareveillère-Lepeaux had made an enemy of the hero of Italy by the firmness with which he opposed the expedition.

The provocation to war was no more the act of the Directory than any of the other mishaps with which it was charged. The reader must have perceived that the incompatibility of the passions raging in Europe had alone provoked the war. On this head, no reproach could justly be made against any one; but, at any rate, it was most assuredly not the patriots, or military men, who had a right to accuse the Directory. What would the patriots have said, had it not supported the Vaudois, punished the papal government, overthrown the King of Naples, and forced the sovereign of Piedmont to abdicate? Was it not the military men, who, in the army of Italy, had always driven them to the occupation of new countries? The news of the war had delighted them all. Was it not, moreover, Bernadotte at Vienna, and a brother of Bonaparte at Rome, who had committed imprudences, if any had been committed? It was not the determination of the Porte which had influenced that of Russia; but, had the fact been so, it was the author of the expedition to Egypt, who would alone have deserved to be reproached for that.

Nothing, then, was more absurd than the mass of the accusations accumulated against the Directory. It merited but one of them—that of having participated in the excessive confidence felt by the patriots and the military men in the power of the republic. It had participated in the revolutionary passions, and suffered itself to be hurried along by them. It had conceived that one hundred and seventy thousand men would be sufficient at the outset of the war, and that the offensive would decide everything. As for its plans, they were bad, but not worse than Carnot's in 1796, not worse than those of the Aulic Council, and founded, moreover, in part, on a project of General Jourdan. There was but one man who could have formed better, as we have observed, and it was not the fault of the Directory that he was not in Europe.

It is but an act of equity in history to point out the injustice of these reproaches; but so much the worse for a government when everything is imputed to it as a crime. One of its indispensable qualities is to possess such a character as may repel injustice. When it has lost this, and people impute to it the faults of others, and even those of fortune, it has no longer the power to govern, and this impotence must doom it to resign. How many governments were worn out since the commencement of the Revolution! The action of France against Europe was so violent that it could not fail to destroy speedily all its springs. The Directory was worn out, as the committee of public welfare was before it, and as Napoleon himself has since been. All the accusations preferred against the Directory were evidence, not of its faults, but of its frailty.

It is not surprising that five civil magistrates, elected to power, not on account of their hereditary greatness or their personal reputation, but because they had deserved rather more esteem than their fellow-citizens—that five magistrates, armed with the sole power of the laws, to oppose the turbulent factions, to reduce to obedience numerous armies, generals covered with glory and with a full sense of their deserts, finally, to administer one-half of Europe—it is not surprising that they should soon appear incompetent, amid the terrible struggle that had anew commenced. It required but one reverse to render this incompetence apparent. The factions alternately beaten, the military men several times repressed, called them contemptuously the *lawyers*, and said that France could not be governed by them.

From a very strange singularity, but which is frequently seen in the conflict of revolutions, public opinion showed some indulgence for only that one of the five directors who least deserved it. Barras, alone, indisputably deserved all that could be urged against the Directory. In the first place, he had never attended to business, and had left all the toil to his colleagues. Excepting in decisive moments, when he raised his voice, which was superior to his courage, he did nothing whatever. He interfered only in the government appointments, which better suited his intriguing disposition. He had shared in all the profits of the companies, and alone justified the reproach of dilapidation. He had always been the defender of firebrands and rogues; it was he who had supported Brune, and sent Fouché to Italy. He was the cause of the bad choice of the generals, for he had opposed the appointment of Moreau, and strongly insisted on that of Scherer. Notwithstanding all these very serious faults, he alone was excepted from condemnation. In the first place, he was not considered, like his four colleagues, as a *lawyer*; for his indolence, his dissolute habits, his soldier-like manners, his connection with the Jacobins, and the recollection

of the 18th of Fructidor, which was attributed exclusively to him, made him in appearance a man more capable of governing than his colleagues. The patriots found in him points of resemblance to themselves, and conceived that he was devoted to them. The royalists received from him secret hopes. The staffs, which he flattered, and which he screened from the just severity of his colleagues, also held him in high favour. The contractors extolled him; and in this manner he gained exemption from the general discredit. He was even perfidious towards his colleagues, for all the reproaches which he had deserved he had the art to throw upon them alone. Such a part cannot prosper long: it may succeed for a moment: it did succeed on this occasion.

The reader is acquainted with the enmity of Barras against Rewbel. The latter, a really able administrator, had offended by his spleen and his superciliousness all those with whom he had had to deal. He had shown severity for the men of business, for all the *protégés* of Barras, and especially for all the military men. Hence he had become an object of general hatred. He was upright, though rather avaricious. Barras had the art, in his society, which was numerous, to throw upon him the most odious suspicions. An unlucky circumstance tended to authorize them. Rapinat, the agent of the Directory in Switzerland, was Rewbel's brother-in-law. The extortions practised in all conquered countries had been committed in Switzerland, but not to such an extent as everywhere else. The vehement complaints of that petty avaricious people had nevertheless produced an extraordinary sensation. Rapinat had been charged with the unfortunate commission of putting seals upon the coffers and treasures of Berne: he had treated the Helvetic government with haughtiness: these circumstances and his unlucky name had caused him to pass for the Verres of Switzerland, for the author of dilapidations in which he had no hand. He had even quitted Switzerland before the time when she had suffered most. The associates of Barras made wretched puns upon his name, and the whole odium fell on Rewbel, who was his brother-in-law. Thus Rewbel, in spite of his own probity, was exposed to all sorts of calumnies.

Lareveillère was not less odious than Rewbel, on account of his inflexible severity, and his influence in the political affairs of Italy. His life, however, was so simple and so modest, that it was impossible to attack his integrity. The society of Barras made him a subject of ridicule. They made game of his person and of his pretensions to a new papacy. They said that he had set up for the founder of the doctrine of Theophilanthropy, of which, however, he was not the author. Merlin and Treilhard, though not so long in power, and less conspicuous than Rewbel and Lareveillère, were, nevertheless, involved in the same unpopularity.

It was in this disposition of mind that the elections of the year VII. which were the last, took place. The furious patriots were determined not to be excluded this year, as in the preceding, from the legislative body. They had inveighed against the system of schisms, and endeavoured to brand it beforehand, and with such success that people durst not again resort to it. In this state of agitation, when men impute to their adversaries all the designs which they apprehend them to entertain, they said that the Directory, recurring, as on the 18th of Fructidor, to extraordinary means, was about to prolong for five years the powers of the existing deputies, and to suspend for all that time the exercise of electoral prerogatives. Because the Directory was engaged in organizing the Helvetic contingent, they alleged that it was going to bring Swiss to Paris. They made a great

noise about a circular to the electors, issued by the commissioner of the government (the prefect) to the department of the Sarthe. It was not a circular, as we have since seen, but an exhortation. The Directory was compelled to express its disapprobation of it in a message. The elections which took place with these dispositions, brought a considerable number of patriots into the legislative body.* No attempt was made this year to exclude them from the legislative body, and their election was confirmed. General Jourdan, who was right in imputing his reverses to the numerical inferiority of his army, but showed a want of his accustomed judgment in imputing to the government a wish to ruin him, was again returned to the legislative body, with a heart big with resentment. Augereau, too, was deputed to it, with an increase of his former spleen and turbulence.

A new director was to be chosen. Chance was not favourable to the republic, for, instead of Barras, it designated Rewbel, the ablest of the five directors, as the member who was to retire. This was a subject of great satisfaction to all the enemies of that director, and a fresh occasion for slandering him more conveniently. As, however, he had been deputed to the Council of the Ancients, he took an opportunity of replying to his accusers, and he did so in the most victorious manner.

On the retirement of Rewbel, the only infraction of the strict laws of probity with which the Directory can be charged was committed. The first five directors, appointed at the time of the institution of the Directory, had made an agreement among themselves, by which each of them was to take ten thousand francs on account of their salary, and give them to the retiring member. The aim of this noble sacrifice was to make the members of the Directory, especially such of them as had no fortune, feel less the transition from supreme power to private life. There was even a reason of dignity in acting thus; for it was derogatory to the consideration of the government to find the man who had one day been invested with supreme power, in poverty the next. It was chiefly this reason that induced the directors to make a more suitable provision for their colleagues. Their salaries were already so moderate that a deduction of ten thousand francs appeared too heavy. They resolved to allow the sum of one hundred thousand francs to each director on retiring. This would be an additional expense to the state of one hundred thousand francs. Application was to be made for this sum to the minister of the finances, who might take it out of one of the thousand savings which it was so easy to make in budgets of six or eight hundred millions. It was decided, moreover, that each director should retain his carriage and horses. As the legislative body annually allowed the costs of outfit, this expense was to be avowed, and would thenceforward become legitimate. The directors, moreover, agreed that the savings made in the costs of outfit should be divided among them. This was assuredly a very slight encroachment on the public purse, if it was one at all; and while generals and companies were making such enormous profits, one hundred thousand francs per annum, devoted to the subsistence of a man who had just been at the head of the government, could not be deemed a robbery. The reasons and the form of the measure excused it in some sort. Lareveillère, to whom it was communicated.

* "The elections, like those of the preceding year, were republican. The Directory was no longer possessed of sufficient strength to contend against public misfortunes and the animosity of parties. The retirement of Rewbel, who was succeeded by Sieyès, deprived it of the only man who could make head against the storm; and introduced in his stead the most decided opponent of this obnoxious and worn-out government." - *Mignet*. E

never would consent to it. He declared to his colleagues that he would never accept his share. Rewbel received his. The one hundred thousand francs given to him were taken from the two millions of secret service money, for which the Directory was not obliged to account. Such was the only fault with which the Directory collectively can be charged. One only of its members, out of the twelve who succeeded one another, was accused of having made private gains. Of what government in the world can the same thing be said?

A successor was to be found for Rewbel. A man of high reputation, who would confer some degree of consideration on the Directory, was sought for. Sieyes, whose name was the most renowned next to that of Bonaparte, was thought of. His embassy to Prussia had added to his reputation. He was already regarded, and very justly, as a man of profound mind; but since he had been in Berlin, the maintenance of the Prussian neutrality was attributed to him; though it was owing, in fact, much less to him than the situation of that power. Thus he was deemed quite as capable to direct the government, as to frame a constitution. He was chosen director. Many persons fancied that in this circumstance they discovered a confirmation of a rumour generally circulated, of very speedy modifications in the constitution. They said that Sieyes was called to the Directory merely to contribute to these modifications. So little did they imagine that the existing state of things could continue, that they beheld in all these facts certain indications of changes.

During this interval, the Directory had not ceased to make the greatest efforts to repair the reverses which had marked the opening of the campaign. Jourdan had lost the command of the army of the Danube, and Massena had been invested with the chief command of all the troops cantoned between Düsseldorf and the St. Gothard. This happy selection was destined to save France. Scherer, impatient to quit an army, the confidence of which he had lost, had obtained permission to transfer the command to Moreau. Macdonald had received urgent orders to evacuate the kingdom of Naples and the Roman states, and to effect a junction with the army of Upper Italy. All the old battalions retained in the interior had been marched off for the frontiers; the equipment and the organization of the conscripts had been accelerated, and reinforcements began to arrive from all quarters.

No sooner was Massena appointed commander-in-chief of the armies of the Rhine and Switzerland, than he set about making a suitable disposition of the forces committed to his charge. Never did general assume the command under more critical circumstances. He had at most thirty thousand men, scattered in Switzerland, from the valley of the Inn to Basle; he had opposed to him thirty thousand men under Bellegarde in the Tyrol, twenty-eight thousand under Hotze in the Vorarlberg, forty thousand under the archduke, between the Lake of Constance and the Danube. This mass of nearly one hundred thousand men was capable of enveloping and destroying him. If the archduke had not been thwarted by the Aulic Council and prevented by illness, and had crossed the Rhine between the Lake of Constance and the Aar, he might have intercepted Massena's retreat into France, surrounded and cut him off. Fortunately, he was not master of his movements. Fortunately, too, Bellegarde and Hotze had not been placed immediately under his command. Between these three generals there was a continual bickering, which prevented them from concerting together for any decisive operation.

These circumstances favoured Massena, and enabled him to take a *solia* position, and to distribute the troops placed at his disposal in a suitable manner. Everything proved that the archduke meant merely to observe the line of the Rhine towards Alsace, and that he purposed to operate in Switzerland, between Schaffhausen and the Aar. Massena moved back the greater part of the army of the Danube into Switzerland, and assigned to it positions which it ought to have taken at first, that is to say, immediately after the battle of Stockach. He had been wrong in leaving Lecourbe too long in the Valteline. That officer was obliged to retire from it, after brilliant actions in which he displayed admirable intrepidity and presence of mind. The Grisons were evacuated. Massena then distributed his army from the great chain of the Alps to the conflux of the Aar and Rhine, choosing the line which to him appeared the best.

Switzerland presents several lines of water, which, commencing at the High Alps, run through the whole of it and throw themselves into the Rhine. The largest and longest is that of the Rhine itself, which, rising not far from the St. Gothard, first runs northward, then spreads out into a spacious lake called the Lake of Constance, issues from it near Stein, proceeds westward to Basle, and then begins again to run northward to form the boundary of Alsace. This line is the most extensive, and it embraces all Switzerland. There is a second, that of Zurich, comprised within the preceding; this is that of the Linth, which, having its source in the little cantons, pauses to form the Lake of Zurich, issues from it by the name of the Limmat, and falls into the Aar, not far from the influx of the latter into the Rhine. This line, which envelops only part of Switzerland, is much less extensive than the former. There is a third, that of the Reuss, inscribed again in the second; it passes from the bed of the Reuss to the Lake of Lucerne, issues from it at Lucerne, and joins the Aar near the point where the Limmat falls into the latter. These lines, commencing on the right against prodigious mountains, terminating on the left in great rivers, consisting sometimes of rivers, at others of lakes, present numerous advantages for the defensive. Massena could not hope to retain the longest, that of the Rhine, and to extend himself from the St. Gothard to the mouth of the Aar. He was obliged to fall back on that of the Limmat, where he established himself in the most solid manner. He placed his right wing, composed of Lecourbe's, Menard's, and Lorges' three divisions, from the Alps to the Lake of Zurich. He gave the command of it to Ferino. He placed his centre on the Limmat, and composed it of four divisions, Oudinot's, Vandamme's, Thureau's, and Soult's. His left guarded the Rhine, towards Basle and Strasburg.

Before he confined himself in this position, he strove to prevent by an action the junction of the archduke with Hotze, his lieutenant. These two generals, placed on the Rhine, the one at its entrance into the Lake of Constance, the other at its exit from it, were separated by the whole length of the lake. In passing this line, to establish themselves before that of Zurich and the Limmat, on which Massena had placed himself, they would have to set out from the two extremities of the lake, in order to form their junction beyond it. Massena might have chosen the moment when Hotze had not yet advanced to fall upon the archduke, to drive him beyond the Rhine, then to turn upon Hotze and repulse him in his turn. It has been calculated that he would have had time for executing this double operation, and for beating separately both the Austrian generals. Unluckily, he did not think of attacking till the moment when they were

near joining, and when they had it in their power mutually to support each other. He fought them on several points on the 5th of Prairial (May 24) at Aldenfingen and at Frauensfeld, and though he had everywhere the advantage, owing to that vigour which he infused into all his movements, still he could not prevent the junction, and was obliged to fall back on the line of the Limmat and Zurich, where he prepared to give the archduke a warm reception, if the latter should be disposed to attack him.

In Italy, the state of affairs was far less propitious. There disasters had followed one another without ceasing.

Suwarrow had joined the Austrian army with a corps of twenty-eight or thirty thousand Russians. Melas had assumed the command of the Austrian army. Suwarrow was invested with the chief command of both armies. He was called the invincible. He was known for his campaigns against the Turks and his cruelties in Poland. He possessed great energy of character, an affected eccentricity, which was carried to madness, and no genius for combination. He was a genuine barbarian, fortunately incapable of calculating the employment of his forces, otherwise the republic might perhaps have succumbed. His army was like himself. It had a bravery that was extraordinary and bordered on fanaticism, but no instruction. The artillery, the cavalry, and the engineers belonging to it, were reduced to absolute ciphers. It was expert only at the use of the bayonet,* and employed it as the French had done during the Revolution. Suwarrow, extremely insolent to his allies, gave the Austrians Russian officers to teach them the use of the bayonet. He employed the most haughty language: he said that the *women*, the *petits-maitres*, the *idlers*, ought to quit the army; that the babblers who presumed to find fault with the imperial service, should be treated as egotists and lose their grades; and that every one ought to sacrifice himself for the deliverance of Italy from the French and the atheists. Such was the style of his addresses. Fortunately, this brutal energy, after doing us a great deal of mischief, had to encounter the energy of skill and calculation, and was foiled by the latter.

Scherer, having entirely lost his presence of mind, had rapidly retreated to the Adda, amidst cries of indignation from his soldiers. Out of an army of forty-six thousand men, he had lost ten thousand, slain or prisoners. He was obliged to leave eight thousand more at Mantua, so that he had but twenty-eight thousand left. Nevertheless, if with this handful of men he had been capable of manœuvring with skill, he might have given Macdonald time to join him, and have avoided many disasters. But he placed himself on the Adda, in the most injudicious manner. He separated his army into three divisions. Serrurier's division was at Lecco, at the exit of the Adda from the Lake of Lecco. Grenier's division was at Cassano. Victor's division at Lodi. He had placed Montrichard, with a few light corps, towards the Modenese and the mountains of Genoa, to maintain the communications with Tuscany, by which Macdonald was to debouch. His twenty-eight thousand men, thus dispersed on a line of twenty-four leagues, could not make a solid resistance anywhere, and must be broken wherever the enemy should present himself in force.

On the evening of the 8th of Floreal (April 27), at the very moment

* "Suwarrow's favourite weapon was the bayonet. One of the Austrian generals having proposed a reconnoissance, he replied with energy, 'Reconnoissance! I will have none of it. It is never difficult to find your opponents when you really wish it. Form column; charge bayonets; plunge into the centre of the enemy—these are my reconnoissances.'"—*Jomini*. E

when the line of the Adda was forced, Scherer resigned the command of the army to Moreau. That brave general had some right to refuse it. He had been obliged to stoop to the part of a mere general of division, and now, when the campaign was lost, when nothing but disasters were to be expected, the command was given to him. However, with a patriotic devotedness which history cannot too highly commend, he accepted a defeat by accepting the command the very same evening that the Adda was forced. Here commences the least extolled but the most glorious portion of his life.

Suwarrow had approached the Adda at several points. When the first Russian regiment appeared in sight of the bridge of Lecco, the carbineers of the brave 18th light infantry quitted the intrenchments and ran to meet those soldiers who had been described as terrible and invincible giants. They dashed upon them with their bayonets, and made a great carnage among them. The Russians were repulsed. They had kindled a flaming courage in the hearts of our brave fellows, who were determined to make these insolent barbarians, who came to interfere in a quarrel with which they had no concern, repent their journey. The appointment of Moreau served to raise their courage still more, and filled the army with confidence. Unfortunately, the position was not tenable. Suwarrow, repulsed at Lecco, had sent troops across the Adda at two points, Brivio and Trezzo, above and below Serrurier's division, which formed the left. That division was thus cut off from the rest of the army. Moreau, with Grenier's division, fought a furious battle at Trezzo, for the purpose of driving the enemy back beyond the Adda, and of again placing himself in communication with Serrurier's division. With eight or nine thousand men, he engaged a corps of above twenty thousand. His soldiers, animated by his presence, performed prodigies of valour, but could not drive back the enemy beyond the Adda. Unfortunately, Serrurier, to whom it was now impossible to send orders, did not conceive the idea of proceeding upon this same point of Trezzo, where Moreau was fighting so obstinately, in order to place himself again in communication with him. He was obliged to desist, and to leave Serrurier's division to its fate. It was surrounded by the whole hostile army, and fought with the utmost obstinacy. Enveloped at length on all sides, it was compelled to lay down its arms.* Part of this division, through the hardihood and presence of mind of an officer, escaped across the mountains to Piedmont. During this terrible action, Victor had luckily retired with his division intact. Such was the fatal battle called the battle of Cassano, on the 9th of Floreal (April 28), which reduced the army to about twenty-eight thousand men.

It was with this handful of brave fellows that Moreau undertook to retreat. That extraordinary man lost not for a moment that presence of mind with which nature had endowed him. Reduced to twenty thousand soldiers, in presence of an army which might have been increased to ninety thousand, if its commanders had possessed the skill to make it march in a mass, he was not shaken for an instant. This calmness was infinitely more meritorious than that which he had displayed when he returned from Germany with an army of sixty thousand victorious men, and yet it has been

* "Serrurier was surrounded on all sides by the imperialists, and, after an honourable resistance, finding his retreat cut off, and the assailants triple his own force, he laid down his arms, with seven thousand men."—*Alison*. E.

much less commended ; so much do the accidents of the passions warp contemporary judgments.

He made it his first care to cover Milan, to afford means for sending off the artillery and the baggage, and to allow time to the members of the Cisalpine government and all the Milanese who were compromised to retire to the rear. Nothing is more dangerous for an army than these families of fugitives which it is obliged to admit into its ranks. They embarrass its march, retard its movements, and may even sometimes compromise its safety. Moreau, after passing two days in Milan, resumed his march to recross the Po. From the conduct of Suwarrow, he had reason to conclude that he should have time to take a solid position. He had two objects to attain ; namely, to cover his communications with France and with Tuscany, by which the army of Naples was advancing. For this purpose, it appeared to him most judicious to occupy the slope of the mountains of Genoa. He marched in two columns ; the one, escorting the parks of artillery, the baggage, the whole equipage of the army, took the high road from Milan to Turin ; the other proceeded towards Alexandria, to occupy the roads to the Riviera of Genoa. He advanced towards his destination without being too closely pressed by the enemy. Suwarrow, instead of rushing with his victorious masses on our feeble army, and completely destroying it, stopped at Milan to receive the honours of triumph decreed him by the priests, the monks, the nobles, all the creatures of Austria, who had returned in a crowd in the train of the allied armies.

Moreau had time to reach Turin, and to send off all the equipage of war towards France. He armed the citadel, strove to excite the zeal of the partisans of the republic, and then went to join the column which he had directed upon Alexandria. He there chose a position which fully proved the soundness of his judgment. The Tanaro, on descending from the Apennines, throws itself into the Po below Alexandria. Moreau placed himself at the conflux of these two rivers. Covered at once by both, he was not afraid of an attack by main force ; he guarded at the same time all the roads to Genoa, and could await the arrival of Macdonald. No position could be more advantageous. He occupied Casale, Valenza, and Alexandria ; he had a chain of posts on the Po and the Tanaro ; and his masses were disposed in such a manner that they could hasten in a few hours to any point which might be attacked. There he established himself with twenty thousand men, and awaited with imperturbable composure the movements of his formidable enemy.

Suwarrow had fortunately taken his time to advance. He had applied to the Aulic Council for authority to dispose of the Austrian corps of Bellegarde, destined for the Tyrol. This corps had just descended into Italy, and increased the combined army to considerably more than one hundred thousand men. But Suwarrow, being ordered to besiege Peschiera, Mantua, and Pizzighitone, all at once, wishing at the same time to secure himself on the side towards Switzerland, and ignorant, moreover, of the art of distributing masses, had not about him more than forty thousand, a force, however, quite adequate to overwhelm Moreau, had he known how to manage it properly.

He advanced along the Po and Tanaro, and placed himself opposite to Moreau. He established himself at Tortona, and fixed his head-quarters there. After a few days of inaction, he at length resolved to make an attempt on Moreau's left wing, that is to say, on the side next to the Po. A little above the conflux of the Po and the Tanaro, opposite to Mugarone

are some woody islands, by favour of which the Russians resolved to attempt a passage. In the night between the 22d and the 23d of Floreal (May 11 and 12), they crossed, to the number of nearly two thousand, to one of these islands, and thus found themselves beyond the principal arm. The arm which they had yet to pass was inconsiderable, so that they might easily swim over it. They boldly crossed it, and were then on the right bank of the Po. The French, apprized of the danger, hastened to the point that was threatened. Moreau, who was informed of other demonstrations made towards the Tanaro, waited till the real point of danger should be clearly indicated, that he might bring his force to bear upon it. As soon as he was certain of it, he marched thither with his reserve, and drove into the Po the Russians who had had the temerity to cross. Two thousand five hundred of them were killed, drowned, or made prisoners.

This vigorous blow rendered Moreau's position, in the singular triangle in which he had posted himself, perfectly secure. But the inaction of the enemy gave him uneasiness. He was apprehensive that Suwarrow had left a mere detachment before Alexandria, and that he might have ascended the Po with the mass of his forces, with the intention of proceeding to Turin and taking the position of the French in the rear, or that he might perhaps have marched against Macdonald. In the uncertainty in which he was left by the inaction of Suwarrow, he resolved to act himself in order to ascertain the real state of things. He determined to debouch beyond Alexandria, and to make a strong reconnoissance. If the enemy had left only a detached corps before him, Moreau's intention was to change this reconnoissance into a serious attack, to overwhelm this detached corps, and then quietly to retire by the high-road of the Bochetta towards the mountains of Genoa, and there wait for Macdonald. If, on the contrary, he should meet with the principal mass, his plan was to fall back immediately, and to regain in all haste the Riviera of Genoa by all the accessory communications that were left him. A reason which particularly induced him to adopt this decisive course was the insurrection in Piedmont, on his rear. It was incumbent on him to draw near to his base as speedily as possible.

While Moreau was forming this extremely judicious plan, Suwarrow was forming another which was destitute of common sense. His position at Tortona was certainly the best that he could have taken, since it placed him between the two French armies, those of the Cisalpine and Naples. He ought not to have quitted it on any account. He nevertheless determined to take with him part of his force to the other side of the Po, to ascend it to Turin, to gain possession of that capital, to organize the Piedmontese royalists there, and to make himself master of Moreau's position. Nothing could be worse calculated than such a manœuvre; for, had he been desirous to take Moreau's position, he ought to have carried it by a direct and vigorous attack, but, above all things, not to have quitted the intermediate position between the two armies, which were striving to effect a junction.

While Suwarrow, dividing his forces, left part of them in the environs of Tortona, along the Tanaro, and took the other beyond the Po to march upon Turin, Moreau was executing the reconnoissance which he had planned. He had sent forward Victor's division, to attack with vigour the Russian corps that was before him. He remained himself with his reserve somewhat in rear, ready to convert this reconnoissance into a serious attack, if he should judge that the Russian corps might be crushed. After a very warm action, in which Victor's troops displayed extraordinary intre-

pidity, Moreau conceived that the whole Russian army was before him he durst not attack in good earnest for fear of having upon his hands a too superior enemy. In consequence, between the two courses which he had purposed to adopt, he preferred the second as the safest. He resolved, therefore, to retire towards the mountains of Genoa. His position was most critical. All Piedmont was in revolt on his rear. A corps of insurgents had gained possession of Ceva, which commands the principal road, the only one accessible to artillery. He was threatened with the loss of the great convoy of the objects of art collected in Italy. These circumstances were most inauspicious. By taking the roads more to the rear, and leading to the Riviera di Ponente, Moreau feared that he should get too far from the communications with Tuscany, and that he should leave them in the hands of the enemy, whom he supposed to be collected in mass about Tortona. In this perplexity he immediately formed his resolution, and made the following dispositions. He detached Victor's division without artillery or baggage, and sent it by roads passable for infantry only towards the mountains of Genoa. It was to hasten to occupy all the passes of the Apennines, for the purpose of joining the army coming from Naples, and of reinforcing it in case that it should be attacked by Suwarrow. Moreau, keeping only eight thousand men at most, proceeded with his artillery, his cavalry, and all that could not travel by the mountain tracks, to gain one of the carriage-roads in rear of Ceva, and leading to the Riviera di Ponente. In deciding upon this eccentric retreat he made another calculation, namely, that he should draw upon himself the enemy's army, and divert it from pursuing Victor and falling upon Macdonald.

Victor retired without accident by Acqui, Spigno, and Dego, and then occupied the crests of the Apennines. Moreau retired with extraordinary celerity upon Asti. The capture of Ceva, which cut off his principal communication, threw him into extreme embarrassment. He sent off the greater part of his parks by the Col de Fenestrella, keeping only the field artillery, that was indispensable to him, and resolved to open himself a route across the Apennines, by setting his own soldiers to construct it. After four days' incredible efforts, the road was rendered passable for artillery,* and Moreau arrived in the Riviera of Genoa without retrograding to the Col de Tenda, which would have separated him too far from Victor's troops detached towards Genoa.

Suwarrow, on receiving intelligence of Moreau's retreat, had lost no time in pursuing him; but he could neither guess nor prevent his skilful combinations. Thus, owing to his coolness and his address, Moreau had brought off his twenty thousand men, without suffering them to be once attacked, and on the other hand had repressed the Russians wherever he had encountered them. He had left a garrison of three thousand men in Alexandria, and was with nearly eighteen thousand in the environs of Genoa. He took post on the crest of the Apennines, awaiting the arrival of Macdonald. He had sent Lapoype's division, Montrichard's light corps, and Victor's division, to the Upper Trebbia, to join Macdonald. He remained himself in the environs of Novi, with the remainder of his *corps d'armée*

* "The republicans were extricated from a situation almost desperate by the skilful vigour of their general, aided by the resources of Guilleminot and the engineer corps under his directions. By their exertions and indefatigable efforts of one-half of the French army, a mountain-path leading across the Apennines from the valley of Garesio to the coast of Genoa, was in four days rendered practicable for artillery and wagons."

Jomini. E

His plan of junction was profoundly meditated. He might draw the army of Naples to him by the shores of the Mediterranean, collect it at Genoa, and debouch with it from the Bochetta, or make it debouch from Tuscany into the plains of Placentia and on the banks of the Po. The first course would insure the junction, because it would take place under shelter of the Apennines; but it would be necessary to cross the Apennines again, and to make head against the enemy, in order to take the plain from him. By debouching, on the contrary, in advance of Placentia, he should be master of the plain as far as the Po. He might choose his field of battle on the very banks of that river, and in case of victory, throw the enemy into it. Moreau was desirous that Macdonald should keep his left close to the mountains, in order to connect himself with Victor, who was at Bobbio. For his own part, he watched Suwarrow, ready to throw himself upon his flanks the moment he should attempt to march to meet Macdonald. In this situation, the junction appeared as safe as behind the Apennines, and would take place on a far preferable ground.

The Directory had at this moment just collected a considerable naval force in the Mediterranean. Bruix, the minister of the marine, had assumed the command of the Brest fleet, raised the blockade of the Spanish fleet, and was cruising with fifty sail in the Mediterranean, with a view to clear it of the English, and to re-establish the communication with the army of Egypt. This junction, which was so much desired, was at length effected, and it was likely to restore our preponderance in the seas of the Levant. Bruix was at this moment off Genoa. His presence had singularly raised the spirits of the army. It was said that he was bringing provisions, ammunition, and reinforcements. Such was not the fact; but Moreau availed himself of this rumour, and took some pains to gain belief for it. He caused a report to be circulated that the fleet had just landed twenty thousand men and considerable supplies. This report singularly encouraged his army, and greatly diminished the confidence of the enemy.

It was now the middle of Prairial (the beginning of June). A new event had taken place in Switzerland. We have seen that Massena had occupied the line of the Limmat or of Zurich, and that the archduke, debouching in two masses from the two extremities of the Lake of Constance, had come and bordered this line throughout its whole extent. He resolved to attack it between Zurich and Brügg, that is, between the Lake of Zurich and the Aar, all along the Limmat. Massena had taken position not on the Limmat itself, but on a series of heights in advance of the Limmat, and covering at once the river and the lake. He had intrenched these heights in the most formidable manner, and rendered them almost inaccessible. Though this part of our line, between Zurich and the Aar, was the strongest, the archduke had resolved to attack it, because it would have been too dangerous to make a wide circuit, for the purpose of attempting an attack above the lake, along the Linth. Massena might have taken advantage of this moment to crush the corps left in front of them, and thus to gain a decisive advantage.

The projected attack was executed on the 16th of June (4th of Prairial). It took place along the whole extent of the Limmat, and was everywhere victoriously repulsed, notwithstanding the obstinate perseverance of the Austrians. Next day, the archduke, thinking that such attempts ought to be followed up, in order not to incur useless losses, renewed the attack with the same obstinacy as before. Massena, considering that he might be forced, that his retreat would then be difficult, that the line which he should

leave would be immediately followed by a stronger, the chain of the Albis, which borders the Limmat and the Lake of Zurich in rear, resolved to retire voluntarily. By this retreat he should lose nothing but the city of Zurich, which he considered as of little importance. The chain of the Albis mountains, running along the Lake of Zurich and the Limmat of the Aar, presenting, moreover, a continuous steep declivity, was almost unassailable. By occupying it he should sustain only a slight loss of ground, for he should fall back no farther than the width of the lake and of the Limmat. In consequence, he retired thither of his own accord, and established himself in such a manner as took from the archduke all inclination to attack him.

Our position was therefore still nearly the same in Switzerland. The Aar, the Limmat, the Lake of Zurich, the Linth, and the Reuss, as far as the St. Gothard, formed our defensive line against the Austrians.

In Italy, Macdonald was at length advancing towards Tuscany. According to his instructions, he had left garrisons in Fort St. Elmo, at Capua, and at Gaeta. This was endangering to no purpose troops who were not capable of upholding the republican party, and who left a chasm in the active army. The French army, on withdrawing, had left the city of Naples a prey to a royal reaction, which equalled the frightful scenes of our own Revolution. Macdonald had rallied at Rome some thousand men of Garnier's division; he had picked up Gauthier's division in Tuscany, and Montrichard's light corps in the Modenese. He had thus formed a corps of twenty-eight thousand men. He was at Florence on the 6th of Prairial (May 25). His retreat was effected with great rapidity and remarkable order. He lost, unfortunately, much time in Tuscany, and did not debouch beyond the Apennines into the plains of Placentia till towards the end of Prairial (the middle of June).

Had he arrived earlier, he would have surprised the allies in such a state of dispersion, that he might have overwhelmed them successively and driven them beyond the Po. Suwarrow was at Turin, which he had taken, and where he had found immense supplies.* Bellegarde was observing the outlets from Genoa; Kray was besieging Mantua, the citadel of Milan, and the fortresses. In no place were thirty thousand Austrians or Russians collected together. Macdonald and Moreau, debouching with a united force of fifty thousand men, might have given a turn to the campaign. But Macdonald thought it right to spend a few days in resting his army, and reorganizing the divisions which he had successively picked up. He thus lost valuable time, and afforded Suwarrow the opportunity of repairing his faults. The Russian general, being informed of the march of Macdonald, hastened to leave Turin and to proceed with a reinforcement of twenty thousand men, for the purpose of placing himself between the two French generals, and resuming the position which he ought never to have quitted. He ordered General Ott, who was in observation on the Trebbia, in the environs of Placentia, to fall back upon him, if he should be attacked; he directed Kray to send to him from Mantua all the troops that he could spare; he left Bellegarde to watch Novi, whence Moreau was to debouch; and he prepared to march himself into the plains of Placentia, to meet Macdonald.

* "The fruits of this conquest of Turin were two hundred and sixty-one pieces of cannon, eighty mortars, sixty thousand muskets, besides an enormous quantity of ammunition and military stores, which had been accumulating in that city ever since the first occupation of Italy by the arms of Napoleon. About the same time intelligence was received of the fall of the castle of Milan, after four days of open trenches"—*Alison*. E.

These are the only arrangements made by Suwarrow during the whole campaign, that have gained the approbation of military men. The two French generals still occupied the positions that we have described. Placea, both of them on the Apennines, they were to descend for the purpose of uniting in the plains of Placentia. Moreau was to debouch from Novi, Macdonald from Pontremoli. Moreau had sent Victor's division to reinforce Macdonald. He had placed General Lapoype with some battalions at Bobbio, on the slope of the mountains, in order to favour the junction; and his plan was to seize the moment when Suwarrow should march in front against Macdonald, to take him in flank. But for this purpose it was requisite that Macdonald should continue to keep himself supported upon the mountains, and not accept battle too far in the plain.

Macdonald broke up about the end of Prairial (the middle of June). Hohenzollern's corps, placed in the environs of Modena, was guarding the Lower Po. It was overwhelmed by superior forces, lost fifteen hundred men, and the whole of it narrowly escaped being taken. This first success encouraged Macdonald, and induced him to hasten his march. Victor's division, which had just joined him, and augmented his army to nearly thirty-two thousand men, formed his advanced guard. Dombrowsky's Polish division marched on the left of Victor's; Rusca's division supported them both. Though the main body of the army, composed of Mont-richard's, Olivier's, and Watrin's divisions, was still behind, Macdonald, enticed by the advantage which he gained over Hohenzollern, purposed to overwhelm Ott, who was in observation on the Tinone, and ordered Victor, Dombrowsky, and Rusca, to march against him immediately.

Three torrents, running parallel to one another from the Apennines to the Po, formed the field of battle. These were the Nura, the Trebbia, and the Tidone. The main body of the French army was still on the Nura. Victor's, Dombrowsky's, and Rusca's divisions advanced towards the Trebbia, and had orders to cross it and to proceed to the Tidone, to overwhelm Ott, whom Macdonald conceived to be unsupported. They marched on the 29th of Prairial (June 17). They first repulsed the advanced guard of General Ott from the banks of the Tidone, and obliged it to take a position farther back, near the village of Sermet. Ott was well nigh overwhelmed; but at that moment Suwarrow came up to his support with his whole force. He opposed General Bagration to Victor, who marched along the Po; he drew back Ott to the centre, against Dombrowsky; and directed Melas to the right upon Rusca's division. Bagration was not at first successful against Victor, and was forced to fall back, but at the centre, Suwarrow made the Russian infantry attack Dombrowsky's division, threw two regiments of cavalry upon its flank, and broke it. From this moment, Victor, who had advanced towards the Po, found himself exposed and in danger. Bagration, reinforced by the grenadiers, resumed the offensive. The Russian cavalry, which had broken the Poles in the centre, and which had thus come upon Victor, charged him in flank, and obliged him to retire. Rusca, on the right, was then forced to relinquish the ground to Melas. Our three divisions recrossed the Tidone, and retrograded to the Trebbia.

This first action, in which one-third of the army at most had been engaged with the whole of the enemy's army, had not proved successful.*

"In vain the French formed squares, and received the assaults of the Cossacks with a rolling fire; they were broken, great part cut to pieces, and the remainder fled in disorder over the Trebbia. The Russians, in the heat of the pursuit, plunged, like the Carthaginians of old, into that classic stream, but they were received with so destructive

Macdonald, unaware of the arrival of Suwarrow, had been too hasty. He resolved to establish himself behind the Trebbia, to collect all his divisions there, and to revenge himself for the check which he had just sustained. Unluckily, Olivier's, Montrichard's and Watrin's divisions were still behind on the Nura, and he resolved to wait till the day after the next, that is, till the 1st of Messidor (June 19), to give battle.

But Suwarrow did not allow him time to collect his forces, and prepared to attack on the very next day, namely, the 30th of Prairial (June 18). The two armies were about to meet along the Trebbia, supporting their wings on the Po and the Apennines. Suwarrow, judging correctly that the essential point was in the mountains, by which the two French armies would be able to communicate, directed his best infantry and his best cavalry to that side. He sent Bagration's division, which was at first on his left, along the Po to his right, against the mountains. He placed it, together with Schweikofsky's division, under the command of Rosenberg, and ordered them both to cross the Trebbia, near Rivalta, in the upper part of its course, in order to draw off the French from the mountains. Dombrowsky's, Rusca's and Victor's divisions were placed towards this point, to the left of the French line. Olivier's and Montrichard's divisions were to take their place in the centre along the Trebbia. Watrin's division was to occupy the right, towards the Po and Placentia.

On the morning of the 19th of Prairial (June 18), the Russian advanced guards attacked those of the French, which were beyond the Trebbia, at Casaliggio and Grignagno, and repulsed them. Macdonald, who did not expect to be attacked, was engaged in bringing his centre divisions into line. Victor, who commanded on our left, immediately took all the French infantry beyond the Trebbia, and for a moment put Suwarrow in peril. But Rosenberg, coming up with Schweikofsky's division, regained the advantage, and, after a furious action, in which both sides sustained prodigious loss, obliged the French to return behind the Trebbia. Meanwhile, Olivier's and Montrichard's divisions arrived at the centre, and Watrin's division on the right, and a cannonade took place along the whole line. After exchanging some shot, both parties halted on the banks of the Trebbia, by which they were separated.

Such was the second action. It had consisted in a fight towards our left—a sanguinary fight—but without result. Macdonald, now having all his force at his disposal, was determined that the third conflict should be decisive. His plan was to cross the Trebbia at all points, and to fall upon both wings of the enemy. With this view, Dombrowsky's division was to ascend the river to Rivalta, and to cross it above the Russians. Watrin's division was to cross it nearly at its influx into the Po, and to gain Suwarrows's extreme left. He calculated, at the same time, that Moreau, whose co-operation he had been expecting for two days past, would come into action on that day at the latest. Such was the plan for the 1st of Messidor (June 19). But a tremendous affray occurred in the night. A French detachment having crossed the bed of the Trebbia to take position, the Russians conceived that they were attacked, and ran to arms. The French

a fire of musketry and grape-shot from the batteries of the main body of the French on the other side, that they were forced to retire with great loss; and the hostile armies bivouacked for the night on the same ground which had been occupied nineteen hundred years before by the troops of Hannibal and the Roman legions. It is remarkable that the fate of Italy has thrice been decided on the same spot: once in the battle between the Romans and Carthaginians, again in 1746 in that between the Austrians and French, and in 1799 between the French and Russians."—*Alison*. E

on their part, did the same. The two armies were intermingled, and a nocturnal conflict ensued, in which both sides were bent on slaughter, without distinguishing friend from foe. After a useless carnage, the generals at length succeeded in bringing back their men to the bivouac.* On the following day, the armies were so fatigued by three days' fighting and by the disorder of the night, that they did not get into action till about ten in the morning.

The battle commenced on our left on the Upper Trebbia. Dombrowsky there crossed the Trebbia at Rivalta, in spite of the Russians. Suwarrow detached thither Prince Bagration. This movement left Rosenberg's flanks uncovered. Victor and Rusca took advantage of this circumstance to fall upon him after crossing the Trebbia. They advanced successfully, and enveloped Schweikofsky's division, where Suwarrow was, on all sides. They placed it in the greatest peril, but it faced about every way and defended itself valiantly. Bagration, perceiving the danger, hastened to the threatened point, and obliged Victor and Rusca to desist from their attempt. Had Dombrowsky seized the moment to fall, on his part, upon Bagration, the advantage would have remained ours at this point, which was the most important, since it was contiguous to the mountains. Unluckily, he continued inactive, and Victor and Rusca were obliged to fall back to the Trebbia. At the centre, Montrieux had crossed the Trebbia near Grignagno, and Olivier towards San Nicolo. Montrieux was marching upon Forster's corps, when the Austrian reserves, for which Suwarrow had applied to Melas, and which were filing past the rear of the field of battle, fell unawares upon the flanks of his division. It was surprised, and the fifth light, which had performed prodigies in a hundred battles, fled in disorder. Montrieux was obliged to recross the Trebbia. Olivier, who had advanced with success towards San Nicolo, and vigorously repulsed Ott and Melas, found himself uncovered by the retreat of Montrieux. Melas, sending counter-orders to the Austrian reserves, whose appearance had alarmed Montrieux's division, directed them against Olivier's division, which was likewise forced to recross the Trebbia. Meanwhile, Watrin's division, moved to no purpose to the extreme right, where it had nothing to do, was advancing along the Po, without being of any service to the army. It was even obliged to recross the Trebbia, in order to follow the general retreating movement. Suwarrow, still apprehensive of seeing Moreau debouch on his rear, made great efforts during the rest of the day to pass the Trebbia, but without success. The French opposed to him an invincible firmness on the whole line, and that stream, which had witnessed so obstinate a conflict, still separated for the third time the two hostile armies.

Such was the third act of that sanguinary engagement. The two armies were disorganized. They had each lost about twelve thousand men. Most of the generals were wounded. Entire regiments were destroyed. But their situation was very different. Suwarrow was daily receiving rein-

* "Worn out with fatigue, the troops on both sides lay down round their watchfires, on the opposite shores of the Trebbia. Towards midnight, three French battalions, misled by false reports, entered in disorder into the bed of the river, and opened a fire of musketry upon the Russian videttes, upon which the two armies immediately started to their arms; the cavalry on both sides rushed into the Trebbia, the artillery played, without distinction, on friends and foes, and an extraordinary nocturnal combat took place by moonlight between hostile bodies up to the middle in water. At length the officers succeeded in putting an end to this useless butchery; and the rival armies separated only by the stream, sunk into sleep within a few yards of each other."

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forcements, and could not but gain by the prolongation of the struggle Macdonald had exhausted all his resources, and might, if he persisted in fighting, be driven in disorder into Tuscany. He thought, in consequence, of retreating to the Nura, with a view to regain Genoa by the back of the Apennines. He quitted the Trebbia on the morning of the 2d of Messidor (June 20). A despatch, in which he described to Moreau his desperate situation, having fallen into the hands of Suwarrow, the latter was overjoyed, and hastened to pursue him as close as possible. The retreat, however, was effected in tolerable order to the banks of the Nura. Unfortunately, Victor's division, which had been incessantly engaged for four days was at length broken, and lost many prisoners. Macdonald, nevertheless, had time to collect his army beyond the Apennines, after a loss of fourteen or fifteen thousand men, killed, wounded, and prisoners.

Very luckily, Suwarrow, hearing Moreau's cannon on his rear, suffered himself to be diverted from the pursuit of Macdonald. Moreau, whom insurmountable obstacles had prevented from moving before the 30th of Prairial (June 18), had at length debouched from Novi, fallen upon Bellegarde, put him to the rout, and taken from him nearly three thousand prisoners. But this too late advantage was useless, and had no other result than to call off Suwarrow, and to suspend his hot pursuit of Macdonald.

That junction, from which such important results were expected, had thus produced a bloody defeat. It gave rise also to disputes between the French generals, which have never been completely cleared up. Military men find fault with Macdonald for having tarried too long in Tuscany, for having made his divisions march at too great a distance from one another, so that Victor's, Rusca's, and Dombrowsky's divisions were beaten two days successively, before Montrichard's, Olivier's, and Watrin's were in line; with having endeavoured on the day of battle to get upon the two wings of the enemy, instead of directing his principal effort on his left towards the Upper Trebbia; with having kept at too great a distance from the mountains, so as not to permit Lapoype, who was at Bobbio, to come to his succour; lastly, with having, above all, been in too great a hurry to give battle, as if he had wished to have the honour of the victory to himself. Military men, while commending the plan skilfully combined by Moreau, have reproached him with only one thing, namely, with not having set aside all delicacy towards an old comrade, with not having assumed the direct command of the two armies, and especially with not having commanded in person at the Trebbia. Whether these reproaches be just or not, so much is certain, that Moreau's plan, executed as it had been conceived, would have saved Italy. It was entirely lost by the battle of the Trebbia. Luckily, Moreau was still there to rally the wrecks, and to prevent Suwarrow from profiting by his immense superiority. It was but three months since the campaign was opened, and, excepting in Switzerland, we had experienced nothing but reverses. The battle of Stockach had lost us Germany. The battle of Magnano and the Trebbia lost us Italy. Massena alone, firm as a rock, still occupied Switzerland, along the chain of the Albis. It must not be forgotten, however, that, amid these cruel reverses, the courage of our soldiers had been as brilliant and indomitable as in the glorious days of our victories; that Moreau had proved himself at once the great citizen and the great captain, and had prevented Suwarrow from destroying our armies in Italy by a single blow.

These last disasters furnished the enemies of the Directory with fresh

arms, and called forth redoubled invectives against it. The fear of an invasion began to seize all minds. The departments of the South and of the Alps, liable to be first overrun by the Austro-Russians, were in the utmost ferment. The cities of Chambéry, Grenoble, and Orange, sent to the legislative body addresses which produced the strongest sensation. These addresses contained unjust reproaches which had been in all mouths for two months past; they referred to the pillage of the conquered countries, the dilapidations of the companies, the destitution of the armies, the ministry of Scherer, his conduct as general, the injustice done to Moreau, the arrest of Championnet, &c. "Why," said they, "have the faithful conscripts been obliged to return to their homes by the destitute state in which they were left? Why have all the peculations been left unpunished? Why was the incapable Scherer, pointed out by Hoche as a traitor, so long retained in the office of minister for war? Why was he allowed to consummate, as general, the mischief which he had prepared as minister? Why have names dear to victory been superseded by names that are unknown? Why is the conqueror of Rome and Naples under accusation?"

The reader has already been enabled to appreciate the worth of these reproaches. The addresses containing them obtained honourable mention, and were ordered to be printed and sent to the Directory. This manner of receiving them sufficiently proved the dispositions of the two Councils. They could not be worse. The constitutional opposition had joined the patriot opposition. The one, composed of ambitious men who wished for a new government, and self-conceited persons, who complained that their representatives had not been received with such favour as they deserved; the other, consisting of patriots excluded by the schisms from the legislative body, or reduced to silence by the law of the 19th of Fructidor; were alike desirous of the ruin of the existing government. They alleged that the Directory had at once mal-administered and ill-defended France; that it had violated the freedom of the elections, and crushed the liberty of the press and of the popular societies. They declared it to be at once weak and violent. They even went so far as to refer to the 18th of Fructidor, and to say that, not having respected the laws on that day, it had no right to invoke them in its favour.

The nomination of Sieyès to the Directory had been one of the first symptoms of these dispositions. To call to the directorship a man who had never ceased to regard the directorial constitution as a bad one, who had already, for that very reason, refused to be a director, was expressing, in a manner, a wish for a revolution. The acceptance of Sieyès, which was doubted, on account of his former refusal, only served to confirm these conjectures.

The discontented of all sorts, who desired a change, grouped around Sieyès. Sieyès was not a clever party-leader. He had neither the character at once supple and daring, nor even the ambition of one; but he rallied about him a great number by his reputation.* It was well known that he

* "Sieyès had acquired a high reputation, not only by the acuteness of his metaphysical talent, but by a species of mystery in which he involved himself and his opinions. He was certainly possessed of great knowledge and experience in the affairs of France, was an adept in the composition of new constitutions of all kinds; and had got a high character, as possessed of secrets peculiarly his own, for conducting the vessel of the state amidst the storms of revolution. He managed, in fact, his reputation, as a prudent trader does his stock. A temper less daring in action than bold in metaphysical speculation, and a considerable regard for his own personal safety, accorded well with his affected air of mystery and reserve."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E.

deemed everything faulty in the constitution and the government, and people thronged about him, as if to invite him to change everything. Barras, who had contrived to make the Directory overlook his former conduct by his connexions and his intrigues with all the parties, had courted Sieyes, and found means to attach him to himself, by basely giving up his colleagues. Around these two rallied all the enemies of the Directory. This party took care to secure the support of a young general, who possessed reputation, and was considered, like many others, as a victim of the government. The position of Joubert, in whom high hopes were centred, and who had been unemployed since his dismissal, had fixed the choice on him. By his marriage with a Mademoiselle de Montholon, he had recently allied himself with M. de Semonville. He had been introduced to Sieyes, and appointed general of the 17th military division; and efforts were not spared to make him the head of the new coalition.

There was no intention of yet making any changes. The plan was first to gain possession of the government, then to save France from invasion; and all constitutional projects were deferred till the time when these dangers should be over. The first thing to be effected was the removal of the members of the old Directory. Sieyes had been in it but a fortnight. He had entered it on the 1st of Prairial as successor to Rewbel. Barras had, as we have seen, escaped the storm. All the acrimony was discharged against Lareveillère, Merlin, and Treilhard, all three perfectly innocent of that which was laid to the charge of the government.

Being three, they had the majority, but it was determined to render the exercise of authority on their part impossible. They had resolved to show the utmost respect to Sieyes, and to forgive even his spleen, that they might not add to the difficulties of their position those which personal dissensions would be likely to produce. But Sieyes was intractable. He found fault with everything, and in this he was sincere; but he expressed himself in such a manner as to prove that he had no desire to concert with his colleagues how to apply a remedy to the evil. Somewhat infatuated with what he had seen in the country from which he had just come, he was continually saying to them, "This is not the way in which things are managed in Prussia."—"Tell us, then," replied his colleagues, "how things are managed in Prussia; enlighten us with your advice; assist us to do what is right."—"You would not understand me," replied Sieyes; "it is useless to talk to you; go on as you have been accustomed to do."

While this incompatibility was manifested in the bosom of the Directory between the minority and the majority, the most vehement attacks were incessantly made upon it from without by the Councils. An open quarrel had already taken place on the subject of the finances. The distress, as we have observed, arose from two causes—the tardiness of the receipts, and the deficit in the estimated revenue. Out of the 400 millions, for which orders had already been given on account of expenses incurred, scarcely 210 millions had been received. The deficit in the estimate of the revenue amounted, according to Ramel, to 67 or even to 75 millions. The amount of the deficit, as stated by him, was still disputed. He gave in the *Moniteur* a formal contradiction to Genissieux, the deputy, and proved what he asserted. But of what use is proving at certain moments! The minister and the government were not the less inveighed against; it was incessantly repeated that they were ruining the state, and continually demanding new funds to supply fresh peculations. The force of evidence

nevertheless, compelled the grant of a supplemental revenue. The tax on salt had been refused: to make amends for it, one decime per franc was added to all the taxes, and that on doors and windows was doubled. But it was doing little to decree taxes. It was requisite to insure the levy of them by different laws relative to their assessment and collection. These laws were not passed. The minister urgently desired that they should be brought under discussion; but they were continually deferred, and his representations were answered by cries of treason, robbery, and similar accusations.

Another cause of quarrel had been found, besides the subject of the finances. Remonstrances had already been made against certain articles of the law of the 19th of Fructidor, which allowed the Directory to shut up clubs, and to suppress newspapers by a mere ordinance. A *projet de loi* relative to the press and the popular societies had been ordered, for the purpose of modifying the law of the 19th of Fructidor, and depriving the Directory of the arbitrary power with which it was invested. The authority which that law conferred on the Directory, to banish at pleasure suspected priests and to erase the names of emigrants from the lists, was also severely censured. The patriots themselves seemed desirous of wresting from it this dictatorship, though it was dangerous to their adversaries alone. The assembly began with the discussion relative to the press and the popular societies. The *projet* brought forward was the work of Berlier. The discussion commenced towards the end of Prairial. The partisans of the Directory, the most conspicuous of whom were Chénier, Bailleul, Breuzé-Latouche, Lecointe-Puyraveau, maintained that this dictatorship granted to the Directory by the law of the 19th of Fructidor, though formidable in ordinary times, was of the most indispensable necessity under existing circumstances. It was not, they contended, in a moment of extreme peril, that the strength of the government ought to be diminished. The dictatorship conferred on it the day after the 18th of Fructidor had become necessary to it, not indeed against the royalist faction, but against the anarchical faction, which was not less formidable than the other, and was secretly leagued with it. Babœuf's disciples, they added, were raising their heads again in all quarters, and threatening the republic with a new inundation.

The patriots, who swarmed in the Council of Five Hundred, replied with their usual vehemence to the speeches of the partisans of the Directory. It was necessary, they said, to give France a shake, and to restore to her the energy of 1793, which the Directory had wholly stifled by the weight of its oppressive yoke. All patriotism would be extinguished, unless the clubs were opened and the patriotic papers were again permitted to speak out. It is idle, they added, to accuse the patriots, and to feign apprehensions of an attack from them. What have these patriots done, who are so grievously accused? For three years past they have been slaughtered, proscribed, without country, in the republic which they willed, and of which they so powerfully contributed to lay the foundation. What crimes have you to charge them with? Have they reacted against the reactors?—No. They are botheaded, turbulent; granted—but are these crimes? They speak, nay, they shout, if you will—they do not murder, however, but every day they are murdered. Such was the language of Briot of the Doubs, of Arena the Corsican, and of a great many others.

The members of the constitutional opposition expressed themselves in a different manner. They were naturally moderate. They assumed a measured, but bitter and dogmatic tone. It was requisite, in their opinion, to

revert to principles too much slighted, and to restore liberty to the press and to the popular societies. The dangers of Fructidor had certainly justified the grant of a temporary dictatorship to the Directory, but how had this dictatorship, which had been conferred in confidence, been employed? Only put that question to the parties, said Boulay of La Meurthe. Though they all entertained different views, yet royalists, patriots, constitutionalists, agreed in declaring that the Directory had made a bad use of its omnipotence. Such a coincidence among men of such opposite sentiments and views could not leave any doubt, and the Directory was condemned.

Thus the irritated patriots complained of oppression, and the constitutionalists, full of pretensions, complained of misgovernment. All united and effected the repeal of the articles of the 19th of Fructidor relative to the journals and the popular societies. This was an important victory, the results of which were to let loose all the periodical publications, and to rally all the Jacobins.*

The agitation kept increasing towards the end of Prairial. The most sinister rumours were circulated on all sides. The new coalition resolved to resort to the tricks which, in representative governments, the opposition usually employ to oblige an administration to resign. Embarrassing and reiterated questions, and threats of accusations, were not omitted. These means are so natural that, even when unpractised in representative government, the instinct of parties immediately discovers them.

The commissions of expenditure, of funds, and of war, in the Council of Five Hundred for investigating those different subjects, met and planned a message to the Directory. Boulay of La Meurthe was directed to draw up the report, and presented it on the 15th of Prairial. At his suggestion, the Council of Five Hundred addressed a message to the Directory, in which it desired to be informed of the causes of the internal and external dangers which threatened the republic, and of the means that existed for obviating them. Applications of this nature have scarcely any other effect than to extort confessions of distress, and to compromise still more the government from which they are wrung. A government, we repeat, must be successful. To oblige it to confess that it has failed, is to force from it the most mischievous of all admissions. To this message were annexed a great number of motions of order, all with a similar object. They were relative to the right to form popular societies, to individual liberty, to the responsibility of ministers, to the publicity of accounts, &c.

The Directory, on receiving the message in question, resolved to give a detailed answer comprehending a sketch of all the events, and an exposition of the means which it had employed and those to which it purposed to resort, to rescue France from the crisis in which she was involved. An answer of this nature required the concurrence of all the ministers, in order that each of them might furnish his report. It would take several days at least. But this was not what the leaders of the Councils wanted. They wanted no accurate and faithful picture of the state of France, but speedy and embarrassing confessions. Accordingly, after waiting some days, the three commissions which had proposed the message submitted through

* "The laws of restraint were no longer enforced against the daily journals, and the general indignation soon spread to the periodical press. In every quarter, in the newspapers, the tribune, the pamphlets, the clubs, nothing was to be heard but declamations against the government. The parties who had alternately felt the weight of their vengeance, the royalists and the Jacobins, vied with each other in inveighing against their unbecoming and want of foresight."—*Lacretelle*. E.

Poulain-Grand-Pré, the deputy, a new proposition to the Council of Five Hundred. It was the 23th of Prairial. The reporter proposed to the Five Hundred to declare themselves in permanence till the Directory should have replied to the message of the 15th. The suggestion was adopted. This was raising a cry of alarm and proclaiming an approaching event. The Five Hundred communicated their determination to the Ancients, and exhorted them to follow their example. The example was followed, and the Ancients also declared their sitting permanent. The three commissions of expenditure, funds, and war, being too numerous, were changed into a single commission, composed of eleven members, and directed to submit the measures demanded by circumstances.

The Directory replied, on its part, that it meant to make its sitting permanent, in order to accelerate the report that was demanded from it. The agitation which such a resolution must have produced may easily be conceived. The most alarming reports were circulated, as usual. The adversaries of the Directory alleged that it was meditating a new stroke of policy, and that it meant to dissolve the Councils. Its partisans replied, on the contrary, that a coalition had been formed between all the parties, for the purpose of overthrowing the constitution by violence. Nothing of the sort was contemplated on either side. The coalition of the two oppositions aimed only at the removal of the three old directors. A first expedient was devised for bringing this about. The constitution required that the director entering upon office should have been a full year out of the legislature. It was discovered that Treilhard, who had sat for thirteen months in the Directory, had quitted the legislature on the 30th of Floreal, year V, and that he had been nominated to the Directory on the 26th of Floreal, year VI. There wanted, of course, four days of the required time. This was a mere quibble; for the irregularity was covered by the silence observed for two sessions; and, besides, Sieyes himself was in the same predicament. The commission of the eleven immediately proposed to annul Treilhard's nomination. This suggestion was carried into effect the very same day, the 28th, and the result was signified to the Directory.

Treilhard was blunt and coarse, but had not firmness equal to the harshness of his manners. He was disposed to give way. Lareveillère was of a totally different disposition of mind. This honest and disinterested man, whose office was an annoyance to him, who had accepted it merely from a sense of duty, and who ardently wished every year that the lot would restore him to private life, was determined not to relinquish his functions, since the coalesced factions appeared to demand his resignation. He conceived that those who wished to remove the old directors had no other object than to abolish the constitution of the year III; that Sieyes, Barras, and the Bonaparte family concurred in the same object with different views, but all equally pernicious to the republic. In this persuasion, he was anxious that the old directors should not abandon their posts. He consequently hastened to Treilhard, and exhorted him to resist. You, Merlin, and myself, said he, will form a majority, and we will oppose the execution of this determination of the legislative body, as illegal, seditious, and wrung from it by a faction. Treilhard durst not follow this advice, and immediately sent his resignation to the Council of Five Hundred.

Lareveillère, though he saw the majority lost, persisted nevertheless in his resolution not to resign, if he were required to do so. The leaders of the Five Hundred determined to nominate immediately a successor to Treilhard. Sieyes would fain have obtained the appointment of a man devoted

to himself; but his influence was null on this occasion. Gohier, president of the court of cassation, formerly an advocate at Rennes, and known to belong rather to the patriotic than to the constitutional opposition, was the person selected. He was an upright citizen and attached to the republic, but of inferior ability, and had no knowledge of men or business.* He was nominated on the 29th of Prairial, and was to be installed on the very next day.

It was not enough to have excluded Treilhard from the Directory. The instigators of that measure were determined to turn out Lareveillère and Merlin also. The patriots in particular were enraged against Lareveillère. They recollected that, though rigid, he had never been a Moun-taineer, that he had frequently opposed their party since the 9th of Thermidor, and that, in the preceding year, he had encouraged the system of schisms. They consequently threatened to put him and Merlin under accusation unless they would both resign. Sieyes was commissioned to make an overture in the first instance to them, to induce them to yield voluntarily to the storm.

On the evening of the 29th, Sieyes proposed a private meeting of the four directors at Merlin's. They repaired thither. Barras, as if they had been in personal danger, went with his sword by his side, and never opened his lips. Sieyes began to speak with considerable embarrassment, made a long digression on the faults committed by the government, and talked a long time before he came to the real object of the meeting. At length, Lareveillère desired him to speak out. "Your friends," replied Sieyes, "and Merlin's, entreat you both to resign." Lareveillère asked who those friends were. Sieyes could not mention one who was entitled to any confidence. Lareveillère then assumed the tone of a man indignant at seeing the Directory betrayed by its own members, and delivered up by them to the plots of the factious. He proved that thus far his conduct and that of his colleagues had been unimpeachable, and that the faults imputed to them were only a tissue of calumnies. He then made a direct attack upon Sieyes on account of his secret projects, and threw him into the utmost embarrassment by his vehement apostrophes. During all this time, Barras maintained a sullen silence. His position was an awkward one, for he alone had deserved all the reproaches which were heaped upon his colleagues. To demand their resignation for faults in which they had not participated, and which he alone had committed, would have been too embarrassing. He, therefore, held his tongue. They separated without coming to any decision. Merlin, who durst not adopt any separate course, had declared that he would follow the example of Lareveillère.

Barras now resolved to employ an intermediate agent to obtain the resignation of his two colleagues. For this purpose he made use of Ber-goeng, an old Girondin, whose fondness for pleasure had drawn him into his society. He begged him to call upon Lareveillère, and to prevail upon him to resign. Bergoeng accordingly went to him on the night of the

* "Gohier was an advocate of considerable reputation and exalted patriotism—an eminent lawyer, and a man of great integrity and candour."—*Gourgaud*. E.

"Gohier did not possess more talent than his colleagues, but more intelligence; he had also boundless ambition, though he declared that he had none. His talent, which might have some merit before a tribunal, was reduced to a cipher in the extraordinary situation which fortune had permitted him to attain. He would have thought it highly conducive to the welfare of France to get rid of the four puppets at the head of the government with him, and to make himself president of the French republic."—*Duchess d'Abrantes*. E.

29th, appealed to the ancient friendship that bound him to Lareveillère and employed all possible means to shake his resolution. He assured him that Barras loved and honoured him, that he considered his removal as unjust, but he besought him to yield, that he might not expose himself to a storm. Lareveillère remained inflexible. He replied that Barras was the dupe of Sieyes, Sieyes of Barras, and that both would be duped by the Bonapartes; that the ruin of the republic was aimed at; but that he would resist to his last gasp.

On the following day, the 30th, Gohier was to be installed. The four directors had met. All the ministers were present. As soon as the installation was over, and the speeches of the president and the new director were delivered, the subject of the meeting of the preceding evening was reverted to. Barras desired to speak in private with Lareveillère. Both of them went into an adjoining room. Barras renewed the same entreaties and the same caresses as before with his colleague, and found him as firm as ever. He went back greatly embarrassed at having effected nothing, and still dreading the discussion of the acts of the old Directory, which could not turn out to his advantage. He then began to talk with violence, and, as he durst not attack Lareveillère, he launched out against Merlin, whom he detested, drew the most ridiculous and the falsest picture of him, and represented him as a desperado, meditating, with a band of cut-throats, a surprise against his colleagues and the Councils. Lareveillère, espousing Merlin's cause, immediately replied, and demonstrated the absurdity of such imputations. Nothing, in fact, in the character of Merlin the lawyer, had any likeness to this portrait. Lareveillère then recapitulated the history of the whole administration of the Directory, and did it in detail, for the purpose of enlightening the ministers and the new director. Barras was in cruel perplexity. At last he rose, saying, "Well, the die is cast; swords are drawn!"—"Wretch!" replied Lareveillère with firmness, "why talkest thou of swords? There is nothing but knives in the case, and they are turned against irreproachable men, whom you are determined to murder, since you cannot force them into a weakness."

Gohier now strove to act the part of mediator, but without success. At this moment, several members of the Five Hundred and of the Ancients, having met, came to beseech the two directors to yield, promising that no act of accusation should be preferred against them.* Lareveillère proudly replied that he wanted no favour, that they might accuse him if they pleased, and that he would defend himself. The deputies who had undertaken this commission returned to the two Councils, and produced a fresh tumult in them by reporting what had passed. Boulay of La Meurthe denounced Lareveillère, admitted his integrity, but unjustly attributed to him the scheme of a new religion, and complained bitterly of his obstinacy which, he said, was on the point of ruining the republic. The patriots inveighed with greater vehemence than ever, and said that, as the directors were obstinate, no mercy ought to be shown them.

* "Bertrand of the Calvados addressed them in these terms: 'You have proposed a reunion, and I propose that you should consider whether you can still retain your offices. If you desire the welfare of the republic, you will not hesitate to decide. You have no power to do good; you will never have the confidence of your colleagues, nor that of the people, nor that of the representatives. You have no longer even the confidence of those vile flatterers who have dug your political grave. Terminate your career, then, by an act of devotion, which the sound hearts of republicans will alone know how to appreciate.'—*Mignet*. E.

The agitation was at its height, the conflict had begun, and it was impossible to tell how far it would be carried. A great number of the moderate members of both Councils met, and said that, to prevent calamities, they ought to go and conjure Lareveillère to yield to the storm. They accordingly went to him on the night of the 30th, and implored him, for the sake of the dangers which impended over the republic, to resign. They told him that they were all of them exposed to the greatest perils, and that, if he persisted in refusing, they knew not how far the fury of the parties might be carried. "But," replied Lareveillère, "do you not see the much greater dangers incurred by the republic? Do you not see that it is not we who are aimed at, but the constitution; that, in giving way to-day, it will be necessary to give way to-morrow, and forever; and that the republic will be undone by our weakness? My functions," he added, "are burdensome to me. If I persist at this moment in retaining them, it is because I deem it my duty to oppose an insurmountable barrier to the plots of the factions. If, however, you conceive that my resistance exposes you to dangers, I will submit; but I declare to you that the republic is undone. One man cannot save it. I yield then, because I am left alone; and I will send you my resignation."

He gave it the same night. In a simple and dignified letter he explained his motives. Merlin begged leave to copy it, and the two resignations were sent together. Thus the old Directory was dissolved.* All the factions which it had endeavoured to reduce, had united their resentments and made common cause against it. It had but one fault, that of being weaker than they; an immense fault, it is true, and which justifies the fall of a government.

Notwithstanding the general animosity, Lareveillère carried with him the esteem of all the enlightened citizens. He refused, on quitting the Directory, to accept the one hundred thousand francs which his colleagues had agreed to give to each member on going out; he would not even take the savings made upon their outfits, to which he had a right; neither would he keep the carriage which it was usual for the director leaving office to retain. He retired to a small house which he possessed at Andilly, where he was visited by all the distinguished men whom the fury of the parties did not intimidate. Talleyrand, the minister, was one of those who came to visit him in his retirement.

* "Thus the government of the Directory was overturned in less than four years after its first establishment, and in twenty months after it had, by a violent stretch of illegal force, usurped dictatorial powers. The people of Paris took no part in this subversion of their rulers, which was effected by the force of the national assemblies illegally directed. Revolutionary fervour had exhausted itself."—*Lacretelle*. E.

THE DIRECTORY.

FORMATION OF THE NEW DIRECTORY—MOULINS AND ROGER DUCOS SUCCEED LAREVEILLERE AND MERLIN—CHANGES IN THE MINISTRY—LEVY OF ALL THE CLASSES OF CONSCRIPTS; FORCED LOAN OF ONE HUNDRED MILLIONS; LAW OF THE HOSTAGES—NEW MILITARY PLANS—RESUMPTION OF OPERATIONS IN ITALY; JOUBERT COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; BATTLE OF NOVI, AND DEATH OF JOUBERT—LANDING OF THE ANGLO-RUSSIANS IN HOLLAND—FRESH DISTURBANCES IN THE INTERIOR; ANIMOSITY OF THE PATRIOTS; DISMISSAL OF BERNADOTTE; PROPOSAL TO DECLARE THE COUNTRY IN DANGER.

YEARS exhaust parties, but it takes a great many to exhaust them. Passions die only with the hearts in which they were kindled. It is requisite that a whole generation should disappear; nothing is then left of the pretensions of parties but legitimate interests, and, in addition to these interests, time is able to bring about a natural and reasonable conciliation. But before this term, parties are indomitable by the mere power of reason. The government that is determined to talk to them the language of justice and the laws soon becomes insupportable to them, and the more moderate it is, the more they despise it as weak and impotent. If, when it finds hearts shut against its advice, it should attempt to employ force, it is declared to be tyrannical, and is accused of combining weakness with malignity. Till time produces its effect, there is but one great despotism that can tame down the irritated parties. The Directory was this legal and moderate government, that strove to subject to the yoke of the laws the parties which the Revolution had brought forth, and which twenty-five years had not yet exhausted. They all coalesced, as we have seen, on the 30th of Prairial, to effect its downfall. The common enemy being overthrown, they arrayed themselves against one another, without any hand to restrain them. We shall see how they behaved.

The constitution, though now a mere phantom, was not abolished, and, the Directory being already overthrown, it was necessary to replace it by a shadow. Gohier had succeeded Treilhard; it was requisite to find successors for Lareveillère and Merlin. Roger Ducos and Moulins* were elected. Roger Ducos was an old Girondin, an honest man, of mean capacity, and wholly devoted to Sieyès. It was through his influence in the Ancients that he had been nominated. Moulins was an obscure gene-

* "Roger Ducos was a man of narrow mind and easy disposition. Moulins, a general of division, had never served in war; he was originally in the French guards, and had been advanced in the army of the interior. He was a worthy man, and a warm and upright patriot."—*Gourgaud*. E.

ral, formerly employed in La Vendée, a warm and upright republican, nominated, like Gohier, through the influence of the patriot party. Other distinguished persons, either civil or military, had been proposed for filling up the Directory; but they had been rejected. It was evident, from such selections, that the parties had no intention to give themselves masters. They had raised to the Directory only such men of inferior talents as are usually chosen to hold office *ad interim*.

The existing Directory, composed, like the Councils, from opposite parties, was still weaker and less homogeneous than the preceding. Sieyes, the only superior man among the five directors, meditated, as we have seen, a new political organization. He was the head of the party calling itself moderate or constitutional, all the members of which, nevertheless, wished for a new constitution. He had no devoted colleague but Roger Ducos Moulins and Gohier, both warm patriots, incapable of conceiving anything but what existed, were well pleased with the existing constitution, but wished to execute and to interpret it in the spirit of the patriots. As for Barras, called naturally to give the casting vote between them, who could rely upon him? He was of himself the living emblem of that chaos of contrary vices, passions, interests, and ideas, exhibited by the dying republic. The majority depending on his voice would therefore be consigned to chance.

Sieyes told his new colleagues pretty plainly that they were assuming the direction of a government threatened with a speedy downfall, but that they must save the republic if they could not save the constitution. This language was highly displeasing to Gohier and Moulins, and they showed their disrelish of it. Accordingly, from the very first day, the sentiments of the directors appeared to be divided. Sieyes held the same language to Joubert, the general, whom the reorganizing party was striving to win. But Joubert, an old soldier of the army of Italy, entertained its sentiments. He was a staunch patriot, and the views of Sieyes appeared suspicious to him. He secretly acquainted Gohier and Moulins with his suspicions, and seemed to attach himself wholly to them. These were questions, however, that could only be brought into discussion in process of time. The most pressing concern was to administer and to defend the threatened republic. The tidings of the battle of the Trebbia, generally circulated, everywhere excited alarm. The crisis required extraordinary measures of public welfare.

The first error of a government is to do precisely contrary to that which preceded it, were it only to comply with the passions by which it had been enabled to triumph. Championnet, the so-much vaunted hero of Naples, Joubert, and Bernadotte, were destined to be raised from imprisonment or disgrace to occupy the highest posts. Championnet was immediately liberated, and appointed commander of a new army, which it was proposed to form along the High Alps. Bernadotte was made minister at war. Joubert was called to the command of the army of Italy. His triumphs in the Tyrol, his youth, and his heroic character, inspired the highest hopes. The reorganizers wished him so much success and glory, that he might be able to support their projects. The choice of Joubert was, to be sure, excellent in itself, but it was a new injustice to Moreau, who had so generously accepted the command of a beaten army, and saved it with such ability. But Moreau was by no means agreeable to the warm patriots, who were at that moment triumphant. The command of the army designated the army of the Rhine, which was not yet in existence, was conferred on him.

Various changes took place in the ministry also. Ramel, minister of the finances, who had rendered such important services since the installation of the Directory, and who had administered during that very difficult transaction from paper-money to specie, had shared the odium cast upon the old Directory. He was attacked with such violence that the new directors, in spite of the esteem which they entertained for him, were obliged to accept his resignation. A man dear to the patriots and respected by all the parties, was appointed his successor. This was Robert Lindet, formerly a member of the committee of public welfare, and so indecently attacked during the reaction. He declined for a long time the offer of a portfolio. His experience of the injustice of parties was not likely to induce him to accept office again. However, he at last consented, out of devotion to the republic.

The diplomacy of the Directory had been censured not less severely than its financial administration. It was accused of having again plunged the republic into war with all Europe, and most unjustly, especially if we consider who were its accusers. These accusers were, in fact, the patriots themselves, whose passions had kindled the flames of war anew. The Directory was more particularly reproached for the expedition to Egypt, at one time so highly extolled, and it was alleged that this expedition had produced the rupture with the Porte and Russia. Talleyrand, already disagreeable to the patriots as an old emigrant, had incurred all the responsibility of this diplomacy, and he was so vehemently attacked, that it was necessary to act with him as with Ramel, and to accept his resignation. The person appointed to succeed him was a native of Wirtemberg, who, under the appearance of German simplicity, disguised extraordinary shrewdness, and whom M. de Talleyrand had recommended as best qualified for the office. This was M. Reinhard. It has been asserted that this appointment was only *ad interim*, and that M. Reinhard merely accepted the post till the moment when M. de Talleyrand could be recalled. The ministry of justice was taken from Lambrechts, on account of the state of his health, and given to Cambacérès. Bourguignon, formerly a magistrate, a sincere and honest patriot, was placed at the head of the police. Fouché that supple and insinuating ex-Jacobin, to whom Barras had given an interest in the traffic of the companies, and for whom he had afterwards procured the embassy to Milan, dismissed on account of his conduct in Italy, was also considered as a victim of the old Directory. He was, therefore, destined to share the triumph decreed to all the victims, and sent to the Hague.

Such were the principal changes made in the high offices of the government and in the armies. It was not enough to change men; it was requisite to furnish them with new means of performing the task under which their predecessors had succumbed. The patriots, reverting, as usual, to revolutionary means, maintained that desperate evils required desperate remedies. They proposed the urgent measures of 1793. After refusing everything to the preceding Directory, they were now willing to grant everything to the new one. They were willing to put extraordinary means into its hands, and even to compel it to use them. The commission of eleven, formed of the three commissions of expenditure, of funds, and of war, and charged, during the crisis of Prairial, to devise means of saving the republic, conferred with the members of the Directory, and agreed with them upon different measures, which accorded with the disposition of the moment. Instead of taking two hundred thousand men from the five

classes of conscripts, the Directory was empowered to call out all the classes. Instead of the taxes proposed by the late Directory, and rejected with such obstinacy by the two oppositions, the idea of a new forced loan was adopted. Conformably with the system of the patriots, it was to be progressive, that is, instead of making each contribute according to the amount of his direct taxes, in which case the lists of the land-tax and personal-tax might have been taken as the basis of the assessment, each was required to contribute according to his fortune. Hence it became necessary to have recourse to an assessing jury, that is, to fleece the wealthy by means of a commission. The middle party opposed this plan, and said that it renewed the system of terror, and that the difficulty of the assessment would, moreover, render this measure null and inefficacious, as all the former forced loans had proved. The patriots replied that it was not right to make all the classes, but the wealthy only, bear the expenses of the war. The same passions still employed, as we see, the same reasons. The forced and progressive loan was decreed. It was fixed at one hundred millions, and declared to be repayable in national domains.

Besides these measures of recruiting and finance, there was one of police, called for on all sides against the renewal of *chouannerie* in the South and in the West, the old theatres of civil war. Fresh outrages were committed: the purchasers of the national domains, the reputed patriots, the public functionaries, were murdered; and, above all, the diligences were stopped and robbed. Among the perpetrators of these crimes were many of the former Vendéans and Chouans, many members of the notorious companies of the Sun, and also many refractory conscripts. Though the real aim of these banditti, whose presence indicated a sort of social dissolution, was plunder, it was evident, from the selection of their victims, that they had a political origin. A commission was appointed to devise a system of repression. It proposed a law which was called the law of the hostages, and has ever since been celebrated under that title. Most of these atrocities were attributed to the relatives of emigrants or to *ci-devant* nobles. It was in consequence proposed to oblige them to give hostages.* Whenever a commune was declared to be in a notorious state of disorder, the relatives of emigrants, the *ci-devant* nobles, the persons possessing influence over the individuals known to belong to these assemblages, were considered as hostages, and as being civilly and personally responsible for the outrages committed. The central administrations were to point out the persons selected for hostages, and to cause them to be confined in houses appropriated to that purpose. There they were to live as they pleased, at their own expense, and to remain shut up so long as the disturbances lasted. When the outrages proceeded so far as murder, four of them were to be banished for every murder committed. It is easy to conceive all that could be urged both for and against this law. It was the only way, so said its partisans, to reach the authors of those disturbances, and it was a mild and humane way. Its adversaries replied that it was a law of suspected persons, a revolutionary law, which, as it was impossible to get at the real culprits, punished *en masse*, and committed all the injustice incident to laws of this

* "The military success of the new coalition, the law of the forced loan, and more particularly the law of the hostages, which obliged each family of emigrants to give securities to the government, had induced the royalists of the South and West again to take arms. They reappeared in bands, which every day became more formidable, and which recommenced the petty but disastrous warfare of the Chouans. They expected the arrival of the Russians, and believed in the speedy restoration of monarchy."—*Mignet* E

nature. In short, all that we have seen so frequently repeated in this history on the subject of the revolutionary laws was urged for and against it. But there was one objection, stronger than all the rest, to be made against this measure. As these banditti proceeded solely from an absolute social dissolution, the only remedy lay in a vigorous reorganization of the state, not in measures utterly discredited, and which were not capable of restoring any energy to the springs of the government.

The law was adopted after a very warm discussion, which produced a signal rupture between the parties that had united for a moment to overthrow the late Directory. To these important measures, designed to arm the government with revolutionary means, were added some which, in other respects, curtailed its power. These accessory measures were the consequence of the reproaches preferred against the late Directory. To prevent schisms in future, it was decided that the choice of any electoral fraction should be null; that any agent of the government attempting to influence the elections should be punished for a misdemeanor against the sovereignty of the people; that the Directory should no longer have authority to bring troops within the constitutional radius without being expressly empowered to do so; that no military officer should be liable to be deprived of his rank unless by the decision of a council of war; that the Directory should no longer have the power to delegate to agents the right granted to it of issuing warrants of arrest; that no *employé* of the government, nor any functionary whatsoever, should be permitted to be a contractor, or even to be concerned in contracts, for supplies; and that a club could not be closed without a decision of the municipal and central administrations. On the subject of a law for regulating the press, the parties could not agree; but the article of the law of the 19th of Fructidor, which gave the Directory the right of suppression in regard to the journals, continued nevertheless abolished; so that, until some new plan should be brought forward, the press remained indefinitely free.

Such were the measures adopted, in consequence of the 30th of Prairial, either for correcting alleged abuses, or to restore to the government an energy which it did not possess. Those measures which are taken in critical moments, after a change of system, are devised to save a state, and rarely come in time to save it, for all is frequently decided before they can be carried into execution. They furnish, at most, resources for the future. The loan of 100 millions and the new levies could not be executed for some months to come. Still the effect of a crisis is to give a shake to all the springs, and to restore to them a certain degree of energy. Bernadotte hastened to write pressing circulars, and in this manner contrived to accelerate the organization of the battalions of conscripts already commenced. Robert Lindet, to whom the forced loan of 100 millions afforded no present resource, called together the principal bankers and merchants of the capital, and urged them to lend their credit to the state. With this they complied, and lent their signature to the ministry of the finances. They formed a syndicate, and, till the taxes should be collected, they signed bills which were to be repaid out of the receipts as fast as they came to hand. It was a sort of temporary bank, established to supply the wants of the moment.

A resolution was also passed to prepare new plans of campaign. Application was made to Bernadotte for one, and he lost no time in presenting a truly singular project, which, fortunately, was not carried into execution. Nothing could be more subject to multiplied combinations than a field of battle so extensive as that on which we were operating. Every one who

looked at it was likely to conceive a different idea ; and if each could propose it and obtain its adoption, there was no reason for not changing the plan every moment. If a multiplicity of opinions be useful in discussion, it is deplorable in execution. At first, it was conceived that we ought to act at one and the same time on the Danube and in Switzerland. After the battle of Stockach, it was thought better to act in Switzerland only, and the army of the Danube was suppressed. Bernadotte, at the time of which we are speaking, was of a different opinion. He pretended that the cause of the success of the allies lay in the facility with which they could communicate across the Alps between Germany and Italy. To cut off these means of communication, he proposed that the St. Gothard and the Grisons, at the right wing of the army of Switzerland, should be taken from them, and that a fresh army of the Danube should be formed to carry back the war into Germany. In order to form this army of the Danube, he proposed to organize speedily the army of the Rhine, and reinforce it with twenty thousand men taken from Massena. This would be compromising the latter, who had before him the whole force of the archduke, and who was liable to be overwhelmed during this shifting about. It is true that it would have been judicious to bring back the war to the Danube, but it would have been sufficient to furnish Massena with the means of taking the offensive, to convert his army into that very army of the Danube. To this end, instead of weakening him, everything ought to have been placed at his disposal. According to Bernadotte's plan, an army was to be formed on the High Alps, to cover the frontiers against the Austro-Russians towards Piedmont. Joubert, collecting the wrecks of all the armies of Italy, and reinforced by the disposable troops in the interior, was to debouch from the Apennines, and to attack Suwarrow by main force.

This plan, warmly approved by Moulins, was sent to the generals. Massena, weary of all these extravagant projects, tendered his resignation. It was not accepted, and the plan was not carried into execution. Massena retained the command of all the troops from Basle to the St. Gothard. The intention of assembling an army on the Rhine, to cover that line, was persevered in. A nucleus for an army was formed on the Alps under the command of Championnet. This nucleus consisted of about fifteen thousand men. All the disposable reinforcements were sent to Joubert, who was to debouch from the Apennines. It was now the middle of summer, in Messidor (July). The reinforcements began to arrive. A certain number of old battalions, retained in the interior, had repaired to the frontiers. The conscripts were organized, and went to replace the veteran troops in the garrisons. Lastly, as there were not skeletons enough to receive the great quantity of conscripts, it was resolved to increase the number of the battalions in the demi-brigades or regiments, which would admit of the incorporation of the new levies into the old corps.

It was known that a reinforcement of thirty thousand Russians, under the command of General Korsakof, was entering Germany. Massena was urged to leave his positions, to attack those of the archduke, and to endeavour to beat him before his junction with the Russians. The views of the government on this point were perfectly correct ; for it was of consequence to make an attempt before the junction of so imposing a mass of forces. Massena, however, refused to take the offensive, whether because he was deficient on this occasion in his accustomed hardihood, or because he was waiting for the resumption of offensive operations in Italy. Military men have all condemned his inactivity, which, it is true, soon became a

fortunate circumstance through the faults of the enemy, and which was redeemed by glorious services. In obedience, however, to the injunctions of the government, and in execution of part of Bernadotte's plan, which consisted in preventing the Austro-Russians from communicating between Germany and Italy, Massena ordered Lecourbe to prolong his right to the St. Gothard, to possess himself of that important point, and to retake the Grisons. By this operation, the French would again become masters of the High Alps, and the enemy's armies operating in Germany would find themselves cut off from all communication with those operating in Italy. Lecourbe executed this enterprise with that boldness and intrepidity which distinguished him in mountain warfare, and was once more master of the St. Gothard.

New events were meanwhile preparing in Italy. Suwarrow, being obliged by the court of Vienna to finish the siege of all the fortresses before he pushed his advantages,* had not followed up the victory of the Trebbia. He might even, without deviating from his instructions, have reserved an adequate force for dispersing our wrecks completely; but he had not sufficient genius for military operations to adopt that course. He wasted his time, therefore, in sieges. Peschiera, Pizzighitona, and the citadel of Milan, had fallen. The citadel of Turin had likewise surrendered.† The two celebrated fortresses of Mantua and Alexandria still held out, and appeared likely to make a long resistance. Kray was besieging Mantua, and Bellegarde Alexandria. Unfortunately, all our fortresses had been consigned to commandants destitute of energy or skill. The artillery in them was ill-served, because broken corps only had been thrown into them; and the garrisons were exceedingly disheartened by the retreat of our active armies, which had fallen back to the Apennines. Mantua, the principal of these fortresses, did not deserve the reputation which had been conferred on it by Bonaparte's campaigns. It was not its strength, but the combination of events, that had prolonged its defence. In fact, Bonaparte, with about ten thousand men, had shut up fourteen thousand there to perish by fever and famine. General Latour-Foissac was now the commandant. He was a skilful officer of engineers, but had not the energy necessary for this kind of defence. Discouraged by the irregularity of the place and the wretched state of the fortifications, he had no notion that it was possible to make amends for the want of walls by daring. His garrison, moreover, was inadequate, and after the first assaults he appeared disposed to surrender. General Gardanne commanded at Alexandria. He was a resolute man, but not well informed. A first assault was vigorously repulsed by him, but

* "About this period a Russian officer of Suwarrow's staff wrote thus to Count Rostopchin, at St. Petersburg: 'Far from applauding the brilliant triumphs of our arms, the cursed court of Vienna seeks only to retard our march. It insists that our great Suwarrow should divide his army and direct it to several points at once. That court, which fears a too rapid conquest of Italy from designs which it does not avow, as it knows well those of our magnanimous emperor, has, by the Aulic Council, forced the Archduke Charles into a state of inactivity, and enjoined our incomparable chief to secure his conquests rather than extend them; thus his army is to waste its time and strength in the siege of fortresses which would fall of themselves if the French army was destroyed. Deceived by his ministers, the Emperor Francis has, with his own hand, written to our illustrious general to pause in a career of conquest, the very rapidity of which fills him with alarm.'"—*Prince Hardenberg's Memoirs*. E.

† "The conquest of the citadel of Turin was of first-rate importance. Besides rendering the allies masters of one of the strongest fortresses in Piedmont, it put into their hands six hundred and eighteen pieces of cannon, forty thousand muskets, and fifty thousand quintals of powder, with the loss of only fifty men."—*St. Cyr*. E.

he had not the sagacity to discover in the place the resources that it still presented.

The month of Thermidor had now arrived (the middle of July). More than a month had elapsed between the revolution of the 30th of Prairial, and the appointment of Joubert. Moreau felt the importance of taking the offensive before the fall of the fortresses, and of debouching, with a reorganized and reinforced army, upon the dispersed Austro-Russians. Unfortunately, he was shackled by the orders of the government, which had enjoined him to wait for Joubert. Thus, in this disastrous campaign, there was a series of unseasonable orders that always led to our reverses. A change of ideas and plans, in matters of execution, and especially in war, is always mischievous. If Moreau, to whom the command ought to have been given at the outset, had at least been invested with it after the battle of Cassano, and had held it undivided, all would have been saved; but, associated first with Macdonald and afterwards with Joubert, he was prevented, for the second and third time, from repairing our misfortunes and recovering the honour of our arms.

Joubert, whom every effort had been made to attach, by a marriage and by caresses, to the party which was projecting a reorganization, lost a whole month, that of Messidor (June and July), in celebrating his wedding, and thus lost the decisive moment. These endeavours produced no real attachment in Joubert to the party whose supporter they were designed to make him, for he continued devoted to the patriots, and they caused him to waste valuable time. He set out, observing to his young wife, "You will see me again, either dead or victorious." He went, in fact, with the heroic resolution to conquer or die. This noble young general, on joining the army in the middle of Thermidor (early in August), manifested the utmost deference for the consummate master whom he was called to succeed. He requested him to stay with him, that he might benefit by his advice. Moreau, quite as generous as the young general, consented to stay till after his first battle, and to assist him with his counsels—a noble and touching instance of confraternity, which reflects honour on the virtues of our republican generals, and belongs to a time when patriotic zeal still swayed the hearts of our warriors more than ambition.

The French army, composed of the remains of the armies of Upper Italy and Naples, and of reinforcements from the interior, amounted to forty thousand men, completely organized, and impatient to measure their strength afresh with the enemy. Nothing could equal the patriotism of these soldiers, who, always beaten, were never disheartened, and always desired to turn again upon the enemy. No republican army deserved better of France, for none so thoroughly confuted the unjust reproach thrown upon the French, that they are incapable of supporting reverses. It is true, that part of its firmness was due to the brave and modest general in whom it had placed all its confidence, and who was always taken from it when he was about to lead it on again to victory.

These forty thousand men were independent of the fifteen thousand destined to form, under Championnet, the nucleus of the army of the High Alps. They had debouched by the Bormida on Acqui, and by the Bochetta on Gavi, and had again ranged themselves in advance of Novi. These forty thousand men, debouching in time, before the junction of the corps engaged in the sieges, might have obtained decisive advantages. But Alexandria had opened its gates on the 4th of Thermidor (July 22). A vague rumour was circulated that Mantua also had surrendered. This

melancholy intelligence was soon confirmed, and news arrived that the capitulation was signed on the 12th of Thermidor (July 30). Kray had rejoined Suwarrow with twenty thousand men; the acting force of the Austro-Russians amounted, at this moment, to sixty and some odd thousand. It was, therefore, no longer possible for Joubert to engage an enemy so superior, upon equal terms. He called a council of war. The general opinion was for returning to the Apennines, and confining themselves to the defensive, till further reinforcements should arrive.

Joubert was about to execute his resolution, when he was prevented by Suwarrow, and obliged to accept battle. The French army was formed in a semicircle on the slopes of the Monte Rotondo, which commands the whole plain of Novi. The left, consisting of Grouchy's and Lemoine's divisions, extended circularly in advance of Pasturana. It had at its back the ravine of the Riasco, which rendered its rear accessible to an enemy who should dare venture into that ravine. The cavalry reserve, commanded by Richepanse, was in the rear of this wing. In the centre, Laboissière's division covered the heights to the right and left of the city of Novi. Watrin's division, at the right wing, defended the approaches to the Monte Rotondo, towards the Tortona road. Dombrowsky, with one division, was blockading Seravalle. General Perignon commanded our left wing, St. Cyr our centre and our right. The position was strong, well-occupied on all points, and difficult to carry. Still, forty thousand men against more than sixty thousand, were immense odds. Suwarrow resolved to attack the position with his customary violence. He sent Kray towards our left, with Ott's and Belegarde's divisions. The Russian corps of Derfelden, headed by Bagration's advanced guard, was to attack our centre, near Novi. Melas, staying a little behind with the rest of the army, was to assail our right. From a singular combination, or rather from the want of combination, the attacks were to be successive, and not simultaneous.

On the 28th of Thermidor (August 15, 1799), Kray commenced the attack at five in the morning. Belegarde attacked Grouchy's division on the extreme left, and Ott, Lemoine's division. These two divisions, being not yet formed, had well nigh been surprised and broken. The obstinate resistance of one of the demi-brigades obliged Kray to throw himself upon the 20th light, which he overwhelmed by directing his principal effort against it. His troops had already reached the plateau, when Joubert galloped up to the point of danger. It was too late to think of retreating, and it was necessary to risk everything in order to drive the enemy from the plateau. Advancing amidst the riflemen to encourage them, he received a ball, which entered near the heart, and stretched him upon the ground.*

* "A new misfortune which befell France about this period, was the death of Joubert, who was killed at the battle of Novi, at the time when, touched by the miseries of his country, he forgot her offences, and felt nothing but her danger. Joubert was the friend of Championnet. On the latter being arrested, he sent his resignation to the Directory, and it was long ere he would again enter the service. When he did, he was first appointed to the command of the 17th military division, the head-quarters of which were then in Paris, and a few weeks after, to the command of the army of Italy. The striking similarity of situation between Joubert and Bonaparte is most remarkable. Both were of equal age, and both, in their early career, suffered a sort of disgrace; they were finally appointed to command, first, the 17th military division, and afterwards the army of Italy. There is in all this a curious parity of events; but death soon ended the career of one of the young heroes. That which ought to have constituted the happiness of his life was the cause of Joubert's death—namely, his marriage. But how could he refrain from loving the woman he espoused? Who can have forgotten Zaphirine de Montholon, her enchanting grace, her playful wit, her good humour, and her beauty. —*Duchess d'Abrantes. E.*

At the moment of expiring, the young hero cried to his soldiers, "Forward my lads! forward!" This event might have produced disorder in the army; but, luckily, Moreau had accompanied Joubert to this point. He immediately assumed the command, which was transferred to him by the general confidence, rallied the men burning with resentment, and led them back against the Austrians. The grenadiers of the 34th drove them with the bayonet, and threw them down the hill. Unluckily, the French had not yet their artillery in battery, and the Austrians, on the contrary, were mowing down their ranks by a shower of howitzer-shot and balls. During this action, Bellegarde attempted to turn the extreme left by the ravine of the Riasco, which has already been mentioned as affording access to our rear. He had made considerable way, when Perignon, seasonably opposing to him the reserve commanded by General Clausel, stopped him in his march. Perignon succeeded in driving him back into the plain, by sending Partonneaux's grenadiers and Richepanse's cavalry to charge him. This vigorous effort relieved the left wing.

Owing to the singular combination of Suwarrow, who intended his attacks to be successive, our centre had not yet been attacked. St. Cyr had had time to make his dispositions and to draw Watrin's division, forming his extreme right, towards Novi. At the earnest desire of Kray, who begged to be supported by an attack upon the centre, Bagration had at length determined to assail it with his advanced guard. Laboissière's division, which was on the left of Novi, suffering Bagration's Russians to approach within half musket-shot, received them with a tremendous fire of musketry and grape, and covered the plain with dead. Bagration, unshaken, then directed some batteries to turn Novi by our right; but, being encountered by Watrin's division, which was approaching Novi, they were driven back into the plain.

Half the day was now spent, and our line was not yet broken. Suwarrow had just come up with the Russian corps of Derfelden. He ordered a new general attack on the whole line. Kray was to assail the left again, Derfelden and Bagration the centre. Melas was directed to accelerate his pace, in order to overwhelm our right. Having made all his dispositions, the enemy advanced upon the whole line. Kray, persisting in his efforts against our left, directed Bellegarde to turn it, while Ott was to attack it in front; but Clausel's reserve repulsed Bellegarde's troops, and Lemoine's division hurled Ott down the slopes of the hills. In the centre, Suwarrow caused a furious attack to be made to the right and left of Novi. A fresh attempt to turn the town was foiled, as in the morning, by Watrin's division. Unluckily, our soldiers, hurried away by their ardour, pursued the enemy too closely, ventured into the plain, and were driven back to their position. At one o'clock the fire slackened again, in consequence of the general fatigue; but it soon recommenced with violence, and for four hours the French, immovable as walls, resisted with admirable coolness the utmost fury of the Russians. They had sustained, thus far, but inconsiderable loss. The Austro-Russians, on the contrary, had suffered severely. The plain was strewn with their dead and wounded. Unfortunately, the rest of the Austro-Russian army, under the command of Melas, arrived from Rivalta. This fresh irruption was about to be directed against our right. St. Cyr, on perceiving this, called back Watrin's division, which had advanced too far into the plain, and directed it towards a plateau to the right of Novi. But while it was making this movement, it found itself enveloped on all sides by the numerous corps of Melas

Alarmed at this sight, it was broken, and reached the plateau in confusion. It was rallied, however, a little to the rear. Meanwhile, Suwarrow, redoubling his efforts at the centre, near Novi, at length drove the French into the town, and made himself master of the heights which commanded it on the right and left. From that moment, Moreau, deeming retreat necessary, gave orders for it before the further progress of the enemy should intercept the communication with Gavi. On the right, Watrin's division was obliged to cut its way through, in order to regain the road to Gavi, which was already closed. Laboissière's division retired from Novi; Lemoine's and Grouchy's divisions fell back on Pasturana, having to sustain furious charges by Kray. Unfortunately, a battalion penetrated into the ravine of Riasco, which runs behind Pasturana. Its fire threw our columns into disorder. Artillery and cavalry were intermingled. Lemoine's division, closely pressed by the enemy, dispersed and threw itself into the ravine. Our soldiers were driven along like dust raised by the wind. Perignon and Grouchy rallied a few brave fellows to stop the enemy and to save the artillery; but they were wounded and made prisoners. Perignon had received seven sabre wounds, and Grouchy six. The brave Colli, the Piedmontese general, who had distinguished himself in the first campaigns against us, and who had afterwards entered into our service, formed a square with some battalions, resisted till it was broken, and fell dreadfully mangled into the hands of the Russians.

After this first moment of confusion, the army rallied in advance of Gavi. The Austro-Russians were too much fatigued to pursue. It could therefore march without being molested. The loss on both sides was equal; it amounted to about ten thousand men for each army. But the killed and wounded were much more numerous on the Austro-Russian side. The French had lost a much greater number of prisoners. They had lost also their commander-in-chief, four generals of division, thirty-seven pieces of cannon, and four pair of colours. Never had they displayed cooler and more persevering courage. They were inferior to the enemy by at least one-third. The Russians had shown their fanatical bravery, but they owed the advantage to number only, and not to the combinations of the general,* who had betrayed on this occasion the grossest ignorance. He had, in fact, exposed his columns to the risk of being cut off one after another, and had not sufficiently supported himself on our right, the point which he ought to have overwhelmed. This deplorable battle shut us definitively out of Italy, and forbade us to keep the field any longer. We were obliged to confine ourselves to the Apennines, fortunate in being still able to retain them. The loss of the battle could not be imputed to Moreau, but to the unlucky circumstance of the junction of Kray with Suwarrow. Joubert's delay was the sole cause of this last disaster.

All our misfortunes were not confined to the battle of Novi. The expedition against Holland, so long announced, was at length executed con

* "Suwarrow's order of battle at Novi was highly characteristic of that singular war rior. It was simply this: 'Kray and Bellegarde will attack the left—the Russians the centre—Melas the right.' To the soldiers he said, 'God wills, the Emperor orders, Suwarrow commands, that to-morrow the enemy be conquered.' Dressed in his usual costume, in his shirt down to the waist, he was on horseback at the advanced posts the whole preceding evening, attended by a few horsemen, minutely reconnoitring the republican position. He was recognised from the French lines by the singularity of his dress, and a skirmish of advanced posts in consequence took place."—*Prince Hardan berg's Memoirs*. E.

jointly by the English and the Russians. Paul I. had, in a treaty with Pitt, stipulated to furnish seventeen thousand Russians, who were to be in English pay and to act in Holland. After many difficulties had been surmounted, the expedition had been prepared for the commencement of Fructidor (the end of August). Thirty thousand English were to join the seventeen thousand Russians, and, if the landing were effected without obstacle, there would be a well-grounded hope of wresting Holland from the French. This was a most important point for England; and, had she only succeeded in destroying the fleets and the arsenals of Holland, she would have been amply repaid for the expenses of the expedition. A considerable squadron sailed for the Baltic to fetch the Russians. The first detachment set sail under the command of General Abercromby, to attempt a landing. All the troops of the expedition, when once assembled, were to be under the supreme command of the Duke of York.

The most advantageous point for landing in Holland was the mouth of the Meuse. The enemy would thus threaten the line of retreat of the French, and be very near the Hague, where the stadtholder had most partisans. A more convenient coast caused a preference to be given to North Holland. Abercromby proceeded to the Helder, where he arrived towards the end of August. After overcoming many obstacles, he landed near the Helder, in the environs of Groot-Keeten, on the 10th of Fructidor (August 27). The immense preparations which the expedition had required, and the presence of all the English squadrons on the coast, had sufficiently forewarned the French and put them upon their guard. Brune commanded both the Batavian and the French army. He had at hand no more than seven thousand French and ten thousand Dutch, commanded by Daendels. He had sent the Batavian division to the environs of the Helder, and disposed the French division in the environs of Harlem. Abercromby, on landing, fell in with the Dutch at Groot-Keeten, repulsed them, and thus assured the disembarkation of his troops. The Dutch showed no want of bravery on this occasion, but they were not directed with sufficient skill by General Daendels, and were obliged to fall back. Brune picked them up, and made dispositions for attacking forthwith the troops which had landed, before they had solidly established themselves, and were reinforced by the English and Russian divisions, by which they were to be joined.

The Dutch manifested the best dispositions. The national guards had offered to garrison the fortresses, and this had enabled Brune to reinforce himself with fresh troops. He had called to him Dumonceau's division, six thousand strong, and he resolved to attack, very early in September, the camp in which the English had established themselves. This camp was formidable. It was the Zyp, once a morass, drained by Dutch industry, forming an extensive area, intersected by dikes and canals, and covered with dwellings. It was occupied by seventeen thousand English, who had there made the best defensive dispositions. Brune had at most but twenty thousand men to attack it; and that number was very inadequate, on account of the nature of the ground. This camp he assailed on the 22d of Fructidor (September 8), and, after an obstinate conflict, was obliged to beat a retreat and to fall back upon Amsterdam. From that moment, he could no longer prevent the assembling of all the Anglo-Russian forces, and was obliged to wait for the formation of a French army to fight them. This establishment of the English in North Holland led to the event that was most to be apprehended, namely, the defection of the great Dutch fleet. The Texel had not been closed, and the English admiral, Mitchell

was enabled to enter it with all his ships. Emissaries of the Prince of Orange had been long labouring to excite the Dutch seamen. On the first summons of Admiral Mitchell, they rose and forced their admiral, Story, to surrender. The whole Dutch navy thus fell into the hands of the English; and this of itself was to them an inestimable advantage.

These tidings reaching Paris, one after another, produced the effect which might naturally be expected from them. They increased the fermentation of the parties, and particularly the animosity of the patriots, who demanded, with greater warmth than ever, the employment of the great revolutionary means. The liberty restored to the journals and the clubs had caused a great number to spring up again. The remnant of the Jacobin party had met in the old Riding-House, where our first assemblies held their sittings. Though the law forbade the popular societies to assume the form of deliberative assemblies, the society of the Riding-House had nevertheless given to itself a president, secretaries, &c., under different titles. Here figured Bouchotte, the ex-minister, Drouet, Felix Lepelletier, and Arena, all of them disciples or accomplices of Babœuf. Here were invoked the manes of Goujon, Soubrany, and the victims of Grenelle. Here were demanded, in the style of 1793, the punishment of all the leeches that sucked the blood of the people, the disarming of the royalists, the levy *en masse*, the establishment of manufactories of arms in the public places, the restitution of their cannon and pikes to the national guards, &c. Here, too, it was more especially insisted on that the late directors, to whom were attributed the recent disasters as consequences of their administration, should be placed under accusation. When the results of the battle of Novi and the events in Holland became known, the violence of these men was unbounded. The generals were loaded with abuse. Moreau was termed a fumbler, Joubert himself, notwithstanding his heroic death, was accused of having ruined the army by his tardiness in joining it. His young wife, and Messrs. de Semonville, Sainte-Foy, and Talleyrand, to whom his marriage was attributed, were objects of especial vituperation. The Dutch government was charged with treason; it was said to be composed of aristocrats, creatures of the stadtholder, enemies to France and liberty. The *Journal des Hommes libres*, the organ of the party that met at the Riding-House, repeated all these declamations, and added to the scandal of the expressions that of printing them.

This animosity struck a kind of terror into many people. They were apprehensive of a return to the scenes of 1793.* Those who styled themselves the *moderates*, the *politicians*, and who, like Sieyes, entertained the laudable design and the somewhat bold pretension of saving France from the fury of the parties and of constituting it a second time, were indignant at the acrimony of these new Jacobins. Sieyes in particular was in the habit of expressing his dread of them, and he declared against them with all the vivacity of his temper. They might, it is true, be deemed formidable, for, besides the spouters and firebrands who exerted their energy in the clubs or in the newspapers, they numbered partisans more weighty, more powerful, and consequently more dangerous, in the government itself. In the first place, there were in the Councils all the patriots excluded last

* "The multitude, to whom it is only necessary to present the phantom of the past in order to inspire it with dread, ranged themselves, in their apprehension of the return of the system of Terror, on the side of the moderate party; and the ultra-republicans failed in an attempt to obtain a declaration that the country was in danger, as at the end of the Legislative Assembly."—*Mignet*. E.

year by the schisms, who had entered by force by means of the elections of this year, and who repeated, in more moderate language, nearly the same things that were said in the society at the Riding-House. These were men who were unwilling to run the risk of a new constitution, who, moreover, distrusted those who proposed to frame one, and who feared lest in the generals the government was seeking a dangerous support. They desired, besides, in order to extricate France from her perils, measures similar to those employed by the committee of public safety. The Council of Ancients, more moderate and more prudent, were not much tainted by these sentiments; but more than two hundred members warmly supported them in the Five Hundred. In this number there were not only hotheaded men, like Augereau, but wise and enlightened men, like Jourdan. These two generals gave the patriotic party a great ascendancy in the Five Hundred. In the Directory, this party had two voices—Gohier and Moulins. Barras continued undecided. On the one hand, he distrusted Sieyes, who testified but little esteem for him, and considered him as thoroughly corrupt: on the other, he dreaded the patriots and their extravagances. He hesitated, therefore, to declare for either. In the ministry, the patriots had just gained a new supporter in Bernadotte. This general was much less vehement than most of the generals of the army of Italy; and the reader will recollect that his division, on arriving at the Tagliamento, quarrelled with that of Augereau about the use of the word *Monsieur*, which it had already substituted for that of *Citoyen*. But Bernadotte cherished a restless ambition. He had observed with vexation the confidence granted to Joubert by the reorganizing party; he conceived that Moreau was thought of since the death of Joubert, and this circumstance indisposing him against the plans of reorganization, attached him entirely to the patriots. General Marbot, commandant of Paris, a violent republican, held the same sentiments as Bernadotte.

Thus two hundred stanch deputies in the Five Hundred, at the head of whom were two celebrated generals, the minister at war, the military commandant of Paris, two directors, a great number of journals and clubs, and a considerable remnant of men who had compromised themselves, fit for a *coup de main*, might well occasion some alarm; and though the Mountaineer party could not spring up again, it is easy to conceive what fears it still excited in persons still full of the recollections of 1793.

Bourguignon had not given satisfaction in the exercise of the functions of the police. He was an honest citizen, but rather indiscreet. Barras proposed to Sieyes a creature of his own, whom he had recently sent as ambassador to Holland, the supple and crafty Fouché. Formerly a member of the Jacobins, thoroughly acquainted with their spirit and their secrets, not at all attached to their cause, seeking amidst the wreck of parties to save only his own fortune, Fouché was eminently qualified to be a spy upon his old friends, and to secure the Directory from their projects. He was accepted by Sieyes and Roger Ducos, and was invested with the ministry of police. This was, under the circumstances, a valuable acquisition. He confirmed Barras in the idea of attaching himself rather to the reorganizing party than to the patriot party, because the latter had no prospects, and was liable, moreover, to carry him too far.

This measure being taken, war against the patriots commenced. Sieyes, who had considerable influence over the Ancients, because that council was wholly composed of *moderates* and *politicians*, exerted that influence to obtain authority to shut up the new society of the Jacobins. As the Riding

House appertained to the Tuileries, it was comprised in the precincts of the palace of the Ancients. Each council having the police of its own precincts, the Ancients had power to shut up the Riding-House. Accordingly, the commission of the inspectors issued an ordinance forbidding all meetings in that place. A single sentinel placed at the door was sufficient to prevent the meeting of the new Jacobins. This was a proof that, if the declamations were the same, the strength was not so. The motive assigned by the Council of the Ancients for this ordinance was a report of the deputy Cornet. Courtois, the same who drew up the report on the 9th of Thermidor, took occasion from it to make a new denunciation against the plots of the Jacobins. His denunciation was followed by a discussion tending to order a report on this subject.

The patriots, driven from the Riding-House, retired to a spacious building in the Rue du Bac, and there recommenced their habitual declamations.* As their organization into a deliberative assembly remained the same, the constitution gave the executive power a right to prohibit the meetings of their society. Sieyes, Roger Ducos, and Barras, decided, at the instigation of Fouché, to prohibit them. Gohier and Moulins were of a different opinion, remarking that, in the present danger, it was necessary to revive the public spirit by means of clubs; that the society of the new Jacobins comprised some wrong heads, but no formidable demagogues, since they had given way to a single sentinel when the Riding-House was closed against them. Their opinion was not heeded, and the decision was taken. The execution of it was deferred till after the celebration of the anniversary of the 10th of August, which was to be held on the 23d of Thermidor. Sieyes was president of the Directory; in that quality he was to speak at the solemnity. The speech which he delivered was a remarkable one. He sought, in the course of it, to point out the danger in which the new anarchists involved the republic, and denounced them as dangerous conspirators, dreaming of a new revolutionary dictatorship. The patriots who attended the ceremony gave an unfavourable reception to this speech, and uttered some vociferations. Amidst discharges of artillery, Sieyes and Barras conceived that they heard balls whizzing past their ears. They returned to the Directory highly incensed. Distrusting the authorities of Paris, they resolved to take the military command from Marbot, who was accused of being a warm patriot and of participating in the pretended plots of the Jacobins. Fouché proposed Lefebvre, a brave general, who concerned himself about nothing but the military watchword, and was an utter stranger to the intrigues of the parties, as his successor. Marbot was therefore dismissed; and, on the day after the next, the ordinance prohibiting the meeting of the society in the Rue du Bac was issued.

The patriots made no more resistance at the Rue du Bac than at the Riding-House. They retired and remained definitively dispersed. But

* "Under Fouché's auspices, the power of the Jacobins was speedily put to the test. He at once closed the Riding-School hall where their meetings were held, and, supported by the Council of Ancients, within whose precincts it was placed, prohibited any further assemblies in that situation. The democrats, expelled from their old den, reassembled in a new place of meeting in the Rue du Bac, where their declamations were renewed with as much vehemence as ever. But public opinion had changed; the people were no longer disposed to rise in insurrection to support their ambitious projects. Fouché, taking advantage of this inaction, resolved to follow up his blow, and the Jacobin club, which had spread such havoc through the world, was at last and for ever closed."—*Alison*. E

they had still the journals left them, and of these they made a formidable use. That which styled itself *Journal des Hommes libres* declaimed with extreme violence against all the members of the Directory, who were known to have approved of the prohibition. Sieyes was severely handled. That perfidious priest, said the patriotic journals, has sold the republic to Prussia. He agreed with that power to re-establish monarchy in France, and to give the crown to Brunswick. These charges had no other foundation than the well-known opinion of Sieyes upon the constitution and his residence in Prussia. He was daily repeating, in fact, that the firebrands and the spouters rendered all government impossible; that it was necessary to concentrate the authority; that liberty might be compatible with monarchy, witness England; but that it was incompatible with the successive domination of every party. He was even reported to have made use of this expression—that the north of Europe was full of wise and moderate princes, who would be capable, with a strong constitution, of making France happy. Such language, whether truly or falsely attributed to Sieyes, might have been used by him, and was sufficient to cause plots to be imputed to him, which had no existence but in the imagination of his enemies. Barras experienced no better usage than Sieyes. The delicacy with which the patriots had long treated him, because he had always flattered them with the prospect of his support, was thrown aside. They declared him a traitor, a corrupt man, who was of no service to any party. Fouché, his adviser, an apostate like himself, was loaded with similar reproaches. Roger Ducos, was in their opinion, only an idiot, blindly adopting the opinion of two traitors.

The liberty of the press was unlimited. The law proposed by Berlier having been rejected, there was but one way left for attacking writers; that was, to procure the revival of a law of the Convention against those who, either by acts or writings, tended to the overthrow of the republic. It was requisite that this intention should be demonstrated before the law became applicable, and then the law decreed the punishment of death. It was impossible to resort to this. A new law had been demanded from the legislative body, and it had been decided that the subject should be immediately taken into consideration. But, in the meantime, the attacks were kept up with the same violence; and the three directors composing the majority declared that it was impossible to govern. They resolved to apply to this case Article 144 of the constitution, which gave the Directory a right to issue warrants for the apprehension of the authors of, or accomplices in, plots formed against the republic. They were obliged to wrest this article exceedingly, in order to apply it to the journalists. As, however, it afforded the means of stopping the violence of their publications, by seizing their presses and apprehending the writers, the directorial majority, by the advice of Fouché, issued warrants against the authors of eleven journals, and ordered seas to be put upon their presses. The ordinance was communicated, on the 17th of Fructidor (September 3), to the legislative body, and produced strong excitement in the patriots. They raised an outcry against a stretch of authority, a dictatorship, &c.

Such was the state of affairs. In the Directory, in the Councils, everywhere, in short, the *moderates*, the *politicians*, were arrayed against the patriots. The former had the majority in the Directory as in the Councils. The patriots were in a minority, but they were ardent, and made noise enough to frighten their adversaries. Fortunately, the means were worn

out, like the parties, and on either side they were much more likely to frighten than hurt. The Directory had twice prohibited the meetings of the new society of the Jacobins, and suppressed their journals. The patriots cried out, blustered, but had neither hardihood nor partisans enough to attack the government.* In this situation, which had lasted ever since the 30th of Prairial, that is, for nearly three months, the idea, so common on the eve of decisive events—that of a reconciliation—was broached. Many deputies of all parties proposed an interview with the members of the Directory, to explain and to adjust their reciprocal grievances. We are all lovers of liberty, said they; we are desirous of saving it from the perils to which it is exposed by the defeats of our armies; let us endeavour, then, to agree together upon the choice of the means, since that choice is our only cause of discord. The interview took place at the residence of Barras. There is not, and there cannot be, any reconciliation between parties, for it would be necessary that they should renounce their object, and this can never be brought about by a conversation. The patriot deputies complained that plots were daily talked of, that the president of the Directory himself had pointed to a class of dangerous men who were meditating the ruin of the republic. They begged to be told who those men were, in order that they might not be confounded with the patriots. Sieyes, to whom this inquiry was addressed, replied, by adverting to the conduct of the popular societies and of the journals, and by expatiating on the dangers of a fresh anarchy. He was then asked to point out the real anarchists, that they might unite against and attack them. "But how is it possible for us to unite against them," said Sieyes, "when not a day passes but members of the legislative body ascend the tribune to support them!"—"It is we, then, whom you attack," rejoined the deputies, to whom Sieyes had given this answer. "When we wish to come to an explanation with you, you abuse and repulse us." A fit of ill-humour succeeding, the parties immediately separated, addressing language to each other much more threatening than conciliatory.

Immediately after this interview, Jourdan conceived the idea of an important proposition, that of declaring the country in danger. This declaration would lead of course to the levy *en masse*, and to several other great revolutionary measures. It was submitted to the Five Hundred on the 17th of Fructidor (September 13). The moderate party strongly opposed it, alleging that this measure, instead of strengthening, would only weaken, the government by exciting exaggerated fears and dangerous agitations. The patriots insisted that some great commotion was required to rouse the public spirit, and to save the Revolution. This expedient, which was excellent in 1793, could not possibly succeed at the present moment, and would have been but an erroneous application of the past Lucien Bonaparte, Boulay of La Meurthe, and Chenier, warmly opposed it, and obtained the adjournment of the question till the following day. The patriots of the clubs had tumultuously surrounded the palace of the Five Hundred, and insulted several of the deputies. It was reported that Ber-

* "France was on the eve of being delivered over to anarchy, when the Directory thought of the expedient of applying to the press the article of the constitution which gave the executive power the right to arrest all persons suspected of carrying on plots against the republic. This bold step produced an immediate ebullition among the democrats, but it was confined to declamations and threats. The tribune resounded with indignant harangues, but not a sword was drawn."—*Lacretelle*. E

bernadotte, at their urgent desire, was about to mount his horse, and to put himself at their head, for the purpose of exciting an insurrection. It is certain that several of the firebrands of the party had strongly pressed him to do so. There was reason to fear that he would suffer himself to be prevailed upon. Barras and Fouché called upon him, and endeavoured to come to an explanation with him. They found him full of resentment against the plans which had been formed, he said, with Joubert. Barras and Fouché assured him that nothing of the kind had taken place, and entreated him to keep quiet.

They returned to Sieyes, and agreed to force Bernadotte to resign without dismissing him. Sieyes, conversing on the same day with Bernadotte, led him to say that he wished soon to return to active service, and that he should consider the command of an army as the most grateful reward for his ministry. Interpreting this reply as an application for his removal, Sieyes, Barras, and Roger Ducos immediately resolved to write to Bernadotte that his resignation was accepted. They seized the opportunity, while Gohier and Moulins were absent, to adopt this determination. On the very next day the letter to Bernadotte was written. The latter was astounded. He replied to the Directory in a very bitter letter, in which he said that they accepted a resignation which had never been offered, and demanded his half-pay. Tidings of this disguised dismissal reached the Five Hundred, at the moment when that assembly was about to vote on the question of the country in danger. A strong sensation was excited by it. "Some extraordinary measures are preparing," exclaimed the patriots. "Let us swear," said Jourdan, "to die in our curule chairs!"—"My head shall fall," cried Augereau, "before any outrage shall be committed upon the national representation." At length, after great tumult, the question was put to the vote. Jourdan's motion was negatived by a majority of 245 votes against 177, and the country was not declared in danger.

When Gohier and Moulins were apprized of Bernadotte's dismissal, which had been decided upon without their participation, they complained to their colleagues, saying that such a measure ought not to have been adopted without the concurrence of the five directors. "We formed the majority," replied Sieyes, "and we had a right to do what we have done." Gohier and Moulins immediately paid an official visit to Bernadotte, and they took care to make as much parade as possible on the occasion.

The administration of the department of the Seine also excited some distrust in the directorial majority; it was changed. Dubois de Crancé succeeded Bernadotte as minister at war.

The disorganization was, therefore, complete in all respects. Beaten abroad by the coalition, nearly overturned at home by the parties, the republic appeared to be threatened with speedy ruin.* It was requisite that

* "Merit was generally persecuted; all men of honour chased from public situations robbers everywhere assembled in their infernal caverns; the wicked were in power; the apologists of the system of Terror were thundering in the tribune; spoliation was re-established under the name of false loans; thousands of victims were already designed under the name of hostages; the signal for pillage, murder, and conflagration, anxiously looked for, couched in the words, 'the country is in danger!' the citizens had no security for their lives; the state for its finances. All Europe was in arms against us. Our armies were routed; our conquests were lost; the territory of the republic menaced with invasion. Such was the situation of France previous to the revo-

a force should spring up somewhere, either to quell the factions or to withstand the foreign powers. It was impossible to hope for this force in a victorious party, for they were all alike worn out and discredited. It could only issue from the bosom of the armies, in which a power, a silent, regular, glorious power resides, such as is wanted by a nation weary of the agitation of dissensions and the confusion of opinions. Amidst this great dissolution, all eyes turned to the men who had distinguished themselves during the Revolution, and seemed to seek a chief. "We want no more babblers," Sieyes had once observed; "we want a head and a sword." The head was found, for it was in the Directory. A sword was sought for. Hoche was dead. Joubert, whose youth, excellent disposition, and heroism, recommended him to all the friends of the republic, had just expired at Novi. Moreau, who was deemed the greatest captain among the generals left in Europe, had produced on public opinion the impression of a cold, indecisive, unenterprising character, and indisposed to undertake great responsibility. Massena, one of our greatest generals, had not yet earned the glory of the saviour of the country. Besides, he was regarded as merely a soldier. Jourdan had just been vanquished. Augereau was a turbulent spirit, Bernadotte a restless one, and neither of these had acquired sufficient renown. There was one resplendent personage, who concentrated in himself every species of glory, who had followed up a hundred victories by a desirable peace, who had raised France to the pinnacle of greatness at Campo Formio, and who at his departure seemed to have carried his good fortune away with him—that was BONAPARTE. But he was in a distant land. He was compelling the echoes of the East to repeat his name. He alone had continued to be victorious, and he was hurling, on the banks of the Nile and the Jordan, those thunderbolts with which he had formerly affrighted Europe on the Adige. It was not enough to deem him glorious, men were determined to think him interesting. They insisted that he was exiled by a distrustful and jealous authority. While, like an adventurer, he was seeking a career vast as his imagination, he was considered as the submissive citizen, repaying by victories the exile to which he was condemned. "Where is Bonaparte?" said one to another. "With a constitution already impaired, his life is wasting away under a burning sky. Ah! if he were among us, the republic would not be threatened with speedy ruin. Europe and the factions would alike respect it!" Confused rumours were circulated respecting him. Sometimes it was said that Victory, unfaithful to all the French generals, had, in his turn, forsaken him, in his distant expedition. But such rumours were discredited. "He is invincible," was the reply; "instead of having experienced reverses, he is marching to the conquest of all the East." Gigantic projects were attributed to him. Some went so far as to assert that he had traversed Syria, and crossed the Euphrates and the Indus; others that he had marched to Constantinople, and that, after overthrowing the Ottoman empire, he would fall upon Europe in rear. The newspapers were full of these conjectures, which prove what imagination expected of this young man.

The Directory had sent him orders to return, and had collected in the Mediterranean an immense fleet, composed of French and Spanish ships, to bring the army back.* The general's brothers, who had remained in

tution of the 18th Brumaire and the establishment of the Consulate. —*First Year of the Consulate.* E.

* It should be observed that the existence of such an order is disputed. We know of no ordinance of the Directory, signed Treilhard, Barras, and Lareveillère, and dated the

Paris, and were commissioned to inform him of the state of affairs, had sent him despatch after despatch, to apprise him of the confusion into which the republic had fallen, and to urge him to return. But these letters had to cross the seas and to pass through the English squadrons, and it was not known whether the hero would receive them, and come back before the dissolution of the republic.

7th of Prairial, recalling Bonaparte to Europe. Lareveillère, in his *Memoirs*, declares that he has no recollection of having given this signature, and considers the ordinance as fabricated. In this case, however, the naval expedition under Bruix, would remain unaccounted for. At any rate, it is certain that the Directory at this period wished for Bonaparte, and that it dreaded his ambition much less than the ferocity of Suwarrow. If the order is not authentic, it is probable; and, besides, it is of little consequence, for Bonaparte was authorized to return whenever he should think fit.

THE DIRECTORY.

CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS OF BONAPARTE IN EGYPT—CONQUEST OF UPPER EGYPT BY DESAIX; EXPEDITION TO SYRIA; CAPTURE OF THE FORT OF EL ARISCH AND JAFFA; BATTLE OF MOUNT TABOR; SIEGE OF ST. JEAN D'ACRE—RETURN TO EGYPT; BATTLE OF ABOUKIR; DEPARTURE FOR FRANCE—OPERATIONS IN EUROPE—MARCH OF THE ARCHDUKE CHARLES TO THE RHINE, AND OF SUWARROW INTO SWITZERLAND; MOVEMENT OF MASSÉNA; MEMORABLE VICTORY OF ZURICH; PERILOUS SITUATION OF SUWARROW; HIS DISASTROUS RETREAT; SALVATION OF FRANCE—EVENTS IN HOLLAND; DEFEAT AND CAPITULATION OF THE ANGLO-RUSSIANS; EVACUATION OF HOLLAND.

BONAPARTE, after the battle of the Pyramids, had found himself master of Egypt. He had begun to establish himself there, and sent his generals into the provinces to complete the conquest of them. Desaix, placed at the entrance of Upper Egypt, with a division of about three thousand men, was directed to reduce the remnants of Mourad Bey's force in that province. It was in Vendémiaire and Brumaire in the preceding year (October, 1798), at the moment when the inundation was over, that Desaix had commenced his expedition. The enemy had retired before him, and did not wait for him till he reached Sediman; there, on the 16th of Vendémiaire (October 7, 1798), Desaix had fought a sanguinary battle with the desperate relics of Mourad Bey. None of the engagements of the French in Egypt was so bloody. Two thousand French had to combat with four thousand Mamelukes and eight thousand Fellahs, intrenched in the village of Sediman. The battle was conducted in the same manner as that of the Pyramids, and like all those fought in Egypt. The Fellahs were behind the walls of the village, and the horse in the plain. Desaix had formed in two squares, and had placed on his wings two other small squares, in order to break the shock of the enemy's cavalry. For the first time, our infantry was broken, and one of the small squares was penetrated. But, by a sudden and admirable instinct, our brave soldiers immediately threw themselves on the ground, that the great squares might be able to fire without hitting them. The Mamelukes, passing over them, charged the great squares with fury for several successive hours, and rushed in desperation on the points of the bayonets till they expired. As usual, the squares then moved off to attack the intrenchments, and carried them. During this movement, the Mamelukes, describing an arc of a circle, came to slaughter the wounded on the rear, but they were soon driven from this field of carnage, and the enraged soldiers put to death a considerable number of them. Never was field of battle so thickly strewn with slain. The French had lost three hundred men. Desaix continued his march during

the whole winter, and after a series of actions, having reduced Upper Egypt as far as the cataracts, he made himself equally feared for his bravery and beloved for his clemency. In Cairo, Bonaparte had been named Sultan Kebir, the Fire Sultan. In Upper Egypt, Desaix was called the Just Sultan.

Bonaparte had, meanwhile, marched to Belbeys, to drive Ibrahim Bey into Syria, and he had collected by the way the wrecks of the caravan of Mecca, plundered by the Arabs. Returning to Cairo, he continued to establish there an entirely French administration. An insurrection, excited in Cairo by the secret agents of Mourad Bey, was most severely quelled, and completely disheartened the enemies of the French.* Thus passed the winter between 1798 and 1799 in the expectation of events. During this interval, Bonaparte received intelligence of the declaration of war by the Porte, and of the preparations which it was making against him with the aid of the English. Two armies were being formed, one at Rhodes, the other in Syria. These two armies were to act simultaneously in the spring of 1799, the one by landing at Aboukir, near Alexandria, the other by crossing the desert which separates Syria from Egypt. Bonaparte was instantly aware of his position, and determined, according to his custom, to disconcert the enemy and to forestall him by a sudden attack. He could not cross the desert which parts Egypt from Syria in summer, and he resolved to avail himself of the winter for destroying the assemblages of troops forming at Acre, at Damascus, and in the principal towns. Djezzar, the celebrated Pacha of Acre, was appointed seraskier of the army collected in Syria. Abdallah, Pacha of Damascus, commanded its advanced guard, and had proceeded as far as the fort of El Arisch, which is the key to Egypt on the side next to Syria. Bonaparte resolved to act immediately. He was in communication with the tribes of the Lebanon. The Druses, Christian tribes, the Mutualis, schismatic Mahometans, offered him assistance, and ardently wished for his coming. By a sudden assault on Jaffa, Acre, and some other badly-fortified places, he might in a short time gain possession of Syria, add this fine conquest to that of Egypt, make himself master of the Euphrates, as he was of the Nile, and thus command all the communications with India. His ardent imagination went still farther, and formed some of those projects which his admirers of Europe attributed to him. It was not impossible that, by raising the population of the Lebanon, he might obtain sixty or eighty thousand auxiliaries, and that, with these auxiliaries, supported by twenty-five thousand soldiers, the bravest in the world, he should be able to march to Constantinople and take that capital. Whether this gigantic project were practicable or not,

* "Shortly after the revolt of Cairo, the necessity of insuring our own safety urged the commission of a horrible act of cruelty. A tribe of Arabs in the neighbourhood of Cairo had massacred a party of French. Bonaparte ordered his aide-de-camp Croisier to proceed to the spot, surround the tribe, destroy the huts, kill all the men, and conduct the rest of the population to Cairo. The order was to decapitate the victims, and bring their heads in sacks, to be exhibited to the people. The party set out, and returned the next day. Many of the poor Arab women had been delivered on the road and the children had perished of hunger and fatigue. About four o'clock, a troop of asses arrived in Ezbekyeh Place, laden with sacks. The sacks were opened, and the heads rolled out before the assembled populace! I cannot describe the horror I experienced at the sight."—*Bourrienne*. E.

"Every night," said Napoleon, in a letter to Regnier, "we cut off thirty heads and those of several chiefs. That will teach them, I think, a good lesson." The victims were put to death in prison, thrust into sacks, and thrown into the Nile. This continued for six days after tranquillity was restored at Cairo. E.

so much is certain, that it occupied his imagination, and when we have seen what, aided by Fortune, he afterwards accomplished, we dare not pronounce any of his plans insane.*

Bonaparte commenced his march in Pluviose (very early in February), at the head of Kleber's, Regnier's, Lannes's, Bon's, and Murat's divisions, about thirteen thousand strong. Murat's division was composed of cavalry. Bonaparte had raised a regiment of an entirely new kind—the dromedary regiment. Two men, seated back to back, were mounted on each dromedary, and such are the strength and swiftness of those animals, that they can travel twenty-five or thirty leagues without stopping. Bonaparte had formed this regiment to give chase to the Arabs, who infested the borders of Egypt. This regiment accompanied the army on this expedition. Bonaparte had, moreover, directed Rear-admiral Perrée to sail from Alexandria with three frigates, and to proceed to the coast of Syria, to convey thither the siege artillery and ammunition. He arrived before the fort of El Arisch on the 29th of Pluviose (February 15). After a slight resistance, the garrison surrendered themselves prisoners, to the number of thirteen hundred men. Considerable magazines were found in the fort. Ibrahim Bey, having attempted to relieve it, was put to flight. His camp fell into the hands of the French, who found in it an immense booty. The soldiers had to endure severe hardships while crossing the desert; but when they saw their general marching by their side, suffering, in impaired health, the same privations and the same fatigues, they dared not complain.† They soon reached Gaza. They took that place in the sight of Djezzar Pacha, and found there, as in the fort of El Arisch, a great quan-

* "The mistake of the captain of a frigate," said the Emperor, "who bore away, instead of forcing his passage to the place of his destination, prevented the face of the world from being totally changed. Acre would otherwise have been taken—the French army would have flown to Damascus and Aleppo—in the twinkling of an eye they would have been on the Euphrates—the Syrian Christians would have joined us—the Druses, the Armenians would have united with us—I should have reached Constantinople and the Indies—I should have changed the face of the world."—*Las Cases*. E.

† "We arrived about four o'clock in the afternoon at Messodiah. Here we witnessed a kind of phenomenon which was not a little agreeable to us. Messodiah is situated on the coast of the Mediterranean, surrounded with little downs of very fine sand which the copious rains of winter readily penetrate. The rain remains in the sand, so that on making, with the finger, holes of four or five inches in depth, at the bottom of these little hills, the water immediately flows out. This water was indeed rather thick, but its flavour was agreeable; and it would have become clear if we could have spared time to allow it to rest. It was a curious spectacle to behold us all lying on the sand, digging wells in miniature, and displaying a laughable selfishness in our endeavours to obtain the most abundant source. We found these sand wells at the extremity of the desert, and they contributed in no small degree to revive the courage of our soldiers. The fatigues subsequently experienced in the desert, excited violent murmurs among the soldiers during their passage across the isthmus. When any one passed them on horseback, they studiously expressed their discontent. The advantage possessed by the horseman provoked their sarcasms."—*Bourrienne*. E.

Just previous to his crossing the desert, Napoleon paid a visit to the Red Sea, when the following adventure occurred, as related by one of his generals:—"The night overtook us, the waters of the Red Sea began to rise around us, when the horsemen ahead cried out that their horses were swimming. Bonaparte rescued the whole party by one of those simple expedients which occur to an imperturbable mind. Placing himself in the centre, he bade all the rest to form a circle round him, and then ride out each man in a separate direction, and each to halt as soon as he found his horse was swimming. The man whose horse continued to march the last, was sure, he said, to be in the right direction; him accordingly we all followed, and reached Suez at midnight in safety though so rapidly had the tide advanced, that the horses were more than breast-high in the water."—*Savary*. E.

tity of ammunition and provisions. From Gaza, the army proceeded to Jaffa, the ancient Joppa, where it arrived on the 13th of Ventose (March 3). This place was surrounded by a massive wall flanked by towers. It contained a garrison of four thousand men. Bonaparte caused it to be battered in breach, and then summoned the commandant, who only answered by cutting off the head of the messenger. The assault was made, and the place stormed with extraordinary intrepidity, and given up for thirty hours to pillage and massacre. Here, too, were found a considerable quantity of artillery and supplies of all kinds. There were some thousands of prisoners, whom the general could not despatch to Egypt, because he had not the ordinary means for escorting them, and he would not send them back to the enemy to swell his ranks. Bonaparte decided on a terrible measure, the only cruel act of his life. Transported into a barbarous country, he had involuntarily adopted its manners. He ordered all the prisoners to be put to death. The army consummated with obedience, but with a sort of horror, the execution that was commanded.* It was during their stay at Jaffa that our soldiers caught the infection of the plague.

Bonaparte then advanced upon St. Jean d'Acre, the ancient Ptolemais, situated at the foot of Mount Carmel. It was the only place that could now stop him. If he could make himself master of it, Syria would be his. But the ferocious Djezzar† had shut himself up there, with all his wealth and a strong garrison. He reckoned upon support from Sir Sidney Smith,‡ then cruising off that coast, and who supplied him with engineers, artillerymen, and ammunition. It was probable, moreover, that he would be soon relieved by the Turkish army collected in Syria, which was advancing from Damascus to cross the Jordan. Bonaparte hastened to attack the place, in hopes of taking it, as he had done Jaffa, before it was reinforced with fresh troops, and before the English had time to improve its

* "The body of prisoners were marched out of Jaffa, in the centre of a large square battalion. The Turks foresaw their fate, but used neither entreaties nor complaints to avert it. They marched on, silent and composed. They were escorted to the sand-hills to the south-east of Jaffa, divided there into small bodies, and put to death by musketry. The execution lasted a considerable time, and the wounded were despatched by the bayonet. Their bodies were heaped together, and formed a pyramid which is still visible, consisting now of human bones, as originally of bloody corpses."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E

"I asked Napoleon about the massacre of the Turks at Jaffa. He answered, It is perfectly true. I ordered nearly two thousand of them to be shot."—*Lord Ebrington's Conversations at Elba*. E.

"Speaking of the massacre of the Turks at Jaffa, Bonaparte said, 'I would do the same thing again to-morrow, and so would Wellington, or any general commanding an army under similar circumstances.'"—*Voice from St. Helena*. E.

† "Djezzar, Pacha of Acre, was a monster of cruelty; the waves frequently drove the dead bodies of his murdered subjects towards the coast, and we came upon them while bathing."—*Bourrienne*. E.

‡ "Sidney Smith," said Napoleon, "is a brave officer. He displayed considerable ability in the treaty for the evacuation of Egypt by the French. He also showed great honour and humanity towards the French who fell into his hands. He was at one time arrested and confined in the Temple as a spy. He displayed great talent and bravery at Acre. The chief cause of my failure there was, that he took all my battering train which was on board some small vessels. He dispersed proclamations among my troops, which certainly shook some of them, and I, in consequence, published an order stating that he was mad. Some days afterwards he sent me a challenge. I laughed, and sent him back word that when he brought Marlborough to fight me, I would meet him Notwithstanding this, I like the character of the man."—*A Voice from St. Helena*. E.

Sir Sidney Smith is still living, at an advanced age, in Paris. E

defences. The trenches were immediately opened. Unfortunately, the siege-artillery, sent by sea from Alexandria, had been intercepted by Sir Sidney Smith. The whole of the siege and field artillery consisted of a thirty-two pound carronade, four twelve-pounders, eight howitzers, and about thirty four-pounders. The French had no balls, but they devised a method of procuring them. They sent out a few horse upon the beach. At sight of them, Sir Sidney Smith kept up a rolling fire from all the batteries, and the soldiers, to whom five sous were given for each ball, went and picked them up amidst the cannonade and amidst universal laughter.

The trenches had been opened on the 30th of Ventose (March 20). Sanson, general of engineers, conceiving that, in a night reconnaissance, he had reached the foot of the rampart, declared that it had neither counterscarp nor ditch. It was concluded that nothing more was needed than to make a mere breach, and then proceed to the assault. On the 5th of Germinal (March 25), a breach was effected; dispositions were made for the assault, but the men were stopped by a counterscarp and a ditch. They immediately set about mining. The operation was carried on under the fire of all the ramparts, and of the fine artillery which Sir Sidney Smith had taken from us. He had given Djezzar some excellent English gunners, and Philippeaux,* an emigrant engineer-officer of distinguished merit. The mine was exploded on the 28th of Germinal (April 17), and blew up only a portion of the counterscarp. Twenty-five grenadiers, headed by the young Mailly, proceeded to the assault. The Turks, seeing that brave officer placing a ladder, were frightened; but Mailly fell down dead. The grenadiers were then disheartened; the Turks returned; two battalions which followed were received with a tremendous fire; Laugier, their commandant, was killed, and again the assault miscarried.

Unfortunately, the place had received a reinforcement of several thousand men, a great number of gunners trained after the European fashion, and immense supplies. It was a siege on a large scale, to be carried on with thirteen thousand men, almost entirely destitute of artillery. It was necessary to open a new mine to blow up the entire counterscarp, and to commence another covered way. It was now the 12th of Germinal (April 1). Ten days had been already spent before the place. The approach of the great Turkish army was announced. It would be necessary to carry on the works and to cover the siege, and all with the single army of thirteen thousand men. The commander-in-chief ordered a fresh mine to be formed with the utmost expedition, and detached Kleber's division towards the Jordan, to oppose the passage of it by the army coming from Damascus.

That army, composed of the tribes of the mountains of Naplouse, amounted to about twenty-five thousand men. Upwards of twelve thousand horse constituted its principal strength. It carried along with it an immense quantity of baggage. Abdallah, Pacha of Damascus, had the command of it. On the 15th of Germinal (April 4), it crossed the Jordan at Yacoub's bridge. Junot, with Kleber's advanced guard, five hundred strong at most, fell in with the Turkish advanced guards on the Nazareth road on the 19th (April 8). Instead of retreating, he boldly faced the enemy, and formed into a square, covered the field of battle with slain, and

* "Sir Sidney Smith was well seconded at Acre by Philippeaux, a Frenchman of talent, who had studied with me as engineer."—*Voice from St Helena*. E.

took five pair of colours.* But, being obliged to give way to numbers, he fell back upon Kleber's division. The latter was advancing, and hastening its march to rejoin Junot. Bonaparte, apprized of the enemy's force, proceeded with Bon's division to support Kleber, and to fight a decisive battle. Djeddar, acting in concert with the army that was coming to raise the siege, attempted to make a sortie, but was received with such a tremendous fire, that he left our works covered with his slain. Bonaparte immediately commenced his march.

Kleber had debouched with his division in the plains that extend at the foot of Mount Tabor, not far from the village of Fouli. He had conceived the idea of surprising the Turkish camp in the night, but had arrived too late to carry it into execution. In the morning of the 27th of Germinal (April 16), he found the whole Turkish army in order of battle. Fifteen thousand foot occupied the village of Fouli; and more than twelve thousand horse were drawn up in the plain. Kleber had scarcely three thousand infantry in square. The whole of the enemy's cavalry set itself in motion, and rushed upon our squares. Never had the French yet seen so many horse, curvetting, charging, and prancing about in all directions. They preserved their accustomed coolness, and, receiving them at the muzzle of their pieces with a tremendous fire, prostrated a considerable number of them at every charge. They had soon formed around themselves a rampart of men and horses, and screened by this horrible abattis, they were enabled to resist for six successive hours the utmost fury of their adversaries. At this moment Bonaparte debouched from Mount Tabor with Bon's division. He saw the plain covered with fire and smoke, and Kleber's brave division defending itself under the shelter of a line of carcasses. He immediately formed the division which he had brought with him into two squares. These two squares advanced in such a manner as to form an equilateral triangle with Kleber's division, and thus to enclose the enemy between them. They marched on in silence, and without giving any sign of their approach till within a certain distance. Bonaparte then ordered a cannon to be suddenly fired, and immediately made his appearance on the field of battle. A tremendous fire, discharged instantaneously from the three points of this triangle, assailed the Mamelukes who were in the midst, drove them in confusion upon one another, and made them flee in disorder in all directions. Kleber's division, fired with fresh ardour at this sight, rushed upon the village of Fouli, stormed it at the point of the bayonet, and made a great carnage among the enemy. In a moment the whole multitude was gone, and the plain was left covered with dead. The Turkish camp, the pacha's three tails, four hundred camels, and an immense booty, fell into the hands of the French. Murat, posted on the banks of the Jordan, slew a great number of the fugitives. Bonaparte ordered all the villages of the Naplousians to be burned. Six thousand French had destroyed that army which the inhabitants had said to be innumerable as the stars of heaven and the sands of the sea.

During this interval, the besiegers had never ceased mining and countermining about the walls of St. Jean d'Acre. The combatants disputed with one another a ground turned upside down by the art of sieges. The French had been six weeks before the place. They had made many assaults.

* "Junot's valour and steadiness in this action attracted the especial notice of Napoleon, who presented to him a splendid shield to be preserved among the archives of his family."—*Duchess d'Abrantes*. E.

repulsed many sorties, killed a great number of the enemy ; but, though they had constantly the advantage, they sustained losses of time and men which were irreparable. On the 18th of Floreal (May 7), a reinforcement of twelve thousand men arrived in the port of Acre. Bonaparte, calculating that they could not have landed in less than six hours, immediately ordered a twenty-four pounder to play against a piece of wall, to the right of the point against which such efforts had for some time been made. When night came on, the assailants mounted to the breach ; they stormed the enemy's works, filled them up, spiked the guns, and slaughtered all they met with. They were at length masters of the place, when the troops which had just landed advanced in order of battle, presenting an alarming force. Rambaut, commanding the first grenadiers who mounted to the assault, was killed: Lannes was wounded. At the same moment, the enemy made a sortie, took the breach in rear, and cut off the retreat of the brave men who had entered. Some succeeded in getting out again ; others, taking a desperate resolution, fled to a mosque, intrenched themselves there, expended their last cartridges, and were prepared to sell their lives dearly, when Sir Sidney Smith, touched by such bravery, caused a capitulation to be granted them. Meanwhile, the besieging troops, marching upon the enemy, drove him back into the place, after making a prodigious slaughter, and taking from him eight hundred prisoners. Bonaparte, obstinate to very madness, gave two days' rest to his troops, and on the 21st (May 10) ordered another assault. The men mounted with the same bravery as ever, scaled the breach, but could not pass it. There was a whole army guarding the place and defending all the streets. It was absolutely necessary to relinquish the enterprise.*

For two months the army had been before Acre ; it had sustained considerable losses, and it would have been imprudent to expose it to more. The plague was in Acre, and the army had caught the contagion at Jaffa. The season for landing troops approached, and the arrival of a Turkish army near the mouths of the Nile was expected. By persisting longer, Bonaparte was liable to weaken himself to such a degree as not to be able to repulse new enemies. The main point of his plan was effected, since he had destroyed the assemblages formed in Syria, and had rendered the enemy in that quarter incapable of acting. As for the brilliant part of those same plans, as for those vague and wild hopes of conquests in the East, these it was necessary to renounce. He decided at last to raise the siege. Such, however, was his regret, that, notwithstanding his unparalleled destiny, he was frequently known, when speaking of Sir Sidney Smith, to make use of this expression : " That man disappointed me of my fortune." The Druses, who, during the siege, had supplied the army with provisions, and all the tribes hostile to the Porte, were thrown into despair by the news of his retreat.

He had commenced the siege on the 1st of Ventose (March 20), and raised it on the 1st of Prairial (May 20) : he had consequently spent two months upon it. Before he quitted St. Jean d'Acre, he determined to leave a terrible token of his presence—he overwhelmed the town with his

* " A striking instance of the attachment of the soldiers to Napoleon appeared during this siege. In the trenches a bomb, with the fusee burning, fell at his feet ; two grenadiers instantly seized him in their arms, and covering him with their bodies, carried him out of danger. They got him out of the reach of the explosion before it took place, and no one was injured."—*Las Cases*. E.

fire, and left it almost reduced to ashes. He bent his course back to the desert. Through the fire, hardship, and disease, he had nearly lost one-third of his force, that is, about four thousand men. He carried away twelve hundred wounded. Now commenced his march to recross the desert. He ravaged the whole country by the way, and struck profound terror into it. On his arrival at Jaffa, he ordered the fortifications to be blown up. There was an hospital in that town for the soldiers infected with the plague. To carry them with him was impossible; if they were left behind, they would be exposed to inevitable death, either by the disease, or by famine, or by the cruelty of the enemy. Accordingly, Bonaparte told Desgenettes, the physician, that it would be much more humane to give them opium than to leave them alone; upon which that physician made this highly admired reply, "My profession is to cure, not to kill." No opium was administered, and this circumstance served to give rise to an unworthy but now exploded calumny.*

Bonaparte at length reached Egypt, after an expedition of nearly three months. It was high time for him to return. The spirit of insurrection had spread throughout the whole Delta. An impostor, calling himself the angel El Mohdhy, who gave out that he was invulnerable, and that he would drive out the French by merely raising a dust, had collected some thousand insurgents. The agents of the Mamelukes gave him their assistance; and he had taken Damanhour and slaughtered the garrison. Bonaparte sent a detachment, which dispersed the insurgents, and killed the invulnerable angel. The insurrection had spread to the different provinces of the Delta. His presence produced everywhere submission and tranquillity. He gave orders for magnificent festivities at Cairo to celebrate his triumphs in Syria. He did not avow that part of his plans which had been foiled, but he boasted, and justly, of the numerous actions fought in Syria, of the glorious battle of Mount Tabor, and of the terrible vengeance which he had wreaked on Djezzar. He issued fresh proclamations to the inhabitants, in which he assured them that he was acquainted with their most secret thoughts, and knew their plans the moment they were formed. They believed these strange assertions of Sultan Kebir, and fancied that he was aware of all their thoughts. Bonaparte had to curb not only the inhabitants, but his own generals and the army itself. A deep discontent pervaded it. This discontent proceeded neither from fatigue nor from danger, still less from privations, for the army was not in want of anything, but from that fondness for his own country which accompanies the Frenchman whithersoever he goes. They had been for a whole year in Egypt; and, for nearly six months, they had received no news whatever from France. Not a vessel had been able to pass. A sombre melancholy preyed upon every heart. Officers and generals were daily applying for leave of absence, that they might return to Europe. Bonaparte granted it to very few, or accompanied it with expressions that were as much dreaded as dishonour. Berthier himself, his faithful Berthier, consumed by an old

* "I feel ashamed to advert to this atrocious calumny. Supposing, however, that Bonaparte could have contemplated the expedient attributed to him, where could there have been found a man sufficiently determined in mind, or so lost to the feelings of human nature, as to force open the jaws of fifty wretched men on the point of death, and thrust a deadly preparation down their throats? The most intrepid soldier turned pale at the sight of an infected person; the warmest heart dared not relieve a friend afflicted with the plague; and it is not to be credited that brutal ferocity could execute what the noblest feelings recoiled at."—*Savary*. E.

passion, solicited permission to revisit Italy. For a second time he was ashamed of his weakness, and would not go.* One day, the army had formed the plan of carrying off its colours from Cairo and marching to Alexandria, for the purpose of embarking. But it went no further than the intention, and durst not defy its general. Bonaparte's lieutenants, who all set the example of murmuring, were silent in his presence, and bowed to his ascendancy. He had had more than one quarrel with Kleber. The ill-temper of the latter proceeded not from discouragement, but from his customary indocility. Matters were always made up between them, for Bonaparte admired the great soul of Kleber, and Kleber was seduced by the genius of Bonaparte.

It was now the month of Prairial (June). They were still ignorant of what was passing in Europe, and of the disasters of France. They merely knew that the continent was in real confusion, and that a new war was inevitable. Bonaparte impatiently waited for further particulars, that he might decide what course to pursue, and return, in case of need, to the first theatre of his exploits. But he hoped first to destroy the second Turkish army assembled at Rhodes, the very speedy landing of which was announced.

This army, put on board numerous transports and escorted by Sir Sidney Smith's squadron, appeared on the 23d of Messidor (July 11) in sight of Alexandria, and came to an anchor in the road of Aboukir, where our squadron had been destroyed. The point chosen by the English for landing was the peninsula which commands the entrance to the road, and bears the same name. This narrow peninsula runs out between the sea and Lake Madieh, and has a fort at its extremity. Bonaparte had ordered Marmont,† who commanded at Alexandria, to improve the defence of the

* "Berthier, after repeated entreaties, had obtained permission to return to France. Bonaparte was sorry to part with him, but he could not see an old friend dying before his eyes, the victim of nostalgia and romantic love. Berthier's passion, which amounted almost to madness, impaired the feeble faculties with which nature had endowed him. One day I went to him with an order from Napoleon. I found him on his knees before the portrait of Madame Visconti which was hanging opposite the door. Ultimately Berthier was prevailed upon to remain with the general-in-chief in Egypt."—*Bourrienne*. E.

† "Auguste Frédérique Louis Viesse de Marmont is one of the most respectable by birth of Napoleon's marshals. His family is noble, and he himself was born in 1774. From his earliest infancy he was designed for the army, and at Toulon attracted the notice of Bonaparte, who, when appointed general of the army of the interior, appointed him his aide-de-camp. Throughout the campaigns of Italy, Egypt, and Syria, Marmont was at the side of Napoleon, and was one of the few selected to return with him to France. In the passage of Mont St. Bernard he greatly distinguished himself, and commanded the artillery at Marengo. In the wars of 1805–1807, he served with equal honour, and in the course of the German campaign of 1809 obtained the marshal's truncheon and the title of Duke of Ragusa. He was afterwards ordered to replace Massena in the command of the army of Portugal, but this was a situation above his abilities. Soon after his arrival in Spain, Marmont effected a junction with the army of Soult, and pursued Wellington towards Salamanca. For a time they watched each other, but a blunder of Marmont threw the initiative into the hands of Wellington; he was at dinner in his tent when information was brought him that the French were extending their wing probably to outflank him. 'Marmont's good genius has forsaken him,' said Wellington, and, mounting his horse, attacked and defeated the French at the great battle of Salamanca, where Marmont lost his arm. He afterwards fought at Lutzen, Bautzen, and Leipsic, and on the entrance of the allies into France was intrusted with the defence of Paris, which, however, he was compelled to surrender to the enemy. He afterwards entered into a treaty with the allies, and marched his troops within their cantonnements, stipulating, however, for the freedom of Napoleon's person. Louis made Marmont a peer, and when Napoleon returned from Elba he denounced him as a traitor, for

fort, and to destroy the village of Aboukir, situated around it. But, instead of destroying the village, it had been deemed right to preserve it in order to lodge the soldiers there; and it had merely been encompassed by a redoubt to protect it on the land side. But as the redoubt was not carried on to the two shores, it was not a close work, and subjected the fort to the same fate as a mere field-work. The Turks, in fact, landed with great boldness, attacked the intrenchments sword in hand, carried them, and made themselves masters of the village of Aboukir, putting to death the garrison. The village being taken, it was impossible for the fort to hold out, and it was obliged to surrender. Marmont, who commanded at Alexandria, left the city at the head of twelve hundred men to hasten to the assistance of the troops at Aboukir. But, learning that the Turks had landed in considerable numbers, he durst not attempt to throw them into the sea by a bold attack. He returned to Alexandria, and left them to establish themselves quietly in the peninsula of Aboukir.

The Turks amounted to nearly eighteen thousand infantry. It was only wretched Fellahs who had composed the infantry of the Mamelukes; these were brave janizaries, carrying a musket without bayonet, slinging it at their back when they had fired, and rushing, pistol and sword in hand, upon the enemy. They had a numerous and well-served artillery, and were directed by English officers. They had no cavalry, for they had not brought more than three hundred horses, but they expected the arrival of Mourad Bey, who was to leave Upper Egypt, skirt the desert, cross the oases, and throw himself into Aboukir with two or three thousand Mamelukes.

When Bonaparte was informed of the particulars of the landing, he immediately left Cairo, and made from that city to Alexandria one of those extraordinary marches of which he had given so many examples in Italy. He took with him the divisions of Lannes, Bon, and Murat. He had ordered Desaix* to evacuate Upper Egypt, and Kleber and Regnier, who were in the Delta, to approach Aboukir. He had chosen the point of Birket, midway between Alexandria and Aboukir, at which to concentrate his forces, and to manœuvre according to circumstances. He was afraid that an English army had landed with the Turks.

Mourad Bey, according to the plan concerted with Mustapha Pacha, had attempted to descend into Lower Egypt; but met and beaten by Murat, he had been obliged to regain the desert. There was now nothing left to fight but the Turkish army, destitute indeed of cavalry, yet encamped behind intrenchments, and disposed to resist with its customary obstinacy. Bonaparte, after inspecting Alexandria and the capital works executed by Colonel Cretin, and after reprimanding Marmont, his lieutenant, who had not dared to attack the Turks at the moment of landing, left Alexandria, on the 6th of Thermidor (July 24). Next day, the 7th, he was at the entrance of the peninsula. His plan was to shut up the Turkish army by intrenchments, and to await the arrival of all his divisions, for he had with

ne part he had played in the abdication. In 1817 he quelled an insurrection at Lyons. Marmont's military talents are not of a high order, but his character is unstained either with rapine or cruelty."—*Court and Camp of Bonaparte*. E.

* In 1830 Marmont took part with Charles X. against the people, and has ever since been an exile from France. E.

"Brave Desaix!" said Napoleon. "That general would have conquered anywhere. He was skilful—vigilant—daring—little regarding fatigue, and death still less. He would have gone to the end of the world in quest of victory."—*Antommarchi*. E

him only the divisions of Lannes, Bon, and Murat, amounting to about six thousand men. But, on observing the dispositions made by the Turks, he changed his mind, and resolved to attack them immediately, hoping to enclose them in the village of Aboukir, and to crush them with bombs and howitzers. The Turks had placed themselves in the following manner: They occupied the extremity of the peninsula, which is very narrow. They were covered by two lines of intrenchments. Half a league in advance of the village of Aboukir, where their camp was, they had occupied two sand-hills, supporting the one on the sea, the other on Lake Madieh, and thus forming their right and left. Midway between these two hills was a village, which they had likewise occupied. They had one thousand men on the hill to the right, two thousand on the other, and three or four thousand in the village. Such was their first line. The second was at the village of Aboukir itself. It consisted of the redoubt constructed by the French, and was connected with the sea by two trenches. There they had placed their principal camp and the bulk of their forces.

Bonaparte made his dispositions with his usual promptitude and decision. He ordered General Destaing, with some battalions, to march to the hill on the left, where the one thousand Turks were posted; Lannes to march to that on the right, where the two thousand others were; and Murat, who was at the centre, to make the cavalry file on the fear of the two hills. These dispositions were executed with great precision. Destaing marched to the hill on the left and boldly ascended it; Murat caused it to be turned by a squadron. The Turks, at sight of this, quitted their post, and fell in with the cavalry, which cut them in pieces, and drove them into the sea, into which they chose rather to throw themselves than to surrender. Precisely the same thing was done on the right. Lannes attacked the two thousand janizaries; Murat turned them, cut them in pieces, and drove them into the sea. Destaing and Lannes then moved towards the centre, formed by a village, and attacked it in front. The Turks then defended themselves bravely, reckoning upon assistance from the second line. A column did in fact advance from the camp of Aboukir; but Murat, who had already filed upon the rear of the village, fell, sword in hand, upon this column, and drove it back into Aboukir. Destaing's infantry and that of Lannes entered the village at the charge step, driving the Turks out of it, who were pushed in all directions, and who, obstinately refusing to surrender, had no retreat but the sea in which they were drowned.

From four to five thousand had already perished in this manner. The first line was carried; Bonaparte's object was accomplished, and now, enclosing the Turks in Aboukir, he could bombard them till Kleber and Regnier should arrive. But he determined to follow up his success and to complete his victory that very moment. After allowing his troops to take breath, he marched upon the second line. Lanusse's division, which had been left as a reserve, supported Lannes and Destaing. The redoubt which covered Aboukir was difficult to carry; it encompassed nine or ten thousand Turks. On the right, a trench joined it to the sea; on the left, another trench prolonged it, but was not continued quite to Lake Madieh. The open space was occupied by the enemy, and raked by the fire of numerous gunboats. Bonaparte having accustomed his soldiers to defy the most formidable obstacles directed them upon the enemy's position. His divisions of infantry marched upon the front and the right of the redoubt

The cavalry, concealed in a wood of palm-trees, was to attack on the left, and then to traverse, under the fire of the gunboats, the space left open between the redoubt and Lake Madieh. The charge was executed. Lannes and Destaing urged forward their brave infantry. The 32d marched with their pieces on their arms towards the intrenchments; the 18th turned them on the extreme right. The enemy, without waiting for them, advanced to meet them. They fought hand to hand. The Turkish soldiers, having fired their pieces and their brace of pistols, drew their flashing sabres. They endeavoured to grasp the bayonets, but received them in their flanks before they could lay hold of them. In this manner the combatants slaughtered one another at the intrenchments. The 18th was on the point of getting into the redoubt, when a tremendous fire of artillery repulsed it and drove it back to the foot of the works. The gallant Leturcq fell gloriously, while persisting in being the last to retire. Fugieres lost an arm. Murat, on his part, had advanced with his cavalry with a view to clear the space between the redoubt and Lake Madieh. Several times he had dashed forward and driven in the enemy, but, being taken between the fire of the redoubt and that of the gunboats, he had been obliged to fall back. Some of his men had advanced to the very ditches of the redoubt. The efforts of so many brave fellows appeared likely to be of no avail. Bonaparte surveyed this carnage, waiting for a favourable moment to return to the charge. Fortunately the Turks, according to their custom, quitted the intrenchments for the purpose of cutting off the heads of the slain. Bonaparte seized this moment, despatched two battalions, one of the 22d, the other of the 69th, which marched upon the intrenchments and carried them. On the right, the 18th also took advantage of this opportunity, and entered the redoubt. Murat, on his side, ordered a fresh charge. One of his squadrons traversed that most formidable space between the intrenchments and the lake, and penetrated into the village of Aboukir. The Turks, affrighted, fled on all sides, and a horrible carnage was made among them. They were pursued at the point of the bayonet, and thrust into the sea.* Murat, at the head of his horse, penetrated into the camp of Mustapha Pacha. The latter, in a fit of despair, snatched up a pistol, and fired it at Murat, whom he wounded slightly. Murat, with a stroke of his sabre, cut off two of his fingers, and sent him

* "Bonaparte no sooner heard of the appearance of the Turkish fleet before Alexandria, than he left Cairo in the utmost haste to place himself at the head of the troops which he had ordered to quit their cantonments and march down to the coast. While he was making these arrangements and coming in person from Cairo, the troops on board the Turkish fleet had effected a landing and taken possession of the fort of Aboukir, and of a redoubt placed behind a village of that name, which ought to have been put into a state of defence six months before, but had been so completely neglected that nothing was easier than to ride through the breaches, and through the spaces left by the falling in of the earth, in every direction. The Turks had nearly destroyed the weak garrisons that occupied those two military points, when General Marmont, who commanded at Alexandria, came to their relief. This general, seeing the two posts in the power of the Turks, returned to shut himself up in Alexandria, where he would probably have been blockaded by the Turkish army, had it not been for the arrival of Bonaparte with his forces, who was very angry when he saw that the fort and redoubt had been taken. Bonaparte arrived at midnight with his guides and the remaining part of his army, and ordered the Turks to be attacked next morning. In this battle, as in those which preceded it, the attack, the encounter, and the rout, were occurrences of a moment, and the result of a single movement on the part of our troops. The whole Turkish army plunged into the sea to regain its ships, leaving behind them everything they had brought on shore."—*Duke of Rovigo's Memoirs*. E.

prisoner to Bonaparte.* Such of the Turks as were not killed or drowned retired into the fort of Aboukir.

More than twelve thousand corpses were floating in the bay of Aboukir, which had once before been covered by the bodies of our seamen. Two or three thousand had perished by the fire or by the sword. The rest, shut up in the fort, had no resource but the clemency of the conqueror. Such was that extraordinary battle, in which, for the first time perhaps in the annals of war, a hostile army was entirely destroyed. It was on this occasion that Kleber, arriving towards the close of the day, clasped Bonaparte round the waist, and exclaimed, "General, you are as great as the world!"

Thus, either by the expedition to Syria, or by the battle of Aboukir, Egypt was delivered, at least for the time, from the forces of the Porte. The state of the French army might be considered as very satisfactory. After all the losses which it had sustained, it still numbered about twenty-five thousand men, the bravest and the best officered in the world. Every day was likely to produce greater sympathy between it and the inhabitants, and to consolidate its establishment. Bonaparte had been there a whole year. Having arrived in summer before the inundation, he had employed the first moments in gaining possession of Alexandria and the capital, which he had secured by the battle of the Pyramids. After the inundation and in autumn, he had completed the conquest of the Delta, and consigned that of Upper Egypt to Desaix. In winter he had undertaken the expedition to Syria, and destroyed Djezzar's Turkish army at Mount Tabor. He had now, in summer, just destroyed the second army of the Porte at Aboukir. The time had thus been spent as well as possible; and while Victory was forsaking in Europe the banners of France, she adhered to them in Africa and in Asia. The three colours waved triumphant over the Nile and the Jordan, over the places which were the cradle of the Christian religion.

Bonaparte was yet ignorant of what was passing in France. None of the despatches from the Directory or from his brothers had reached him. He was a prey to anxiety. With a view to obtain some intelligence, he ordered brigs to cruise about, to stop all merchantmen, and to gain from them information of the occurrences in Europe. He sent to the Turkish fleet a flag of truce, which, under the pretext of negotiating an exchange of prisoners, was to endeavour to obtain some news. Sir Sidney Smith stopped this messenger, treated him exceedingly well, and perceiving that Bonaparte was ignorant of the disasters of France, took a spiteful pleasure in sending him a packet of newspapers. The messenger returned and delivered the packet to Bonaparte. The latter spent the whole night in devouring the contents of those papers, and informing himself of what was passing in his own country. His determination was immediately taken.† He resolved

* * Mustapha Pacha was taken and carried in triumph before Bonaparte. The haughty Turk had not lost his pride with his fortunes. 'I will take care to inform the sultan,' said the victor, meaning to be courteous, 'of the courage you displayed in this battle, though it has been your mishap to lose it.'—'Thou mayst save thyself the trouble,' answered the prisoner haughtily, 'my master knows me better than thou canst.'—*Scott's Life of Napoleon.*

† "Heavens!" said Napoleon to me one day, after perusing the accounts from France, 'my presentiment is verified; the fools have lost Italy. All the fruits of our victories are gone! I must leave Egypt.' There is no truth whatever in the assertion of his having planned his departure before the battle of Aboukir. Such an idea never crossed his mind.—*Bourrienne.* E.

to embark secretly for Europe, and to attempt the passage at the risk of being taken on the way by the English cruisers. He sent Rear-admiral Ganteaume directions to get *La Muiron* and *La Carrère* frigates in readiness for sailing. Without communicating his intentions to any one, he hastened to Cairo to make all his arrangements, prepared long instructions for Kleber, to whom he purposed to leave the command of the army, and returned forthwith to Alexandria.

On the 3d of Fructidor (August 22), taking with him Berthier, Lannes, Murat, Andreossy, Marmont, Berthollet, and Monge, and escorted by some of his guides, he proceeded to a retired spot on the beach. Some boats were waiting there. They got into them and went on board *La Muiron* and *La Carrère* frigates. These were accompanied by *La Revanche* and *La Fortune*, xebecs. They set sail immediately, that by daylight they might be out of sight of the English cruisers. Unfortunately it fell calm; fearful of being surprised, some were for returning to Alexandria. Bonaparte resolved to proceed. "Be quiet," said he; "we shall pass in safety." Like Cæsar, he reckoned upon his fortune.

This was not, as it has been called, a cowardly desertion; for he left a victorious army to defy dangers of all kinds, and the most horrible of all, confinement in London. It was one of those rash acts by which the great ambitious tempt Heaven, and to which they afterwards owe that unbounded confidence which by turns exalts and casts them down.

While this great destiny was thus consigned to the chances of the winds or of a meeting with the enemy, Victory returned to our banners in Europe, and the republic extricated itself by a sublime effort from the perils to which we have seen it exposed. Massena was still on the line of the Limmat, deferring the moment of resuming the offensive. The army of Italy, after losing the battle of Novi, had dispersed itself in the Apennines. Fortunately, Suwarrow followed up the victory of Novi no better than he had done that of the Trebbia, and wasted in Piedmont that time which France employed in preparations. At this moment, the Aulic Council, as fickle in its plans as the Directory had been, conceived one which could not fail to change the aspect of events. It was jealous of the authority which Suwarrow had insisted on exercising in Italy, and was vexed to see that this general had written to the King of Sardinia, to recall him to his dominions. The Aulic Council had views upon Piedmont, and was anxious to remove the old marshal from that country. Little harmony prevailed, moreover, between the Russians and the Austrians, and all these reasons together induced the Aulic Council entirely to change the distribution of the troops upon the line of operation. The Russians were intermixed with the Austrians on the two theatres of the war. Korsakof was operating in Switzerland with the Archduke Charles, and Suwarrow with Melas in Italy. The Aulic Council resolved to remove the archduke to the Rhine, and Suwarrow into Switzerland. In this manner the two Russian armies would both have to act in Switzerland. The Austrians would have to act by themselves on the Rhine; and they would have to act alone in Italy also. They were to be soon reinforced by a new army destined to fill the chasm left by Suwarrow. The Aulic Council assigned as reasons for this change, that it was better to let the troops of each nation fight separately; that the Russians would find in Switzerland a temperature more analogous to their own climate; and that the movement of the Archduke Charles to the Rhine would second the expedition to Holland. England could not fail to approve of this plan, for she hoped much for the expedition to Holland from the

presence of the archduke on the Rhine, and she was not sorry to see the Russians, who had already occupied Corfu, and entertained the design to possess themselves of Malta, removed to a distance from Genoa.

This dislocation, executed in presence of Massena, was extremely dangerous, and, besides, it transferred the Russians to a theatre of war not at all suited to them. These soldiers, accustomed to charge in the plain and with the bayonet, knew nothing of firing; and in the mountains it is expert riflemen that are more particularly needed. The Aulic Council, which, in accordance with the spirit of cabinets, made military reasons subordinate to political considerations, forbade its generals to urge a single objection, and issued orders for the strict execution of this plan in the middle of Fructidor (the last days of August).

We have already described the configuration of the theatre of war, and the distribution of the armies on that theatre.* The waters issuing from the High Alps, and sometimes running in the form of rivers, at others forming lakes, presented different lines, one within another, commencing on the right, against a great chain of mountains, and ending on the left in that great river which separates Germany and France. The two principal were those of the Rhine and the Limmat. Massena, when obliged to abandon that of the Rhine, had fallen back upon that of the Limmat. He had even been compelled to retire a little behind the latter, and to support himself upon the Albis. The line of the Limmat, nevertheless, separated the two armies. This line was composed of the Linth, which rises among the High Alps in the canton of Glarus, and then falls into the Lake of Zurich; of the Lake of Zurich; of the Limmat, which issues from that lake, and falls into the Aar near Brüg. The Archduke Charles was behind the Limmat, from Brüg to Zurich. Korsakof was behind the Lake of Zurich, waiting for a position to be assigned to him. Hotze was guarding the Linth.

According to the plan adopted, the archduke, destined for the Rhine, was to be replaced by Korsakof behind the Limmat. Hotze was to remain upon the Linth, with the Austrian corps of Vorarlberg, in order to extend a hand to Suwarrow, on his march from Italy. It became a question what route Suwarrow should be ordered to take. He had to cross the mountains, and might follow one or the other of the lines which intersect Switzerland. If he preferred penetrating by the valley of the Rhine, he might, by crossing the Splügen, proceed by Coire to the Upper Rhine, and there form his junction with Hotze. It was calculated that he might arrive about the 25th of September (Vendémiaire 3, year VIII). This movement would be attended with the advantage of being effected at a distance from, and out of reach of, the French, and consequently of not depending upon any accident. Suwarrow might take another route, and, instead of following the line of the Rhine, enter the valley of the Reuss by the St. Gothard, and debouch by Schwytz behind the line of the Linth, occupied by the French. This march had the advantage of bringing him upon the back of the enemy's line; but it would be necessary to prepare a movement of Hotze beyond the Linth, that he might be able to extend a hand to the army coming from the St. Gothard; in order to second this movement, an attack

* Whatever pains I may take to be perspicuous, I cannot hope to render the narrative of the succeeding events thoroughly intelligible, unless the reader will place before him a map, be it ever so incomplete. Still these events are so extraordinary, and decided in so positive a manner the salvation of France, that I think them worthy of being clearly understood; and therefore beg the reader to refer to a map. The worst map of Switzerland will suffice to enable him to comprehend the general plan of the operations.

upon the Limmat would be required; in short, a general operation on the whole line would be necessary; and a harmony, a precision difficult of attainment, when acting at such great distances and in such numerous detachments. This plan, which the Russians impute to the Austrians, and the Austrians to the Russians, was nevertheless preferred. A general attack on the whole line was consequently ordered to be made at the latter end of September. At the moment when Suwarrow should debouch from the St. Gothard into the valley of the Reuss, Korsakof was to attack below the Lake of Zurich, that is along the Limmat, and Hotze above the Lake, along the Linth. Two of Hotze's lieutenants, Linken and Jellachich, were to penetrate into the canton of Glarus, and as far as Schwytz, and to give the hand to Suwarrow. The general junction once effected, the troops assembled in Switzerland would amount to eighty thousand men. Suwarrow was coming with eighteen thousand; Hotze had twenty-five, Korsakof thirty. The latter had in reserve the corps of Condé, and some thousand Bavarians. But, before the junction, thirty thousand under Korsakof, and twenty-five thousand under Hotze, that is, fifty-five thousand, would be exposed to the attack of Massena's whole army.

The moment, in fact, when the Archduke Charles quitted the Limmat, and before Suwarrow had yet crossed the Alps, was too favourable for Massena not to seize it, and not to rouse himself at last from the inaction for which he had been so severely censured. His army had been increased by the reinforcements, which it had received, to about seventy-five thousand men; but it had to extend itself from the St. Gothard to Basle—an immense line to cover. Lecourbe, forming its right, and having Gudin and Molitor under his command, guarded the St. Gothard, the valley of the Reuss, and the Upper Linth, with twelve or thirteen thousand men. Soult, with ten thousand, guarded the Linth to its influx into the Lake of Zurich. Massena, with Mortier's, Klein's, Lorges' and Mesnard's divisions, forming a total of thirty-seven thousand men, was before the Limmat, from Zurich to Brüg. Thureau's division, consisting of nine thousand men, and Chabran's division, of eight thousand, guarded, one the Valais and the other the environs of Basle.

Massena, though inferior in force, had the advantage of being able to concentrate his principal mass on the essential point. Thus he had before the Limmat thirty-seven thousand men, whom he could direct upon Korsakof. The latter had weakened himself by sending a reinforcement of four thousand men to Hotze, by the back of the Lake of Zurich, which reduced him to twenty-six thousand. Condé's corps and the Bavarians, who were to form a reserve for him, were still far behind Schaffhausen. Massena had, therefore, an opportunity of falling with thirty-seven thousand men upon twenty-six thousand. When he had beaten Korsakof, he could direct his force against Hotze, and, after putting both to the rout, perhaps destroying them, he could overwhelm Suwarrow, coming into Switzerland with the hope of finding there an enemy vanquished, or at least confined within his line.

Massena, apprized of the enemy's plans, forestalled his general attack by a day, and fixed it for the 3d of Vendémiaire (September 25, 1799). Ever since he had retired to the Albis, a few paces beyond the Limmat, the course of that river belonged to the enemy. It would be requisite to take it from him by crossing. This he proposed doing with his thirty-seven thousand men. While he proceeded to operate below the Lake of Zurich, he directed Soult to operate above it, and to cross the Linth the same day. Military men have imputed one fault to Massena. He ought, they say, to

have rather enticed Suwarrow into Switzerland, than to have kept him out of it. If, therefore, instead of leaving Lecourbe to fight uselessly at the St. Gothard against Suwarrow, Massena had directed him to join Soult, he would have made more sure of overwhelming Hotze and of crossing the Linth. As, however, the result obtained was as great as could be wished, this reproach has been preferred against Massena with a strict reference to principles alone.

The Limmat issues from the Lake of Zurich at Zurich itself, and divides the town into two parts. Agreeably to the plan concerted with Hotze and Suwarrow, Korsakof prepared to attack Massena, and for this purpose he had moved the mass of his forces into that part of Zurich which is in advance of the Limmat. He had left but three battalions at Kloster Fahr, to guard a point where the Limmat is more accessible. He had despatched Durasof with a division towards the influx of the Limmat into the Aar, to watch that quarter; but his main body, at least eighteen thousand strong, was in advance of the river, in an offensive situation.

Upon this state of things Massena founded his plan. He resolved to mask rather than to attack the point of Zurich, where Korsakof had concentrated his forces; then, with a considerable portion of his troops, to attempt the passage of the Limmat at Kloster Fahr, a point but weakly defended. The passage effected, he purposed that this division should ascend the Limmat on the opposite bank, and place itself on the rear of Zurich. He then intended to attack Korsakof on both banks, and to keep him shut up in Zurich itself. The most important consequences might result from this disposition.

Mortier,* with his division, which was eight thousand strong, and occupied the right of this field of battle, was directed upon Zurich. It was first to awe, then to attack, the Russian mass. Klein, with his division, consisting of ten thousand men, was to be placed at Altstetten, between the point of Zurich and that of Kloster Fahr, where the passage was to be attempted. It would thus be able either to proceed before Zurich, and assist Mortier against the Russian mass, or hasten to the point of crossing, if necessary, to second the passage. This division comprised four thousand grenadiers and a reserve of superb cavalry. Lorges' division and part of Mesnard's were to effect the passage at Kloster Fahr. This mass comprehended nearly fifteen thousand men. The remainder of Mesnard's division was to make demonstration on the Lower Limmat, to deceive and to detain Durasof.

These dispositions, which have earned the admiration of all critics, were carried into execution at five in the morning of the 3d of Vendémiaire (September 25). Preparations for the passage had been made near the village of Dietikon, with extraordinary assiduity and secrecy. Boats had been dragged to the spot by hand, and concealed in the woods. Very

* " Marshal Mortier was born in 1768. In 1791 he obtained the rank of captain in a volunteer regiment; and under Pichegru, Moreau, and Massena, fought his way to the command of a division. He was a favourite with Napoleon, who created him a marshal for the zeal with which he seized Hanover at the rupture of the peace of Amiens. Being afterwards created Duke of Treviso, Mortier went to Spain, but met with no success. He took part in the Russian expedition, but distinguished himself only by blowing up the Kremlin. In 1814, he submitted to Louis, and was confirmed in his honours and posts; but he turned traitor on the return of Bonaparte, and was, therefore, on the second restoration, shut out from the chamber of peers. In 1819, however, he was restored to his peerage."—*Court and Camp of Bonaparte*. Mortier was the most distinguished of the victims of Fieschi's atrocious attempt to assassinate the reigning King of France. E.

early in the morning they were afloat, and the troops drawn up in silence on the bank. General Foy, since distinguished as a public speaker, commanded the artillery in this ever memorable battle. He placed several batteries in such a manner as to protect the passage. Six hundred men boldly embarked, and reached the opposite bank. They rushed immediately upon the enemy's riflemen and dispersed them. Korsakof had posted three battalions, with cannon, on the plateau of Kloster Fahr. Our artillery, more skilfully directed, soon silenced the fire of the Russian artillery, and protected the successive passage of our advanced guard. When General Gazan had united a sufficient reinforcement with the six hundred men who had first crossed, he marched upon the three Russian battalions guarding Kloster Fahr. These had posted themselves in a wood, and made a most gallant defence. Gazan surrounded them, and was obliged to kill almost the very last man before he could dislodge them. These three battalions being destroyed, a bridge was thrown across. The remainder of Lorges' division and part of Mesnard's passed the Limmat. Fifteen thousand men were now beyond the river. Bontemps' brigade was placed at Regensdorf, to make head against Durasof, if he should attempt to ascend the Lower Limmat. The bulk of the troops, directed by Oudinot,* chief of the staff, marched up the Limmat, for the purpose of proceeding to the rear of Zurich.

This part of the operation being accomplished, Massena returned to the other side of the Limmat, to superintend the movement of his wings. Towards the Lower Limmat, Mesnard had so completely deceived Durasof by his demonstrations, that the latter had posted himself upon the bank and opened all his fire. On the right, Mortier had advanced upon Zurich by Wallishofen, but he had fallen in with Korsakof's main body, posted, as we have said, in advance of the Limmat, and had been obliged to fall back. Massena, coming up at that moment, despatched Klein's division, which was at Altstetten. Humbert, at the head of his four thousand grenadiers, marched upon Zurich and restored the fight. Mortier renewed his attacks; and thus the French succeeded in shutting up the Russians in Zurich.

Meanwhile Korsakof, mortified at hearing cannon on his rear, had sent several battalions to the other side of the Limmat; but these weak succours had proved useless. Oudinot, with his fifteen thousand men, continued to ascend the Limmat. He had taken the little camp placed at Hong; he had also taken the heights which are in the rear of Zurich, and possessed himself of the high-road to Winterthur, which affords an outlet into Germany, and was the only one by which the Russians could retreat.

The battle was almost over, and immense results were prepared for the

* "Charles Nicholas Oudinot was born in 1767. From early youth he expressed a wish to become a soldier, obtained a commission, and rose rapidly through the subordinate ranks, to be general of division. Oudinot distinguished himself under Hoche, Pichegru, Moreau, Massena, and Bonaparte, on the Rhine, in Switzerland, and in Italy, and in 1804, was made count of the empire. His valor at Wagram procured him the higher title of Duke of Reggio, and in 1809 he at length obtained the baton. In the Russian expedition he received many severe wounds, and greatly distinguished himself at Bautzen. On the Emperor's abdication he offered his services to Louis, who made him colonel-general of the grenadiers, and military governor of Metz. During the Hundred Days he resisted all Bonaparte's overtures, and on the second restoration of the Bourbons was rewarded by the chief command of the Parisian national guard, a peerage, and a seat in the cabinet. Oudinot's last military service was in the invasion of Spain in 1823, where he exerted himself to arrest the fanatic course of the advocates of despotism."—*Court and Camp of Bonaparte*. E.

following day. The Russians were shut up in Zurich: Massena had moved fifteen thousand men upon their rear by means of the passage of Kloster Fahr, and placed eighteen thousand in front of them. He could scarcely fail to inflict on them a severe disaster. It has been conceived that, instead of leaving Klein's division before Zurich, he should have sent it by Kloster Fahr, to the rear of that town, to intercept completely the road to Winterthur. But he was apprehensive lest, if Mortier were left with eight thousand men only, Korsakof might overwhelm him and throw him into the Linth. Korsakof, it is true, would have fallen in with Soult and Lecourbe; but he might also have met with Suwarrow coming from Italy, and we know not what might have resulted from this singular combination.

Korsakof had at length become aware of his position, and had moved his troops into the other part of Zurich, behind the Limmat. Durasof, on the Lower Limmat, on hearing at last of the passage, had stolen away; and avoiding Bontemps' brigade by a circuit, had regained the road to Winterthur. Next day, the 4th of Vendémiaire (September 26), the battle could not fail to be obstinate, since the Russians were determined to fight their way through, and the French to win immense trophies. The engagement began early. The unfortunate town of Zurich, crowded with artillery, carriages, and wounded, attacked on all sides, was enveloped, as it were, in fire. On this side of the Limmat, it was attacked and ready to be stormed by Mortier and Klein. On the other, Oudinot pressed it in the rear, and purposed to cut off Korsakof's retreat. The road to Winterthur, the theatre of a sanguinary conflict, had been several times taken and retaken. Korsakof, preparing at length to retreat, had placed his infantry in the van, his cavalry in the centre, his artillery and his carriages in the rear. In this manner he advanced, forming a long column. His brave infantry, charging with fury, overthrew all before it, and opened a way for itself; but when it had passed, with part of the cavalry, the French returned to the charge, attacked the rest of the cavalry and the baggage, and drove them back to the gates of Zurich. At the same moment, Klein and Mortier entered the town on their side. The celebrated and unfortunate Lava-ter, attempting to disarm the furious soldiers, was struck by a ball and mortally wounded. All the troops left in Zurich were finally obliged to lay down their arms. One hundred pieces of cannon, all the baggage, the administrations, the chest of the army, and five thousand prisoners, fell into the hands of the French. Korsakof had, moreover, eight thousand men put *hors de combat* in this obstinate engagement. Eight and five made a loss of thirteen thousand men, that is, of half his army. The great battles in Italy had not presented more extraordinary results. The consequences for the rest of the campaign were not likely to be less important than the material results. Korsakof, with thirteen thousand men at most, hastened to regain the Rhine.

Meanwhile Soult, who was directed to cross the Linth above the Lake of Zurich, executed his commission with no less success than the commander-in-chief. He had effected the passage between Bilten and Reichenburg. One hundred and fifty brave fellows, holding their muskets over their heads, had swam across the river, reached the opposite bank, cleared it of the riflemen, and protected the landing of the advanced guard. Hotze, who had hastened immediately to the point of danger, was killed on the spot by a ball, and his death had thrown the Austrian ranks into confusion. Petrasch, who succeeded Hotze, endeavoured, but in vain, to throw the

corps that had passed into the Linth; he was obliged to fall back, and retired with precipitation upon St. Gall and the Rhine, leaving three thousand prisoners and some cannon. Generals Jellachich and Linken, despatched by the Upper Linth to the canton of Glarus to meet Suwarrow at the *debouché* of the St. Gothard, had on their part retired, when they received intelligence of all these disasters. Thus nearly sixty thousand men were already driven from the line of the Limmat beyond that of the Rhine, after suffering immense losses. Suwarrow, who expected to debouch in Switzerland on the flank of an enemy attacked on all sides, and to decide the defeat of that enemy by his arrival, was destined to find, on the contrary, all his lieutenants dispersed, and himself amidst an army victorious in all quarters.

Leaving Italy with eighteen thousand men, he had reached the foot of the St. Gothard on the fifth complementary day of the year VII (September 21). He had been obliged to dismount his Cossacks, and to load their horses with his artillery. He sent Rosenberg with six thousand men to turn the St. Gothard by Disentis and the Crispalt. Arriving on the 1st of Vendémiaire (September 23) at Airolo, at the entrance of the gorge of the St. Gothard, he there found Gudin with one of the brigades of Lecourbe's division. A most obstinate battle ensued; but his soldiers, bad marksmen, having no notion of anything but advancing and fighting till they were killed, fell in whole platoons under the fire and stones. He determined at length to alarm Gudin on his flanks, and thus obliged him to yield the gorge as far as the Hospital. Gudin had, by his resistance, given Lecourbe time to collect his troops. The latter, having only six thousand men at hand, was unable to resist Suwarrow, who was on the point of arriving with twelve thousand, and Rosenberg, who, having already reached Urseren, had six thousand on his rear. He threw his artillery into the Reuss, then gained the opposite shore by climbing almost inaccessible rocks, and penetrated into the valley. Having got beyond Urseren, and having Rosenberg no longer on his rear, he broke down the Devil's Bridge, and killed a great number of the Russians before they had cleared the precipice by descending into the bed of the Reuss and ascending the opposite bank. Lecourbe had thus retreated foot by foot, availing himself of all obstacles to harass Suwarrow's soldiers, and to cut them off one by one.

The Russian army arrived in this manner at Altorf, at the extremity of the valley of the Reuss, exhausted with fatigue, in want of provisions, and extremely weakened by the losses which it had sustained. At Altorf the Reuss falls into the Lake of Lucerne. If Hotze, according to the plan agreed upon, had been able to push forward Jellachich and Linken beyond the Linth as far as Schwytz, he would have sent boats to the mouth of the Reuss to receive Suwarrow. But, after the events which had just occurred, Suwarrow found himself without a single boat, and pent up in a frightful valley. It was the 4th of Vendémiaire (September 26), a day of general disaster along the whole line. He had, therefore, no other resource than to throw himself into the Schachenthal; and to cross tremendous mountains, where there was no beaten track, for the purpose of penetrating into the Muthenthal. He set out on the following day. Only one man could pass at once along the path that he had to pursue. The army took two days to travel the distance of a few leagues. The first man had reached Mitten before the last had yet quitted Altorf. The precipices were covered with carriages, horses, soldiers, dying of famine and fatigue. On reaching the Muthenthal, Suwarrow might debouch by Schwytz, not far from the Lake of Zurich, or ascend the valley, and throw himself by the Brägel upon the

Linth. But, on the side next to Schwytz, Massena was about to arrive with Mortier's division, and on the other side of the Brägel was Molitor, who occupied the defile of the Kloenthal, towards the banks of the Linth. After allowing his troops two days' rest, Suwarrow resolved to fall back by the Brägel. On the 8th of Vendémiaire (September 30) he commenced his march. Massena attacked him in rear, and Molitor met him from the other side of the Brägel, at the defile of Kloenthal. Rosenberg bravely withstood all Massena's attacks; but Bagration, in the van, made vain efforts to force his way through Molitor. He opened the Glarus road for himself, but could not clear that of Wesen. Suwarrow, after sanguinary and destructive conflicts, cut off from all the roads, and driven back upon Glarus, had no resource but to ascend the valley of Engi, and to throw himself into that of the Rhine. But this route was still more frightful than that which he had already traversed. He nevertheless decided to take it, and, after four days of unparalleled efforts and hardships, reached Coire and the Rhine. Out of his eighteen thousand men he had saved scarcely ten thousand. The Alps were strewn with the bodies of his soldiers. This barbarian, styled invincible, retired overwhelmed with confusion and filled with rage.* In a fortnight, more than twenty thousand Russians and five or six thousand Austrians had fallen. The armies ready to invade us were expelled from Switzerland, and driven into Germany. The coalition was dissolved; for Suwarrow, exasperated against the Austrians, would not serve with them any longer. We may add—France was saved.

Everlasting glory to Massena, who thus executed one of the most admirable operations recorded in the history of the war, and who had saved us at a more perilous moment than that of Valmi and Fleurus! We ought to admire battles great for the conception or the political result; but we ought to celebrate more particularly those that save. We owe admiration to the one, gratitude to the others. Zurich is the brightest jewel in Massena's coronet, and there is not a military coronet that bears one more brilliant.

While these auspicious events were occurring in Switzerland, Victory returned to our banners in Holland. Brune, faintly pressed by the enemy, had found time to concentrate his forces, and after beating the Anglo-Russians at Kastrikum, had enclosed them at the Zyp and obliged them to capitulate. The conditions were the evacuation of Holland, the restitution of all that they had taken at the Helder, and the liberation without exchange of eight thousand prisoners. The French would fain have insisted on the restitution of the Dutch fleet, but this was refused by the English, and fears were entertained of the mischief which they might do to the country if the capitulation were rejected.

Thus terminated this memorable campaign of 1799. The republic, having entered too soon into action, and committed the blunder of taking the offensive before it had concentrated its forces, had been beaten at Stockach and at Magnano, and lost by these two defeats Germany and Italy. Massena, left alone in Switzerland, formed a dangerous salient point between two victorious masses. He had fallen back upon the Rhine then upon the Limmat, and lastly, upon the Albis. There he had rendered himself unassailable for four months. During this time, the army of Naples,

* "Irritated at such severe obstacles, the old marshal, Suwarrow, advanced to the front of his troops, lay down in a ditch, and declared his resolution to be buried there where his children—as he called his soldiers—had retreated for the first time."—*Journal* E

endeavouring to form a junction with the army of Upper Italy, had been beaten at the Trebbia. Subsequently joining that army behind the Apennines, rallied and reinforced, it had lost its general at Novi, been again beaten, and definitively lost Italy. The Apennines were even overrun and the Var threatened. But there terminated our disasters. The coalition, dislocating its forces, had sent the Archduke Charles to the Rhine, and Suwarrow into Switzerland. Massena, seizing this moment, had destroyed Korsakof, deprived of the archduke, and put to flight Suwarrow, deprived of Korsakof. He had thus repaired our misfortunes in a splendid victory. In the East, the campaign had ended with brilliant triumphs. But it must be confessed that, if these great exploits had upheld the republic when ready to fall, if they had shed over it some fresh glory, they had not restored to it either its greatness or its power. France was saved, but only saved; she had not yet recovered her rank, and she was even still exposed to dangers on the Var.

THE DIRECTORY.

RETURN OF BONAPARTE; HIS LANDING AT FREJUS; ENTHUSIASM EXCITED BY HIM—AGITATION OF ALL THE PARTIES ON HIS ARRIVAL—HE JOINS SIEYES FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE DIRECTORIAL CONSTITUTION—PREPARATIONS FOR, AND OCCURRENCES OF, THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE—OVERTHROW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE YEAR III; INSTITUTION OF THE PROVISIONAL CONSULATE—CONCLUSION

THE tidings of the battle of Zurich and of the capitulation of the Anglo-Russians followed almost immediately on the heels of each other, and soothed those who had been alarmed. It was the first time that those hated Russians were beaten, and they were beaten so completely that the satisfaction could not fail to be profound. But still Italy was lost, the Var threatened, the southern frontier was in danger. The greatness of Campo Formio had not been recovered by us. At the same time, the greatest perils were not without, but within. A disorganized government, unruly parties, which would not submit to authority, and which, nevertheless, were not strong enough to possess themselves of it; a kind of social dissolution everywhere, and robbery, a sign of that dissolution, infesting the high-roads, especially in provinces formerly torn by civil war—such was the state of the republic. A respite of a few months was insured by the victory of Zurich. It was not so much a defender that was needed at this moment as a chief, to seize the reins of government. The entire mass of the population desired, at any rate, quiet, order, the termination of dissensions, and a unity of purpose. It was afraid of the Jacobins, of the emigrants, of the Chouans, of all the parties. It was the moment of a marvellous fortune for him who should allay all these fears.

The despatches containing the particulars of the expedition to Syria, and of the battles of Mount Tabor and Aboukir, produced an extraordinary effect, and confirmed the notion that the hero of Castiglione and Rivoli would continue to conquer wherever he should appear. His name was again in the mouths of all, and the questions, "What is he doing? when will he come?" were everywhere repeated. Was he not coming back? it was asked. Nay, by a singular instinct, a rumour that he had actually arrived was twice or thrice circulated. His brothers had written to him; so had his wife; but it was not known whether their letters had ever reached him. We have seen that they were in fact intercepted by the English cruisers.

Meanwhile, the man who was the object of such extraordinary anxiety, was quietly crossing the sea amidst the English squadrons. The passage was not prosperous, and was prolonged by contrary winds. The English had been seen several times, and apprehensions were entertained of falling

into their hands. Bonaparte alone, pacing the deck of his ship with calm and serene look, confided in his star, learned to believe in it, and not to be agitated on account of inevitable dangers. He read the Bible and the Koran, works of the nations which he had just quitted. Fearing lest, after the recent events, the south of France should be invaded, he had steered not for the coast of Provence, but for that of Languedoc. He intended to land at Collioure or Port Vendre. A gale had carried him to Corsica. The whole island had hastened to greet their renowned fellow countryman.* He had then sailed for Toulon. He was on the point of reaching that port, when, all at once, about sunset, thirty sail of English ships were discovered to larboard: they were seen amidst the rays of the setting sun. It was proposed to hoist out a boat, and to steal away to land. Still, confiding in his destiny, Bonaparte resolved not to leave the ship. The enemy actually disappeared, and on the 15th of Vendémiaire, year VIII (October 9, 1799,) at daybreak, La Muiron and La Carrère frigates, and La Revanche and La Fortune xebecs, came to anchor in the Gulf of Frejus.

The inhabitants of Provence had, for three successive years, been apprehensive of an invasion by the enemy. Bonaparte had delivered them from this fear in 1796; but it had recurred with more force than ever since the battle of Novi. On learning that Bonaparte had anchored off the coast, they fancied that their saviour had arrived. All the inhabitants of Frejus thronged to the beach, and in a moment the sea was covered with boats. A multitude, intoxicated with enthusiasm and curiosity, stormed the vessels, and, breaking through all the sanitary laws, communicated with the newcomers.† All inquired for Bonaparte—all were anxious to see him. It was now too late to enforce sanitary measures. The administration of health was obliged to dispense the general from quarantine, otherwise it must have condemned the whole population, which had already communicated with the crews, to the same precaution. Bonaparte immediately landed, and resolved to set out the same day for Paris.

The telegraph, speedy as the winds, had already spread along the road from Frejus to Paris the extraordinary tidings of the landing of Bonaparte. The most confused joy immediately burst forth. The news, proclaimed in all the theatres, had produced an extraordinary excitement there. Patriotic songs everywhere superseded the theatrical representations. Baudin, deputy of the Ardennes, one of the framers of the constitution of the year III, a wise and a sincere republican, passionately attached to the republic, and deeming it undone unless a powerful arm should come to uphold it, died of joy on hearing of this event.‡

* "The arrival of their celebrated countryman immediately set all the inhabitants of the island in motion. A crowd of cousins came to welcome him, and the streets were thronged with people."—*Las Cases*. E.

† "We were in the port and approaching the landing-place when the rumour spread that Bonaparte was on board one of the frigates. In an instant the sea was covered with boats. In vain we begged them to keep at a distance; we were carried ashore; and when we told the crowd both of men and women who were pressing about us the risk they ran, they all exclaimed, 'We prefer the plague to the Austrians!'"—*Bourrienne*. E.

‡ "Bonaparte was received like a victorious monarch re-entering his dominions at his own time and pleasure. Bells were everywhere rung, illuminations made, a delirium of joy agitated the public mind; and the messenger who carried the news of his disembarkation to Paris was received as if he had brought news of a battle gained."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E.

"The news of Napoleon's return caused a general delirium. Baudin, the deputy of the Ardennes, who was really a worthy man, struck with the idea that Providence has

Bonaparte set out the same day, the 17th of Vendémiaire (October 9), for Paris. He passed through Aix, Avignon, Valence and Lyons. In all these cities the enthusiasm was unbounded. The bells rang in the villages, and at night bonfires were kindled on the roads. At Lyons, in particular, the sensation was stronger than anywhere else. On leaving the latter city, Bonaparte, who wished to arrive incognito, took a different route from that which he had mentioned to his couriers. His brothers and his wife, deceived by his directions, were hastening to meet him while he was entering Paris. On the 24th of Vendémiaire (October 18th), he was already in his own house, in the Rue Chantierine, before any one had the least suspicion of his arrival. Two hours afterwards he went to the Directory. The guard recognised him, and shouted, on seeing him, "Bonaparte for ever!" He hastened to the president of the Directory. This was Gohier. It was agreed that he should be presented to the Directory on the following day. Accordingly, on the 25th, he was introduced into the presence of the supreme magistrates. He said that, after consolidating the establishment of his armies in Egypt by the victories of Mount Tabor and Aboukir, and committing the charge of it to a general qualified to insure its prosperity, he had left it to fly to the succour of the republic, which he believed to be undone. He had found it saved by the exploits of his brethren in arms, and at this he rejoiced. Never, he added, clapping his hand to his sword, never would he draw it but in defence of that republic. The president congratulated him on his triumphs and on his return, and gave him the fraternal embrace. The reception was apparently most cordial, but at bottom there were felt fears too real and too strongly justified by circumstances, for his return to afford pleasure to the five republican magistrates.

When men awake from a long apathy and attach themselves to something, it is with enthusiasm. In that nullity into which opinions, parties, and all the authorities had fallen, people had remained some time without attaching themselves to anything. The disgust felt for men and things was universal. But, on the appearance of that extraordinary individual whom the East had given back to Europe, in so unexpected a manner, all disgust, all uncertainty ceased. Upon him all eyes, all wishes, and all hopes were immediately fixed.

All the generals, employed or not employed, patriots or moderates, hastened to Bonaparte. This was but natural, since he was the first member of that most ambitious and most discontented class. In him it seemed to have found an avenger against the government. All the ministers, all the functionaries successively dismissed during the fluctuations of the Directory, thronged also round the new-comer. They went apparently to visit the illustrious warrior, but in reality to observe and to flatter the man to whom the future seemed to belong.

Bonaparte had brought with him Lannes, Murat, and Berthier, who never quitted him. Very soon Jourdan, Augereau, Macdonald, Beurnonville, Leclerc, Lefebvre, and Marbot, notwithstanding differences of opinion, appeared around him. Moreau himself soon formed part of this retinue. Bonaparte had met him at Gohier's. Sensible that his superiority permitted him to make the first advances, he went up to Moreau, declared his impatience to make his acquaintance, and expressed an esteem for him which deeply affected him. He afterwards made him a present of a sabre

at length sent the man for whom he and his party had so long searched in vain, died the very same night from excess of joy."—*Gourgaud*. E.

enriched with precious stones, and contrived to gain him completely. In a few days, Moreau belonged to his court. He too was discontented, and went with all his comrades to visit the presumed avenger. To these illustrious warriors were added men of all professions. Among them were seen Bruix, ex-minister of the marine, who had just been traversing the Mediterranean at the head of the French and Spanish fleets, a man of acute and subtle mind, as capable of conducting a negotiation as of commanding a squadron; and M. de Talleyrand, who had reason to fear the displeasure of Bonaparte because he had not accompanied him to Egypt. But M. de Talleyrand relied for a favourable reception upon his talents, his reputation, and his importance; and he was favourably received. These two men liked one another too well, and felt too much need of each other's friendship, to pout with one another.* There were also seen in the Rue Chantierine, Rœderer, formerly *procureur* of the commune, a man full of frankness and intelligence, and Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely, an old constituent, to whom Bonaparte had attached himself in Italy, and whom he had employed in Malta, a brilliant and a fertile orator.

But it was not merely the disgraced and the discontented who paid their court to Bonaparte. The heads of the existing government showed the same eagerness to visit him. All the directors and all the ministers gave him entertainments, as on his return from Italy. A great number of the members of the two Councils obtained introductions to him. The ministers and the directors paid him a much more flattering homage. They came every moment to consult him as to how they should act. Dubois-Crancé, the minister at war, had, as it were, transferred his portfolio to Bonaparte. Moulins, the director, who specially attended to the department of war, passed part of his mornings with him. Gohier and Roger Ducos also called upon him. Cambacérès, minister of justice, an able lawyer, who had that liking for Bonaparte which weak minds have for their opposite, and whom Bonaparte affected to caress, to prove himself capable of appreciating civil merit; Fouché, minister of the police, who was desirous of changing his worn-out patron Barras for a new and powerful protector; † Réal, commissioner to the department of the Seine, a warm and generous patriot, and one of the cleverest men of his time, were equally assiduous in their attentions to Bonaparte, and conversed with him on affairs of state. The general had not been above a week in Paris, when the management of affairs came almost involuntarily into his hands. In default of his will, which as yet was nothing, he was asked for his opinion. On his part, he affected, with his usual reserve, to withdraw himself from the assiduities of which he was the object. There were many whom he refused to see; he showed himself but little, and went abroad, only, as it were, by stealth. ‡

* "Talleyrand availed himself of all the resources of a supple and insinuating address, in order to conciliate a person whose suffrage it was important for him to secure."—*Gourgaud*. E.

† "It was Talleyrand who disclosed to Bonaparte's view all the weak points of the government, and made him acquainted with the state of parties and the bearings of each character."—*Fouché's Memoirs*. E.

‡ "Bonaparte was too cunning to let me into all the secrets of his plans and the means of their execution, and thus to place himself at the mercy of a single man; but he said enough to me to win my confidence, and to persuade me that the destinies of France were in his hands."—*Fouché's Memoirs*. E.

§ "Napoleon seemed to give his exclusive attention to literature, and was more frequently to be found at the Institute, or discussing with Volney and other men of letters the information which he had acquired in Egypt on science and antiquities, than in the

His face had become thinner, and his complexion darker. He wore since his return a gray frock-coat, and a Turkish sabre, fastened to a silken cord. To those who had been fortunate enough to obtain a sight of it, this was an emblem that reminded them of the East, the Pyramids, Mount Tabor, and Aboukir. The officers of the garrison, the forty adjutants of the national guard, and the staff of the place, desired to be presented to him. He delayed from day to day, and seemed to lend himself with regret to all this homage. He listened, he observed everything, but as yet he opened his mind to none. This was deep policy. When a man is necessary, he need not be afraid to wait. He irritates the impatience of people; they hasten to him; and he has nothing to do but to choose.

What is Bonaparte going to do? was the question which each asked the other. It proved that there was something inevitable to be done. Two principal parties, and a third, a subdivision of the two others, offered themselves to him, and were disposed to serve him if he adopted their views: these were the patriots, the moderates or politicians, and lastly, the *pourris*, as they were called—the corrupt of all times and of all the factions.

The patriots, it is true, distrusted Bonaparte and his ambition; but, with their fondness for destroying, and their improvidence for the morrow, they would fain have employed his arm to overturn everything, when it would be time enough to think of the future. But, such were the sentiments of those firebrands only, who, always dissatisfied with existing institutions, considered the business of destroying as the most urgent of all. The rest of the patriots, those who might be called the republicans, distrusted the renown of the general, wished at most that a place should be given to him in the Directory, perceived even with pain that for this purpose it would be necessary to grant him a dispensation on account of age, and were, above all, desirous that he should go to the frontiers, to raise the fallen glory of our arms and to restore the republic to its former splendour.

The moderates or politicians, men fearing the fury of the parties and especially of the Jacobins, having no longer any hopes of a violated and worn-out constitution, were anxious for a change, and wished that it might be effected under the auspices of a powerful man. "Take the supreme power, frame for us a wise and moderate constitution, and give us security"—such was the secret language which they addressed to Bonaparte. They composed the most numerous party in France. It comprehended even many compromised patriots, who, having fears for the Revolution, were desirous of committing the public welfare to a strong hand. They had a majority in the Council of Ancients, but were considerably in the minority in that of the Five Hundred. They had hitherto followed the highest civil renown, that of Sieyès, and the worse Sieyès had been used at the Riding-House the more they had attached themselves to him. It was but natural that they should now run with much greater alacrity to meet Bonaparte, for it was strength that they sought, and there was much more of that in a victorious general than in a political writer, how illustrious soever he might be.

Lastly, the *pourris*, the corrupt, were all the rogues, all the intriguers, who were striving to make their fortune, who had dishonoured themselves

haunts of politicians, or the society of leaders of either party in the state. Neither was he to be seen at the places of popular resort: he went into no general company, seldom attended the theatres, and when he did, took his seat in a private box."—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. E.

in making it, and who were still bent on making it at the same price. These followed Barras and Fouché, the minister of police. Among them were men of all sorts—Jacobins, moderates, and even royalists. They formed not a party but a numerous *coterie*.

We must beware of subjoining to this enumeration the partisans of royalty. They were too insignificant since the 18th of Fructidor, and besides, Bonaparte inspired them with no sentiment whatever. Such a man could think of none but himself, and could not take the supreme power in order to transfer it to others. They went no farther, therefore, than to side with the enemies of the Directory, and to accuse it in the language of all the parties.

Among these different parties Bonaparte could make but one choice. The patriots were not at all to his liking. Some of them, attached to what existed, distrusted his ambition; others were desirous of a *coup de main*; then what but interminable agitations! and it was not possible to lay the foundation of anything with them. Besides, their spirit was directly contrary to the march of the times, and they were emitting their last flames. The corrupt were nothing, except in the government, into which they had naturally introduced themselves, for to that point their wishes invariably tend. For the rest, there was no occasion whatever to take any notice of them; they would be sure to come to him who should get most chances in his favour, because they were anxious to keep possession of places and of money. The only party on which Bonaparte could support himself was that which, participating in the wishes of the whole population, was desirous of screening the republic from the factions by constituting it in a solid manner. Herein all future prospects were involved, and to this side he could not fail to incline.

His choice could not be doubtful. From instinct alone it was decided beforehand. Bonaparte felt a horror of the turbulent, and a disgust of the corrupt. He could not like any but those moderate men, who wished some one to govern for them. Besides, these formed the nation itself. But it was requisite to wait, to allow the parties to make their overtures, and to watch their chiefs, in order to discover with which of them an alliance might be formed.

The parties had all of them representatives in the Directory. The patriots had, as we have seen, Moulins and Gohier. The corrupt men had Barras. The politicians or moderates had Sieyes and Roger Ducos.

Gohier and Moulins, sincere and honest patriots, more moderate than their party because they were in power, admired Bonaparte; but, desirous of employing his sword solely for the glory of the constitution of the year III, they wished to send him to the armies. Bonaparte treated them with great respect; he esteemed their honesty, for he was always fond of that quality in men—and this is a natural and interested fondness in a man born to govern. Besides, the attentions which he paid them were the means of proving that he honoured genuine republicans. His wife was intimate with the wife of Gohier. She calculated also, and she had observed to Madame Gohier, "My intimacy with you will be a reply to all calumnies."

Barras, who felt his political end approaching, and who beheld in Bonaparte an inevitable successor, thoroughly detested him. He would have submitted to flatter him as formerly, but he felt that he was more despised by him than ever, and he kept aloof from him. Bonaparte entertained for this ignorant, inflated, corrupt epicurean, an aversion that daily became more insurmountable. The name of *pourris* (rotten), which he had given

to him as his, sufficiently proved his disgust and his contempt. He could scarcely have consented to ally himself with him.

There was yet left the truly important man, namely Sieyes, drawing Roger Ducos along in his train. In calling Sieyes to the Directory at the moment of the 30th of Prairial, it would seem as if people had intended to throw themselves into his arms. Bonaparte was almost angry with him for having taken the first place in his absence, for having fixed men's minds for a moment, and for having excited hopes. He manifested a spleen against him for which he never accounted. Though very opposite in genius, and in habits, they had nevertheless superiority enough to agree together and to forgive one another their differences, but too much pride to make mutual concessions. Unfortunately, they had not yet spoken to each other: and two great minds which have not yet flattered one another are naturally enemies. They watched one another, and each waited for the other to take the first steps. They met at dinner at the house of Gohier. Bonaparte had felt himself sufficiently above Moreau, to take the first steps; he thought that he could not act in the same manner towards Sieyes, and did not speak to him. The director maintained the same silence. They retired in a rage. "Did you notice that little insolent fellow?" said Sieyes; "he never so much as saluted the member of a government which ought to have had him shot."—"What could people be thinking of," said Bonaparte, "to put that priest into the Directory? He is sold to Prussia, and, unless you take good care, he will deliver you up to her." Thus, in men of the highest superiority, pride gets the better even of policy. It is true that, if it were otherwise, they would no longer have that loftiness which qualifies them to govern men.

Thus the personage whom Bonaparte had the most interest to gain was the very one for whom he felt the greatest aversion. But their interests were so identical that they were soon destined, in spite of themselves, to be propelled towards one another by their own partisans.*

While they were watching each other, and the throng of visitors to Bonaparte kept continually increasing, the latter, still uncertain what course to pursue, had sounded Gohier and Ducos, to ascertain whether they would consent to his being director, though he had not attained the requisite age. It was in the place of Sieyes that he was desirous of entering into the government. By excluding Sieyes, he should become master of his colleagues, and be certain to govern in their name. This, to be sure, would be but an incomplete success; but it was a medium of attaining power without absolutely effecting a revolution; and, having once attained it, he should have time to look about him. Whether he was sincere, or whether he meant to deceive them, which is very possible, and to persuade them that he carried his ambition no farther than a place in the Directory, he sounded them, and found them inflexible in regard to age. A dispensation, though given by the Councils, appeared to them an infraction of the constitution. He was, therefore, obliged to renounce this idea.

The two directors, Gohier and Moulins, beginning to feel uneasy on account of the ardour which Bonaparte manifested for political functions, proposed to get rid of him by giving him the command of an army. Sieyes did not coincide in this plan, observing, with his usual spleen, that, instead

* "Sieyes entertained a strong apprehension that Bonaparte would be too ambitious to enter into his constitutional views; and this apprehension was not without foundation. But, through the importunity of common friends, an interview at length took place, which terminated in an alliance."—*Mignet*. E.

of furnishing him with occasion to acquire fresh glory, they ought, on the contrary, to forget him and to cause him to be forgotten. There was some talk of sending him to Italy, when Barras said that he had done his business so cleverly there that he had no wish to return to that country. At length, it was decided that he should be sent for and invited to take a command, leaving the choice of the army to himself.

Bonaparte, being summoned, repaired to the Directory. He was acquainted with the observation of Barras. Before the purpose for which he was summoned had been notified to him, he began to speak in a high and threatening tone, mentioned the remark of which he had to complain, and eyeing Barras, said that, if he had made his fortune in Italy, at any rate it was not at the expense of the republic. Barras was silent. Gohier, the president, replied to Bonaparte that the government was persuaded that his laurels were the only fortune that he had brought back from Italy. He then told him that the Directory invited him to take a command, leaving the choice of the army to himself. Bonaparte answered coldly that he had not yet rested sufficiently from his fatigues; that the transition from a dry to a damp climate had tried him severely, and that he needed a little more time to recruit himself. This circumstance could not fail to apprise the directors of his views, and him of their distrust.

This was a motive for making haste. His brothers, his habitual advisers, Rœderer, Réal, Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely, Bruix, and Talleyrand, brought to him every day members of the moderate and political party in the Councils. These were, in the Five Hundred, Boulay of La Meuthe, Gaudin, Chasal, Cabanis, Chenier; in the Ancients, Cornudet, Lemer cier, Fargue, Daunou. All were of opinion that he ought to ally himself with the true party, the reforming party, and to unite with Sieyes, who had a constitution ready made, and the majority in the Council of the Ancients. Bonaparte was of precisely the same opinion, and aware that he had no option; but it was requisite that he should be reconciled with Sieyes, and this was a difficult matter. So important, however, were the interests at stake, and so delicate and dexterous were the mediators between his pride and that of Sieyes, that the alliance could not fail to be effected. M. de Talleyrand would have conciliated a still more unruly pride than that of these two men. The negotiation was soon opened and concluded. It was agreed that a stronger constitution should be given to France under the auspices of Sieyes and Bonaparte. Without coming to any explanation respecting the form and nature of that constitution, it was tacitly understood that it should be republican, but that it should deliver France from what both called the babblers, and give the greatest share of influence to the two master minds which were entering into this alliance.

A system-maker, dreaming of the too long delayed accomplishment of his conceptions, an ambitious man, aspiring to rule the world, were, amidst that nullity of all system and of all power, eminently adapted to coalesce. The incompatibility of their temper was of no consequence. The address of the mediators, and the importance of the interests, sufficed to palliate that inconvenience, at least for the moment; and a moment was enough for effecting a revolution.

Bonaparte was, therefore, determined to act with Sieyes and Roger Ducos. He still manifested the same aversion for Barras, the same respect for Gohier and Moulins, and maintained a like reserve with all three. But Fouché, with a sagacious foresight of rising fortune, perceived with the utmost regret the dislike of Bonaparte for his patron Barras, and was morti-

fied to observe that Barras took no pains to overcome that dislike. He had fully determined to pass over to the camp of the new Cæsar; but hesitating, from a relic of shame, to desert his protector, he would fain have taken him along with him. Assiduously attentive to Bonaparte, and tolerably well received, because he held the portfolio of the police, he strove to conquer his repugnance for Barras. He was seconded by Réal, Bruix, and the other advisers of the general. Conceiving that he had succeeded, he prevailed upon Barras to invite Bonaparte to dinner. Barras sent him an invitation for the 8th of Brumaire (October 30th). Bonaparte accepted it. After dinner they began to talk of public affairs. Bonaparte and Barras waited for one another. Barras first adverted to the object of their meeting. He commenced with some general remarks relative to his personal situation. Hoping, no doubt, that Bonaparte would contradict him, he declared that he was ill, worn out, and that it was high time for him to retire from public business. As Bonaparte still kept silence, Barras added that the republic was disorganized, that it was requisite, in order to save it, to concentrate the supreme power, and to appoint a president; he then named General Hedouville* as worthy of being elected to that office. Hedouville was as unknown as he was incapable. Barras disguised his thoughts, and named Hedouville, that he might avoid mentioning himself. "As for you, general," added he, "it is your intention to proceed to the army; go, gain fresh glory, and replace France in her proper rank. For my part, I shall withdraw into that retirement which I need." Bonaparte looked steadfastly at Barras, made no reply, and there the conversation dropped. Barras, confounded, added not another word. Bonaparte immediately retired, and, before he left the Luxembourg, went to the apartments of Sieyès. He declared to him emphatically, that he was resolved to act with him alone, and that they had only to decide upon the means of execution. The alliance was sealed at that interview, and they agreed to prepare everything for the 18th or the 20th of Brumaire.

On his return home, Bonaparte found there Fouché, Réal, and the friends of Barras. "Well," said he to them, "what do you think your Barras has proposed to me? To appoint a president, naming Hedouville and meaning himself, and to send me to the army. There is nothing to be done with such a man." The friends of Barras were anxious to repair this awkwardness, and strove to excuse him. Bonaparte, without arguing the point, changed the conversation, for his resolution was taken. Fouché immediately called on Barras to reproach him, and to prevail upon him to go and counteract the effect of his absurd conduct. The very next morning, Barras posted away to Bonaparte to make excuses for the language which he had used the preceding day, and to offer his devotedness and his coöperation in anything that the general might think fit to attempt. Bonaparte paid little attention to him, replied by generalities, and talked, in his turn, of fatigue, of his shattered health, and of his dislike to men and public business.

Barras saw that he was undone, and was sensible that his game was up. It was high time for him to reap the reward of his double intrigues and his cowardly defections. The ardent patriots would have nothing to do with him since his conduct towards the society at the Riding-House; the repub-

* Hedouville was born in 1755. In 1801 Bonaparte appointed him ambassador to St. Petersburg. On the restoration of the Bourbons, he was made a peer of France, and died in the year 1825. E.

licans, attached to the constitution of the year III, felt no other sentiment for him than contempt and distrust. The reformers, the politicians, saw in him only a man stripped of all consideration, and applied to him the term *rotten* (*pourri*) invented by Bonaparte. He had nothing left him but some intrigues with the royalists by means of certain emigrants concealed in his court. These intrigues were of very old date. They had commenced so far back as the 18th of Fructidor. He had communicated them to the Directory, and obtained their authority to prosecute them, that he might have in his hands the threads of counter-revolution. He had thus secured the means of betraying at will either the republic or the pretender. A negotiation was on foot at this moment with the latter, about a sum of several millions to second his return. It is possible, however, that Barras was not sincere with the pretender, for all his partialities must have been in favour of the republic. But it would be a difficult task to ascertain precisely the preferences of this old debauchee. He was perhaps not acquainted with them himself. Besides, at such a point of corruption, a little money will unfortunately prevail over all the preferences of taste or of opinion.

Fouché, distressed to see his patron undone, distressed above all to find himself compromised in his disgrace, redoubled his assiduity to Bonaparte. The latter, distrustful of such a man, concealed from him all his secrets; but Fouché, nothing daunted, because he perceived that Bonaparte's victory was insured, resolved to conquer his sternness by dint of services. He had the police; he conducted it skilfully; and he knew that people were conspiring everywhere. He took good care not to communicate this to the Directory, the majority of which, composed of Moulins, Gohier, and Barras, might, in consequence of his revelations, have adopted measures fatal to the conspirators.

Bonaparte had been about a fortnight in Paris, and almost everything was already prepared. Berthier, Lannes, and Murat, were daily gaining the officers and the generals. Among these Bernadotte out of jealousy, Jourdan from attachment to the republic, and Augereau from Jacobinism, had kept aloof, and communicated their fears to all the patriots of the Five Hundred; but the mass of the military men was won. Moreau, a sincere republican, but suspected by the patriots who ruled, dissatisfied with the Directory, which had so ill rewarded his talents, had no resource but in Bonaparte. Caressed and won by him, and willingly enduring a superior, he declared that he would second all his projects. He had no wish to be let into the secret, for he had a horror of political intrigues, but he desired to be summoned at the moment of execution. There were in Paris the 8th and 9th dragoons, which had formerly served under Bonaparte in Italy, and were devoted to him. The 21st chasseurs, organized by him, when he commanded the army of the interior, and which had once had Murat in its ranks, was not less attached to him. These regiments were still soliciting permission to file off before him. The officers of the garrison and the adjutants of the national guard also begged the honour of being presented to him, and had not yet obtained it. He deferred this reception, purposing to make it concur with his plans. His two brothers, Lucien and Joseph, and the deputies of his party, were daily making fresh conquests in the Councils.

An interview with Sieyes was fixed for the 15th of Brumaire, in order to decide upon the plan and the means of execution. On that very day the Councils were to give an entertainment to Bonaparte, as had been done on

his return from Italy. It was not, as on that occasion, the Councils which gave it officially. The thing had been proposed in secret committee; but the Five Hundred, who, on the first moment of his landing, had chosen Lucien president, with a view to do honour to the general in the person of his brother, were now distrustful, and refused to give an entertainment. It was then decided that it should be given by subscription. The number of the subscribers was from six to seven hundred. The dinner took place in the church of St. Sulpice; it was cold and silent: every one watched his neighbour, and maintained the utmost reserve. It was evident that some great event was expected, and that it would be the work of part of those who attended the banquet. Bonaparte was silent and thoughtful. This was but natural; for, on retiring, he was to go and determine the place and hour of a conspiracy. No sooner was dinner over than he rose, walked with Berthier round the tables, addressed a few words to the deputies, and then precipitately withdrew.*

He proceeded to Sieyes to make his final arrangements with him. Then it was that they first agreed upon the government to be substituted for that which existed. It was resolved that the Councils should be suspended for three months, that the five directors should be superseded by three provisional consuls, who, during these three months, should exercise a sort of dictatorship, and be commissioned to frame a constitution. Bonaparte, Sieyes, and Roger Ducos, were to be the three consuls. The next point was to settle the means of execution. Sieyes was sure of a majority in the Ancients. As there was talk every day of incendiary projects formed by the Jacobins, it was proposed to impute to them a plan for attacking the national representation. The commission of the inspectors of the Ancients, wholly at the disposal of Sieyes, was to propose to transfer the legislative body to St. Cloud. The constitution actually conferred this right on the Council of the Ancients. To this measure that Council was to add another, which was not authorized by the constitution, namely, to commit the duty of protecting the translation to a general of its selection, that is to say, to Bonaparte. The Ancients were to invest him at the same time with the command of the 17th military division, and of all the troops cantoned in Paris. With these forces, Bonaparte was to escort the legislative body to St. Cloud. There the confederates hoped to make themselves masters of the Five Hundred, and to extort from them the decree of a provisional consulate. Sieyes and Roger Ducos were, on that same day, to resign their office of directors. It was proposed to compel Barras, Gohier, and Moulins, to resign. The Directory would thus be disorganized by the dissolution of the majority: they would then go to the Five Hundred and tell them that there no longer existed a government, and oblige them to

* "It was not without hesitation that Napoleon yielded to a project started by Lucien, who by all sorts of manœuvring had succeeded in prevailing on a great number of his colleagues to be present at a grand subscription dinner to be given to Bonaparte by the Council of Five Hundred. The disorder which unavoidably prevailed in a party amounting to upwards of two hundred and fifty persons animated by a diversity of opinions, and the anxiety and distrust arising in the minds of those who were not in the grand plot, rendered this meeting one of the most disagreeable I ever witnessed. It was all restraint and dullness. Bonaparte's countenance sufficiently betrayed his dissatisfaction. Besides, the success of his schemes demanded his presence elsewhere. Almost as soon as he had finished his dinner, he rose, saying to Berthier and me, 'I am tired, let us be gone.' He went round to the different tables, addressing to the company compliments and trifling remarks, and departed, leaving at table the persons by whom he had been invited."—*Bourrienne*. E.

appoint the three consuls. This plan was most judiciously conceived; for when a resolution is to be effected, it is always expedient to disguise whatever is illegal as much as possible, to make use of the terms of a constitution for destroying it, and of the members of a government for its overthrow.

The 18th of Brumaire was fixed for obtaining the decree of translation, and the 19th for the decisive sitting at St. Cloud. The task was divided. The decree of translation and the efforts for obtaining it were left to Sieyès and his friends. Bonaparte undertook to have the armed force in readiness and to lead the troops to the Tuileries.

Having made all the arrangements, they parted. Nothing was heard on all sides but rumours of some great event that was ready to break out. On like occasions, similar rumours had always been in circulation. There are no revolutions that succeed, but such as can be known beforehand. Fouché, moreover, took good care not to forewarn the three directors, who had no hand in the conspiracy. Dubois-Crancé, notwithstanding his deference to the superior talents of Bonaparte in military matters, was a stanch patriot. He received intelligence of the plan, and hastened to denounce it to Gohier and Moulins, but they gave no credit to the story. They knew full well that he had great ambition, but they would not yet believe that there existed a conspiracy on the point of exploding. Barras certainly perceived a great bustle, but he was aware that he was ruined whatever might happen, and he resigned himself, like a coward, to the influence of events.

The commission of the Ancients, of which Cornet,* the deputy, was president, was directed to prepare everything in the night between the 17th and 18th for obtaining the passing of the decree of translation. The window-shutters were closed and the curtains drawn, that the public might not be apprized by the lights of the night-work that was going forward in the bureaux of the commission. Care was taken to convoke the Council of the Ancients for seven o'clock, and that of the Five Hundred for eleven. In this manner, the decree of translation would be passed before the Five Hundred had met; and, as all discussion was forbidden by the constitution at the moment when the decree of translation was promulgated, the tribune of the Five Hundred would be closed by this promulgation. Another precaution was taken; that was to delay the delivery of the letters of convocation for particular deputies. Thus it was certain that those of whom any distrust was felt would not arrive till after the question was decided.

Bonaparte, on his side, had taken all the necessary precautions. He had sent for Colonel Sebastiani, who commanded the 9th dragoons, to ascertain the feeling of the regiment. That regiment was composed of four hundred foot and six hundred horse. It contained many young soldiers; but the veterans of Arcole and Rivoli gave the tone to it. The colonel answered to Bonaparte for the regiment. It was agreed that Sebastiani, upon pretext of reviewing it, should leave his barracks at five o'clock, distribute his men partly in the Place de la Révolution, partly in the garden of the Tuileries, and that he himself, with two hundred horse, should occupy the Rue du Mont Blanc and Rue Chantierine. Bonaparte then sent word to the colonels of the other regiments of cavalry that he would review them on

* "Bonaparte afterwards made Cornet a member of the Conservative senate, and grand officer of the Legion of Honour. On the restoration of the Bourbons, he became a peer of France"—*Scott's Life of Napoleon*. F

the 18th. He also desired it to be intimated to all the officers who wished to be presented to him that he would receive them on the morning of the same day. As an excuse for the choice of the hour, he alleged that he was obliged to leave town. He sent to beg Moreau and all the generals to be in the Rue Chantierine at the same hour. At midnight, he despatched an aide-de-camp to Lefebvre, requesting him to call upon him at six in the morning. Lefebvre was wholly devoted to the Directory; but Bonaparte reckoned upon his not opposing his ascendancy. No intimation had been sent either to Bernadotte or to Augereau. He had taken care to deceive Gohier by inviting himself, together with all his family, to dine with him on the 18th; and, at the same time, in order to prevail upon him to resign, he had sent his wife to beg him to come the next morning, at eight o'clock, to breakfast with him in the Rue Chantierine.*

On the morning of the 18th, a bustle, unexpected even by those who concurred in producing it, manifested itself in all quarters. A numerous cavalry passed along the Boulevards; all the generals and officers in Paris proceeded in full uniform to the Rue Chantierine, little suspecting what a concourse they should find there. The members of the Ancients hastened to their post, astonished at this sudden convocation. The Five Hundred were most of them ignorant of what was in preparation. Gohier, Moulins, and Barras, were in complete ignorance. But Sieyes, who had for some time been taking lessons in riding, and Roger Ducos, were already on horseback and proceeding to the Tuileries.

As soon as the Ancients had assembled, the president of the commission of the inspectors addressed them. The commission appointed to watch over the safety of the legislative body had learned, he said, that dangerous plots were hatching, that conspirators were thronging to Paris, holding secret meetings there, and preparing to attack the freedom of the national representation. Cornet added that the Council of the Ancients had in its hands the means of saving the republic, and that it ought to employ them. These means consisted in transferring the legislative body to St. Cloud, in order to withdraw it from the attempts of the conspirators, in meanwhile placing the public tranquillity under the safeguard of a general capable of insuring it, and in choosing Bonaparte for that general. Scarcely was the reading of this proposition and of the decree which comprehended it finished, when a certain agitation took place in the Council. Some members opposed it; Cornudet, Lebrun, Fargues, and Regnier, supported it. The name of Bonaparte, on which great stress had been laid, and of whose support they were certain, decided the majority. At eight o'clock the decree was passed. It transferred the councils to St. Cloud, and convoked them for the following day at twelve o'clock. Bonaparte was appointed commander-in-chief of all the troops in the 17th military division, of the guard of the legislative body, of the guard of the Directory, of the national guards of Paris and the environs. Lefebvre, commandant of the 17th division, was placed under his orders. Bonaparte was summoned to the bar to receive the decree, and to take the oath to the president. A mes-

* "What low intrigues marked the 17th of Brumaire! On that day I dined with Bonaparte, and he said after dinner, 'I have promised to dine to-morrow with Gohier, but, as you may readily suppose, I do not intend to go. However, I am very sorry for his obstinacy. By way of restoring his confidence, Josephine is going to invite him to breakfast with us to-morrow. It will be impossible for him to suspect anything.'" — *Bourrienne*. E.

senger of state was directed to carry the decree immediately to the general.

This messenger, who was Cornet, the deputy himself, found the Boulevards choked by a numerous cavalry, and the Rue du Mont Blanc and the Rue Chantierine crowded with officers and generals in full uniform. All were hastening to comply with General Bonaparte's invitation. The saloons of the latter were too small to receive such a numerous company; he ordered the doors to be thrown open, stepped out on the balcony, and addressed the officers. He told them that France was in danger, and that he relied upon them to assist him in saving it. Cornet handed to him the decree. He seized it, read it to them, and asked if he could reckon upon their support. All replied, clapping their hands to their swords, that they were ready to second him. He then turned to Lefebvre. The latter, seeing the troops in motion without his orders, had questioned Colonel Sebastiani, who, without replying, had desired him to go to General Bonaparte. Lefebvre entered in an ill-humour. "Well, Lefebvre," said Bonaparte to him, "you, one of the pillars of the republic, will you suffer it to perish in the hands of these *lawyers*? Join me, and assist me to save it. Stay," added Bonaparte, handing him a sabre; "there is the sabre which I wore at the Pyramids; I give it to you as a token of my esteem and my confidence."—"Yes," replied Lefebvre, with deep emotion, "let us throw the *lawyers* into the river." He declared that he would stay with Bonaparte. Joseph had brought Bernadotte; but the latter, perceiving the drift of these movements, withdrew to give intimation of them to the patriots. Fouché was not in the secret; but, apprized by the event, he had ordered the barriers to be closed, and the departure of the couriers and of the public vehicles to be suspended. He then came in all haste to inform Bonaparte of what he had done, and to make protestations of his attachment to him. Bonaparte, who had thus far left him on one side, did not repel him, but told him that his precautions were useless, that neither ought the barriers to be closed nor the ordinary course of things suspended; that he was marching with the nation and relied upon it.* Bonaparte was informed at this moment that Gohier would not come on his invitation. He showed some ill-humour at this, and sent him word that he would ruin himself to no purpose if he was determined to resist. He immediately mounted his horse to proceed to the Tuileries, and to take the oath before the Council of the Ancients. Almost all the generals of the republic were on horseback by his side. Moreau, Macdonald, Berthier, Lannes, Murat, Leclerc, were behind him as his lieutenants. He found at the Tuileries the detachments of the 9th, harangued them, and, having filled them with enthusiasm, entered the palace.

He appeared before the Ancients, accompanied by this magnificent staff. His presence produced a strong sensation, and proved to the Ancients that they had associated themselves with a powerful man, who possessed all the means requisite for giving success to a stroke of policy. He presented himself at the bar. "Citizens representatives," said he, "the republic was

* "Fouché made great professions of attachment and devotion. He had given directions for closing the barriers, and preventing the departure of couriers and coaches. 'Why, good God!' said the general to him, 'wherefore all these precautions? We go with the nation, and by its strength alone. Let no citizen be disturbed, and let the triumph of opinion have nothing in common with the transactions of days in which a actions minority prevailed.' — *Gourgaud*. E

on the point of perishing. Your decree has saved it. Wo to those who shall attempt to oppose its execution! Aided by all my companions in arms, here assembled around me, I shall find means to prevent their efforts. In vain examples are sought in the past to disturb your minds. Nothing in history resembles the eighteenth century, and nothing in this century resembles its close. We will have the republic. We will have it founded on genuine liberty, on the representative system. We will have it, I swear, in my own name and in the name of my companions in arms."—"We all swear it," repeated the generals and the officers who were at the bar. The manner in which Bonaparte took the oath was adroit, inasmuch as he had avoided taking an oath to the constitution. A deputy would have spoken for the purpose of remarking this; but the president refused to hear him, on the ground that the decree of translation interdicted all discussion. The assembly broke up immediately. Bonaparte then went into the garden, mounted his horse, accompanied by all the generals, and reviewed the regiments of the garrison which successively arrived. He addressed the soldiers in a short and energetic speech, telling them that he was going to effect a revolution which would restore to them abundance and glory. Shouts of *Bonaparte for ever!* rent the air. The weather was superb, the concourse extraordinary. Everything seemed to second the inevitable attempt that was about to terminate the confusion by absolute power.

At this moment the Five Hundred, apprized of the revolution that was preparing, had proceeded tumultuously to the hall in which they met. No sooner were they assembled, than they received a message from the Ancients, containing the decree of translation. On the reading of it, a multitude of voices were raised at once; but the president, Lucien Bonaparte, enjoined silence by virtue of the constitution, which forbade further deliberation. The Five Hundred broke up immediately; the most ardent of them ran to each other's houses, and held secret conventicles, to express their indignation, and to devise means of resistance. The patriots of the faubourgs were in vehement agitation, and thronged tumultuously around Santerre.

Meanwhile Bonaparte, having finished the review of the troops, had returned to the Tuileries, and gone to the commission of the inspectors of the Ancients. That of the Five Hundred had entirely adhered to the new revolution, and lent itself to all that was going on. It was there that everything was to be done upon pretext of carrying the translation into execution. Bonaparte sat there permanently. Cambacérès, the minister of justice, had already repaired thither. Fouché came also. Sieyès and Roger Ducos arrived to give their resignations. It was of consequence to obtain another from the Directory, because then the majority would be dissolved; there would exist no executive power, and there would be no need to apprehend a last act of energy on its part. There was no hope that either Gohier or Moulins would give theirs: M. de Talleyrand and Admiral Bruix were, therefore, despatched to Barras to extort his.

Bonaparte then distributed the command of the troops. He directed Murat, with a numerous cavalry and a corps of grenadiers, to occupy St. Cloud. Serrurier was posted at the Point-du-Jour with a reserve. Lannes was intrusted with the command of the troops which guarded the Tuileries. Bonaparte then gave Moreau a singular commission, and certainly the least honourable of all, in this great event. He directed him to go with five

hundred men and guard the Luxembourg.* Moreau had instructions to blockade the directors upon pretext of providing for their safety, and to prevent any communication whatever between them and persons without the palace. At the same time Bonaparte sent to the commandant of the directorial guard to notify that he was to obey him, ordering him to quit the Luxembourg with his troops and to come to him at the Tuileries. With the assistance of Fouché, a last and an important precaution was taken. The Directory was empowered to suspend the municipalities. Fouché, acting in his capacity of minister of the police, as if he had been authorized by the Directory, suspended the twelve municipalities of Paris, and deprived them of all power. In consequence of this measure, no rallying-point was left for the patriots, either in the Directory or in the twelve communes which had succeeded the great communes of former days. Fouché then caused bills to be posted, exhorting the citizens to order and quiet, and assuring them that powerful efforts were making at that moment to save the republic from its dangers.

These measures were completely successful. The authority of General Bonaparte was everywhere acknowledged, though the Council of the Ancients had not acted constitutionally in conferring it on him. This council, in fact, had a right to order the translation, but not to appoint a supreme chief of the armed forces. Moreau proceeded to the Luxembourg, and blockaded it with five hundred men. Jubbé, commandant of the directorial guard, immediately obeying the instructions which he had received, ordered his men to mount their horses, quitted the Luxembourg, and proceeded to the Tuileries. Meanwhile the three directors, Moulins, Gohier, and Barras, were in the most painful perplexity. Moulins and Gohier, their eyes being at length opened to the conspiracy which had before escaped them, went to the apartments of Barras, to ask him if he would stand firm with them and form the majority. The voluptuous director was in the bath, and had scarcely heard of what Bonaparte was doing in Paris. "That fellow," he exclaimed, with a gross expression, "has deceived us." He promised to unite with his colleagues, for he promised everybody, and sent Bottot, his secretary, to the Tuileries, to pick up intelligence. But no sooner had Gohier and Moulins left him, than he fell into the hands of Bruix and M. de Talleyrand. It was not difficult to convince him of the impotence to which he was reduced, and there was no reason to fear that he would fall gloriously in defence of the directorial constitution. He was promised quiet and fortune, and he consented to give in his resignation. A letter had been drawn up for him, which he signed, and which Messrs. de Talleyrand and Bruix lost no time in conveying to Bonaparte. From that moment Gohier and Moulins made useless attempts to get to him, and they at length learned that he had resigned. Left alone by themselves, having no longer the right to deliberate, they knew not what course to pursue, and yet they were determined faithfully to perform their duty to the constitution of the year III. They resolved, therefore, to repair to the

* "This was one of Bonaparte's happy strokes: Moreau, who was a slave to military discipline, regarded his successful rival only as a chief nominated by the Council of Ancients. He received his orders, and obeyed them. Bonaparte appointed him commander of the guard of the Luxembourg, where the directors were under confinement. He accepted the command, and no circumstance could have contributed more effectually to the accomplishment of Napoleon's views, and to the triumph of his ambition."
— *Bourrienne*. E.

commission of the inspectors, and to ask their two colleagues, Sieyes and Ducos, if they would unite with them to reconstitute the majority, and to promulgate at least the decree of translation. This was a sorry resource. It was not possible to collect an armed force and to raise a standard hostile to that of Bonaparte; it was therefore useless to go to the Tuileries to beard Bonaparte in the midst of his camp and of all his forces.

They nevertheless went thither, and were allowed to go. They found Bonaparte surrounded by Sieyes, Ducos, a multitude of deputies, and a numerous staff. Bottot, secretary to Barras, had just been very roughly received. "What," said he to him, raising his voice, "what have they done with that France which I left so brilliant? I left her peace, I have found war; I left victories, I have found defeats; I left the millions of Italy, and I have found despoiling laws and wretchedness! What is become of the hundred thousand French whom I knew, all my companions in glory?—they are dead!"* Bottot retired aghast; but at this moment the resignation of Barras arrived and had pacified the general. He told Gohier and Moulins that he was glad to see them; that he reckoned upon their resignation, because he believed them to be too good citizens to oppose an inevitable and salutary revolution. Gohier replied with emphasis that he had come with his colleague, Moulins, with the sole intention of labouring to save the republic. "Yes," replied Bonaparte; "save it? and with what?—with the means of the constitution, which is crumbling to pieces on all sides?"—"Who told you so?" replied Gohier. "Perfidious wretches, who have neither the courage nor the will to march along with it." A very warm altercation ensued between Gohier and Bonaparte. At this moment a note was brought to the general. It informed him that there was a great commotion in the fauxbourg St. Antoine. "General Moulins," said Bonaparte, "you are a kinsman of Santerre?"—"No," replied Moulins, "I am not his kinsman, but his friend."—"I am informed," proceeded Bonaparte, "that he is exciting insurrection in the fauxbourgs. Tell him that on the very first movement I will have him shot." Moulins replied with energy to Bonaparte, who repeated his declaration that he would have Santerre shot. The altercation continued with Gohier. Bonaparte wound up with saying to him, "The republic is in danger—it must be saved—I will it. Sieyes and Ducos have given their resignation; Barras has just given his. You two, left by yourselves, are powerless; you can do nothing; I advise you not to resist." Gohier and Moulins replied that they would not desert their post. They returned to the Luxembourg, in which they were, from that moment, closely guarded, separated from one another, and deprived of all communication by the orders of Bonaparte transmitted to Moreau. Barras had just set out for Gros-Bois, his country-seat, escorted by a detachment of dragoons.

There was now no longer any executive power. Bonaparte had singly all the force in his own hands. All the ministers had assembled at the commission of the inspectors, where he was. All orders emanated thence, as from the only point where any organized authority existed. The day closed in great tranquillity. The patriots formed numerous conventicles, and proposed desperate resolutions, but without believing in the possibility

* "Then all at once concluding his harangue, in a calm tone, Bonaparte added, 'This state of things cannot possibly last. It would lead us in three years to despotism.'" *Madame de Staël. E.*

of executing them, such was the dread which they felt of the ascendancy of Bonaparte over his troops.

In the evening, a council was held at the commission of the inspectors. The object of this council was to arrange with the principal members of the Ancients what was to be done on the morrow at St. Cloud. The plan settled with Sieyes was to propose the adjournment of the Councils, with a provisional consulate. This proposition was attended with some difficulties. Many of the members of the Ancients, who had contributed to pass the decree of translation, were now alarmed at the domination of the military party. They had not imagined that it was the intention to create a dictatorship in behalf of Bonaparte and his two associates. They merely wished that the Directory should be differently composed, and notwithstanding Bonaparte's age, they would have consented to appoint him director. They made a proposal to that effect. But Bonaparte replied in a decided tone that the constitution was no longer able to move on, that a more concentrated authority was absolutely required, and particularly an adjournment of all the political discussions which agitated the republic. The nomination of three consuls, and the suspension of the Councils till the 1st of Ventose, were, therefore, proposed. After a very long discussion, these measures were adopted. Bonaparte, Sieyes, and Ducos, were chosen for consuls. The *projet* was drawn up, and was to be submitted to the council on the following morning at St. Cloud. Sieyes, who was perfectly acquainted with the revolutionary movements, advised that forty of the leaders of the Five Hundred should be arrested in the night.* Bonaparte rejected this counsel, and had reason to repent it.

The night was tolerably quiet. Next morning, the 19th of Brumaire (November 10), the road to St. Cloud was covered with troops, carriages, and inquisitive persons. Three halls had been prepared in the palace: one for the Ancients, the second for the Five Hundred, and the third for the commission of the inspectors and Bonaparte. The preparations were to have been completed by noon, but they could not be finished before two o'clock. This delay had well nigh proved fatal to the authors of the new revolution. The deputies of the two Councils were walking in the gardens of St. Cloud, and conversing together with extreme warmth. Those of the Five Hundred, irritated at having been banished, as it were, by those of the Ancients, naturally inquired what they purposed doing that day. "The government is decomposed," said they; "granted—we admit that it has need to be, that it must be, recomposed. Do you insist, instead of having incapable men, men of no renown, on placing in it imposing men? would you put Bonaparte into it?—though he is not of the required age, we again consent to it." These home questions embarrassed the Ancients. They were obliged to admit that something more was intended, that a plan was formed for overthrowing the constitution. Some of them made insinuations on this subject, but they were unfavourably received. The Ancients, alarmed on the preceding evening by what had passed at the commission of the inspectors, were quite shaken on seeing the resistance that manifested itself in the Five Hundred. From that moment the disposition of the legislative body appeared doubtful, and the plan of the Revolution was in great

* "The recommendation was a wise one, but Napoleon thought himself too strong to need any such precaution. 'I swore in the morning,' said he, 'to protect the national representation; I will not this evening violate my oath.'"—*Gourgaud*. E.

danger. Bonaparte was on horseback at the head of his troops. Sieyes and Ducos had a post-chaise and six horses in waiting* at the gate of St. Cloud. Many other persons, preparing, in case of check, to betake themselves to flight, had adopted the same precaution. Sieyes, nevertheless, displayed throughout this whole scene extraordinary coolness and presence of mind. It was feared lest Jourdan, Augereau, or Bernadotte, might come to address the troops. Orders were given to cut down the first person who should attempt to harangue them, no matter whether general or representative.

The sitting of the two Councils commenced at two o'clock. In the Ancients complaints were made by members who had not been summoned on the preceding day to attend the discussion on the decree of translation. These complaints were set aside. The Council then turned its attention to a message to the Five Hundred, to inform them that a majority of its members had met and were ready to deliberate. In the Five Hundred, the deliberation commenced in a different manner. Gaudin, who was commissioned by Sieyes and Bonaparte to open the discussion, having adverted to the dangers which threatened the republic, proposed two things: first, to thank the Ancients for having transferred the council to St. Cloud; and, secondly, to form a commission charged to make a report on the dangers of the republic and on the means of obviating those dangers. If this proposition had been adopted, there was a report already prepared, and the provisional consulship and the adjournment would then have been proposed. But no sooner had Gaudin finished speaking, than a tremendous shout burst forth in the assembly. From all quarters arose vehement shouts of "Down with the dictators!"—"No dictatorship!"—"The constitution for ever!"—"The constitution or death!" exclaimed Delbrel. "We are not afraid of bayonets; we are free here." These words were succeeded by fresh shouts. Some deputies eyeing Lucien, the president, furiously repeated, "No dictatorship! down with the dictators!" At these insulting cries, Lucien spoke. "I am too tenacious," said he, "of the dignity of president, to endure any longer the insolent menaces of certain speakers. I call them to order." Instead of quieting, this injunction only rendered them more furious. After a long uproar, Grand-Maison proposed to take the oath to the constitution of the year III. The motion was instantly adopted. A call of the assembly was also demanded. This too was adopted. Each deputy went in his turn to the tribune to take the oath, amidst the shouts and plaudits of all present. Lucien himself was obliged to quit the chair for the purpose of taking an oath tending to overthrow the plans of his brother.

Things were taking a dangerous turn. Instead of appointing a commission and listening to plans of reform, the Five Hundred took an oath to uphold what existed; and the wavering Ancients were ready to recede. The Revolution was likely to miscarry. The danger was imminent. Augereau, Jourdan, the influential patriots, were at St. Cloud, waiting for the favourable moment for bringing over the troops to their side. Bonaparte and Sieyes immediately agreed that it was high time to act, and to draw the wavering mass to their side. Bonaparte resolved to go to the two Councils at the head of his staff. He met Augereau, who said to him in a jeering tone, "There you are in a pretty plight!"—"Matters were in a much worse state at Arcole," replied Bonaparte, and away he went to the bar of the Ancients. He was not accustomed to public assemblies. To

speak for the first time in public is embarrassing, nay, even daunting, to the firmest minds, and under the most ordinary circumstances. Amidst such events, and to a man who had never appeared in any tribune, it could not fail to be much more difficult. Bonaparte, strongly agitated, addressed the Ancients in broken sentences, but in a loud voice. "Citizens representatives!" said he, "you are not in ordinary circumstances. You are on a volcano. Permit me to make some observations. You deemed the republic to be in danger—you transferred the legislative body to St. Cloud—you called me to carry your decrees into execution—I left my home to obey you: and already myself and my brave companions in arms are assailed by a thousand calumnies. People talk of a new Cromwell, of a new Cæsar. Citizens! had I aimed at such a part, it would have been easy for me to assume it on my return from Italy, in the moment of the most glorious triumph, and when the army and the parties invited me to seize it. I aspired not to it then, I aspire not to it now. It is the dangers of the country that have alone awakened my zeal and yours." Bonaparte then drew, still with a voice that betrayed his emotion, a picture of the dangerous situation of the republic, torn by all the parties, threatened with a new civil war in the West, and with an invasion in the South. "Let us," he added, "prevent all these calamities; let us save the two things for which we have made so many sacrifices—liberty and equality."—"Say something about the constitution too!" exclaimed Linglet, the deputy. This interruption disconcerted the general for a moment; but presently recovering himself, he replied in a tremulous voice; "Constitution! you have no constitution. You destroyed it yourselves by assaulting the national representation on the 18th of Fructidor; by annulling the popular elections on the 22d of Floreal; and by attacking the independence of the government on the 30th of Prairial. That constitution which you speak of all the parties are striving to destroy. They have all come to let me into the secret of their projects, and to make me offers to second them. I have refused. If I am required, I will name the parties and the men."—"Name them," cried the opponents, "name them; demand a secret committee." A long uproar succeeded this interruption. Bonaparte at length resumed, and recurring to the state in which France was placed, exhorted the Ancients to take such measures as were capable of saving her. "Surrounded," said he, "by my brethren in arms, I will second you. I call to witness those brave grenadiers whose bayonets I see, and whom I have so often led against the enemy—I call to witness their courage, we will assist you to save the country. And if any orator," added Bonaparte in a threatening tone, "if any orator, paid by foreigners, should talk of outlawing me, I would then appeal to my companions in arms. Recollect that I march accompanied by the god of fortune and by the god of war."*

* "All the speeches which have been subsequently passed off as having been delivered by Bonaparte on this occasion differ from each other; as well they may, for he delivered none, unless his confused answers to the president, which were alike devoid of dignity and sense, are to be called a speech. It is impossible to conceive anything more confused or worse delivered than the ambiguous and perplexed replies of Bonaparte. There was not the slightest connection in what he stammered out. He was no orator. Perceiving his embarrassment, I said in a low voice, pulling him gently by the coat-skirt, 'Withdraw, general, you know not what you are saying.' It is hard to tell what would have happened, if, on seeing him retire, the president had said, 'Grenadiers, let no one pass.' Probably, instead of sleeping next night at the Luxembourg, Bonaparte might have ended his career at the Place de la Révolution."—*Bourgeois*. E.

These daring words were a warning for the Five Hundred. The Ancients received them very favourably, and appeared to be won by the presence of the general. They granted him the honours of the sitting.

Bonaparte, after regaining the Ancients, resolved to go to the Five Hundred, and endeavour to overawe them. He advanced, followed by some grenadiers. He entered, but left them behind him at the extremity of the hall. He had to traverse nearly half the length of it to reach the bar. No sooner had he arrived there, than furious shouts burst forth from all quarters. "What!" cried a multitude of voices, "soldiers here! arms! What is the meaning of this? Down with the dictator! down with the tyrant!" A great number of deputies rushed to the middle of the hall, surrounded the general, and addressed to him the strongest expressions. "What!" said they, "is it for this that you have conquered? All your laurels are blasted. Your glory is changed into infamy. Respect the temple of the laws. Be gone, be gone!" Bonaparte was confounded amidst the crowd that thronged around him. The grenadiers whom he had left at the door hastened up, pushed back the deputies, and clasped him in their arms. It is said that in this tumult some of the grenadiers received dagger wounds, which were intended for him. One of the grenadiers, named Thomé, had his clothes torn. It is very possible that, in the tumult, his clothes may have been torn without there being any daggers in the case. It is possible too that there might have been daggers in more than one hand. Republicans, conceiving that they beheld a new Cæsar, might arm themselves with the steel of Brutus, without being assassins. It is a great weakness to justify them for so doing.* Be this as it may, Bonaparte was thrust out of the hall. It is said that he was agitated, which is not more surprising than the supposition of daggers. He mounted his horse, rode away to his troops, told them that an attempt had been made to assassinate him, that his life was in danger, and was everywhere greeted with shouts of *Bonaparte for ever!*

The storm meanwhile raged with greater violence than ever in the Assembly, and its fury was directed against Lucien. The latter displayed extraordinary firmness and courage. "Your brother is a tyrant," said some of the members to him; "in one day he has lost all his glory." Lucien strove in vain to justify him. "You would not listen to him," he replied. "He came to explain his conduct, to make you acquainted with his mission, and to answer all the questions that you have been incessantly addressing to him since you met. His services claimed at least that he should be allowed time to defend himself."—"No, no; down with the tyrant!" shouted the enraged patriots. "Outlaw him!" added they, "outlaw him!" This was an appalling word. Robespierre was undone by it. Pronounced against Bonaparte, it might make the troops waver and detach them from him. Lucien courageously opposed the proposition of outlawry, and insisted that his brother ought first to be heard. He struggled for a long time amidst a tremendous uproar. At length, taking off his cap and his toga, "Wretches!" he exclaimed, "would you force me to outlaw my own brother! I resign the chair, and I will go to the bar to defend him who is accused."

* "Though I did not accompany Bonaparte to the Council of Five Hundred, I do not hesitate to declare that all that has been said about assaults and poniards is pure invention"—*Bourrienne*. E.

At this moment Bonaparte heard outside the scene that was passing in the assembly. He was alarmed for his brother, and sent ten grenadiers to bring him out of the hall. The grenadiers entered, found Lucien encompassed by a group, laid hold of him by the arm, saying that it was by his brother's orders, and hurried him away. The moment had arrived for taking a decisive step. If there was any wavering, all would be lost. Rhetorical means for working upon the Assembly having become impracticable, no alternative was left but force. It was requisite to hazard one of those daring acts, before which usurpers always hesitate. Cæsar hesitated before he passed the Rubicon, Cromwell before he turned out the parliament. Bonaparte determined to march his grenadiers against the Assembly. He mounted his horse, with Lucien, and rode along the front of the troops. Lucien harangued them. "The Council of the Five Hundred is dissolved," said he; "it is I that tell you so. Assassins have taken possession of the hall of meeting, and have done violence to the majority; I summon you to march and to clear it of them." * Lucien afterwards swore that himself and his brother would be the faithful defenders of liberty. Murat and Leclerc then took a battalion of grenadiers, and conducted it to the door of the Five Hundred. They advanced to the entrance of the hall. At the sight of the bayonets, the deputies set up tremendous shouts, as they had done at the appearance of Bonaparte. But these shouts were drowned by the rolling of the drums. "Grenadiers, forward!" cried the officers. The grenadiers entered the hall, and dispersed the deputies, who fled, some by the passages, others by the windows. In a moment the hall was cleared, and Bonaparte was left master of this deplorable field of battle.

These tidings were carried to the Ancients, and filled them with alarm and regret. They had not wished for such a procedure. Lucien appeared at their bar. He came to justify his conduct in regard to the Five Hundred. The Assembly was content with his reasons, for, what could it do in such a situation? It was requisite to bring matters to a conclusion, and to accomplish the proposed object. The Council of the Ancients could not singly decree the adjournment of the legislative body and the institution of the consulship. The Council of the Five Hundred was dissolved; but there were still left about fifty deputies, partisans of the change. They were collected and made to pass the decree, the object of the revolution which had just been effected. The decree was then carried to the Ancients, who adopted it about midnight. Bonaparte, Roger Ducos, and Sieyès, were nominated provisional consuls, and invested with the whole executive power. The Councils were adjourned to the 1st of the following Ventose. They were replaced by two commissions of twenty-five members each, selected from the Councils, and appointed to approve such legislative measures as the three consuls should have occasion to take. The consuls and the commissions were charged to frame a new constitution.

* 'Notwithstanding the cries of "Vive Bonaparte!" which followed this harangue, the troops still hesitated. It was evident that they were not fully prepared to turn their swords against the national representation. Lucien then drew his sword, exclaiming, 'I swear that I will stab my own brother to the heart, if he ever attempt anything against the liberty of Frenchmen.' This dramatic action was perfectly successful. Hesitation vanished, and, at a signal given by Napoleon, Murat, at the head of his grenadiers, rushed into the hall, and drove out the representatives. Every one yielded to the reasoning of bayonets, and thus terminated the employment of the armed force on that memorable day.'—*Bourriens*. E

Such was the revolution of the 18th of Brumaire,* on which such opposite opinions are entertained, which is regarded by some as an outrage which annihilated our struggling liberty, by others as a daring but necessary act, that put an end to anarchy. What may justly be said of it is, that the Revolution, after assuming all the characters, monarchical, republican and democratic, at length took the military character, because, amidst that perpetual conflict with Europe, it was requisite that it should constitute itself in a strong and solid manner. The republicans deplore so many useless efforts, so much blood spilt to no purpose, in order to found liberty in France, and they are grieved to see it immolated by one of the heroes whom it had brought forth. But here the noblest of sentiments leads them into error. The Revolution, which was to give us liberty, and which has prepared everything for our enjoying it some day or other, was not itself, neither could it be, liberty. It was destined to be a great struggle against the old order of things. After conquering it in France, it was requisite that it should conquer it in Europe. But so violent a struggle admitted not of the forms or of the spirit of liberty. For a moment, and but a brief one, the country possessed liberty under the Constituent Assembly: but when the popular party became so menacing as to intimidate public opinion; when it stormed the Tuileries on the 10th of August; when, on the 2d of September, it sacrificed all those of whom it felt distrust; when, on the 21st of January, it forced every one to compromise himself with it by imbruing his hands in royal blood; when, in August, 1793, it obliged all the citizens to hasten to the frontiers, or to part with their property; when itself abdicated its power, and resigned it to that great committee of public welfare, composed of twelve individuals—was there, could there be, liberty? No; there was a violent effort of enthusiasm and heroism; there was the muscular tension of a wrestler engaged with a potent antagonist. After this moment of danger, after our victories, there was a moment of relaxation. The latter end of the Convention and the Directory exhibited moments of liberty. But the struggle with Europe could be only temporarily suspended. It soon recommenced, and, on the first reverse, all the parties rose against a too moderate government, and invoked a mighty arm. Bonaparte, returning from the East, was hailed as sovereign, and called to the supreme power. It is absurd to say that Zurich had saved France. Zurich was but an accident, a respite; it required a Marengo and a Hohenlinden to save her. It required something more than military successes. It required a powerful reorganization at home of all the departments of the government; and it was a political chief, rather than a military chief, whom France needed. The 18th and 19th of Brumaire were, therefore, necessary. All we can say is, that the 20th is to be condemned, and that the hero made a bad use of the service which he had just rendered. But we may be told that he came to perform a mysterious task, imposed, without his being aware of it, by Fate, of which he was the involuntary agent. It was not liberty that he came to continue, for that could not yet exist. He came to continue, under monarchical forms, the revolution in the world; he came to continue it, by seating himself, a plebeian, on a throne; by bringing the pontiff to Paris to anoint a plebeian brow with the sacred oil; by creating an aristocracy with plebeians; by obliging the old

* "Thus was consummated this last violation of law—this final blow against liberty; and from this day brute force commenced its dominion. On this disastrous day the Revolution expired!"—*Mignet*. E

aristocracies to associate themselves with his plebeian aristocracy; by making kings of plebeians; by taking to his bed the daughter of the Cæsars, and mingling plebeian blood with the blood of one of the oldest reigning families in Europe; by blending all nations; by introducing the French laws in Germany, in Italy, and in Spain; by dissolving so many spells; by mixing up together and confounding so many things. Such was the immense task which he came to perform; and meanwhile the new state of society was to consolidate itself under the protection of his sword; and Liberty was to follow some day. It has not yet come; it will come. I have described the first crisis which has prepared the elements for it in Europe; I have done it without animosity, pitying error, reverencing virtue, admiring greatness, striving to fathom the deep designs of Providence in these mighty events, and respecting, when I conceived that I had fathomed, them.

APPENDIX.

ORIGIN OF THE WAR IN LA VENDEE.

(From the Quarterly Review, Vol. 15.)

THE Bocage is an appellation of local fitness which has been disregarded in the political divisions of the country. Under the old monarchy it made part of Poitou, of Anjou, and of the Comté Nantais; under the revolutionary distribution, it lies in the four departments of the Lower Loire, the Maine and Loire, the two Sèvres, and La Vendée. The nature of the country, and the character and circumstances of the inhabitants, were alike peculiar; the whole surface consists of low hills and narrow valleys; scarcely a single eminence rises above the other sufficiently to give a commanding view, and there is no extent of level ground. These valleys are watered with innumerable brooklets flowing in different directions, some towards the Loire, some making their way to the sea, others winding till they reach the Plain, a slip of land on the south border of the Bocage, where they form small rivers.—Such is the general appearance of the country. Along the Sèvre towards Nantes it assumes a wilder character; farther east, towards the Loire, the valleys expand, and the declivities fall in wider sweeps. There are few forests, but the whole region has the woody appearance of a Flemish landscape. The inclosures are small, and always surrounded with quick hedges, in which trees stand thickly; these trees are pollarded every fifth year, a stem of twelve or fifteen feet being left standing. Only one great road, that from Nantes to Rochelle, traverses the country. Between this and the road from Tours to Bordeaux, by way of Poitiers, an interval of nearly one hundred miles, there are only cross-roads of the worst description. The byways are like those in Herefordshire, where the best account which a traveller hears is, that there is a good bottom when you come to it. They are narrow passes worn in a deep soil between high hedges, which sometimes meet over head; miry in the wet season, and rugged in summer; upon a descent, the way usually serves both for a road and the bed of a brook. One of these ways is like another; at the end of every field you come to a cross-road, and the inhabitants themselves are bewildered in this endless labyrinth if they go a few miles from their own home.

The Bocage includes about seven-ninths of the Vendean country. There are two other natural divisions; the Plain, which has already been slightly mentioned, and which took no direct part in the war; and the Marsh, or the sea coast, a tract intersected with innumerable ditches and canals, where the inhabitants bear all the external marks of sickness and misery: yet have they enjoyments of their own; and charms might be found in the region itself, were it not for its insalubrity. M. Berthre de Bournisieux, a Vendean, compares his native country to a vast body covered with arteries—but without a heart; without roads, without navigable rivers, without any means of exportation—it had no trade to stimulate, no centre to enliven, no cities to civilize it. The largest towns contained not more than from two to three thousand inhabitants: the villages were small and at wide intervals, and the country was divided into small farms, rarely any one exceeding six hundred francs in rent. The chief wealth was in cattle, and the landholders usually divided the produce with the tenant. A property which consisted of five-and-twenty or thirty such farms was thought considerable. There was therefore no odious inequality in La Vendée, and the lord and vassals were connected by ties which retained all that was good of the feudal system, while all that was evil had passed away. The French

writers lament the unimproved state of the people, their ignorance, their prejudices, and their superstitions; but nowhere in France were the peasantry more innocent or more contented, nowhere have they shown themselves capable of equal exertions and equal heroism. There was little pride among the gentry, and no ostentation; they dwelt more upon their estates than was usual in other provinces, and thus, for the most part, escaped the leprous infections of Paris. Their luxury lay in hospitality, and the chase was their sole amusement; in this the peasantry had their share. When the wolf, the boar, or the stag was to be hunted, the *curé* gave notice in the church, and the country turned out at the time and place appointed, every man with his gun, with the same alacrity and obedience which they afterwards displayed in war. On Sundays the peasantry danced in the court of the Chateau, and the ladies of the family joined them. The lords seem to have been their own stewards; they went about their farms, talked with their tenants, saw things with their own eyes, shared in the losses as well as the gains, attended at the weddings and drank with the guests. It was not possible that revolutionary principles could mislead a people thus circumstanced.

There are historical grounds for supposing that the Vendéans are descended from the Huns, Vandals, and Picts, who subdued the western parts of France; their form and complexion support this opinion, giving strong indications that they are neither of Gallic nor Frank descent. Perhaps nothing distinguishes them more from Frenchmen in general than their remarkable taciturnity, unless it be the purity of manners for which their countrymen extol them. Drunkenness is the sin which most easily besets them; worse vices are said to have been almost unknown to them before the civil wars, and the Vendéans in general were said to be good fathers, good sons, and good husbands. Few quarrels occurred among them, and no lawsuits; they had a wholesome proverb, that no saint had ever been a lawyer, and their disputes therefore were always referred and easily accommodated by friendly arbitration. Among their sports, there are two which seem deserving of notice. Commune would challenge commune to a trial of strength, like that which concludes the game of steal-clothes in the West of England—a line is drawn, an equal number of picked men lay hold of a long rope, and the party which pulls the other out of its own ground is victorious. The other sport is of an intellectual character. He who kills a pig usually invites his neighbours to a feast, which is called *les rilles*; after the supper, when their spirits are all raised by wine, some one of the company mounts the table and delivers a satirical sermon. *La manière de faire l'amour tient un peu dans ce pays de celle des chats*, says M. Bourniseaux. The men pinch the girls, untie their aprons, and steal kisses, for all which the girls box their ears in return. At marriages, the bridesmaids present the bride with a distaff and spindle, to remind her of her domestic duties; and with a branch of thorn, ornamented with ribbons and fruit or sweetmeats, emblematical of the sorrows as well as pleasures of the state which she is about to enter: at the same time a marriage song is sung; its tenor is that the season of joy and thoughtlessness is past, that the morning of life is gone by, that the noon is full of cares, and that as the day advances we must prepare for trouble and grief;—a mournful but wholesome lesson, which is seldom heard without tears. If the bride has an elder sister still in her state of spinsterhood, she is made to spin coarse flax; and if an elder brother of the bridegroom be unmarried, he has the severe task assigned him of making a fagot of thorns. The sports continue till all the wine is consumed.

The smaller landholders and the townsmen were on good terms with the nobles, but had not the same attachment to them as was felt by the peasantry. Among them the beginning of the Revolution was regarded with pleasure; the towns indeed were generally attached to the new principles, but the bond of good-will was not broken, and the Vendéans acquit their countrymen, who took part with the republic, of any share in the atrocities which were committed. In the Plain, some personal animosity was displayed during the first movement of 1789, and some chateaux were destroyed; this part of the country was much more civilized, and it may be presumed that vice had kept pace with civilization. But in the Bocage the people wished to remain as they were, believing that no change could improve a condition in which they enjoyed peace, plenty, security, and contentment. When the national guards were formed, the lord was called upon in every parish to take the command; when mayors were to be appointed, it was the lord who was everywhere chosen; and when orders were published to remove the seats of the lords from the churches, they were not obeyed in La Vendée. The peasantry had neither been stung by insults nor aggrieved by oppression; they regarded the lords as their friends and benefactors, and respect and gratitude are natural to the heart of uncorrupted man. The law which imposed a constitutional oath upon the clergy injured them more deeply; their priests were almost all born among them, they spoke the dialect as their mother tongue, they were bred up in the same habits, and the people were attached to them by every possible tie of respect and love. Even General Turreau

confesses that their lives were exemplary and their manners truly patriarchal,—*il faut en convenir, la plupart de ceux-ci menaient une vie exemplaire, et avaient conservé les mœurs patriarcales*. When, therefore, their pastors were superseded by men who had taken an oath which the Vendéans held in abhorrence, the churches were deserted, the new clergy were in some places insulted, in others driven away:—in a parish consisting of four thousand inhabitants, one of these men could not obtain fire to light the church tapers. Partial insurrections took place and blood was shed. A peasant of Bas Poitou resisted the *gendarmes* with a pitchfork; he had received two-and-twenty sabre strokes, when they cried to him, *Rends-toi!—Rendez-moi mon-Dieu!* was his reply, and he died as the words were uttered.

After the 10th of August, a persecution of the refractory priests began; and the peasants, like the Cameronians in Scotland, gathered together, arms in hand, to hear mass in the field, and die in defending their spiritual father. More than forty parishes assembled tumultuously; the national guards of the Plain routed this ill-armed and worse conducted crowd, and slew about a hundred in the field. Life and free pardon were offered to others if they would only cry *Vive la nation!* there were very few who would accept of life upon these terms: the greater number fell on their knees, not in supplication to man, but in prayer to Heaven, and offered themselves bravely to the stroke of death;—from man they requested no other favours than that a little earth might be thrown over their remains, to preserve them from the wolves and dogs.

The revolutionary writers insist that the war in La Vendée was the result of plans long existing, and ably concerted. General Turreau says, *il faut être bien ignorant ou de bien mauvaise foi, pour assigner une cause éventuelle et instantanée à la révolte du Bas Poitou*. General Turreau was the faithful servant of the Convention in its bloodiest days, and the faithful servant of Bonaparte after his return from Elba: he hated the old government, and he hated the Bourbons whatever government they might establish; but he never objected to the wildest excesses of revolutionary madness, nor to the heaviest yoke of imperial despotism. General Turreau, therefore, may be sincere in disbelieving that a sense of religion and loyalty could instantaneously rouse a brave and simple people to arms, because, never having felt either the one sentiment or the other, he is utterly ignorant of their nature and their strength. He supposes a conspiracy of the emigrants, the nobles, and the priests, fomented by foreign powers. M. Bournisieux, with more knowledge of the circumstances and the people, with more truth, with sounder philosophy, and with a better heart, ascribes the moving impulse to its real source. To expect, he says, that the nobles and clergy, insulted, injured, outraged, and plundered, as they were by the Revolution, should have embraced the Revolution, would be to know little of the human heart, *C'eût été demander à la philosophie un miracle, et l'on sait que la philosophie n'en fit jamais*. But he declares that, in the insurrection of La Vendée, the priests and nobles were, for the most part, forced to make common cause with the insurgents; that, with few exceptions, they did not come forward voluntarily to take the lead; that, having taken arms, they exerted themselves strenuously, but that, when terms of pacification were proposed, they were the first to submit, and the peasantry were the last. That the peasants should thus have acted, he says, may well astonish posterity; for they derived nothing but benefit from the Revolution, which delivered them from the payment of tithes, and from the feudal grievances. Thus, however, it was; in Jacobinical phrase, they were not ripe for the Revolution; which is, being interpreted, they loved their king and their God, their morals were uncorrupt, their piety was sincere and fervent, their sense of duty towards God and man unshaken. Hitherto what tumults had broken out had been partial, and provoked merely by local vexations, chiefly respecting the priests; but when the Convention called for a conscription of three hundred thousand men, a measure which would have forced their sons to fight for a cause which they abhorred, one feeling of indignation rose through the whole country, and the insurrection through all La Vendée broke forth simultaneously and without concert or plan. The same principle which made them take arms made them look to their own gentry for leaders; the opportunity was favourable; nor can it now be doubted, that if the Bourbon princes and the allied powers had known how to profit by the numerous opportunities offered them in these western provinces, the monarchical might long since have been restored.

The 10th of March, 1793, was the day appointed for drawing the conscription at St Florent, in Anjou, upon the banks of the Loire. The young men assembled with a determination not to submit to it; after exhorting them in vain, the republican commander brought out a piece of cannon to intimidate them, and fired upon them; they got possession of the gun, routed the *gendarmes*, burnt the papers, and, after passing the rest of the day in rejoicing, returned to grow sober, and contemplate upon the vengeance which would follow them. One of the most respectable peasants in this part of the country was a wool-dealer of the village of Pin en Mauges, by name Jaques Catho-

lineau. About twenty young men promised to follow wherever he would lead; he was greatly beloved and respected in his neighbourhood, being a man of quiet manners, great piety, and strong natural talents. They rang the tocsin in the village of Poitevinère: their numbers soon amounted to about a hundred, and they determined to attack a party of about eighty republicans, who were posted at Jallars with a piece of cannon. On the way they gathered more force; they carried the post, took some horses and prisoners, and got possession of the gun, which they named *Le Missionnaire*. Encouraged by this success, which also increased their numbers, they attacked two hundred republicans the same day at Chemillé, with three pieces of artillery, and they met with the same success. At the same time, a young man, by name Foret, in the same part of the country, killed a gendarme who sought to arrest him, ran to the church, rang the tocsin, and raised a second body of insurgents. A third was raised in like manner by Stofflet, a man who had served sixteen years as a soldier, and was at that time gamekeeper to the Marquis de Maulevrier. On the 16th of March both these troops joined Cathelineau; they marched that very day upon Chollet, the most important town in that part of the country, garrisoned by five hundred soldiers. These also fell into their power, and they found there arms, ammunition, and money. Easter was at hand; and the insurgents, thinking they had done enough to make themselves feared, thought they might keep the holidays as usual; they dispersed every man to his own house; and a republican column from Angers traversed the country without meeting with the slightest resistance, and also without committing the slightest act of violence—a moderation which M. de la Roche Jaquelein ascribes to fear. When the holidays were over, the insurgents appeared again; success had given them confidence in their strength; and, looking forward with hope of some important results from the devoted spirit of loyalty which they felt in themselves, and which they well knew pervaded the country, they called for the gentry of the country to lead them on.

There was more discipline in a feudal army, or among a troop of guerrillas, than among the Vendéans. The men could not be induced to form a patrol, or act as sentinels,—these were charges which they would not undertake for any reward, and when it was necessary, the officers were obliged to perform this duty themselves. To this defect in their system some of their most ruinous defeats must be ascribed. When the army was assembled, and different columns were to be formed to march against the different points of attack, the manner of forming them was singular, and not without its advantage. Notice was given, M. Roche Jaquelein is going by such a road; who will follow him? M. Cathelineau goes in yonder direction; who follows him? The men were thus allowed to follow their favourite leader, with no other restriction than that when a sufficient number had volunteered, no more were allowed to join. A system of tactics had been formed perfectly adapted to the nature of the troops and of the country. We have heard much of the improvements made by the French republicans in the art of war, and of the advantages which their armies derived when the field was once left open to merit, and men rose from the ranks to the highest military rank. These things imposed upon the English people too long. In La Vendée it is perfectly certain that generals were employed by the government who had no other claim to promotion than their brutality, and their services amongst mobs or in the clubs of the metropolis; among the royalists they were first selected from old feelings of hereditary respect, but intellect immediately rose to its level, and even before any feelings of selfishness, or ambition, or vanity, mingled with and defaced the principle which first roused them to arms. Stofflet and Cathelineau were attended to in the council with as much deference, and obeyed in the field with as much readiness as Lescure and Roche Jaquelein. The first principle of the Vendéans was always to be assailants, to fight only when they pleased and where they pleased; and, inasmuch as they observed this principle, they always fought to advantage. When they reached the point of attack, the companies were formed in the same manner as the column, every man following the captain whom he preferred. Their usual order of battle, according to General Turreau, was in a crescent, with the wings *en flèche*, composed of the best marksmen, men who never fired a shot without taking a steady aim, and who never, at ordinary distances, failed in their mark: their skill in the use of fire-arms was such, that he says no military people, however trained, however skilful, could compare with the hunters and sportsmen of Loroux and the Bocage as musketeers. But order of battle was what they seldom thought of; and their tactics are more clearly explained by the marchioness who understood them better from the conversation of her husband and her friends, than General Turreau did from his defeats or his victories. Their whole tactics, he says, consisted in creeping behind the hedges and surrounding the enemy, which the nature of the country easily enabled them to do: then they poured in, on all sides, a murderous fire; not in platoons, but every man as fast as he could load, and make sure of his victim, loading with four or five balls, and firing point blank against

men in close ranks. The moment that the Blues appeared confused, or offered opportunity, they set up their dreadful yell, and sprang upon them like bloodhounds in pursuit. Men of the greatest strength and agility had it in charge to seize the artillery, to prevent it, as they said, from doing mischief. "You, sir, you are a strong fellow; leap upon the cannon." Sometimes with no better weapon than a stake pointed with iron, the peasants would do this, and drive the enemy from their guns. If the attack was made in a more open country, they accelerated the decisive movement, and rushed at once upon the cannon, falling upon the ground when they saw the flash, rising instantly and running towards them. But they preferred the cover in which, from their manner of firing, they were sure of killing five for one. Their officers never thought of saying, to the right or the left; they pointed out some visible object, a house or a tree.

Before they began the battle they said their prayer, and almost every man crossed himself before he fired his piece. Meantime, as soon as the firing was heard, the women and children, and all who remained in the villages, ran to the church to pray for the victory; and they who happened to be working a field fell on their knees there under the canopy of heaven, and called upon the God of Hosts to protect those who were fighting for his altars, and for his holy name. Throughout all La Vendée, says the marchioness, there was but one thought and one supplication at one time. Every one awaited in prayer the event of a battle upon which the fate of all seemed to depend. Turreau speaks with horror of the effect of such a system, and calls upon those officers who had served upon the frontiers, before they were sent into these departments, to say if the Austrians, or the disciplined troops of old Frederick, were as terrible in action, or possessed as much address, stratagem, and audacity, as the peasants of the Bocage; to say if it were possible that any war could be more cruel and more fatiguing for soldiers of all sorts; and if they would not rather make a year's campaign upon the frontiers than serve a single month in La Vendée. "You are crushed," says he, "before you have time to reconnoitre, under a mass of fire, with which the effect of our ranks is not to be compared. If you withstand their violent attack, they rarely dispute the victory, but you derive little fruit from it: it is scarcely ever that cavalry can be employed in pursuit; they disperse, and escape from you over fields and hedges, through woods and thickets, knowing every path, gap, gorge, and defile, every obstacle which may impede their flight, and every means of avoiding them." Home they went, out of breath, but not out of heart, ready and eager for the next summons, and crying, *Vive le Roi! quand même* . . . But, inasmuch as their flight was easy, retreat for the republicans became murderous. Lost among the labyrinthine roads of the Bocage, they fell in small parties into the hands of the villagers, who made sure, in the retreat, of all stragglers. The pursuit was terrible; the conquerors knew the ground; they understood where and how to intercept the fugitives; they could load as they ran, and keep up as quick a fire in the chase as in the battle. The benefit which the republicans derived, from five or six victories, were not equal to the evils which they endured in one defeat. "Dead bodies," says Turreau, "were all the spoils of the field: neither arms nor ammunition were ever taken; if the Vendean was pursued, he had his musket, and when in danger of being taken, he broke it; but the raw levies, whom the Convention at first sent against them, threw away their arms and incumbrances as soon as they took panic; and, if only two or three hundred men were left upon the field, the royalists gathered up twelve or fifteen hundred muskets."

If there be one thing more honourable to the Vendéans than another in this memorable contest, it is that the republicans never could establish a system of espionage among them; whenever they attempted to employ one of the natives as a spy, the man either trifled with them or betrayed them. And this Turreau gives as one reason for laying waste the country with fire and sword, and exterminating the people:—but of this hereafter. Their zeal was carried to the utmost height; even this general, the agent of Robespierre and Bonaparte, compares it to that with which the crusaders were animated, and says that the defenders of the throne and the Altar seemed to have taken the *Preux* of the days of chivalry for their models. They went to battle, he says, as to a festival;—women and old men, and priests and children exciting and partaking the rage of the soldiers;—he had himself seen boys of twelve years old slain in the ranks; and he may be believed, for M. de Puisaye affirms that Boisguay, who commanded a division of three thousand men among the Chouans, was but fifteen. M. Berthre de Bourniseaux denies the stories which are related of their superstition and gross credulity; yet there are passages in the marchioness's Memoirs which clearly show their proneness to superstition; and surely the cause in which they were engaged, the perpetual danger in which they lived, and the horrors which were continually before their eyes, were likely to inflame their imaginations. It is said that some of the priests promised them a miracle, and declared that all who were killed by the enemy in the cause of the holy church, should rise again from the dead on the third day. It is

added that many women kept the bodies of their husbands and their sons unburied, in expectation of this resurrection; and a yet wilder tale is told by Prudhomme, which some German poet, whose imagination revolts at no conceivable horror, might think a fit subject to be clothed in verse. A girl, who had heard and believed this opinion, suddenly remembered it as she was watching by the death-bed of her lover. It occurred to her how happy it would be for both, if he could be made a partaker of this resurrection: he was too weak to leave his bed—oh that the Blues might find him there, and give him his crown of martyrdom! Some republican troops entered the village; she fired at them from the window, and escaped by a back door into the woods. They broke open the doors and murdered the dying man. After some hours she returned; her first design had been accomplished; and she closed the door carefully. The second day she placed provisions by the bedside; the third day came and called him; and clung still to the hope of seeing him revive, till the fourth morning, when she could no longer resist the painful evidence of her senses.

This was a case of individual madness, the effect of love, grief, credulity, and insane hope. From such cases no general inferences can be drawn; but that the Vendéans were generally under the influence of strong religious enthusiasm is certain. Man, who is by nature religious, always becomes superstitious in proportion as he is ignorant or ill-instructed; and times of public calamity are always times of fanaticism. But however exalted the imaginations of this brave people may have been, and however extravagant their expectations of the visible interference of Heaven, their earthly desires, if the monarchy should by their efforts be restored, indicate equal moderation and nobleness of mind. First they would have asked that the whole of the Bocage, which now made part of three provinces, should be formed into a separate province, under the name of La Vendée, a name which they now regarded with becoming pride; they would have entreated the King that he would be pleased once to honour it with his presence; that a corps of Vendéans might form part of his body-guards; and that in memory of the war the white flag might always be hoisted upon the towers of all their churches. They desired no diminution of imposts, no exemption from military services, no peculiar privileges, but they would have solicited that some former plans for opening roads and rendering their streams navigable might be effected. Such was the recompense which the Vendéans would have asked if they had succeeded in overthrowing the Jacobine tyranny, and placing the innocent dauphin upon the throne of his murdered father. Shame be to the Bourbons if it be not accorded them now!

ILLUSTRATIONS.

The subjoined character of Robespierre gives us a better idea of his personal peculiarities, than any with which the revolutionary historians have furnished us.

DIED, 28th July, 1794, at Paris, aged 35, under the guillotine (with nearly seventy of his party, members of the Convention), Maximilian Robespierre. This emulator of Cromwell was short in stature, being only five feet two or three inches in height. His step was firm, and his quick pace in walking announced great activity. By a kind of contraction of the nerves, he used often to fold and compress his hands in each other; and spasmodic contractions were perceived in his shoulders and neck, the latter of which he moved convulsively from side to side. In his dress he was neat and even elegant, never failing to have his hair in the best order. His features had nothing remarkable about them, unless that their general aspect was somewhat forbidding; his complexion was livid and bilious; his eyes dull and sunk in their sockets. The constant blinking of the eyelids seemed to arise from convulsive agitation; and he was never without a remedy in his pocket. He could soften his voice, which was naturally harsh and croaking, and could give grace to his provincial accent. It was remarked of him that he could never look a man full in the face. He was master of the talent of declamation; and as a public speaker was not amiss at composition. In his harangues, he was extremely fond of the figure called *antithesis*; but failed, whenever he attempted irony. His diction was at times harsh, at others harmoniously modulated, frequently brilliant, but often trite, and was constantly blended with common-place digressions on virtue, crimes, and conspiracies. Even when prepared, he was but an indifferent orator. His logic was often replete with sophisms and subtleties; but he was in general sterile of ideas, with but a very limited scope of thought, as is almost always the case with those who are too much taken up with themselves. Pride formed the basis of his character; and he had a great thirst for literary, but a still greater for political, fame. He spoke with contempt of Mr. Pitt; and yet, above Mr. Pitt, he could see nobody unless himself. The reproaches of the English journalists were a high treat to his vanity:—whenever he denounced them his accent and expression betrayed how much his self-love was flattered. It was delightful to him to hear the French armies named the “armies of Robespierre;” and he was charmed with being included in the list of tyrants. Daring and cowardly at the same time, he threw a veil over his manœuvres, and was often imprudent in pointing out his victims. If one of the representatives made a motion which displeased him, he suddenly turned round towards him, with a menacing aspect, for some minutes. Weak and revengeful, sober and sensual, chaste by temperament, and a libertine by the effect of the imagination, he was fond of attracting the notice of the women, and had them imprisoned, for the sole pleasure of restoring them their liberty. He made them shed tears, in order to wipe them from their cheeks. In practising his delusions it was his particular aim to act on tender and weak minds. He spared the priests, because they could forward his plans; and the superstitious and devotees, because he could convert them into instruments to favour his power. His style and expression were in a manner mystical; and, next to pride, subtlety was the most marked feature of his character. He was surrounded by those only whose conduct had been highly criminal, because he could, with one word, deliver them over to the punishment of the law. He at once protected and terrified a part of the Convention. He converted crimes into errors, and errors into crimes. He dreaded even the shades of the martyrs of liberty, whose influence he weakened by substituting his own. He was so extremely suspicious and so distrustful, that he could have found it in his heart to guillotine the dead themselves. To enter into a strict analysis of his character, Robespierre, born without genius, could not create circumstances, but profited by them with address. To the profound hypocrisy of Cromwell he joined the cruelty of Sylla without possessing any of the great military and political qualities of either of these

ambitious adventurers. His pride and his ambition far above his means exposed him to ridicule. To observe the emphasis, with which he boasted of having proclaimed the existence of the Supreme Being, one might have said, that, according to his opinion, God would not have existed without him. When, on the night of the 27th of July, he found himself abandoned by his friends, he discharged a pistol in his mouth, and, at the same time, a gendarme wounded him by the discharge of another. Robespierre fell bathed in blood; and a *sans-culotte*, approaching him, pronounced these words in his ear: "There is a Supreme Being!" Previously to his execution, the bandage being taken off his head, his jaw fell down, in consequence of the wound which he had given himself.*

It is generally supposed that he attempted to shoot himself by discharging a pistol into his mouth, which, however, only fractured the lower left jaw, and left it hanging down by the flesh and ligaments; but a field officer in the French army, of the name of Meda, subsequently claimed the honour of having fired this shot; and he supported his assertion by some plausible facts. Meda—who afterwards rose to be a colonel, and was killed in that rank at the battle of Moskwa—was at this period of the age of eighteen or nineteen, and a private gendarme: as such he accompanied Leonard Bourdon in his attack on the Robespierrians in the Maison de Ville, and showed so much firmness and courage, that when Bourdon returned to the Convention, to give an account of his success, he brought Meda with him, placed him by his side in the tribune, stated that he had with his own hand *frappe* (literally *struck*, but it probably means *wounded or killed*) two of the conspirators, and obtained for him the honours of the sitting, honourable mention in the *procès verbal*, and a promise of military promotion. The next day there appears an order of the Convention to deliver to Meda a pistol which had been placed on the bar the day before. All this the *procès verbal* of the sittings and the report in the *Moniteur* record. But, on the other hand, it is not stated that *one* of the two struck by Meda was Robespierre. On the contrary, Bourdon says, that Meda *disarmed* him of a knife, but does not say that he either *struck or shot him*—a circumstance so transcendently important, that Bourdon could have hardly omitted to state it, had it been so. Nor is it said that the pistol delivered to Meda was his own, nor that it was the pistol by which Robespierre was wounded; nor is any reason given why he should have shot Robespierre, whom, if his own account be correct, he might have taken alive. Meda, there can be no doubt, accompanied Bourdon (Bourdon says that he *never quitted him*), and distinguished himself generally; but neither in the *procès verbal*, nor in the *Moniteur*, is there any evidence of his having shot Robespierre; and his own statement is somewhat at variance with Bourdon's, and not very intelligible as to the position in which the alleged shot was fired. This would of itself excite some doubts, but these doubts are much strengthened by the following facts: 1. Barrère, in the official report, (made, not like Bourdon's, verbally, in the hurry and agitation of the moment, but on the third day, and after the collection and examination of all the facts,) states distinctly that Robespierre clumsily wounded himself: 2. The surgeon who dressed the wound made a technical and official report, that it must have been inflicted by the patient himself; and, 3. It is stated, that, as the poor wretch lay mangled on a table at the Hotel de Ville, he supported his broken jaw, and endeavoured to absorb the blood with a *woollen pistol-bag*, which he had in his left hand. This trifling circumstance, which could hardly have been invented, strongly corroborates the reports of Barrère and the surgeon, and the general opinion. We suppose the truth to have been, that Robespierre drew his pistol from the woollen bag, which he held in his left hand, and on the approach of the gendarmes shot himself with the right, and fell—that Meda picked up the pistol and carried it to the Convention, which next day restored it to him as a trophy to which he had the best right. This conjecture seems to reconcile all the facts and all the statements, except only the *tardy* assertion of Meda himself — *Quarterly Review*.

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